The planet's first legal think tank dedicated to climate migrants
26 January 2021 – conducted by James Sedlack
In the following interview, conducted by James Sedlack, Maura discusses her experience dealing with coastal flooding, public works issues, and questions of migration as former mayor and long-term resident of Mastic Beach, NY, a small coastal town on Long Island. For more perspective on Maura’s story, please see her short film with The Nature Conservancy on Long Island water quality.
19 February 2021 – Interview submitted by Earth Refuge Archivist Robert Los
Mehrdad Payandeh holds the Chair for International Law, European Law and Public Law at Bucerius Law School. Born in Tehran in 1978 he studied law at Heinrich-Heine-University of Düsseldorf. In 2008, he finished his doctoral thesis in international law, and in 2009 passed the Second State Exam, after a legal clerkship that took him to the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations in New York, Hengeler Mueller, as well as the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. After obtaining an LL.M. at Yale Law School he returned to Heinrich-Heine-University as a research assistant and from 2012 until 2016 he worked there as a Junior Professor for International Law and Public Law. In 2016 he finished his habilitation with a thesis in constitutional law, before joining Bucerius Law School. Since 2020 Professor Payandeh is a member of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of the United Nations.
General Questions
What is your name and where in the world do you call home?
Mehrdad Payandeh, born in Tehran, raised in Düsseldorf, and since 2016 I call Hamburg my home.
What is your role and what does this entail?
I am a professor of law focusing on international law, EU law and public law. I consider my role to be primarily in research and teaching, with the occasional involvement in consulting of civil society as well as state actors. Moreover, I am a member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which monitors whether states comply with their obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. This treaty is focused on racial discrimination, but there are some intersections with environmental issues and climate change, e.g. when it comes to the rights of indigenous peoples in the context of activities of the extraction industries.
As Professor of Law and have you noticed any changes in recent years in terms of for example weather and/or temperature?
I have noticed those changes not really as a professor of law but rather as every other person taking note of the news as well as of public discourse. As a professor of law I have noticed an increase in interest in issues surrounding environmental law and climate change, with regard to academic discourse as well as from students.
Status Quo of International Law regarding Climate Migration – Existing Laws and Institutions
What are the open questions from the perspective of international law regarding the future challenge of climate migration?
Under international law, new phenomena always raise the question of whether they can be accommodated within the existing legal framework or whether there is need for change of the legal rules. In this regard, climate migration raises in particular the question of whether and in how far the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention might be applicable, but also whether general international human rights law might have something to say about the obligations of states with regard to climate migration.
We should bear in mind that climate migration is not a fixed term but rather encompasses very different scenarios, to which different rules of international law may apply. For example, from the perspective of international law it makes a difference whether a person moves within his or her country of nationality or whether they cross state borders. Only those outside their country of origin can qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention. It also makes a difference whether a person is forced to move due to climate change related environmental deteriorations or, say, because those degradations have triggered a persecutory ethnic conflict. This is because the 1951 Convention requires a risk of persecution for discriminatory reasons.
With regard to the further development of international rules, there are many open questions: Will the existing rules be re-interpreted or formally changed? Will there be a new international treaty specifically dealing with climate migration? If so, how specific will it be and how concrete would the obligations of states under such a treaty be? For the moment, however, the focus seems to be on non-binding instruments such as the Global Compact on Refugees adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2018. This Compact recognizes the connection between climate change related environmental degradation and migration and has initiated the Global Refugee Forum as a way to build solidarity between states in sharing responsibility for refugees.
What do you think of the emerging movement that wants to subsume climate migrants under the existing refugee definition given the current absence of political will to change it?
At least with regard to the definition under the 1951 Refugee Convention, treating climate migrants as refugees is rather problematic. The position that climate migrants find themselves in seems hard to reconcile with the scenarios envisioned under the Geneva Refugee Convention, which is focused on persecution and discrimination. I also have my doubts whether the rules of the Geneva Convention are well-suited to deal with the phenomenon of climate migration. The Convention grants protection only to those who reach the borders of another country. Furthermore, the protection regime under the Convention does not adequately reflect the common responsibility of the industrial countries for climate change and for the causes of climate migration.
Of course, in certain situations, the Geneva Refugee Convention may be able to offer protection also to climate refugees. And of course, the mandate of the UNHCR is broader and the UNHCR is deeply engaged with the relationship between climate change and the displacement of people, both on a policy level as well as on the ground. And rightly so.
There are other, regional instruments beyond the Geneva Convention – such as the Refugee Convention of the Organisation of African Unity of 1969 or the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 – that employ a broader definition that might be more open to including climate migration or at least climate change-related aspects of migration. The practice of states and other international actors under these regional instruments might in turn have an influence on the interpretation of universal rules, either within the context of international refugee law or human rights law.
To what extent are there existing international agreements, national laws or institutes that guarantee protection to climate migrants?
Again, there is no unified approach, but there are a number of global initiatives dedicated to climate migration. There is, for example, the Nansen Initiative which developed a (non-binding) Protection Agenda with the involvement of a large number of states as well as non-state actors. This initiative, like its follow-up project, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, approached climate migration from a broad perspective, dealing both with internally displaced persons as well as migrants that cross state borders against the background of disasters and climate change. The Paris Agreement acknowledges the relationship between climate change and migration, but it does not address climate migration in a more meaningful way. However, at the Conference of the Parties session in Paris (COP21), a Taskforce on Climate Displacement was established. Initiatives aimed at progress in the field of environmental law, such as for example the Global Pact for the Environment project that aims at establishing a legally binding instrument, do not focus on climate migration. So, we can see a number of mostly state-led initiatives aimed at cooperation and exchange, but no real momentum to address the issue in any legally binding manner.
On the regional level, there are some rules on the protection of migrants that could be interpreted as encompassing at least some forms of climate migration. Within the European Union, for example, there are some attempts to interpret the conditions for so-called “subsidiary protection” under the EU Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) in a manner encompassing the threat of serious harm in the context of environmental disasters, but this seems to be rather an outlier position at the moment. Moreover, there are a number of EU member states which under their national laws recognize – albeit in a rather limited manner and subject to some restrictive conditions – subsidiary or temporary protection for persons who, if they were deported, would be subject to serious harm because of environmental destruction.
In the absence of a more far-reaching European political momentum to recognize climate change-related circumstances as grounds for protection, there is also further potential for human rights-based approaches, both under the European Convention on Human Rights as well as under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In this connection, the recent case of Teitiota v. New Zealand, decided by the UN Human Rights Committee could serve as a precedent for the human rights discourse in Europe.
Moving beyond Europe, there is in particular the Kampala Convention, a binding treaty adopted within the African Union, which deals with the protection of internally displaced persons and explicitly covers people who had to flee due to natural or human-made disasters. However, this is still far away from comprehensively covering all forms of climate migration.
Are there any claims under international law against emitters by states that have been particularly hard hit by climate change?
This question touches upon a rather different topic, the vast and rather controversial field of climate change litigation. While we have, up to now, talked about the protection of (individual) climate migrants from deportation, claims against emitters aim in a different direction. In the last years, we have seen a huge increase in cases being brought before domestic as well as regional courts to tackle the effects of climate change. These cases are based on different legal rules and principles – e.g., environmental law, human rights law but also domestic torts law – and aimed at different litigation goals – e.g., ordering states to employ more ambitious measures against climate change, or compensation for climate change-related damages or adaptation measures. On the international level, there have not been any major cases directly dealing with climate change. But there are debates surrounding the question of whether and how a case could be brought before the International Court of Justice – with a number of states, in particular island states that are and will be most directly affected by climate change, openly discussing options for such action.
Which way forward is imaginable, and which is feasible?
Regarding the specific issue of climate migration at the level of international law, I think we need to be realistic. The short-term prospects for a universal legally-binding instrument addressing climate migration in a comprehensive and effective manner are rather limited – regardless of whether we are thinking of a specific climate migration convention, or an addendum or protocol to any of the existing treaties dealing with climate change or migration.
For the time being, dealing with climate migration remains primarily a political endeavour. That does, however, not mean that academics, civil society, states and organisations should not think about and advocate for feasible instruments, measures and approaches concerning legal responses to climate migration. This includes exploring the potential of general human rights for issues surrounding climate migration.
Teitiota v. New Zealand (2020) – First of many climate migration cases?
Which implications does the case have for the recognition of climate migration in international law? What was the ground-breaking aspect of it?
The case originates in an individual communication to the UN Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the Covenant”), one of the main human rights treaties on the universal level. Mr. Teitiota, a national of Kiribati, had unsuccessfully claimed refugee status in New Zealand due to the deteriorating environmental and economic situation on the island of Tarawa in Kiribati, which he attributed to rising sea levels. He claimed that this situation would deprive him of his means of subsistence and that it could result in violence, thereby threatening his right to life under article 6 of the Covenant.
The Committee eventually rejected the claim of the petitioner. Nonetheless, its decision was ground-breaking in that it acknowledged the implications of the right to life in the context of climate change and climate migration: It highlighted both the obligation of Kiribati to take measures aimed at adapting to climate change impacts and enhance resilience in order to protect the right to life of its inhabitants, as well as the obligations of New Zealand when it comes to the decision of whether to deport a person to a state that suffers climate change-induced harm. The Committee acknowledged that the right to life could bar such a deportation if there was the serious threat that due to environmental conditions a person would not have adequate access for example to water and food. The Committee thereby acknowledged that the level of protection under the Covenant and in particular under the right to life can go beyond the scope of the protection against deportation (non-refoulement) under international refugee law. While this was already clear before the decision – the protection against deportation under international human rights law goes further than the protection under international refugee law insofar as no discriminatory persecution is required –, the decision is ground-breaking for making the link to climate change and climate change-related situations.
However, the Committee established a rather high threshold for a violation of the right to life: It emphasized that the petitioner must prove that the deteriorating situation in his resident country would have a specific impact on him; an overall bad situation would not suffice. And there would have to be a high risk of irreparable harm. Furthermore, it held that while the situation in Kiribati was threatening, it was not clear yet whether Kiribati – with the help of the international community – was in a position to take measures to halt the development or even to relocate its population.
The decision is therefore remarkable for highlighting very clearly the human rights dimension of climate change, in particular with regard to the right to life. And it acknowledges that the deportation of a person to a country in which they would be subjected to a serious threat to their life, also with regard to a lack of possibilities to provide for water and food, could amount to a human rights violation. However, the Committee also made clear that the threshold for such a violation is very high and, in particular with regard to incremental climate change-related impacts, a prohibition to deport someone can only be assumed when the threat to his or her life is imminent.
Change in international court rulings?
The decision of the Human Rights Committee builds upon earlier decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as well as the European Court of Human Rights which had already highlighted some human rights implications with regard to climate change. The Committee, however, goes beyond those previous holdings. Its decision is not so much a “change” in international rulings as it is a further development.
Which further questions derive from that particular ruling?
The decision highlights that the threshold for a violation of the right to life in the context of climate migration is rather high. And although the Committee develops a number of criteria, it is not easy to predict in which constellations exactly it would come to the conclusion that there has been a violation. What is clear is that the Committee looks at the probability of the risk and the severity of the impact, and that it does not only consider the overall situation in a country or region but that the environmental degradation must affect the individual petitioner himself.
The decision moreover shows the inherent limits of a human rights approach to climate migration: It highlights the non-refoulement obligation, i.e., the obligation to not deport someone to a country where he or she will be exposed to a serious threat to his or her life, but that, of course, presupposes that the person has already reached the territory of a state in which he or she wants to apply for refugee status. For people wanting to leave their country due to deteriorating circumstances, this approach does not do much – a problem which we already know from the field of refugee law in general. This obligation also only applies in the last minute, when the worst effects have already set in.
And while the Committee highlights the general implications of the right to life in order to combat climate change, it does so in a rather general manner, leaving much leeway to states with regard to what measures they want to take to tackle climate change and to adapt to the negative impact of climate change. Generally, this is in keeping with human rights doctrine on positive obligations: how they are fulfilled is primarily a political question and not for the courts to decide. A violation of such obligations will usually only exist if a state does nothing at all, or blatantly way too little. In this regard, though, I think that there is still a lot of potential for the development of normative guidelines for dealing with climate change and climate migration.
Is the ruling a possible back door entrance for legal protection under Art. 3 ECHR and the respective national laws (for example § 3e AsylG)?
As I have mentioned, the European Court of Human Rights has already acknowledged that human rights have implications in cases of environmental harm and in the context of climate change. And it has also developed a line of jurisprudence dealing with human rights limits to deportation decisions. In this regard, the Court could, in the future, build upon the Human Rights Committee’s decision to further develop its jurisprudence.
In a similar manner, domestic courts could consider the decision of the Committee when interpreting domestic law and fundamental rights: While decisions of UN human rights treaty bodies are not formally binding, they constitute authoritative interpretations of the human rights obligations of states under the international treaties they have ratified. Accordingly, domestic courts, including the German Federal Constitutional Court, have held – albeit with different degrees of enthusiasm – that decisions of UN treaty bodies should be taken into account when interpreting and applying the law. In this regard, the Teitiota decision could serve as a starting point for the development of human rights obligations in the context of climate migration.
It should, however, be highlighted again that such a human rights approach cannot substitute for a more comprehensive approach to climate migration: Political measures are needed to address the root causes of climate migration, to mitigate the impact of climate change, specifically with regard to states and regions that are particularly vulnerable to its effects, and to come up with ideas and plans of how to deal with the rising number of people that will have to leave their homes because they have been deprived of their means of subsistence or because their place of residence has become uninhabitable. International law provides the normative framework for this discussion, and international human rights law in particular should serve as a constant reminder of what’s at stake.
This interview was slightly edited for formatting purposes.
18 February 2021 – by Vaughn Rajah
“Optimism is a strategy for making a better future. Because unless you believe that the future can be better, you are unlikely to step up and take responsibility for making it so.”
― Noam Chomsky
Transitional justice comprises the implementation of legal and non-legal measures in order to (1) address and acknowledge systemic human rights violations, (2) transition a society into a new manifestation of itself in which those violations no longer exist, and (3) render justice to victims of those previous violations[i].
This concept was likely not at the forefront of the minds of the architects of the Paris Agreement[ii]. Yet, the “spirit”, of transitional justice is imbedded in international environmental law. The international legal principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is premised on the notion that developed states must bear greater burdens in tacking climate change than developing states for two reasons: their greater historical responsibility for global warming, and their greater wealth[iii].
The Anthropocene is, however, not the first time humans have had to navigate complex historically rooted tensions about the ideal relationship between responsibility for past and future action. This article will provide an introductory analysis of the possible application of transitional justice mechanisms in addressing these tensions in the international climate context.
This article will analyse three fundamental mechanisms in the transitional justice toolkit, in the climate context: truth commissions, reparations and litigation.
Truth Commissions
Traditionally, truth commissions are instituted by new governments to establish their legitimacy by formally breaking with the past, and to create an opportunity for reconciliation or unification[iv]. Truth commissions can avoid some of the limitations and political difficulties of pursuing legal punishments for past actions. Their purpose is to investigate, document, and raise awareness of past harms as a form of acknowledgement, and to recommend strategies for addressing these harms, avoiding future recurrence, and supporting particular victims. Compared to prosecutions, truth commissions can more easily engage with systemic bases for harm. In the climate context, a possible avenue could be the creation of an UN-supported, but independent international climate truth commission, comprised of senior individuals in the climate policy and legal space to construct frameworks on historical responsibility[v]. In documenting experiences of climate consequences, representation would be key to the legitimacy of such a commission.
Reparations
Efforts to provide redress for historical atrocities and abuse are typically framed as “reparations”. Reparations can take many forms, and include material compensation, rehabilitation, symbolic gestures, and guarantees of non-recurrence[vi]. In the climate context, reparations could feasibly take the form of short-term investments in local well-being and development, and long-term investments in capacity building and technological advancements in order to mitigate the worst effects of ecological disaster[vii]. Non-material reparations may encompass formal apologies and acknowledgments and are linked to the truth-seeking institutions discussed above. It would be imperative for climate reparation framework to adopt a “bottom-up” approach to adequately identify and implement solutions for the needs of recipients, particularly those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
Litigation
Legal remedies are not novel in the climate fight. Climate litigation is a growing phenomenon in domestic courts around the world[viii]. Climate change is driving activists and litigants to reimagine pre-existing legal norms in light of its many strands of contention and uncertainty. Increasingly, plaintiffs are advancing strong, rights-based arguments in the courtroom. A human rights-based approach is also a pillar of legal action in the transitional justice context[ix]. The importance of a rights-based approach goes beyond the mere winning of a case. It is also a “win” in this kind of strategic litigation when the publicity of a lawsuit elevates social consciousness regarding climate policy, steering attention on a mass scale towards the fundamental rights impacted by climate change.
Conclusion
However, strategic climate litigation aimed at expanding the Overton window is both vital and insufficient on its own. Without further fundamental and longer lasting reforms, it is unlikely that sufficient deterrence can be cultivated to ensure non-recurrence. Therefore, similar to the most effective examples of transitional justice policies, successful climate change mitigation strategies must implement a plurality of approaches in the pursuit of a sustainable society. Whilst transitional justice and climate policy do not correlate on an one-to-one scale, the international climate regime cannot afford to ignore ideas on how to build cooperation and effectively assign responsibility. Transitional justice may well be a relevant piece in solving that puzzle.
Earth Refuge Archivist and Human Rights Pulse core team member Vaughn Rajah is passionate about sustainability and human rights. His scholarship and writing focuses on international law, climate change and transitional justice.
References
[i] ICTJ. What is Transitional jusice? https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice [Accessed 19 January 2021].
[ii] Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
[iii] Rio Declaration, Principle 7.
[iv] I Robinson. Truth Commissions and Anti-Corruption: Towards a Complementary Framework? International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2015, Pages 33 – 50.
[v] S Klinsky. The Global Climate Regime and Transitional Justice. Routledge Advances in Climate Change Research. 2018. Pages 95 – 100.
[vi] Climate Strategies. Why Explore “Transitional Justice” in the Climate Context? https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Why-Explore-Transitional-Justice-in-the-Climate-Context.pdf [Accessed 20 January 2021]. Page 3.
[vii] As above, pages 4 – 5.
[viii] Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. http://climatecasechart.com/ [Accessed 21 January 2021].
[ix] E Anderson. Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: Lessons from the Field. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 47, Issue 1, 2015, pages 305 – 317.
We are seeking reliable and creative volunteers to research for Earth Refuge. As a Legal Researcher, you will be expected to produce content for each of our research projects, amongst them our regional Legal Toolkits.
The aim of this project is to provide legal recourse to climate migrants, because as of yet there are no significant regional or international frameworks that protect them. You will be asked to critically analyse, summarise and (re-)interpret relevant case law, treaties, conventions and soft law, both regionally and internationally.
Our toolkits will be published by region, starting with the United States, Bangladesh and regions in South America (though this is subject to change). The toolkits will cover different areas of law:
You will be referenced as an Author, along with other contributors/editors and will work very closely with the Co-Founders and respective Advisors in the drafting process. Longer term commitments are prefered, with an average of 3-4 hours a week spent researching (subject to change depending on how many volunteers are taking part in the drafting process). Areas of work will be allocated according to interest, if possible.
If you are interested in becoming a Legal Researcher for Earth Refuge, please send an email with your desired role and name in the subject header to [email protected], e.g. ‘LEGAL RESEARCHER – FULL NAME’.
Please submit the following documents with your application:
12 February 2021 – submitted by Earth Refuge Correspondent Aubrey Calaway
Cambodian tour guide Chem Vichhai talks with Aubrey Calaway about extreme weather and ailing ecosystems in his home providence of Siem Reap. Taking us inside different stops on his tour, Vichhai describes how local residents of the Prek Toal Floating Village community- and Cambodia as a whole- are struggling to adapt to a changing climate.
Vichhai’s Business Facebook
What is your name and where in the world do you call home?
My name is Chem Vichhai and I am from Siem Reap, Cambodia. Right now, I am living in Battambang province with my parents, which is my hometown. I moved from Siem Reap-Battambang because of Covid-19.
What kind of work do you do? And what inspired you to pursue this career?
I am an English-Speaking Tour Guide. I chose this career because I love to speak the English language and want to share the beautiful culture, history, and custom of my country to all the people around the world who come to Cambodia. Besides that, I can meet people from other countries and learn about their country too.
Have you noticed any changes in your local environment, like temperature or weather?
Yes, I have noticed some changes in my local environment. First of all, the temperature has changed every year. Cambodia is a hot country all year ‘round- everybody can usually adapt and get used to it. But for years and years the temperature has been increasing.
In 2019 it was a very hot year because Cambodia got less rain. Normally we get rain in late June until the end of October, which is the rainy season. November to May is the dry season with no rain. But in 2019, it rained very little and made it hard for people in Cambodia to live and farm. The weather is so hot in the dry season (up to 40 C). Some places have no water for use. I think this is unusual if I compare to last year when we got a lot of rain.
2020 is a bad year besides the corona virus. Cambodia is affected by nature too. During the rainy season Cambodia got a huge flood, and it flooded almost the whole country. All farming is gone, especially rice farming.
Do you think these changes are related to climate change?
Yes, looking at all of this, I think the climate is changing because people don’t care about the environment. These changes were a sudden shock to the people in Cambodia.
Have these changes affected your life?
This change has really affected my life. It makes it difficult to work. It is so hot in dry season and all my farming was destroyed by water in the wet season. It is hard to get income to support my family, and sometimes I got sick or dizzy when I work because of heat and high humidity. I do not sleep well during nighttime because of the temperature.
And right now, there are no tourists because of Covid.
Have you been able to adapt?
I have been able to adopt but it is not so easy. Others, [especially] older people, have a big problem with this change.
Can you tell me about one or two of the places where you take tourists?
Angkor Wat Temple is the biggest Hindu temple in the world and a beautiful place for people to visit during their vacation. Angkor Wat was built in the jungle and surrounded by massive moat. On the way to go to see this temple, we can enjoy the big trees that flank the road and [provide] nice shade for people. Can see monkey, bird and other animals too. So, when we arrive inside the temple, everybody feels like they arrived to the heavens or home of God because it is so peaceful.
I also take tourists to Prek Toal Floating Village. This place is so beautiful. Most tourists go this place because they wanted to see the big freshwater lake and watching the beautiful birds, swamp forest, and the floating houses where the local people live. This trip focused on nature and real life of Khmer.
How is the environment important in your work?
If the environment is terrible, I think no tourist will come to my country, so I have no job too. Without the environment, with dirty water, and other things affecting the birds, trees, and fishes, I will find it difficult to work with tourist and just to live myself as well. So, the environment is really important to my work and people in my country.
Are there any communities where you take tour groups that are being affected by changes in the climate or environment?
Yes, there are, including the Prek Toal Floating Village community When climate change happens, it becomes more difficult for people living in their floating village because their lives focus on nature and the environment.
[For] some years people have a hard time finding the fish for consumption because there’s less water. Fish are very important for people who are living in the village. Forest fire also occurred during the dry season and killed animals, birds, and fish that lost their habitat. The people have no land for farming.
Trees are also cut down by people or destroyed by fire, so now there are not so many big trees for connecting their [floating] houses. Without big trees close by, there is no mooring to connect their house and control it from moving when there is a lot of water or wind.
How are people in these communities adapting to these changes?
Even as the climate changes and it makes it difficult for people living in the floating house, the people still stay there and try to adapt to the situation because most of them have no other place to go or live. They try to catch the fish when the water goes down and process it by smoking or drying the fish in order to keep it a long time and eat it later when they can’t find more. Sometimes they plant the vegetables on the floating garden for cooking instead of buying from market.
Some people work as a boat driver or fish worker and other jobs in the village to get some income to support their family. But some people will migrate to the mainland to find a job if there is no food to eat in the village.
Do they receive any support from aid organizations, the government, or others?
Some received support from NGOs and the government, but not everybody. And it is not every month, only something like on time per year or two years.
In your opinion, is there enough work being done to minimize the climate-related issues you’re seeing on the ground?
In my opinion, not enough. In Cambodia, mostly the people don’t care about the environment. They care only about their family. Education is still poor in Cambodia.
I think it will affect things long-term if the people do not protect the environment together. If things do not change, it will impact Cambodia as a whole. People will live and die by climate change one day.
This interview has been edited for clarity.
11 February 2021 – by Flora Bensadon
When it comes to the question of refugees and providing aid, the Global North is first in line with answers and propositions. However, when it comes to acting on the agreed upon policies and practices, the Global North is also first to counter-act with policies relieving the states from cooperation and burden sharing to protect their own interests (Behrman 2019:59). Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a dramatic increase in refugee flows, to which states in the Global North answered by restricting entry to their territory. As we move into the 21st Century, the world now faces new challenges and the emergence of a new type of refugee: those fleeing their countries due to climate related issues. The Global North adopted restrictive policies when faced with the ongoing refugee crisis, which leads us to believe it will do the same throughout the 21st Century. This essay will thus be focusing on just that.
First, we will define the system of remote control and discuss the different border controls set in place within the Global North. We will continue by establishing the lack of governance within the international refugee regime, which eventually leads to a lack of accountability of the Global North with regard to refugees. Finally, we will discuss the role of public opinion in the refugee protection discourse.
Remote Control
Remote control is a “system of passports, visas, and passenger ship checks” that keeps people from leaving for certain destinations without having passed initial screening (Fitzgerald 2019:4). For instance, states have put in place pre-clearances in foreign airports to avoid having refugees reach their territories. The same governments also converge on global visa policies, carrier sanctions and liaison officers (Fitzgerald 2019:14-15). In addition, they campaign for remote control throughout the countries of departure, like the British government did in 1934. They successfully pressured the Greek government to pass a law prohibiting anyone without a valid passport or visa to leave from Greece to Palestine (Fitzgerald 2019:5). These policies of expulsion, and many others, are meant to keep asylum seekers away from the Global North (Fitzgerald 2019:1). Because of the non-refoulement clause of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Hatton 2020:82) that prevents refugees from being sent back to their persecutors once on the territory, states now result in the manipulation of territoriality (Fitzgerald 2019:9). It allows states the possibility to refuse entry to refugees by saying they did not actually step foot into their territory.
Border reinforcements of wealthier democratic states therefore suggest the following: While the respective governments do cooperate amongst themselves to exclude refugees and migrants, there is a lack of willingness to cooperate in the burden-sharing when it comes to the reception of refugees. Yet, more lenient border policies would further provide refugees with protection and aid by providing them basic human rights. This entails access to safety, to food, to shelter, to healthcare, to education and to work (Feldman 2012:391). However, given the current geopolitical context, it does not seem that recipient states would enact such policies due to the fact that they perceive refugees as an economic strain (Behrman 2019:59).
Refugees can first be perceived as an economic strain because of the expanses spent by host countries to provide them with the necessary protection, which is with national resources and services, as previously mentioned. This would result, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, in refugees costing countries of the European Union 0.1% of their GDP (Shellito 2016:16). In addition, refugees might also disturb local economic markets, from food to housing, thus altering prices. For instance, Turkey has faced a sharp increase in rental pricing because of the refugee crisis, which hurts Turkish families with relatively low incomes (Shellito 2016:17). And so, because refugees can negatively impact host countries’ economy, said countries are less inclined to adopt lenient border policies.
Lack of Governance
The international refugee regime has always lacked a clearly defined system of global governance, allowing states of the Global North to avoid their responsibilities. It remains restrained as it contains no binding obligation on states to cooperate or ensure the functioning of the regime (Betts and Milner 2020:1-4). In turn, this weak governance has prevented important forms of dialogue, political engagement and cooperation, which are necessary to facilitate international cooperation or the realization of the regime’s core objective: solutions for the protection of refugees (Betts and Milner 2020:4), including those affected by climate change.
The United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) the regime’s primary institution, was founded to provide this protection; it also supervises the application of conventions and develops international refugee law (Goodwin-Gill 2020:2). However, the UNHCR’s financial structure was designed to make it dependent on Western states as it relies mostly on the donation of those governments (Parekh 2020:28). Its role is to supervise the international refugee regime and publish non-binding guidelines on the application of international refugee law. Because the UNHCR does not hold power to enforce any rule of law (Goodwin-Gill 2020:40), it constrains its ability to resist or influence the actions and interests of more powerful states (Betts and Milner 2020:2). Thus, as nothing prevents governments of the Global North from prioritizing their own interests above their responsibility to help refugees, they have no incentive to cooperate with the international refugee regime any more than they already do (Parekh 2020:23).
Finally, states of the Global North measure their success in the refugee regime in their ability to control refugees by containing them in their regions of origin (Betts and Milner 2020:7) or monitoring their movement through remote-control policies (Behrman 2019:48). And so, as long as refugees remain in the Global South, whether in their home region or refugee camps, governments will neither be motivated to cooperate empathetically, nor feel the pressure to assume their share of the burden (Betts and Milner 2020:7).
Lack of Accountability
States within the Global North have a duty to rescue due to the superior means they possess over developing countries. However, because they are not the cause of the problem, nor have they initiated the events that forced refugees to flee their countries of origin, they minimize their obligations toward refugees (Parekh 2020:23). Although their duty to protect and rescue comes second to their own interests, states of the Global North are still seen as rescuers. As a result, they are somewhat excused from taking on too much of the burden of refugees (Parekh 2020:24). As it is not clear who should be responsible for the protection of displaced persons, those who fail to rescue are rarely held accountable.
However, if wealthier states with actual resources to help cannot be blamed for not upholding their duty of rescue, they can be blamed for being co-contributors to a system that structurally prevents the majority of refugees from seeking refuge because of the aforementioned remote-control policies (Parekh 2020:27). If not held accountable for their actions, governments will continue to allow the perpetuation of human rights violations refugees face.
For example, in 2010, following the destructive earthquake that occurred in Haiti, Haitians have been granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS); it allowed them to work legally in the United States (US). Unfortunately, in 2017, the Trump administration attempted to end TPS for Haitians (Macdonald 2019). Although it did not succeed, this kind of behavior is a clear indicator of the current US president’s stance toward refugees, bringing us to believe that cooperation and burden-sharing will not be increased in the near-future. And consequently, without accountability, governments might try to further minimize their role within the international refugee regime.
Public Opinion
Finally, while governments of the Global North have been struggling between their own interests and their moral obligations to refugees, the rise of nationalism has only added fuel to the push back against refugees (Parekh 2010:23). Although populist political parties might not always get elected in office, they still shift the agendas of other political parties towards a more anti-immigration stance (Hatton 2020:87). In fact, general public opinion has shifted dramatically against immigrants all across the Global North, due to the overall climate that surrounds refugees and asylum seekers more specifically (Hatton 2020:88). For example, because public opinion is strongly against unauthorized entry; an increase in the number of arrivals has induced hardened attitudes towards immigrants as a whole (Hatton 2020:89).
As the decisions of the democratic governments in the Global North normally reflect the majority of the populations’ point of view towards a contentious topic, the rise of nationalism across the Global North has the ability to reveal the poignant possibility that the burden-sharing and cooperation of Western governments and related institutions within the international refugee regime will not increase in the decades to come.
Flora Bensadon is a recent graduate of History and International Development from McGill University, Canada. Through her studies, her culturally diverse background and her travels, Flora has taken a profound interest in the problems of migration, specifically those of climate refugees.
References
Alexander Betts and James Milner. May 2019. “Governance of the Global Refugee Regime,” World Refugee Council Research Paper No. 13: 1–14.
David Scott FitzGerald. 2019. “Never Again?” In: Refuge Beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers, 21–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
David Scott FitzGerald. 2019. “The Catch-22 of Asylum Policy,” In: Refuge Beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers, 1–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 February 2021 – by Keila McFarland Dias
Paulo Ricardo is a Brazilian activist who holds as his mission to make environmental justice a reality in all societal, governmental and institutional spheres. Paulo is the Climate Group coordinator at Engajamundo, an NGO created by young people who believe in their responsibility as a key part of the solution when it comes to tackling the greatest social and environmental crises our world is faced with. A central objective of Engajamundo is to empower and educate the Brazilian youth in the face of environmental and social issues. Engajamundo is built on four pillars: education, advocacy, mobilisation and civic participation, expanding on five work groups, which focus on Climate, the SDGs (UN Sustainable Goals), Gender, Biodiversity and Sustainable Cities , respectively. This is a highly effective approach as one cannot speak about climate change mitigation without addressing, for instance, how climate change aggravates gender inequality.
Engajamundo has been an active organisation in multiple United Nations Climate Change Conferences. The diversity brought by Engajamundo to these conferences acts as a channel fostering an intersectional and inclusive environmental movement. What is often overlooked is the vast array of challenges that NGOs such as Engajamundo are faced with when accessing these international spaces. Following the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Brazil became a leading actor driving environmental protection efforts. Nevertheless, under the present Bolsonaro government, certain privileges awarded to non-governmental organisations, such as credentials to attend the UN Conferences of Parties (hereinafter COPs), were removed, thus hindering the representation of relevant groups in international conferences and consequently silencing the voices of the communities most affected by climate change. Paulo explains how, beyond the lack of governmental support, another challenge relates to the financial barriers imposed on organisations from the Global South: even though Engajamundo is the leading youth climate organisations in Brazil, the lack of resources impedes the representatives of this NGO to have a seat at the table in these high-level conferences that so greatly impact decision-making. This is a contrasting (and devastating) reality compared to the easier access to these conferences enjoyed by Global North activists, which further accentuates how these events tend to be inordinately influenced by the elites.
Additional challenges are found in the realm of language barriers: Brazil is the only country in Latin America that has portuguese as its official language, therefore indigenous peoples and other ethinic/racial minorities struggle to be able to speak on behalf of their communities as access to the English language is virtually reserved for the wealthy parts of Brazilian society. An important objective of Engajamundo is to open spaces for people with these language barriers to be able engage in environmental decision-making, thus striving to make the movement more accessible, intersectional and balanced. Engajamundo translates the jargon of what is decided in these conferences in order for the general public to actively participate in climate change mitigation efforts, given that for decades the environmental movement has been a distant one predominantly embraced by the elitist categories of society, consequently neglecting the experiences and rights of marginalised communities, reflecting the imbalance of power of the global structure.
Mainstream environmentalism remains strongly white and middle/upper-class in character, it has therefore excluded the experiences and rights of people of colour. Herein lies the weakness of the environmental movement: it traditionally seeks solutions “from the very demographic that is most complicit with causing and benefiting from exploitation and environmental degradation”. A widespread misconception has been that environmental protection has been primarily driven by Western activists. In 2018, youth climate activism gathered “momentum” through Fridays for Future , founded by Greta Thunberg. Albeit being an important part of climate activism, the media has terribly misconceived this movement as the first of its kind.
Youth climate advocacy and action for change in different corners of the world have taken place for decades, nevertheless, these remain invisible. We must not fail to point out that the immense spotlight placed on Greta has been a result of her privilege as a white person from Europe, which Paulo has discussed with Greta herself. Her achievements are honourable and have certainly helped in consolidating the movement, nevertheless , it is crucial to highlight that in countries such as Brazil, grass-roots organisations, especially those that are youth-led and/or led by vulnerable groups most affected by the climate crisis, have been actively engaging in the fight against the environmental crisis for decades yet have received no such recognition.
The voices of environmental activists from the Global South have been blatantly silenced by systemic racism. An abysmal example of racism took place during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland: Ugandan climate activist Vanessa Nakate gave a conference alongside fellow climate advocates Loukina Tille, Luisa Neubauer, Greta Thunberg, and Isabelle Axelsson. Nakate, the only activist representing the Global South, was however removed from a photo taken of the group, which sparked fierce debate over race and media representation. “Her voice is just as, if not more, valuable than ours in a place like this” , wrote Axelsson. Nakate has stated that this racist act performed by Associated Press, represented the erasure of the continent, as “Africa is the least emitter of carbons, but we are the most affected by the climate crisis…You erasing our voices won’t change anything. You erasing our stories won’t change anything.” Founder of Rise Up Climate Movement , which aims to amplify the voices of activists from Africa and spearheading the campaign to save Congo’s rainforest, which is facing massive deforestation, Nakate has been a leading activist not only in her country but in the continent as a whole, and regrettably the reason which brought her visibility was this instance of flagrant racism and discrimination. Paulo stresses that the BIPOC community has been at the forefront of the fight against climate change long before the movement gained prominence, yet they are made invisible and virtually excluded from decision making, in addition to being stripped from their achievements as they are constantly “measured” against white activists.
The environmental movement has a long-standing, uneasy relationship with racial politics. “There’s a level of racism in the movement itself, where some folks think that talking about these issues is a distraction,” said Jacqueline Patterson, director of the NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program . The racism and implicit bias is evident within environmentalism, therefore elevating racial justice within the movement has been a constant struggle, despite the scientific evidence that demonstrates that racial and ethnic minorities are the communities most at risk from climate change. The year of 2020 brought to the fore a reality that has burdened the BIPOC community around the globe: that of environmental racism . Paulo sheds light on the disproportionate impacts of climate change on people living in slums, people living far away from the urban cores, the indigenous tribes, and other marginalised communities. Communities that unjustly carry the burden of discrimation and racism are further impacted by climate change as governments do not comply with their international obligations to respect and safeguard basic fundamental rights. In the USA, for instance, over 14,3 million people of colour live in areas under high levels of pollution due to decades of residential segregation and racial injustice. In Brazil, the issue of environmental racism is even further aggravated as the country is governed by politicians who, like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, believe that climate change is a Marxist plot, proving how this is a negationist and negligent government. The most striking example of environmental racism in Brazil is the lack of basic sanitation, which, albeit being a right guaranteed by the Constitution and defined by law, disproportionately impacts neighbourhoods of people of colour.
It is important to highlight how the government itself has launched attacks on the environment, for instance, Brazilian Minister of the Environment Ricardo Salles called for environmental deregulation while public was “distracted” by COVID-19, which was condemned by Greenpeace Brasil spokeswoman Luiza Lima stating that “ Salles believes that people dying in line at hospitals is a good opportunity to move forward on his anti-environmental project .” Alarmingly, the government froze two initiatives targeting environmental protection, namely, the Fundo Clima (Climate Fund) and Fundo Amazônia (Amazon Fund). Therefore, in June 2020, three legal actions were brought against Bolsonaro’s government by, inter alia , Greenpeace and the Brazilian Association of Members of the Ministry of the Environment. Top level politicians propagate a discourse that is contrary to the environmental protection agenda. According to Tica Minami, Brasil’s Greenpeace Programme Director, “this is a government that neglects its role in protecting the rainforest, as it incentivises deforestation. As a result, destruction levels, criminality and violence have exploded in the Amazon”, increasing Brazilian emissions and breaching the human rights of the indigenous communities living in the rainforest. Engajamundo diligently works towards changing this reality as its representatives lobby for environmental justice, by bringing climate litigation strategies. Paulo concluded the interview speaking about how Brazilian climate activists engage in this fight against climate change on the basis of their need to survive. As emphasised by Paulo, “a luta pela justiça nunca pode parar ” (the struggle for justice must never stop): climate justice will never be achieved in a world that is deprived of racial and ethnic justice, therefore it is imperative to uplift the voices of BIPOC activists and amplify their narratives, as they are key to solving the environmental crisis.
This interview was conducted by E&U For the Climate in collaboration with Human Rights Pulse and Earth Refuge during January 2021, a month dedicated to Environmental Justice and Human Rights.
The author and interviewer Keila McFarland Dias is the co-founder of E&U For the Climate.
8 Maggie Wang
Hurricane Eta, the twelfth hurricane of the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season, made landfall in Central America on 3 November. In the following days, Eta wreaked havoc across Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras, leaving over 200 dead and thousands more without homes.
The rainfall, winds, and flooding from Eta produced an estimated seven billion dollars in damage and left few lives in the region untouched. A mere 13 days later, Hurricane Iota followed in Eta’s wake, creating an additional $1.25 billion in damage.
It is worth noting that these climate challenges are not exclusive to Central America, and these events are not new. Steve Trent, executive director of the Environmental Justice Foundation, notes, “Eta and Iota are one wake-up call among many—Maria, Idai, Irma, Harvey, Katrina, Kenneth. There is a litany of names of increasingly destructive hurricanes and cyclones that are causing the death or displacement of millions. Every day brings new damning stories from every corner of the world.” The stories are even more damning when they involve the destruction or displacement of thousands of families and the erosion of entire cultures and ways of life.
It will take years for the region to recover from the damage caused by Eta and Iota, much of which was uninsured. Immediate relief attempts have already faced difficulties due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the unstable nature of many governments and communities in the region will require careful attention both in the long and short term.
In particular, Eta and Iota will likely spur new waves of internal and international migration, which must be anticipated and adequately addressed to ensure the safety of affected populations. The “Dry Corridor” of Central America faces the combined impacts of both “slow-onset” hazards, such as drought and sea-level rise, and “sudden-onset” hazards, such as hurricanes. Pablo Escribano, a Thematic Specialist in Migration, Environment and Climate Change at the International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean, observes that this combination makes Central America particularly vulnerable.
Many of the communities that bore the brunt of Eta and Iota relied on small-scale agriculture, and these sudden-onset disasters caused further disruption to a way of life already under threat from slow-onset hazards. In Central America, relief and recovery efforts are complicated by state fragility, which has allowed for the growth of organised crime. These vulnerabilities may make migration a compelling solution. Driven by the knowledge that their home communities are unlikely to be restored to liveable condition for years, if at all, migrants may seek refuge and opportunity in cities in their home countries. If their home states are unable to provide for them, many may also choose to migrate across borders.
The challenges, then, are twofold. First, governments, IGOs, and NGOs must provide for the needs of the displaced with particular attention to women and minority groups whose needs have historically been overlooked and who, as a result, face additional burdens in migrating or rebuilding their livelihoods. Second, they must create long-term visions and frameworks to build resilience amongst affected communities and prepare for inevitable future disasters.
The Challenges to Forming a Solution
Addressing the needs of these displaced peoples is complicated by the lack of information surrounding the links between climate change and migration. Escribano highlights that surveys of the caravan that brings Central American migrants to the United States-Mexico border have not been able to deduce whether climate change and extreme weather have motivated significant migration. Instead, most cite economic hardship and loss of livelihood as their reasons for migrating, even though climate may be a driver of such hardship.
Similarly, Escribano says, “we’ve managed to raise attention to the areas of origin of migrants, but we’re not paying as much attention to destination areas or figuring out where these migrants settle and what challenges they face.” By filling these gaps in knowledge, policymakers and humanitarian groups will be able to understand migrants’ needs, better help them adapt to their new surroundings and establish the support networks necessary to economic and social stability.
One key area of concern is cities. Migrants to urban areas face difficulties in building social safety nets, and in Central America they frequently seek employment in the informal economy. However, the informal labour market is highly unstable and provides limited access to healthcare and other resources; so migrants remain vulnerable to crime and exploitation. These hazards are compounded for women and ethnic minorities. Urban development must be mindful both of creating and addressing sustainability goals and of promoting the welfare of these underserved populations.
Some governments in Central America are beginning to recognise the link between migration and climate change. Belize, for example, has integrated migration issues into its national climate strategy. After Eta and Iota struck in November, the Guatemalan and Honduran governments called for international recognition and assistance in addressing the climate crisis. Yet, as Andrew Harper, the UNHCR’s Special Advisor on Climate Action, notes, “in Central America, there are a number of states that have been in denial about climate change, but those states are also the ones that are often being hammered by extreme weather events.” As a result, Harper continues, “you have to be smart in how you approach these issues. You have to find a common point of understanding.”
However, though some governments are finding themselves no longer able to deny climate change, they continue to overlook the impacts of events like Eta and Iota on migration and mobility. The latest migrant caravan, which departed from Honduras in mid-January, has been met with violence and disdain by the Guatemalan and Mexican governments. Ironically, however, as Amali Tower, founder and executive director of Climate Refugees, observes, “the Trump administration slashed aid to Central American countries intended to aid development of jobs and sustainable farming.” Had such aid not been slashed, migration may not have become as pressing a concern.
These developments have placed migrants in a double bind, which has been particularly challenging for the region’s Indigenous communities. Tower points to “structural discrimination, systemic exclusion, and a long history of human rights abuses, including land dispossession and even environmental leaders being killed” as a few of the reasons why “it’s not surprising that the development of Indigenous populations in every Central American country lags far behind national averages”. Climate change, including desertification and sea level rise, is already forcing Indigenous peoples to leave their ancestral homelands, thereby uprooting the fragile cultural and social structures that have afforded them agency in otherwise deeply hostile surroundings.
Yet, the situation is not without hope. Kayly Ober, Senior Advocate and Program Manager of the Climate Displacement Program at Refugees International, points to sustainable development solutions that focus on building resilience in order to enable access to key resources that allow people to remain in their communities in the face of climate change. This includes, for instance, flood- or drought-resistant seeds, alternative irrigation methods, and skills training for occupations outside of agriculture. Ober states that “it’s about giving people options and enabling them to live in dignity”.
The EJF’s Steve Trent echoes the importance of living in dignity, pointing out that “99% of all deaths from weather-related disasters occur in the world’s 50 least developed countries, which contribute less than 1% of global carbon emissions”. Recognising the rights and listening to the voices of those most affected by climate injustice is therefore key to formulating effective policies at the national and international levels.
When it comes to formulating such policies, Andrew Harper remains positive: “people now recognise that, the longer we delay, the more far-reaching and costly and lethal the consequences are”. Trent expresses a similar sentiment, stating that “it is not too late to act. What is needed now, above all, is political will and leadership”. The COVID-19 pandemic may have provided some of that will. On one hand, Harper points out that though the pandemic may have distracted people from the issue of climate change, on the other, it has demonstrated that communities can join together in the face of an existential threat.
The struggles and lessons from Central America’s experience with Eta and Iota serve as an urgent warning. Countless other communities, ranging from Scandinavia to the Sahel to the South Pacific, are facing similar challenges. Though there is still time to act, it is limited. Only with proactive governments equipped with a strong understanding of the needs of their people can the climate crisis—and the migration issues that inevitably follow—be adequately addressed.
This article was originally published by Human Rights Pulse on 5 February 2021 as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.
Maggie is an undergraduate at the University of Oxford, where she has held leadership roles with a student-run publishing house and a student-run art gallery, among other groups. She is particularly interested in womxn’s rights, disability rights, prisoners’ rights, and environmental justice.
4 February 2021 – by Gabriela Freeman
One year ago, Australia was hit by a bushfire season of unprecedented scale and intensity, causing widespread environmental destruction and loss of property, and life. Now eclipsed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Trump-Biden election, last year’s devastating phenomenon is becoming a distant memory. Though this does not mask the reality that thirty-three human lives were lost, over 3,000 homes were destroyed,[1] and three billion animals were killed or displaced.[2]
I was living in Canberra, Australia, during what is now colloquially known as the ‘Black Summer’. It felt as if the apocalypse was near. For weeks, we lived in a cloud of yellow smoke through which, at times, you would be lucky to see a few metres ahead. As bushfire smoke carries hazardous particles, residents started wearing bulky P2 masks both in- and outdoors – mind this was pre-COVID times. The smoke permeated inside our houses, and many experienced respiratory issues, constant headaches and sore eyes. As fires approached borders, many residents had to evacuate their homes.
Every day we heard stories of family members, friends, and other Australians who fell victim to the bitter harvest of one of Australia’s worst bushfires. I have cousins who are farmers in New South Wales that lost over 700 sheep and cattle to the flames. While they stayed to defend their property against encroaching fires which saved the structure of the house itself, many other vital resources turned into ash. With hundreds of thousands of hectares of farmland burnt, countless other farmers suffered the same fate or worse, and will be recovering for years to come.
Roughly a week after the worst of the bushfires passed, and less than 24 hours after a massive dust storm blanketed entire towns and again blacked out the sun, Canberra was lashed with a severe hailstorm.[3] In the middle of summer and with bushfires burning across the country, golf ball-sized hailstones damaged thousands of cars, buildings, and trees, and injured or killed many animals.
Reparable damage to a car or house pales in comparison to stories from tiny Pacific island nations, whose residents have already permanently lost significant areas of liveable or arable land due to rising sea levels. Yet all of these extreme weather events are portents of impending climate crises which will continue to cause destruction and loss of life until drastic action is taken.
A climate migrant is forced to relocate when life in their current home becomes insupportable. As we are already seeing climate change-related disasters cause unsustainable living situations, it is no longer a hypothetical scenario for future generations to face, but a reality occurring within our lifetimes. These stories represent the beginning of such conditions that will only continually worsen, and ultimately result in an increase in climate migrants.
Current systems are failing climate migrants. Not only are governments and corporations neglecting to make the extreme policy changes necessary to halt climate change, but existing legal frameworks are insufficient to protect climate migrants in their plight. The international community has an obligation to undertake a reform agenda in this area, in order to afford increasing numbers of vulnerable climate migrants the protections they require and deserve. A bushfire season of this magnitude will certainly not be our last.
Gabriela Freeman is a soon-to-be lawyer and graduate of Law and International Relations from the Australian National University. Gabriela’s diverse cultural background and love of nature have influenced her twin passions for human rights, particularly for migrants and refugees, and the environment. She is committed to gaining the skills to effectively advocate for marginalised people, and meaningfully contribute to the climate justice movement. Outside of work, you can find her outdoors in the Australian bush, reading Richard Bach, or learning to play the drums.
[1] https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick_Guides/AustralianBushfires
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-53549936
[3] Images below by author Gabriela Freeman
31 Elsabé Boshoff
Poverty and Environment
The view that poverty leads to pollution and environmental destruction, or that poorer people care less about the environment, was for a long time firmly embedded in traditional views of environmentalism. Western environmentalists sought to conserve the natural environment in selected protected zones or areas, often displacing local communities that had lived on the land for centuries. This approach not only had limited success in addressing wider ecological challenges, but also caused social injustices and further marginalisation of vulnerable groups. A similar approach underlies some development models, according to which a community or state must first reach a certain level of economic development before they could (or should) be concerned with addressing environmental destruction.
Yet in reality, poorer people often live closer to the land and have a more direct interest and concern in environmental protection. For example, while wealthy people can afford to move to clean, pollution-free areas, economically and socially marginalised people often suffer the health and quality of life consequences of environmental destruction and waste generated by the wealthy.
Furthermore, we live in what the chemist and Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen has termed the Anthropocene; an epoch where no part of the world remains unaffected or untouched by negative human influences and destruction. This destruction ranges from polluting 88 percent of the ocean surface with plastic waste, to causing an estimated 1 million species to be threatened by extinction, to even changing the chemistry of the air. Today it is clear that the “pollute now, clean up later” model which most developed countries followed, is no longer a feasible option. At the same time, consumption and inequality, and thus the asymmetrical consequences of environmental destruction, continue to rise.
Intersecting Social and Environmental Vulnerabilities
In recognition of this reality, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the world’s governments at a special UN Summit in 2015 under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Agenda 2030 and the SDGs serve as the current blueprint for the future of humanity. Comprising 17 Goals, the SDGs cover all aspects of human wellbeing, from peace to clean water, gender equality to climate action. Under the slogan of “leave no-one behind” the SDGs aim to eradicate poverty and hunger, reduce inequality within and among states, and provide a “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity”. It recognises that ecological sustainability and environmental protection cannot be reached without addressing people’s basic needs and ensuring a more equitable sharing of the limited planetary resources. Conversely, it also recognises that people can only “fulfil their potential […] in a healthy environment”.
However, the idea that the people who suffer most from social and economic injustices are also the worst affected by environmental degradation and destruction, has a longer history. The Environmental Justice (EJ) movement emerged in the United States in the 1980s, when a predominantly African American neighbourhood in Warren County, North Carolina, was identified by the government to host a toxic landfill. This started a national movement of people speaking out against environmental injustices targeting communities based on their “race and economic status”. Despite its origins in the US, EJ has a lot in common with the “environmentalism of the poor” as it developed in other parts of the world around the same time. From India, to Brazil, to Nigeria, local groups have risen up in protest over oil extraction, dam construction, mining, and monoculture production affecting marginalised groups. Broadly conceived, the term EJ could be applied to this wide range of activities all rejecting the “unequal distribution of ecological costs and benefits”.
Synergies and Complementarity of SDGs and Environmental Justice
There are many ways in which the aims and principles of EJ and the SDG targets overlap, especially in the inseparability of social and ecological concerns, in the recognition of the need to address inequality and intersecting vulnerabilities, and in addressing patterns of consumption which underlay inequality and degradation.
They also complement one another in that the SDGs set concrete targets for achieving these common aims, such as ensuring that all people have access to clean water and sanitation (Goal 6), affordable and sustainable energy (Goal 7), sustainable industrialisation (Goal 9) and inclusive, safe and resilient cities (Goal 11).
SDG Goal 16 is also closely related to the ambitions of EJ, in that it explicitly aims to achieve access to justice for all. SDG 16 in particular “calls for non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development – to ensure that the SDGs leave no one behind”. It also requires of states to provide for inclusive processes for decision-making, access by the public to information and equitable access to justice, thereby empowering people to direct the various elements of development above.
EJ on the other hand affirms “the right to be free from ecological destruction”. This language of “rights” supplements the language in the SDGs which in the setting of “goals” and “targets” does not have the same strong component of entitlement and enforceability.
The areas of overlap between the SDGs and EJ in their aims and underlying principles allow them to be applied in a way that is mutually reinforcing. While the EJ is very much a grassroots movement, the SDGs are a globally orchestrated development plan implemented at the highest levels. Drawing on the strengths of each – local level advocacy and community mobilisation and participation of the EJ and the broad strategic aims of the SDGs – the two systems may strengthen the common goal of ecologically sustainable and equitable human development.
This article was originally published by Human Rights Pulse on 31 January 2021 as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.
Elsabé is a human rights lawyer by training and currently works in human rights at the African regional level. She is specifically interested in issues related to extractive industries, socio-economic rights, sustainable development and transitional justice. She is a co-editor of an edited volume: Governance, Human Rights and Political Transformation in Africa, and is excited to edit content for this inspiring initiative.
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