“Clean and White” Revisited: What Zimring Teaches Us About Environmental Racism Today

28 January 2021 – by Aubrey Calaway

When President Donald Trump issued a tirade of tweets berating late Maryland congressman and civil rights advocate Elijah Cummings, the media and public were quick to condemn the remarks.

Some cited Carl A. Zimring’s Clean and White: A History of Environmental Racism in the United States in order to explain the racist roots of lodging those specific criticisms against a majority-Black city. Zimring’s book, widely released the same year that Donald Trump was elected, provides an incisive look at how whiteness, waste, and sanitation have been entangled since the emergence of the United States (US). Now, after four years of the Trump presidency and the deaths of over 400,000 Americans due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is arguable that Clean and White offers critical new insight into the current crisis. How might the same legacy of environmental racism in those tweets be at play in the politics of the pandemic?

Environmental Fear-Mongering

When Trump and right-wing pundits call COVID-19 the “Chinese virus”, but make sure to describe the new variant of the virus as “first identified in Britain,” this is not simply the result of differing international relations. Throughout his administration, Trump has evoked fears of foreign filth as a way to pander to white nativism.

In doing so, Trump preyed on the same underlying anxieties about environmental hygiene and sexual pollution that Zimring argues have been stoked since the mid-19th century. He writes that “during the [Civil] war, fear of germs and fear of social order without slavery produced fears that would endure and intertwine”. The early 20th century influx of immigrants and Black southerners to northern cities, Zimring explains, would demand new methods for whites to uphold both racial purity and superiority, two mutually supporting ideas. The sanitary maintenance of these growing industrial cities was just the ticket.

As Zimring shows, non-white citizens have long been over-represented in “dirty” jobs like laundry, waste hauling, and scrap recycling. Jewish immigrants, once barred the white middle-class, were able to “ascend” the racial hierarchy by moving from scrap-scavengers to junkyard managers. Black, Asian, and Latinx residents were, as a result of restricted economic mobility and the supposed biological impurity of their skin color, kept tied to waste. Ideas of “who would deserve to be clean and who should do the cleaning” that were codified in the 1850s were solidified within the 20th century urban order.

A Dirty Legacy

Cleanliness in the years 2020 and 2021 has taken on new meaning, but the costs to non-white communities fall in line with the history that Zimring lays out. Immigrants and non-white communities are overly represented among essential, frontline workers, and fewer than 1 in 5 Black workers are able to telework. One Harvard study found that healthcare workers of color were more likely to care for patients with COVID-19, to report using inadequate or reused protective gear, and nearly twice as likely as white colleagues to test positive for the coronavirus. As non-white nurses, bus drivers, warehouse workers, and cleaning service people continue to be exposed to COVID-19 at dramatic rates, we see the contagious new consequences of centuries-old environmental racism.

But understanding America’s history of environmental racism is not just about survival. It is also about resistance. Despite record-breaking numbers of protesters at Black Lives Matter protests this past summer, high rates of mask wearing and social distancing led to no noticeable increases in COVID 19 cases. While it is too early to tell whether the Capitol riot will prove to have been a ‘superspreader’ event, images of the dense, maskless, and overwhelmingly white crowds demand a new look at how race and hygiene are once again colliding. As Zimring highlights, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated after delivering his “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” speech in support of the Memphis Sanitation Workers’ Strike. The political entanglement of masks, “dirty things” and racial justice is not one of happenstance. It is simply the newest iteration of a history of struggle.  

Looking to the future

Almost fourteen years ago to the day, then senator Joe Biden filed the paperwork to launch his bid for president of the United States. Later that afternoon, speaking in reference to fellow candidate senator Barack Obama, Biden remarked: “I mean, you got the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy.”

Clean and White sifts through the dirt and grime of 244 years of American history to prove that understandings of race – and the perpetuation of racism – have always been about who has been deemed to be “clean,” and who has not. As the COVID-19 pandemic rages on and Joe Biden steps up to replace Donald Trump as president, the legacy of environmental racism and hygiene in the United States is more pressing than ever. Whether Joe Biden and white Americans will pay attention remains to be seen.

This book review was published as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.


Aubrey Calaway is writer and researcher who has investigated issues of climate change, human trafficking, and community resilience. She currently works as a research fellow at Human Trafficking Search.

The Inequality of Climate Change

brown tree on dried ground at daytime

26 January 2021 – By Veronica Rotman

It is undeniable that the effects of climate change disproportionately impact the poor. Climate change interferes with the full exercise of multiple fundamental human rights—like the rights to health, water, food, and housing—through its adverse effects on ecosystems, natural resources, and physical infrastructure.

Since the evolution of Homo sapiens, the earth’s dynamic climate has played a pivotal role in the accumulation, distribution, and preservation of natural resources and wealth. In order to survive and develop, societies have had to constantly adjust behaviours to the climate. Adaptability determines humanity’s ability to cope and recover from events. The largest distinction in adaptation strategies lies between developing and developed countries. 

According to the Global Climate Risk Index, eight of the ten countries most affected by extreme weather events from 1998 to 2017 were developing nations. These countries are vulnerable not just to frequency of events but also in their limited capacity to deal with impact. With an increase in intensity and duration of adverse weather events, time and resources available to rebuild will decrease. The impacts of climate change, however, far exceed these broad terms. Effective public health infrastructure underpins the social and economic development, and climate change starkly affects water and sanitation, prevalence of disease, food availability, population growth, and migration. 

Water and Sanitation

Over two billion people are dependent on drinking water contaminated with faeces. Water availability and sanitation is an existing issue that will intensify quickly with an increase in the global temperature. Access to reliable sources of drinking water is a fundamental human right entwined in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to a standard of living adequate for health and wellbeing. However, this basic need is not met in many parts of the world. Contaminated water can transmit a myriad of diseases, like polio, typhoid, cholera, and dysentery as well as more-familiar diarrhoea—an illness that is laughed off in the West but causes 485,000 deaths per year in developing countries due to contaminated water. As rainfall and temperature change over time, the provision of clean water, adequate sanitation, and drainage will become even more strained.

Although rainfall is projected to increase in the moist tropic regions and higher latitudes, it is forecasted to decrease in middle latitudes and semi-arid low latitudes. In the regions experiencing reduced rainfall, river levels will drop and warmer temperatures will degrade water quality as dilution of unfavourable contaminants decreases, oxygen dissolves at a slower rate, and micro-bacteria become more active. Climate change exacerbates conditions in already drought-stricken regions, reducing access to clean water and generating drier conditions that strain agriculture and lead to more wildfires. 

Disease

The effect of climate change on global disease patterns will intensify existing vulnerabilities across the world. Transmission rate and spread of rodent-borne and vector-borne diseases is expected to increase with the temperature—for example, experts have seen the rate at which pathogens mature and replicate within mosquitos accelerates with temperature. Insect population density and bite frequency also rises. A study by the University of Princeton found that mosquito abundance increases 30 – 100% with every 0.5 degree increase in temperature in the East African Highlands. According to the World Health Organization, over 405,000 people die of malaria annually with the vast majority (>97%) of deaths occurring in developing countries of Africa and Southeast Asia. As habitat distribution of mosquitos changes with the climate, human populations with little or no immunity to infections may be at risk, finding themselves in new transmission zones. 

The human right to the “highest attainable standard of health” is implicated by climate change through increased spread of disease and the resulting decreased capacity of health care facilities to cope. This will disproportionately impact the poor through access to quality healthcare, both cost and availability. Malaria can be prevented through spraying DDT, using mosquito nets, taking medications, and through education surrounding stagnant water sources near the dwelling. Malaria can be treated, but most of these solutions are not available to developing countries. 

Food Insecurity will Grow With Climate Change

The Climate and Food Vulnerability Index found that the ten most food-insecure countries in the world generate under half a tonne of CO2 per person—collectively 0.08% of total emissions. Crops, forestry, livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture will all be affected by rising temperatures, changes in precipitation regimes, and increased concentrations of CO2. This includes changing patterns of plant and livestock disease, affecting crop yields and agricultural production. Increased frequency of extreme weather events will destroy crops; flooding and rising sea levels will contaminate fresh water sources and agricultural land or cause salinisation and the elimination of nursery areas for fish. 

Regions where subsistence farmers, Indigenous people, and coastal communities undertake small-scale food production are particularly vulnerable. This is often due to lack of access to optimal land, adequate agricultural inputs, and access to trade. Approximately three-and-a-half million annual deaths of mothers and young children can be attributed to malnutrition, low birth weights, and non optimal breast-feeding. Growth stunting due to chronic undernutrition affects one in every three children under five-years-old born in developing countries.

It is likely that some agricultural regions will benefit in productivity with the warming climate, but this is almost entirely in high-latitude developed countries that do not already have large proportions of malnutrition. The impacts of climate change on food security and malnutrition are expected to be colossal. Access to food has been recognised as a fundamental human right, and climate change can threaten this through availability, accessibility, adequacy, and sustainability of food—all elements that are already reduced in developing nations. 

Migration and Resulting Conflict

Population growth is occurring in conjunction with climate change, intensifying established issues with shelter, water, and food insecurity. With more environments becoming flooded, arid, or inhospitable, large-scale population migration is likely. The UN projects that global populations will reach 9.8 billion by 2050, with roughly 83 million new additions per year. The majority of this increase can be attributed to a small number of countries. It is expected that by 2050, half of the world’s population will reside in India, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States, Indonesia, and Uganda. Eight out of nine of these are Global South nations. Most developed countries are predicted to stay in similar numbers and would even decline slightly if not for the expected migration from developing countries. 

Drought increases and desertification of arid environments will cause population migration into urban areas from drought-hit, rural areas. Sea levels are rising as a result of both ice-cap melt and oceanic thermal expansion associated with climate change and will be a prominent driver of large-scale population displacement all around the world.  

Impacts will be felt most severely in densely-populated, low-lying river deltas including the river delta of Bangladesh. The IPCC reports that nearly one million people will have to migrate by 2050, growing to over two million by 2100 due to sea level rise. 

For some countries it is quite simple: elevate or relocate. But both of these solutions bring a myriad of problems, especially on a large scale.  

Responsibility of Developed Nations

The wealthy countries of China, the United States, and the European Union are the world’s top emitters of fossil fuels and contribute over half of global emissions. The reality is the countries that will suffer most gravely are those that have contributed least to the problem. These top emitters contribute 14 times the emissions of the bottom 100 countries. Without substantial action from these countries, the world will struggle to tackle climate change. Questions must be raised about international justice and the violation of human rights. 

The disproportionate responsibility of climate change across the world must be represented at an international political level. And the pressure must be put on those key players.  This is the focus of some UN initiatives including the Paris agreement and Sustainable Development Goals. Industrialised, wealthy nations are not spared the effects of climate change. On the contrary, climate change exacerbates inequities here as well. Ultimately, climate change gives Western nations a heavy hunch of responsibility. We have the resources, science, and technology to change the trajectory; the Global South often does often not. 

Corporate responsibility must also be addressed. Worldwide, 100 fossil fuel corporations are responsible for 71% of all industrial emissions. Even if corporations agree to emissions reduction targets, they often fail to include the emissions associated with the entire life cycle of products—from upstream emissions associated with extraction, production, and processing to the downstream emissions of product use and disposal. Some companies will only include emissions associated with their own facilities, which can be an extremely small proportion of the total. The devil is in the details. It should be a requirement for all corporations to accurately measure emissions and report them with full transparency. These should be reviewed externally and held to accord in emission reduction targets.

Individual actions are important for the climate movement, but corporations have the ability to influence consumer habits, drive policy change, and respond quickly and boldly to the climate crisis. We must hold them accountable.

At this stage in time, industrialised nations are demanding developing countries spend their scarce resources on adaptation and coping strategies to survive. These resources should be spent dealing with existing problems, not those exacerbated by climate change. Aotearoa, as one example, must step up to put pressure on corporations as well as other developed nations to do the same. The Zero Carbon Act was a significant step in Aotearoa, accounting for a climate commission, periodic risk assessments, and national adaptation plans; however, it fails to make the unequivocal link between climate change and human rights—a valuable tool that could escalate action. We have set emission reduction targets, we have raised expectations, but it is still not reflected in a demonstrable, measurable reduction of CO2.  

Measurable progress speaks louder than targets, and emissions must be reduced to net zero. Only then will we gain the respect and leverage necessary to encourage significant action in other Western countries. Empathy is an innate human attribute, and if we could prevent the incomprehensible suffering of millions, would we not? Those in developed nations will still find that climate change will cause disruption and discomfort, at best; but the poor will suffer gravely. 

This article was originally published by Human Rights Pulse on 22 January 2021 as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.


Veronica is a marine scientist with interests in the interrelationship between human rights, climate change and the environment.

Book Review of “As Long as Grass Grows: The Indigenous Fight for Environmental Justice, from Colonisation to Standing Rock” by Dina Gilio-Whitaker

19 January 2021 – by Ella Kiyomi Dobson

I use the terms Native and Indigenous interchangeably throughout this book review. These terms refer to the Indigenous communities across the United States whose land was stolen during European colonisation of the Americas. I am eternally grateful to be living and studying on Abenaki Land.

Dina Gilio-Whitaker, of the Colville Confederate Tribes, creates a compelling narrative centred upon the environmental justice of the centuries-long Indigenous fight against the United States’ (US) cultural and legal systems. Systems that, to this day, are deep-seated in white supremacist and settler-colonial frameworks of oppression. The author provides a range of case studies surrounding more contemporary environmental justice issues such as the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) and extractive development expansion, to the industrial revolution’s impact on environmental and cultural degradation. An underpinning theme is the paradigm shift required within environmental justice; away from one “defined by norms of distributive justice within a capitalist framework” (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019, pp. 12), to one that “can accommodate the full weight of the history of settler colonialism…and embrace differences in the ways Indigenous peoples view land and nature” (pp.12). She argues that the eradication of Indigenous worldviews through the imposition of dominant Christian settler-colonial ideas still permeates today, and that a deeper understanding of the Indigenous worldview that “there is no separation between people and land, between people and other life forms, or between people and their ancient ancestors” (pp. 138) would pave the way for freedom from environmental harms and injustices for Indigenous communities.

Legal frameworks should protect people, their health and wellbeing, and that of the environment. However, Gilio-Whitaker highlights that the US legal system is embedded in settler-colonial understandings of Indigenous cultures, which continues to cause harm. The first example of this is the Obama administration’s endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (pp.32). Whilst sanctioning for Indigenous peoples’ rights, the government’s “dictatorial and colonial” (pp. 33) approach functions like a backhanded compliment. It claims to support “rights to Indigenous self-determination” (pp. 32), but drowns the document in disclaimers, which shows the lengths to which administrations are willing to go in order to maintain a false pretence of supporting Indigenous peoples. A second example is in passing the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978), which outlawed the ban on Indigenous religious expression, but still provided legal backing for the destruction of sacred sites (pp. 140). The examples of unsuccessful cases, such as Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (pp. 140) and San Francisco Peaks (pp. 141-142), assumes the fundamental misunderstanding of Indigenous religion within Western agendas. This stems from the historical imposition of Christianity that still infiltrates today despite US secularity. This lack of understanding or compassion has forced Indigenous communities to pursue alternative approaches, such as pointing out human health implications (pp. 142), in hopes of establishing legal agency within jurisdictions. In order to decolonise the system, Gilio-Whitaker argues that we must divorce the legal system from a dominant Western religion in order to better protect Indigenous peoples and their cultures.

The need for coalition-building between Native and non-Native peoples is another strong undercurrent of Gilio-Whitaker’s book. However, in order to achieve productive collaboration for environmental justice, an understanding of histories and cultures is required by non-Natives, in order for us to act as better allies and collaborators. One such critical understanding that Gilio-Whitaker promotes through the history of national parks is the social construction of nature originating from the “virgin wilderness hypothesis” (pp. 39), or The Pristine Myth, which physically manifested into national parks. These parks were created in the name of “preservation”, but in reality, the only thing preserved was “white supremacy and settler privilege” (pp. 95) through relentless erasure of Indigenous peoples. In order to move forward in the environmental movement, non-Natives must disentangle ourselves from and decolonise the way we think about nature by for instance, re-imaging the way we think and talk about “wilderness”, particularly in the US. Another critical understanding was brought to the surface in Gilio-Whitaker’s account of the demonstrations organised by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe against DAPL and the culture clash that arose from the requirement for women to wear skirts. It highlighted the importance of traditional understanding and respect when supporting Indigenous communities. At first, I could understand why women stood by their views on wearing a skirt, which was embedded in the historical oppression or conditioning of women. However, Gilio-Whitaker makes a strong argument for why such clashes occur, which made me rethink my own stance. This shift in understanding came from looking at the changes in cultural systems as only benefitting white communities, and ultimately promoting white privilege. This reframing of the non-Native women’s belief as “white cultural superiority” (pp. 124) solidified for me how this culture clash still promotes an inherently racist agenda.

On the whole, I found Gilio-Whitaker’s analysis of Indigenous environmental justice crucial and thought-provoking. However, I felt that there was a political bias which, albeit understandable, convoluted the narrative and was at times contradictory. For instance, in her introduction, the same paragraph claims that Democrats and their values both do and do not support the movement for Indigenous social and environmental justice (pp. 11). Furthermore, the author goes on to argue that President Obama and his administration were more supportive of Indigenous peoples (pp. 33). Yet, throughout the book Gilio-Whittaker highlights the ambivalence of the Obama administration on Indigenous rights through examples such as the UNDRIP endorsement (pp. 32-33) and San Francisco Peaks legal battle (pp. 141). I would argue that instead of this conflicted approach towards a single administration, holding all political parties and leaders accountable would further benefit the environmental justice movement.

Gilio-Whitaker’s holistic account of Indigenous environmental justice structured within contemporary and historical timelines highlights the work that is still required to decolonise knowledge production and for the US to finally divorce itself from deeply racist ideologies that dictate social, environmental and legal systems.

This book review was published as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.


Ella Kiyomi Dobson is a senior at Dartmouth College majoring in Environmental Studies and minoring in studio art. They are particularly interested in the intersection of environmental and social issues pertaining to ecological and fisheries conservation. With previous experience working in the field at marine research labs, they are curious as to how to mitigate the consequential social injustices that stem from biological conservation and related policies. 


References

Gilio-Whitaker, D. (2019). As Long as the Grass Grows: The indigenous fight for environmental justice, from colonisation to Standing Rock. Boston: Beacon Press.

Introduction to January’s “Environmental Justice and Human Rights” Collaboration

tree trunk

In January 2021 Earth Refuge is collaborating with two excellent NGOs aiming to bring you insightful, accessible, and practical content about environmental justice and human rights throughout the month. This webinar is an introduction to all three organisations, their overall missions and how they hope to move forward in tackling environmental injustices globally.

Human Rights Pulse is a platform that brings together human rights practitioners, policymakers, campaigners, and students to raise awareness of current human rights issues around the world and to promote solution-oriented discussion. Human Rights Pulse aims to make human rights discussions accessible, engaging, and practical, in creating content which promotes the values of democracy, sustainability, and human rights.

E&U For The Climate is an international student-led organisation driven by the commitment of young citizens to environmental protection working to advocate for sustainability and policy solutions that mitigate the environmental crisis whilst tackling both climate change and gender/social/ethnic/racial injustices.

Impact of Climate Change on the Arab Spring and Migrant Crisis

rocky mountain view at daytime

13 January 2020 – by Joseph Bensadon

The photo of Aylan Kurdi shook the world in September 2015 as the migrant crisis reached its mediatic climax.[1] But this photo does not represent a forgotten past. Climate change, through its impact on food insecurity and subsequent migratory movements, continues to produce waves of humanitarian emergencies, only to be exacerbated by the “threat multiplier” effect. 

For the Syrian boy Aylan, Climate Change affected him through its impact on the Arab Spring. This piece will look at the repercussions of Climate Change on the Arab Spring through the 2010 wheat crop yields and the Egypt Uprising. It will also explore the consequences this unrest had on migratory waves.

2010 Wheat Production

The 2011 price of wheat rose to $850, compared to $450 in 2010 as production fell in late 2010.[2] This decrease in production was the result of Canada’s yield,[3] the second in the world, plummeting by a quarter due to record rainfall. At the same time, China experienced droughts and dust storms from early 2010 into 2011, while Eastern Europe, Russia and the United States suffered similar low crop yields. Substitute products were not left unscathed as La Niña decreased Southern soybean and maize harvests, ultimately raising the overall price of food products.[4]

Egyptian Uprising

The Egyptian Uprising on the Tahrir Square in 2011 demonstrates one of the many negative externalities Climate Change can have in such a globalized economy. According to Troy Sternberg, the Chinese wheat drought in November 2010 was the main cause for this uprising.[5] The fall in production by 0.5% put pressure on the price of wheat and affected the availability of bread in Egypt. This in turn led to public protests which were met strongly by the authoritarian regime of President Hosni Mubarak. It is worth noting that Mubarak was in no way popular before these events unfolded.[6] Climate impacts only exacerbated the discontent. Since most Middle Eastern countries have an arid geography, they are heavily reliant on food importation, with some countries spending over 30% of their per capita income on food (Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Iraq).[7] That civil unrest spread throughout the Arab World, and became the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring

As the CNA report “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change” stated back in 2007, Climate Change acts as a “threat multiplier” for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.[8] Projected Climate Change will worsen already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, potentially causing widespread (geo)political instability and the emergence of failed states. Anticipating the impending crisis, the CNA identified both a national security risk for the United States, and the potential for violent unrest in the region. Inevitably, Climate Change played an essential role in the chain of events that unfolded, primarily through the increase in global food prices.[9] However, it is important to point out that the price increase was most likely only an aggregating factor. If governments had been more self-reliant, they may have been able to move away from their heavy reliance on food import through the development of their local markets and, thus, be less sensitive to food price shocks.

Migrant Crisis

The Arab World will “face drier winters, diminishing fresh water runoff and dwindling groundwater resources as the century progresses”,[10] with 75 to 250 million people in Africa projected to be exposed to water stress and food insecurity. This has already led to an increase in urban migration in the region, which intensified the political unrest by bringing “diverse, tribal, ethnic and religious groups into close contact while straining states’ capacity to cope with the needs of the populace”.[11] With its aforementioned impact on political stability, Climate Change will also aggravate poor conditions for people living in the Arab World, accentuating the flight of the population abroad.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring and subsequent migrant crisis can be attributed to many factors. While the most important and conspicuous factor is one of geopolitical nature, Climate Change still played its role in the Arab Spring as the silent trigger to the unrest. The wheat crop yield decrease and food price increase were directly influenced by unusual climate events, such as droughts and record rainfalls, which are directly correlated with man-made Climate Change. As these extreme weather events are going to increase in numbers, we can expect a corresponding emergence of political unrest across the world, especially in areas suffering from food insecurity. As a “threat multiplier”, Climate Change will augment migration movements from developing and underdeveloped countries to those more prosperous, for the latter have an environment less sensitive to the impacts of Climate Change and the resources to mitigate its impact, whereas the former, do not.


Joseph has a keen interest in working towards making our society sustainable. He wishes to use his background studying Climate Change, Economics and Cultural Diversity to bring the issue of climate migration to the forefront of the public debate, in order to promote international collaboration to mitigate the risk for local populations. He currently works in climate finance, with a focus on real estate, where he hopes to move the industry towards becoming more responsible, improving its impact on society.


References

[1] BBC News. 2020. Migrant Crisis: Photo Of Drowned Boy Sparks Outcry. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34133210> [Accessed 8 December 2020].

[2] Nasdaq. 2020. Nasdaq CBOT Wheat Future. [online] Available at: <https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/commodities/zw?timeframe=10y> [Accessed 8 December 2020].

[3] Werrell, C. and Femia, F., 2013. The Arab Spring and Climate Change – A Climate and Security Correlations Series. Center for American Progress.

[4] Ibid. 22

[5] Ibid. 14

[6] Ibid. 18

[7] Ibid. 19

[8] 2007. National Security And The Threat Of Climate Change. [online] Available at: <https://archive.org/stream/NationalSecurityAndTheThreatOfClimateChangeCNAApril2007/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change%20CNA%20April%202007_djvu.txt> [Accessed 8 December 2020].

[9] Ibid.

[10] Werrell & Femia. 40

[11] Ibid. 43

Protecting Climate Migrants: A Gap in International Asylum Law

people walking on beach during daytime

7 January 2021 – by Anxhela Mile

I. Introduction

‘Climate refugees fall through the cracks of asylum law’

International Organization for Migration [1]

There are currently no legal protections for ‘climate refugees.’ Additionally, a debate exists on whether to characterize those displaced by environmental degradation, climate change, and natural disasters as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘climate migrants.’ This paper assesses the law on refugees and addresses the legal protection gap as climate migrants are not a recognized category under international law.[2] Part I discusses the impacts on climate change and the increase in migration. Part II addresses the legal gap and assesses resolutions, court decisions, and a recent UN Human Rights Committee decision on climate refugees. Part III assesses ways the international community can move forward to protect climate migrants and provides several recommendations, and Part IV addresses other relevant gaps in international asylum law. 

Overall, this paper is important as it raises awareness on relevant policy issues that the international community must face to strengthen asylum law and promotes the need for a Special Rapporteur on Climate Change, Human Rights, and Migration.

A. Climate Change and Migration

The Intergovernmental Report on Climate Change Report of 2018 demonstrated that the effects of climate change will be starkly different from 1.5°C to 2.0°C.[3]  “The current level of global warming is 1.1°C warmer relative to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.”[4] Climate change threatens people’s livelihoods by displacing them from their homes, destroying limited natural resources, and exacerbating food insecurity.[5] Without drastic climate mitigation, the world is on track to 4°C warming by 2100, which would prove to be disastrous.[6] Additionally, those who will bear the worst burden of climate change are also those who have contributed the least to climate change.[7] The world’s Least Developed Countries account for 1% of global emissions, but have experienced 99% of the deaths from climate and weather-related disasters.[8]

Climate change will also continue to devastate populations around the world. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), “since 2009, an estimated one person every second has been displaced by climate or weather-related disaster since 2009 with an average of 22.5 million people displaced by climate or weather-related events since 2008.”[9] A World Bank report Groundswell – Preparing for International Climate Migration also stated “by 2050 – if no action is taken – there will be more than 143 million internal climate migrants” across sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.[10]  For example, in Ethiopia, 1.5 million Ethiopians could be prompted to migrate by 2050 because of water shortages; 1.7 million Mexicans can turn into migrants by 2050 from arid north and low-lying southern regions that will be more prone to drought, wildfires, and flooding; and in Bangladesh: 13.3 million Bangladeshis can turn into climate migrants by 2050, exacerbated by overpopulation and overcrowded areas.[11] 

Sea-level rise is also posing an increasing risk to coastal areas and is harming human settlements on Island-Nations such as Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands.[12] The people on these islands have few options besides relocating or elevating and protecting their land.[13] In the United States, climate migrants on the The Isle de Jean Charles on Louisiana’s wetlands are prone to experience intense flooding and are seeking relocation.[14] With the increase in the number of potential climate migrants and refugees, the international community must face the issue of how to protect and assist these vulnerable populations. Ultimately, climate change is “fundamentally a humanitarian issue in which our one home, with the perfect conditions for sustaining human life, is at jeopardy.”[15] The next section will assess the current legal framework governing climate refugees/migrants.

II. Legal Protection Gap

A. Current Legal Regime

The law of refugees is established by an international law framework with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Before the Refugee Convention, in 1921, the League of Nations created the office of the Commissioner for Refugees which assessed Russian refugees’ legal status and provide relief.[16] With the changes of the early to mid-20th century, including people who were fleeing Eastern Europe and other places decimated by the World Wars, the need for an international organization with a mission on migration was clear.[17] 

According to the Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who: “[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”[18] Assessing the language in the Refugee Convention and laws adopted in response to the Convention, there is a clear protection gap with regard to climate refugees since the current legal status does not include the “environment,” “climate,” or “natural disaster.”[19] The law also does not account for internal migration or displacement, which according to the World Bank, will greatly increase over the next few decades.[20]

B. Soft-Law Resolutions and Compacts

The international community is beginning to recognize the connections among environmental degradation, climate change, and the influx of migrants and refugees. First, the Global Compact for Migration is an international non-binding agreement that “intends to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities that migrants may face.”[21] The Compact states that “societies are undergoing demographic, economic, social and environmental changes at different scales that may have implications for and result from migration.”[22] While the Compact does not provide any legal protections for climate migrants, language in the Compact reveals that the international community recognizes that climate change is a factor that influences asylum seekers.

Second, the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as part of the Global Compact on Refugees 2018 states “while not in themselves causes of refugee movements, climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements.”[23] Climate and environmental degradation are included in the sections addressing “prevention and root causes” of migrant and refugee movements. However, the comments on climate change were minimal throughout the document, indicating a lack of awareness of the severity of the issue.

Finally, a task force on climate displacement was created after the 2015 Paris Agreement Climate Conference to “develop recommendations to avert, minimize, and address displacement in the context of the adverse effects of climate change.”[24] The task force published a report with “recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”[25] Some recommendations include: (a) consider national legislation and policies that can minimize and address displacement related to climate change, taking into consideration human rights obligations; (b) enhance research, data collection and sharing of information to understand and manage human mobility; (c) strengthen preparedness, including early warning signs, contingency plans, and resilience building strategies; (d) integrate human mobility challenges into national planning processes; (e) assist internationally displaced persons; and (f) facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people.[26]

Overall, while there are several international reports recognizing the need to protect climate migrants, soft-law resolutions do not provide the legal protections that migrants need.

C. Courts and Climate Migrants – The Case of Mr. Teitiota

Courts are also grabbling with the uncertain legal status and legal characterization of ‘climate refugees,’ demonstrated by the case of Mr. Teitiota. In Teitiota v. Chief Executive Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment,a Kiribati citizen, Teitiota applied for refugee status in New Zealand stating that he should be protected as a refugee after residing in New Zealand unlawfully since his permit had expired.[27] Teitiota applied for refugee and protected person status “on the basis of changes to his environment” since sea level rise and other impacts of climate change are forcing people off the island of Kiribati.[28] The court had to determine if Teitiota met the threshold for protected person status under the Refugee Convention.[29]

The lower court in New Zealand originally found a lack of serious harm or serious violation of human rights and “expressed concern about expanding the scope of the Refugee Convention and opening the door to millions of people who face hardship due to climate change.”[30] New Zealand’s Court of Appeals ruled that, while climate change is a major and growing concern, the applicant did not qualify as a refugee under international human rights law within the 1951 Refugee Convention since climate change is not addressed under the Convention.[31] While Teitiota’s asylum claim was ultimately rejected, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of New Zealand recognized the “gravity of climate change” and the possibility “that environmental degradation resulting from climate change or other natural disasters could [] create a pathway into the Refugee Convention or protected person jurisdiction.”[32]

After Teitiota’s asylum application in New Zealand was denied, Teitiota and his family were deported back to Kiribati.[33] He then filed a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee, “arguing that by deporting him, New Zealand had violated his right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).[34] Mr. Teitiota further claimed that sea level rise and other effects of climate change had rendered Kiribati uninhabitable for all its residents.”[35]

In its opinion, the Human Rights Committee concluded that “New Zealand’s court did not violate his right to life” under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)[36] and under asylum law since Teitiota “did not objectively face a real risk of being persecuted if returned to Kiribati.”[37] The Committee further stated that Teitota was not a “refugee” as defined by the Refugee Convention since:

He had not been subjected to any land dispute in the past and there was no evidence that he faced a real chance of suffering serious physical harm from violence linked to housing/land/property disputes in the future. He would be able to find land to provide accommodation for himself and his family.[38] Moreover, there was no evidence to support his contention that he was unable to grow food or obtain potable water. There was no evidence that he had no access to potable water, or that the environmental conditions that he faced or would face on return were so perilous that his life would be jeopardized.[39]

However, the UN decision was incredibly important since it acknowledged the connections between climate change, migration, and human rights, by reasoning that climate change-induced migration can occur through sea level rise, salinization, land-degradation, or through intense storms and flooding.[40]  It also emphasized the need for countries to act to prevent and mitigate climate change.[41]

Dissenting Opinion of Committee Member, Dunan Laki Muhumuza, stated the current conditions on the Republic of Kiribati “are significantly grave, and pose a real, personal and reasonably foreseeable risk of a threat to his life under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR.”[42] He disagreed with the majority’s opinion which held that the removal of Teitiota to the Republic of Kiribati did not violate his rights and found that the risks to Kiribati were more immediate and current than the majority found the impacts of climate change to be.[43]

The UN Human Rights Committee decision is said to be a “landmark” decision because the Committee stated that governments should not return migrants to countries where lives would be threatened by climate change.[44] While the Committee ruled against Teitiota, the Committee recognized that climate change and environmental degradation is a real threat to present and future generations. The Committee further noted that without “national and international action on climate change, impacts could become extreme enough to threaten the right to life, making it unlawful for states receiving climate migrants to turn them away.”[45] While the Committee believed that there is still time to for countries like Kiribati to protect their own citizens, they recognized “without robust national and international action, however, climate change might undermine the right to life, “thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations” of countries receiving climate migrants.”[46] Therefore, the UN Human Rights Committee was a drastic step towards recognizing the rights of climate migrants.

The next section will assess various recommendations that the international community can implement to protect climate migrants.

III. Opportunities to Protect: Recommendations

There are several proposed ways to protect climate migrants/refugees. This section will discuss several options, including revising the 1951 Refugee Convention, creating a new Convention that focuses solely on climate refugees, and appointing a Special Rapporteur on Climate Migration. This section ultimately proposes that the most immediate step the international community should take is to appoint a Special Rapporteur with a specific agenda.

A. Revise the 1951 Refugee Convention

Regarding revising the 1951 Convention, there are several challenges which the international community will face. The Head of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at the UN Migration Agency worries that opening the 1951 Convention may weaken refugees current legal status.[47] Opponents also argue that revising the 1951 will be time-consuming.[48] There may also be issues with countries having to re-ratify the convention, and there is already a lack of political will to even implement the Convention as it stands.[49]

There are also substantive challenges with revising the 1951 Refugee Convention to account for climate refugees. First, while many climate refugees will seek asylum across borders, many affected by climate change will also be internally displaced, and the 1951 Convention does not provide any protections for internal displacement.[50] Second, some argue that “focusing [on] a single cause [such as climate change] can distort and oversimplify the context” of extending protection.[51] Therefore, it is not recommended that the international community revise the 1951 Convention but instead look at other options to protect climate migrants.

B. Create a New Climate Refugee Convention

In response to the legal protection gap, scholars suggest that the international community either revise the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees to include climate refugees or negotiate a new convention to guarantee specific rights and protections for climate refugees and migrants.[52]  Faculty of Law at the University of Limoges have proposed a Draft Convention on climate refugees as environmentally-displaced persons with proposed Art. 2(2) stating:

“Environmentally-displaced persons” are individuals, families, groups and populations confronted with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that impacts their living conditions, resulting in their forced displacement, at the outset or throughout, from their habitual residence.[53]

While creating a new convention may also be a lengthy and cumbersome process, a new convention may be the best way to ensure that the connections between climate change and migration are properly assessed. Some organizations report that a new convention must (1) “qualify individuals and communities that cannot avail themselves of government relief from the effects of the climate crisis as those who are “persecuted” and thus allowed to formally make a claim for asylum in a country of their choosing; and (2) it must do so without the need to identify a specific polluter or industrial process as the source of such persecution.”[54] While the international community should eventually aim to create a new Convention, there are a few options that can be achieved sooner than implementing a new Convention. 

C. Meet International Climate Obligations

International non-profits and scholars call for States to meet their obligations under the climate law framework established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).[55] By meeting their obligations under the UNFCCC, the international community will limit climate change to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels. While this will not legally protect climate migrants, it may mitigate how many people are displaced. The Head of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at the UN Migration Agency supports that preventive and mitigation measures (following the Paris Agreement) must be a key part of the discussion in protecting climate refugees.”[56] Therefore, States should be encouraged to meet their international obligations under the Paris Agreement and other future climate agreements regulating greenhouse gas emissions.

D.   Appoint UN Special Rapporteur

International organizations and scholars call for a UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Climate Change “to guide international action on climate-induced displacement.”[57] UN Special Rapporteurs “are independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council with the mandate to monitor, advise and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries (country mandates) and on human rights violations worldwide (thematic mandates).”[58] In 2018, the Human Rights Council appointed a Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment.[59] Therefore, it is plausible and recommended that the UN Human Rights Council appoint a Special Rapporteur on human rights and climate refugees. Additionally, the Head of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at the UN Migration Agency states that “human rights-based approaches are key for addressing climate migration.”[60]

Moving forward, the international community should continue to investigate the links between climate change and migration. While the international community must decide how it will protect climate migrants, it is recommended that the Human Rights Council appoint a Special Rapporteur on climate migrants. In examining the links between climate change and migration, the Special Rapporteur can be tasked with the following:

  1. Investigate the strengths and weaknesses of defining climate migrants as “environmentally-displaced persons.”[61]
  2. Encourage State Parties to meet their obligations under the international climate regime.
  3. Assess the political will of various States in signing on to a new refugee convention that particularly protects climate migrants.
  4. Determine and prioritize immediate action plans for incredibly vulnerable States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu.
  5. Explore the ethics of resettlement programs that involve vulnerable Pacific Island States such as Fiji, Tuvalu, and Kiribati.[62] Within the resettlement program, the Special Rapporteur can also investigate the ethics behind intercepting migrants and denying refugee status to those traveling by boat.[63]
  6. Examine States’ duties to climate migrants in light of the principle of non-refoulement.[64]

The next section of this paper will briefly address other relevant issues in international asylum law pertaining to legal protection gaps of climate migrants. 

IV. Lack of a Cohesive International System

Overall, the international system clearly needs more comprehensive protection for asylum seekers all around the world. World leaders are taking antagonistic actions toward asylum seekers and migrants and are using events such as the COVID-19 epidemic as a mechanism to bar asylum seekers from protection.[65] Scholars also note that the 1951 Refugee Convention “contains significant gaps and ambiguities … which render the 1951 Refugee Convention’s applicable legal standards insufficient in ensuring protection.”[66] First, one weakness includes States’ “more restrictive approaches” towards asylum-seekers, which includes State policies that discourage asylum seekers from arriving to a country’s territory.[67] Second, regional instruments exist that alter the standards of asylum law in different areas around the world.[68] Third, while the General Assembly can issue “soft-law” resolutions and “further the progressive development of international law,” there is still a lack of enforcement of international law.[69] 

Moreover, the “gaps and ambiguities in the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention resulted in a refugee framework did not adequately cover new refugee law issues … and created disparate and sometimes contradictory standards” which vary depending on the country the asylum seeker is attempting to seek protection from.[70] Countries implement different policies has led to a fragmented and antagonistic approach towards asylum seekers. This is a major concern as countries respond to refugee crises in different ways. Additionally, the issue of climate migration will increasingly apply pressure to States’ legal and political systems. Therefore, it is important for the international community to create a more uniform approach to asylum law.  One approach is to create guidance documents each year to encourage States to take a more harmonious approach towards asylum seekers.

V. Concluding Remarks

There is still no legal framework protecting “climate refugees.” As the impacts of climate change will worsen, the need to ensure legal protections and rights for climate refugees and migrants is more important than ever. While language on climate displacement was at least mentioned in the UN Global Compact for Migration, the term climate refugee is still undefined. In response, it is advised that the international community should appoint a Special Rapporteur to work with UN Subsidiary bodies to (1) assess the strengths and weaknesses of different language on environmentally-displaced persons, (2) encourage State Parties to meet their obligations, (3) assess the political will of States signing on to a new refugee convention, (4) determine and prioritize immediate action plans for incredibly vulnerable States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, (5) explore the ethics of resettlement programs that involve vulnerable Pacific Island Nations, and (6) examine duties to climate migrants in light of the principle of non-refoulement.  As Pope Francis has stated: “the natural environment is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the responsibility to everyone. If we make something our own, it is only to administer it for the good of all. If we do not, we burden our consciences with the weight of having denied the existence of others.”[71]


Anxhela (Angela) Mile is a J.D. and LL.M. graduate of the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (Pace Law). At Pace Law, Anxhela specialized in global environmental law and used her legal skills and scientific background to work on climate change and other global environmental issues. During her academic career, Anxhela has worked as a law clerk at the DOJ’s Environmental and Natural Resources Division, as a legal intern to the UN, and as a semester judicial clerk at the Southern District of New York.


References

[1] Benjamin Glahn, ‘Climate refugees’? Addressing the international legal gaps, International Bar Association (June 11, 2009), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442.

[2] Id.

[3] INTERGOVERMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (“IPCC”), Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments (Oct. 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/ [hereinafter “IPCC Report”].

[4] Benoit Mayer, The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018), (Nov. 2018) (citing Urgenda Foundation v. The Netherlands [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689 (June 24, 2015); aff’d (Oct. 9, 2018) (District Court of The Hague, and The Hague Court of Appeal at ¶ 3.5).

[5] Environment, Disasters, and Climate Change, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/environment-disasters-and-climate-change.html, (last accessed on October 21, 2019) [hereinafter “UNHCR Climate Change”].

[6] Raymond Clémençon, The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal Failure or Historic Breakthrough, 25 J Envt’l & Dev. 3, 24 (2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs10.1177/1070496516631362.

[7] “Without naturally occurring greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the planet would be 30 degrees cooler on average.” Gus Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability 1, 10 (Yale University Press eds., 2008) (See also Climate change has and will continue to influence the availability of freshwater, damage the health of ecosystems, cause sea level rise that will exacerbate coastal erosion, flooding and wetland loss, and may even increase human health suffering through increases in malnutrition, increased burden of diarrheal disease, and increase cardo-respiratory diseases. A 2004 report by the World Health Organization stated the loss of over 150,000 lives due to climate change).

[8] Protecting Climate Refugees: Securing international protection for climate refugees, Environmental Justice Foundation, https://ejfoundation.org/what-we-do/climate/protecting-climate-refugees [hereinafter “EJF Protecting Climate Refugees”].

[9] UNHCR Climate Change, supra note 5.

[10] Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration, The World Bank (March 19, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell—preparing-for-internal-climate-migration [hereinafter “Groundswell”].

[11] Id.

[12] Climate Change & The International Court of Justice, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy (hereinafter “Yale Report”).

[13] Climate Reality Project, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: HOW DOES CLIMATE CHANGE AFFECT PACIFIC ISLAND NATIONS? (March 14, 2019), https://climaterealityproject.org/blog/trouble-paradise-how-does-climate-change-affect-pacific-island-nations

[14] Coral Davenport et Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees,’ NY Times (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-the-first-american-climate-refugees.html.

[15] Drawdown: The Most Comprehensive plan ever proposed to reverse global warming 190 (Paul Hawken Eds. 2007).

[16] Corinne Lewis, UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From Treaties to Innovation,Routledge 1, 2-3 (2012).

[17] Id. at 12.

[18] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) Art 1(A)(2), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.

[19] María Cristina García, Does the United States Need a Climate Refugee Policy,Historical Climatology (April 25, 2019),https://www.historicalclimatology.com/blog/does-the-united-states-need-a-climate-refugee-policy.

[20] Groundswell, supra note 10.

[21] Global Compact for Migration, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact.

[22] Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, ¶ 12, U.N. GA Doc. A/CONF.231/3 (July 30, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.231/3.

[23] U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee, Global Compact for Migrants, ¶ D (8), U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (2018) https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf.

[24] COP24 side event: Recommendations of the Task Force on Displacement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage-ld/workshops-meetings/cop24-side-event-recommendations-of-the-task-force-on-displacement (last accessed on October 21, 2019).

[25] Leila Mead, Task Force Highlights Linkages among Climate-related Displacement, SDGs IISD: SDG Knowledge Hub (Oct. 23, 2018), https://sdg.iisd.org/news/task-force-highlights-linkages-among-climate-related-displacement-sdgs/.

[26] Task Force on Displacement, Report of the Task Force on Displacement (Advanced unedited version) 1, 7 (Sept. 17, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018_TFD_report_17_Sep.pdf.

[27] Mark Baker-Jones et Melanie Baker-Jones, TEITIOTA v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT – A PERSON DISPLACED, 15 QUT L. Rev. 102, 121 https://eprints.qut.edu.au/111864/1/111864.pdf

[28] Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2014) NZCA 173 https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/pdf/jdo/b8/alfresco/service/api/node/content/workspace/SpacesStore/70056dfa-a205-4baf-9d8d-e97ed5244899/70056dfa-a205-4baf-9d8d-e97ed5244899.pdf.

[29] Id. at ¶ 7.

[30] Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Sabin Center at Columbia University, Climate Change Chart, SC 7/2015 [2015] NZSC 107, http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/20150720_2015-NZSC-107_judgment-1.pdf.

[31] Id. at ¶ 41; See also Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2015) NZSC 107, http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/20150720_2015-NZSC-107_judgment-1.pdf.

[32] Id.

[33] UN News, Historic UN Human Rights case opens door to climate change asylum claims (Jan. 21, 2020),

https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E [hereinafter “Historic UN Human Rights Case”].

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Historic UN Human Rights Case, supra note 33.

[37] Human Rights Committee: Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016 (Jan. 7, 2020) ¶ 2.8, 10, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016&Lang=en [hereinafter “Human Rights Committee Decision on Climate Migrants”] (The Court also explained that: “

[38] Id. (The Tribunal noted that the father of the author’s wife was negotiating with the new owner of the land where the author had been living, and that an arrangement had been made to give the father time to relocate his family to their home island in the south. The Tribunal considered that while the author would need to share the available land with other members of his kin group, it would provide him and his family with access to sufficient resources to sustain themselves to an adequate level.)

[39] Id.

[40] Press Release, Human Rights Committee, Historic UN Human Rights case opens door to climate change asylum claims (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E.

[41] Id

[42] Id. at ¶ 1.

[43] Id.

[44] Kate Lyons, Climate refugees can’t be returned home, says landmark UN human rights ruling, The Guardian (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling.

[45] Hillary Aidun, Ama Francis, U.N. Human Rights Committee Issues Landmark Climate Migration Decision, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (Jan. 21, 2020)http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/01/21/landmark-u-n-decision-says-countries-may-not-turn-away-climate-migrants-in-the-future/.

[46] Id.

[47] Dina Ionesco, Let’s Talk About Climate Migrants, Not Climate Refugees (June 6, 2019), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/.

[48] Benjamin Glahn, supra note 1.

[49] Seven reasons the UN Refugee Convention should not include ‘climate refugees,’ UNSW Law: Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law (June 7, 2017),https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/seven-reasons-un-refugee-convention-should-not-include-climate-refugees.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Benjamin Glahn, supra note 1.

[53] Michel Prieur, et al., Draft convention on the international status of environmentally- displaced persons, Revue Europeenne De Droit De L’Environnement 395, 397 (2008), https://www.persee.fr/doc/reden_1283-8446_2008_num_12_4_2058.

[54] Climate Refugees: The Climate Crisis and Rights Denied, Othering & Belonging Institute 1, 2 (Dec. 2019).

[55] EJF Protecting Climate Refugees, supra note 8.

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] FAQS: United Nations Special Rapporteurs, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/faqs-united-nations-special-rapporteurs.

[59] UN News: David R. Boyd, Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/DavidBoyd.aspx.

[60] Ionesco, supra note 47.

[61] See language proposed by the Faculty of Law at the University of Limoges, supra note 53.

[62] Suong Vong, Protecting Climate Refugees is Crucial for the Future, Humanity in Action USA (May 2017) https://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/protecting-climate-refugees-is-crucial-for-the-future/ (Humanity in Action argues that the Pacific Access Category (PAC) program is “discriminatory in nature.” It is a program that “offers resettlement opportunities in New Zealand, although it has an annual cap of just 250 people each from Fiji and Tonga and 75 each from Tuvalu and Kiribati. In addition to the threshold limitations, the PAC requires applicants to have already secured a job offer in New Zealand; to have a good command of English; and to undergo a rigorous and costly medical check-up.”

[63] According to the UNHCR, asylum-seekers who are on a vessel that is being intercepted still have a right to be individually screened to determine if they have a basis of protection, such as a credible fear. If countries such as the U.S. and Australia are allowed to intercept asylum-seekers on the high seas, countries will increasingly be ignoring the human rights protections that asylum seekers and climate migrants deserve.

[64] UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf. (The principle of non-refoulement is a bedrock of the protections granted to refugees and other persons seeking protection in other countries). With climate change intensifying the need for vulnerable to migrate, States must have a more appropriate approach towards protecting asylum seekers and not resort to deportation and detainment.

[65] Muzaffar Chishti and Jessica Bolter, Interlocking Set of Trump Administration Policies at the U.S.-Mexico Border Bars Virtually All from Asylum, Migration Information Source (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/interlocking-set-policies-us-mexico-border-bars-virtually-all-asylum.

[66] Lewis, supra note 16, at 37.

[67] Id. at 86. 

[68] Id. at 87.

[69] Id. at 90.

[70] Id.

[71] Drawdown, supra note 15, at 191.