Category: Africa

8 June 2021 – by Rachel Aronoff

Climate-induced violence is rising in poverty-ridden regions across the earth, and women are being left in the shadows of its wrath.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, compounding variations in seasonality have resulted in an increased incidence of extreme weather events, acute environmental degradation, and a widespread decline in quality of life. With more than 95% of farmed land using rain-fed cultivation, these regions are heavily reliant on stable rainfall cycles to maintain annual agricultural yields. ¹ In recent years, increasing severity in climate variability has magnified the intensity and frequency of flooding and drought, exacerbating issues of food insecurity and resource scarcity throughout the land.

Changes in climate disproportionately impact the livelihoods of women because they possess limited social control and ownership of land, and often serve as primary caregivers within their communities. They also face increased exposure to gender-based violence during periods of economic and environmental upheaval, as well as harmful discrimination in the labour market, making it difficult to generate alternative sources of income as needed.

Economic pressures have intensified with environmental disaster in many rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, driving hunger-based fatalities. In Angola, girls as young as the age of 12 are resorting to prostitution in order to avoid starvation. ² Crisis coverage from the Thomas Reuters Foundation reports that “a girl might get 500 kwanzas ($1) for sex – enough to buy about a kilo of beans or two kilos of maize – but could get as little as 200 kwanzas.. Sometimes they earn as little as 5 RGT ($0.31) for one sexual encounter, which is .. not even enough to buy a loaf.” ³ These conditions simultaneously place girls at higher risk of sexual exploitation and human trafficking due to the subversive nature of the sex market.

In the Amboseli basin of southern Kenya, rising temperatures have caused rivers and grasslands to dry up, causing women and young girls to walk extensive distances to collect essential resources including firewood and water. ⁴ A field report conducted by the UN Africa Renewal program affirms that these tasks are both physically and mentally demanding, as it may take more than 20 hours per week to locate clean water, examine existing well levels, and carry the water home. ⁵ This process leaves young girls vulnerable to sexual assault and rape, whilst worsening the spread of infectious disease and infirmity within already weakened communities.

Environmental extremes also aggravate the prevalence of child marriage in various rural regions. The intensity and duration of recent dry spells have left countless families in dire need of basic resources, causing many to offer their daughters as brides to help ease financial stress. In rural districts of Malawi, “girls are forced sometimes to marry younger than 14. Some are impregnated by schoolteachers, some are forced to get married so the in-laws will bring bread and butter to their homes, others marry because of peer pressure. Especially when harvests are not good, these problems arise as girls are used to generate income.” ⁶

An increase in child marriage has further driven the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), as this procedure is often carried out in preparation for marriage. Despite bans that have been implemented to prohibit both of these practices, researchers in northern Kenya have witnessed a climate-related surge in cases. ⁷ Throughout the 2020/2021 season, periods of prolonged drought were superseded by widespread locust outbreaks, resulting in deeper impoverishment and irreparable damage to livestock and crops. Despairing households succumbed to desperate measures, marrying off their daughters in exchange for dowries. ⁸

Girls who have undergone FGM are also perceived as more ‘valuable’ in comparison to those who remain uncut, inviting higher bride prices. Many families are able to circumvent the bans on these practices by shipping their daughters to neighboring countries where laws are less restrictive, and having them sent back prior to marriage. ⁹

In the absence of government intervention, rates of child marriage and FGM will continue to rise in synchronicity with environmental disaster and displacement. A severe lack of legal reinforcement and safeguarding services in regions across Sub-Saharan Africa is contributing to this endless cycle of gender-based violence. If vulnerable areas are left without stronger protection aid, this issue will only continue to worsen as levels of hunger and extreme weather events become more pervasive.

It is vital to draw deeper attention to the connections between climate change and violence against women and children in order to subvert the underground nature in which many of these practices are conducted. In addressing the impacts of climate-sensitive stresses, it is crucial to accentuate the various gender disparities inherent in a shifting ecological framework.

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References

1.  Summary. (2021). International Water Management Institute. Retrieved May 24, 2021. https://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/issues/rainfed-agriculture/summary/

2.   Batha, Emma. (2020) Cheap as bread, girls sell sex to survive hunger crisis in Africa. (2020). Thomas Reuters Foundation News. Retrieved May 24, 2021. https://news.trust.org/item/20200130182713-wao6m/

3.  Batha, Emma. (2020).

4.   Kenya: The impact of climate change is worsening the issue of child marriage among the Maasai’. (2019). Minority Rights Group International. Retrieved May 24, 2021. https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2019_MR_Report_170x240_V7_WEB.pdf

5.  Mourdoukoutas, Eleni. (2016). Women Grapple With Harsh Weather. United Nations Africa Renewal. Retrieved May 24, 2021. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2016/women-grapple-harsh-weather

6. Climate change connections to HIV and AIDS. (2009). The Winds of Change: Climate change, poverty and the environment in Malawi, Oxfam International. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/winds-change

7.  Wadekar, Neha. (2020). Child Brides of Climate Change. Pulitzer Center. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/child-brides-climate-change

8.  Wadekar, Neha. (2020).

9.  Wadekar, Neha. (2020).

4 May 2021 – by Rachel Aronoff

Climate change is generating far-reaching effects on some of the most fragile populations and ecosystems on earth. Despite contributing the lowest carbon emissions per capita, climate-sensitive regions have been forced to bear the brunt of severe weather conditions and chronic biophysical changes in the environment.

Malawi, a landlocked country situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, remains one of the most vulnerable regions in the world affected by anthropogenic climate change. The land and the communities existing within it continue to be ravaged by extreme climate variability and environmental degradation, resulting in increased limitations in human mobility.

Throughout the past two decades, distinct inconsistencies in seasonal weather patterns have made it difficult for small-scale farmers and communities dependent on subsistence farming methods to maintain their livelihood. ¹ The worsening irregularities in seasonality have exacerbated issues of food insecurity and disease, whilst intensifying the pervasive sense of poverty that plagues a majority of the nation.

The country’s socioeconomic well-being is actively tied to agricultural output, with 80% of its rapidly expanding population occupying rural land through small-scale farming. ² A vast proportion of Malawian farmers depend on rainfed cultivation involving stable rainfall cycles to support agricultural production. This system heightens the risk of damage to annual crop yields, and limits the possibility of growth during dry seasons. Due to extreme financial affliction, the use of artificial water channeling remains particularly low, with less than 5 percent of farmers adopting irrigation methods. ³ The reliance on cyclical rainfall patterns amplifies the population’s susceptibility to the adverse effects of climate variability, such as flooding and drought.

Climate assessments reveal that seasonal dry and rainy conditions have become less predictable and more intense. During the 2016/2017 season, Malawi experienced extensive drought that led to acute crop failure and a sharp decline in agricultural production. ⁴ Simultaneously, crop yields had already dropped by 30 percent in the previous 2013/2014 season, adding to lingering issues of food insecurity and severe malnutrition. ⁵ Across the country, an estimated 6.5 million people – 39% of the population – including 3.5 million children are projected to have fallen below the annual minimum food requirements. ⁶ This has produced disturbing health effects on young and developing children, including issues of physical and cognitive impairment. More than 37 percent of children under the age of five (over 1 million) are stunted due to food insecure conditions. ⁷

Consecutive dry spells have prevailed in succeeding seasons, driving starvation rates. During the 2018/2019 season, 2.8 million people were identified as in crisis, with 450,000 people in immediate need of food. ⁸ The 2020 dry season brought prolonged drought to the Central and Southern regions of rural Malawi, resulting in limited crop production. The subsequent spread of the COVID-19 pandemic slowed the economy and drove steep rises in commodity prices, affecting the livelihoods of both rural and urban districts. ⁹ It is predicted that approximately 2.6 million people will require aid to combat food insecurity throughout the 2020/2021 season. ¹⁰

Widespread flooding in Malawi has also increased in magnitude and frequency in recent years. In 2019 alone, two major tropical cyclones decimated the country, leaving 731,879 people in immediate need, 99,728 people displaced, and 975,588 facing adverse effects. ¹¹

Changes in rainfall characteristics have made flooding more intense and destructive, exposing some of the poorest districts in the country to environmental displacement. Communities living in Nsanje, a marginalized region deeply prone to climate fluctuations, have been heavily displaced by recent flooding. ¹² Many are driven to evacuation camps after finding their homes, livestock, and community infrastructure dismantled by the floods.

These conditions disproportionately amplify the protection risks of women and children because they hold very little social autonomy or access to legal safeguarding services. An Oxfam report revealed that “women may well have little option but to resort to prostitution in order to get income to feed their children. In Bwemba, the women estimate that in between five and seven out of every 10 households the woman might resort to selling sex for food during the critical months of December to February.” ¹³

Environmental disaster and displacement also force women and young girls to travel further distances to retrieve water, leaving them vulnerable to rape and assault. These measures simultaneously fuel the spread of HIV and AIDs, resulting in greater poverty and weakness within the population. ¹⁴

A growing concern is that Malawi’s highly climate-sensitive economy is not equipped to adapt to the impending challenges of climate change. The compounding effects of heavy flooding in conjunction with extensive dry spells will result in increased mortality rates and environmental displacement on a national scale. In order to combat the various challenges presented by severe climate variability, it will be critical for mitigation and adaptation strategies to be implemented at a local level. Utilizing localized knowledge can help provide better insight into developing a strong adaptation framework that prioritizes the needs of those most deeply affected.

It is vital to recognize that the most destitute regions in the nation, and on earth, remain those most insidiously neglected and adversely affected by the impacts of climate change. The ongoing climate crisis in Malawi will continue to deteriorate if its effects on highly vulnerable communities are left unchecked. In developing deeper awareness of the present and forthcoming threats of climate instability, we must mobilize greater urgency to move towards a more climate-resilient future.

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References

1.  Agriculture and Food Insecurity: Malawi. (2017). US Agency for International Development. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://www.usaid.gov/malawi/agriculture-and-food-security

2.  Agriculture and Food Insecurity: Malawi. (2017).

3.  Climate Smart Agriculture In Malawi. (2018). Climate-smart agriculture (CSA)

considerations,  The World Bank. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/CSA%20_Profile_Malawi.pdf

4.  Climate Change Impacts in Malawi. (2020). Assessing the impacts of climate change on the agriculture sectors in Malawi, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Retrieved April 27, 2021.

5.  Climate Change Impacts in Malawi. (2020).

6.  La Niña Events Impact Eastern and Southern Africa. (2016). ReliefWeb, OCHA Services. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/malawi-floods-final-report-emergency-appeal-n-mdrmw014-20-december-2020

7.  Kumchulesi, G. (2018). Persistence of Child Malnutrition in Malawi: Explanations from Demographic and Health Surveys. Journal of African Development, 20(1), 69-75. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jafrideve.20.1.006

8.  Anyadike, Obi. (2019). Drought in Africa leaves 45 million in need across 14 countries. The New Humanitarian. Retrieved April 27, 2021.

9.  Malawi. (2021). Over 2.6 million people in need of food assistance in Malawi. ReliefWeb, OCHA Services. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/malawi-floods-final-report-emergency-appeal-n-mdrmw014-20-december-2020

10.  Malawi. (2021).

11.  Situation Analysis. (2021). Malawi: Floods Final Report – Emergency Appeal. ReliefWeb. OCHA Services. Retrieved April 27, 2021.

vhttps://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/malawi-floods-final-report-emergency-appeal-n-mdrmw014-20-december-2020

12.  Situation Analysis. (2021).

13.  Climate change connections to HIV and AIDS. (2009). The Winds of Change: Climate change, poverty and the environment in Malawi, Oxfam International. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/winds-change

14.  Climate change connections to HIV and AIDS. (2009).

15 April 2021 – by Elias Nepa

INTRODUCTION

International responses to growing conflict in nations struggling to overcome the consequences of imperialism, capitalism, and neoliberal policy are hypocritical and hyperbolic at best, and deplorable at worst.

The provision of foreign aid in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is extended myopically. It securitizes sexual violence^[i], lacks structures supportive of restitution, and fails to ameliorate the legitimate losses of community safety, institutional rights, and welfare post-conflict. In this essay, focus will be placed on two areas within DRC: international aid and its distribution and the implications for the community safety, human rights, and welfare of its citizens.

The provision of international aid in DRC focuses on addressing gender-specific threats, and gender-based violence in particular. This paper employs an intersectional eco-feminist approach to explore the issues of women’s experiences of education inequality, gender-based violence, and environmental injustice to explain why it is necessary to create multi-pronged approaches to mitigate sexual violence in DRC.

This work serves to clarify and underscore the lack of interconnectedness in the policies governing the provision of international aid with regard to education inequality, gender-based violence, and education inequality. In critically exposing the links and inequalities within and between the three, this work implores a policy direction that does not utilize a singular focus but rather encompasses these facets in tandem. In sum, this approach urges a view of the gender-based violence of women as a nodal point ^[ii] in which each of the aforementioned facets receives the appropriate and necessary support within a nexus of complex and intertwined – as opposed to independent – human rights issues.

BACKGROUND

Gender-based violence takes center-stage in the context of international aid, feminist thought, and conversation on equality. The effort to recognize gender-based violence, threats, and insecurities on an international scale has been thoroughly documented. Established as a war crime in 1919, rape was first tried in 1997. The trial of Jean Paul Akayesu was the first to prosecute rape as a war crime and act of genocide. His trial correlates with the emergence of indictments and trials of rape.^[iii]

Hansen^[iv] recognizes that the pursuit of rape-related indictments in the historical context of former Yugoslavia as an important step in the international codification of rape during wartime as a humanitarian problem during the early 1990’s. When the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1820 in 2008^[v], it was celebrated as a success for the effort of feminists to place gender-based violence, gender specific insecurities, and threats women face on the international stage. Resolution 1820 explicitly recognizes sexual violence as a weapon of war and a threat to international peace and security.

However, this was not without significant effort from the academy. Sara Merger’s article on the Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security^[vi] provides great insight on the feminist background and context of gender-based violence in international security. The feminist literature of international conflict-related sexual violence has understood and conceptualized two camps as explanatory variables within the context of gender inequality, military culture, and armed conflicts.^[vii]

The ‘opportunistic’ camp asserts that conflict-related sexual violence stems from soldiers’ masculine identity and claim to power; soldiers will rape because they are men, or because they are soldiers, or because they are men and soldiers.^[viii],[ix] The widely adopted ‘weapon of war’ perspective argues that conflict-related sexual violence is used strategically by combatants for specific objectives “such as accessing and extracting material resources or undermining enemy morale.”^[x],[xi] As it stands now, sexual violence as a weapon of war is recognized in “at least 12 Security Council resolutions passed since 2000 rivaling nuclear and biological weapons, terrorism, arms proliferation for receiving the most attention among security actors.”^[xii]

This securitization of sexual violence is seen as an accomplishment amongst feminists, which gives it incredible political value, and deliberately frames sexual violence as a commodified item similar to that of arms or biological weapons. However, it is arguable that this commodification enables a conceptual – and forceful – mutation of our understanding of sexual violence that obfuscates feminist values and understandings of sexual violence, the gendered hierarchies, dimensions, inequities that inform it, and ultimately obscures the structures, power dynamics, and social consequences that underpin everyday sexual violence. According to Merger, securitization effectively decontextualizes and homogenizes sexual violence, augments aid strategies, and creates a political economy of sexual violence. These unintended effects shamefully neglect the intersections of institutional inequality that perpetuate perpetration during conflict and under normal conditions. Little distinction is made between and amongst perpetrators of sexual violence, between and amongst victims, and between the purposes of sexual violence in this framework.^[xiii]

In decontextualizing and homogenizing the experience of sexual violence to fit neatly into the securitization framework, incidences of gender-based violence are relieved of their unique contexts and heterogeneity. We must remember that gender-based violence is an interaction, that it is nourished by narratives that render causal connections unclear, and also presents a manipulation of power that can grow to become symbolic. In this paradigm, however, perpetrators in armed groups or civilians are seen as one and the same, victims are given aid as though their experiences are uniform and indivisible, and the causal explanations for sexual violence are relieved of their nuance and complexity.

In the context of this characterization, a “vast majority of aid funds for sexual violence in armed conflict are directed toward treating victims of rape with only about a quarter of international funding directed toward preventing sexual abuse.”^[xiv]In fact, findings reveal some organizations received more aid than necessary to “treat victims of sexual abuse, while they lacked funding to implement other crucial projects”^[xv]. Strikingly, “funding earmarked for conflict-related sexual violence is nearly double the budget for all security sector reform activities.”^[xvi]Security sector reform activities can include environmental protections, institutional development, and protections of education since these are also women’s issues that are gendered and – as will be explored – at their confluence, have high rates of gendered violence. Unfortunately, current aid programs target sexual violence singularly and tend to neglect general forms of violence.^{[xvii],[xviii],[xix]} Funds narrowly provide support for healthcare in response to gender violence but can be limited to emergency responses, and are predominantly appropriated for treating victims of rape, disregarding other forms of sexual harm.^[xx]The potential lost in developing aid strategies that may address root causes of conflict and insecurity rather than just one of its symptoms is incredible. Today, we are seeing aid funds specifically directed toward conflict-related sexual violence at the expense of broader programs that could address the structural causes of this form of abuse, or the structural causes of violence more generally.

On the other hand, the skewed nature of aid and its foregrounding of sexual violence as a global security threat has enabled its perpetration, and encouraged an exploitation of the victimization narrative. Merger’s article highlights a few sources that note this problem. Autessere^[xxi] finds that the disproportionate focus on conflict-related sexual violence in eastern DRC “raised the status of sexual abuse to an effective incentive and bargaining tool”, whereby armed groups employ sexual violence strategically to break down morale as well as to leverage sexual violence as symbol of strength and dominance. Rebel groups were motivated to engage in “gang rape” by the prospect of seeing their names in headlines, and the increased negotiating power this provided them. Eriksson Baaz and Stern^[xxii] note how the international focus on sexual violence against women and girls contributed to “a process in which allegations of rape are perceived as, and become, a particularly effective bargaining, and ultimately quite effective income-earning strategy”. Douma and Hilhorst^[xxiii] note individual women in DRC have exhibited “shopping behavior,” whereby they “exchange information on the organizations that offer most or free assistance and by consequence prefer to go there”. There are also reports of “women that admit that they had not been raped, but fabricated a story to obtain services they needed but were only available to rape victims”. Further, stories of community workers that “lure women into saying that they have been raped with the promises for material and financial assistance” prosper. Allegations of rape have “become increasingly entangled in disputes over land, income and property”.^[xxiv] Merger describes the confluence of these interactions as a political economy that situates a currency of sexual violence wherein aid organizations, victims, and perpetrators “all find material benefit in the commercial trade in this violence.^[xxv]

In the context of DRC, gender-based violence is directly related to environmental justice and educational equity. An expansion of international aid and policy can address these three issues in tandem. Outside of a paradigm of securitization that creates a debilitating political economy around sexual violence,^[xxvi] a policy shift recognizing the unique confluence of education inequality, environmental justice, and gendered violence is not only reflective of an eco-feminist approach to policy but would recognize the intersection of education, the environment, and violence. The eco-feminist approach to policy deviates from the co-opted feminist approach that serves to obfuscate humanitarian issues whilst linking it to the environment. In order to elucidate this further, this paper will outline gender-based violence in relation to issues of education inequality and gendered violence with a similar argumentation related to ecology, and particularly natural resource extraction.

I. EDUCATION INEQUALITY, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN

Education Inequality

Education inequality is cited as the number one indicator of social immobility in DRC. It is “a key factor in determining socio-economic status in the DRC, whereby the higher the education level of the head of the household is, the less likely it is for the family to be poor.”^[xxvii] Along the lines of gender, girls face a greater rate of inaccessibility to education^[xxviii]: they make up more than 54% of the non-schooled population in the world. More broadly, “in sub-Saharan Africa, over 12 million girls are at risk of never receiving an education”^[xxix].

Education as a social institution provides safety, access to food, social mobility, and ingratiation into society for orphans and children of rape that are debilitated by gender-based violence which is influenced by conflict. Without policy that reflects the nuances of gender-based violence and its impact on these factors, a deplorable neglect of these children in the name of the application of obfuscated and myopic feminist policy occurs to their detriment.^[xxx]

The pointed lack of child protection and child welfare systems in tandem with the underdevelopment of educational institutions is alluded to throughout this paper. According to DeHerdt and Titeca^[xxxi], drop out rates and repetition rates were high on average across the country. Primary education was costly for parents and families to afford,^[xxxii] and public finance of education went from $150 per pupil to $10 per pupil in 2006. At the same time, the number of primary and secondary teachers on government payroll was cut by half, and salaries were reduced by 25%. Since Tshesikedi has taken office, DRC embarked on a large reform measure to introduce free primary education. The goal was to reduce expenses for the poorest families. The World Bank approved $8 million in grants and loans to promote free primary education in eastern and central provinces.^[xxxiii]Since September of 2019, this has been in effect.

Unfortunately, teachers complain they have not received wages which has led to protest. Teachers marched in Bukavu, South Kivu to voice this grievance reflecting failures in the implementation of this policy. Some teachers have abandoned their jobs or are absent with schools in response to the lack of wages. Children are left without supervision in these cases.^[xxxiv] Compounded onto this, parents are still required to pay for their children’s uniforms or other decent clothes and learning materials.^[xxxv] These impediments are directly affecting children’s access to education and teacher’s rights to timely pay. Overcrowding due to the displacement of refugees has complicated the issue as existing schools are unable to accommodate an overflow of  refugee children.

Without a universal primary education or child welfare system, children in DRC are more likely to be exploited by exposure to violence, child mining operations, or by working as servants for families. Primarily, orphaned or children of gender-based violence experience this. They are “excluded from their communities, which causes them to experience severe trauma and distress. This causes a phenomena known as “street children”^[xxxvi] ; their vulnerability so normalized as to have name. This paper will explore in depth the reality of a significant number of school-aged children working in mines. The work is extremely dangerous in nature, and these children are exploited due to the political economy of the region. Those more vulnerable –street children, orphans, and children of rape– have higher participation rates.^[xxxvii] Orphaned children, for example, are experience dispossession and abandonment. Such vulnerability may be exploited by armed groups and militias to increase their capacity both as working units and operators of mines.

The confluence of these issues is a consequence of gender-based violence, violence in general, and the failure of international aid to recognize these multi-dimensional aspects of conflict. In delivering aid towards narrow and singular focuses, support counter-intuitively and unintentionally exacerbates the current context and impedes the development of approaches that are multifaceted and can target these issues and their intersections. For example, the lack of a developed child-welfare system or child-protection system in DRC, along with education inequality, forces children, particularly ‘street children’ into a an even more vulnerable position by preventing their access to an education as they experience higher rates of exploitation. Moreover, the weakened structure of educational institutions exacerbate the circumstances of these children by the absence of ability to accommodate orphaned children or children of gender-based violence. Yet, funding – as Merger’s analysis pointed out – does not recognize the multiplicity and intersectionality that a multidimensional approach would employ.

The Direct Link Between Education and Violence

Since the international paradigm is one that encourages the predominant narrative of DRC’s humanitarian crisis as one of sexual violence, we can follow that narrative to further illuminate the link between education as an institution and sexual violence to highlight the need for multi-dimensional policy reform. While DRC’s characterization as the rape capital of the world is not a direct misnomer, it ignores institutional, structural, and other causal factors that inform or fail to prevent violence; in particular, the lack of a child welfare-education system as well as a cursory application of feminist objectivity in international policy.

According to Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child^[xxxviii]

“Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.

For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:

a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;

b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;

c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.”

‘Multilateral’ and ‘bilateral’ are keywords here. Multilateral approaches would consider the necessity of an education system and child-welfare system that protects children from intercommunal disputes, everyday rape, and rape as a weapon of war^[xxxix].

Sexual violence generally occurs at high rates; during conflict, however, we see more pronounced links between gender-based violence and education inequality, outcomes, and child protection. While girls are already at risk of not receiving an education as aforementioned, during conflict the use of communities as a point of leverage puts girls, children, and the institution of education at risk.

To elaborate, as armed groups and national security forces violently negotiate control over natural resource-rich territories, 5.2 million children have gone without an education. In 2016, conflict in the Greater Kasai region displaced 1.8 million children in urgent need of education (HNO, 2019).^[xl] Further, in the Tanganyika province, “a resurgence of violence resulted in the destruction of more than 300 schools while in Kasai region damaged infrastructure forced 150,000 children out of school.”^[xli] Targeting of community infrastructure, and in particular educational institutions, contributes to the displacement of children and their access to and mobility within the already tenuous education institution in DRC.

The implications of this type violence are many. First, with a resurgence of violence during conflict, and the appeal to armed groups to leverage and negotiate the safety of individuals and communities for strategic gain, we see a similar political economy of war encouraging the destabilization of communities. Second, the violence inhibits the linear development of a social institution. Under ‘normal’ conditions, the progress of students and the social mobility they would experience as a result, would not be interrupted by egregious acts of violence. These acts of violence not only threaten their safety, but also the constitution of their academic identities: their emotional well-being, academic achievement, and academic progression.^[xlii]  In the upcoming example, it is clear how gender-based violence interdicts successful educational attainment, but destabilizes the structural integrity and continuity of education as an institution. Third, on the international stage, the violence occurring at the confluence of international education and gendered violence is neglected in the international security framework due to the sole focus of funds being provided to institutions for emergency responses, or general responses to gendered violence. Fourth, children that may need an education institution as a provisional space of security, in particular orphaned children and children of rape, are made increasingly vulnerable due to the high rates of exploitation. Together, these implications point to the need for change in international security frameworks to remedy the neglect of the intersection of violence, gender-based violence and education inequality.

Attacks against education institutions cannot be decontextualized. To illustrate the urgency behind a change in policy, we must bear witness to the human losses and victimizations at the confluence of education inequality and gender-based violence.

“On 31 August 2020 unidentified armed men attacked and raped female students at an examination centre hosting 35 final year students, 16 boys and 16 girls in Isiro town in Haut-Uélé province the night before exams. The students went on to take their exams the next day. Also on 31 August 2020 in South Kivu province, about 700 students and their teachers fled after fighting near an exam centre. On 27 August 2020, at least two students and one teacher were reported to have been killed in Masisi area of North Kivu province following a confrontation between security forces and an armed group near an exam centre. The students were killed while sitting the second day of the National Primary End-of-Studies Test in Ngoyi Primary School.^[xliii]

Education inequality, child welfare, violence, and security purely and incontrovertibly intersect. Yet, this is not reflected in international policy and aid. In addition to violent and traumatizing victimization, there are further consequences of the lack of recognition of these intersections.

Important consequences of this, outside of violent and traumatizing victimization are many. First, a victimization influenced disruption of education which may prevent successful educational attainment exacerbating long-term educational equity and social mobility. As students endure, anticipate, or avoid violent interactions in school, their potential for educational attainment is impacted. Second, violence inhibits the fortitude of the educational structure and the support it offers. A curtailment of a ‘normal’ socialization process and access to essential services and support networks^[xliv] occurs further harming the academic and personal progression of these students. Third, there are intergenerational impacts due to the intensity of the trauma, school dropout rates increase leading to structural disadvantages for future generations. Fourth, this violence largely affects women exacerbating present and significant gender inequality in the education sector and at large.^[xlv] Fifth and finally, as these individuals experience sexual violence there is potential for increases in early pregnancy for girls that furthers the disruption in access to education that would otherwise occur during normal conditions.^[xlvi]

Appropriating aid funding and security reform funding towards education and child welfare institutionally would greatly benefit and impede the use of sexual violence as a tool both under ‘normal’ conditions and during conflict. The benefits of a stronger, more protected education system and sound child-welfare system include a weakened pipeline to exploitation that armed groups and civilians can exploit, a reduction in the amount of street children and at-risk behavior amongst youth in vulnerable positions, multigenerational impacts related to social mobility for those with and without parental units, and a reduction in gendered inequalities in education. Building, rehabilitating, and most importantly securitizing these institutions would impede gender-based violence holistically.

Fortunately, the World Bank’s funding strategy is working towards this. Within the $800 million dollar aid Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education (EESSE) plan,^[xlvii] are a multitude of goals focused on school safety, inclusion, fee reduction, and increase in accessibility. Unfortunately, the project development objectives and context lack a multi-dimensional analysis of inequality and gender-based violence in DRC. There is an avoidance of the link between gender-based violence, conflict, and education. The project indicates sexual violence with the same connotation as the international securitization framework. The component related to safety is “Disbursement Linked Indicator^[xlviii] 4: Create Safe and Inclusive School Environments”, which is contingent on three Disbursement Linked Results. The Disbursement Linked Results^[xlix] are unrelated to the potential for violence by armed groups and militias. There is a complete absence of funding for security reform for schools or an allusion to the incidence of conflict related Gender-based violence in schools.^[l] This suggests a significant opportunity missed in a large funding package to create fortified institutions or to implement preventative measures that could withstand the potential of violence.

The United Nations^[li] report does not emphasize the intersections of sexual violence in terms of locations, or with specific focus on educational institutions. Sexual violence is instead decontextualized and homogenized as instances of conflict-based sexual violence, rather than contextualized in terms of location, hierarchy, and gender inequality as feminist theory and praxis would advise.

II. RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE

Ecofeminism

Ecofeminism finds its roots in an ethic that recognizes the conceptual connection between environmental justice and feminism. The feminist philosophy argues that a deeper understanding of environmental issues and vice-versa is achieved through an analysis of the domination of nature by human beings in relation to the domination of women and children. The logics that dominate the earth are inextricably linked to the logics that dominate women. Feminist scholarship and environmental ethic are deeply connected.^[lii],[liii] Gwen Hunnicutt argues that there is a pervasive logic of domination that explains many aspects of exploitation, extraction, and domination of both women and the earth. Donna Haraway^[liv] describes ecofeminist thought as ascribing agency and a constructed reality to the earth enabling it as an actor in the story of man’s domination. In connection to women, Haraway articulates a perspective of feminist thought that describes women’s battle as one in which women, in opposition to a male-dominated society, are agentic actors within socially constructed realities that are devoid of essentialist and misogynistic thought that epitomizes patriarchy. This logic of domination extends from Marxist theory describing man’s domination of nature as a requisite of capitalism. Extending this to the domination of women reveals the link between the domination of nature and the domination of women.

Its conceptualization is strengthened by the incorporation and delineation of intersectional ecofeminism. Intersectional ecofeminism takes into consideration multiple forms and conversations of feminism including Indigenous Feminist thought, Indian Feminist thought, Latin American feminist thought, and African feminist thought. Ecofeminism bridges together the different tenets that link together the rights of the environment and the rights of the humans that inhabit it.^{[lv],[lvi],[lvii]} As Mallory describes, there is much to gain from an “ecofeminist analys[is] of the material and conceptual intersections between the oppression of women, people of color, indigenous peoples, the poor, and other marginalized human groups and the degradation of natural places.”

Further, the many lived experiences of these marginalized groups, the analyses that stem from them, and their shared historical contexts make up the fabric of the fluid quilt that is ecofeminism; rather than existing as a theory to be debated and contested, ecofeminism exists as an inclusive discourse, encouraging the incorporation of new perspectives as Kings and Glazebrook describe.^[lviii]

Incorporating this into our analysis of the provision of aid in relation to gendered-violence in DRC means considering the communal-industrial-governmental intersections, and applying the theoretical considerations of environmental and feminist ethic. This is in stark contrast to the one-dimensional approach that considers eliminating sexual violence as the panacea for safety, protection, and mobility for the Congolese civilians.

Political Economies of Resources, Territory, and Sexual Violence

The political economy of sexual violence is intrinsically connected to the political economy of territory and the claim to natural resources in eastern DRC. Environmental justice and natural resource extraction are explicitly linked. While community members lack the agency over their native environments and bear the brunt of the resultant socio-economic consequences, their environments endure significant harm. Experienced in tandem, social inequities that exist within these communities are exacerbated by the presence of harmful extractive activities such as mining. Experiences of volatility, instability, and boom-bust economic cycles as commodity prices shift are characteristic for communities that home extractive activity.^[lix] Further, structural problems within these areas occur within the larger landscape of the nation. For instance, persistent poverty is a consistent theme in these areas due to the loss of local economic control to multinational firms.^[lx]

The consequences go beyond the structural and environmental. In relation to the political economy of sexual violence, territory and claims to resource-rich land exacerbates the use of sexual violence as a tool of leverage and control. Territory, in particular, impacts the ability of communities to utilize their environment as they would under normal conditions. The contours of territory in the political economy of sexual violence and conflict at large impacts the safety of women and children – arguably this is safety they would experience under normal conditions. Under such conditions, according to Kings, “it is most often women who bear the brunt of the extra burdens created by climate change and environmental degradation.” For example, it is women that bear the brunt of having to travel further to collect water or food each day^[lxi]. These travels would be, under normal conditions, considered a typical part of daily life. Under the conditions of conflict and within the political economy of sexual violence, these travels are precarious in DRC. Women and children are more vulnerable to government forces and rebel groups that are alleged to have engaged in heinous acts of sexual violence as a deliberate method to gain territory and disseminate fear. According to the Enough Project’s Interrupting Silence Report:

 “…rebel and state army commanders oversaw or orchestrated rape and sexual enslavement while in effective control over their subordinate troops with knowledge that they were committing rape in the context of civilian attacks, triggering their liability for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Court recently heard arguments by Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda alleging that … commander Bosco Ntganda oversaw and ordered troops to rape civilians. Bensouda argued that the FPLC used rape to terrorize non-ethnic Hema civilians under Ntganda’s command, and in one instance Ntganda ordered his bodyguards to rape three women in an apartment where he was staying.”^[lxii]

At the intersection of territory and sexual violence, there is a threat to the local economic structure of communities. Policy should reflect the violence in the context of a strategic military tool to manipulate the psychology of communities and gain control over a particular areas and regions with connections to the harm mineral extraction. Policy of this caliber would set environmental regulations in regions and areas where there exist protections against extraction and its detrimental effects; in other words, policy would reflect the reality of the environmental implications of the political economy of sexual violence.

Further, both ecology and sexual violence are not issues to be securitized in tandem. To avoid the risk of further decontexualization, environmental regulations should be developed and implemented in the context of armed group and militia exploitation, economic disruption and use of sexual violence. Not only would this policy reflect a desire to prevent environmental degradation and the aforementioned economic consequences of harmful extractive policies, it would also respect the ownership of those native to their land and variety of harms they experience. Sexual violence on the other hand must be securitized with respect to the social organization in which it occurs as mentioned. Indeed there is an intersection between ecology and violence that cannot be disregarded and must be reflected in policy. Though, distinctively, there must be a respect for the complexity of both issues as occurring in a liminal space. There is a boundary between the sexual violence and environmental violence that occurs in Eastern Congo. Where one meets the other there is certainly overlap and the two human rights atrocities must be contextualized with respect to where there is mutual exclusivity. Experienced by women, men, boys, and girls by civilians, armed groups, military soldiers, and family members, sexual violence is reported to occur on paths to forge for food, it is experienced in the privacy of homes, and experienced on schools sites. Further, according to Claudia Seymour, there is an invisible violence that occurs that is not recognized or understood. The social organization of violence, its social consequences, and the obfuscation of the international human rights provision in its securitization process serves to work against progress in the region. While environmental degradation, exploitation, is experienced where mining cites are present,^[lxiii] sexual violence is also the tool or rather vehicle by which familial disruption, morale destruction, and painful invisible violence occurs.^[lxiv] Sexual Violence, therefore, shapes the contours of the social reality and organization of the individuals, communities, and provinces experiencing it. Research and policy must reflect this and deviate from a decontextualized conflict perspective that understands sexual violence as a condition or symptom. It is a condition while also being conditional. It requires microscopic observation and analysis to wholly understand and prevent.

The framework of environmental justice reconciles community protection and sustainability with environmental protection and sustainability. Policy that reflects this connection can influence outcomes in the following example. In certain cases,

“crimes involving SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] involving SGBV also undermine authority figures traditionally meant to protect women and children in the community.^[lxv] Furthermore, sexual violence both drives and stems from forced displacement: when soldiers and rebels rape civilians, civilians often flee out of fear of repeat attacks or stigmatization. Internally displaced persons and refugees are in turn disproportionately vulnerable to sexual violence in part because they live in IDP and refugee camps that lack security and rule of law.”^[lxvi]

In the framework of environmental justice and feminist ethic, social equity and harm prevention are emphasized as values driving policy. In establishing protections for territory, there is recognition of the community impact related to the location of that community and its environment. Practically speaking, environmental considerations in regulatory reforms relating to territory at the national and provincial level would reflect the “precautionary principle; erring on the side of human safety and wellbeing rather than industrial development.”^[lxvii] In the next section, we will explore what this may look like.

III. CHILD LABOR      

Exploring the linkages between feminist thought and environmental ethic exposes multiple junctures that necessitate policy upheaval and reform. Previously articulated is the necessity to include environmental protections to territory to further dissuade a critical juncture wherein the rights of vulnerable human and non-human life are magnified and accentuated. Unfortunately, without such policy, the rights of the child in Eastern DRC are exploited to a heinous extent. These children are neglected due to international and national focus that homogenizes humanitarian issues related to conflict.

Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports reveal that no advancements were made in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.^[lxviii] Despite the aforementioned initiatives such as universal primary education, anti-trafficking in persons law, and the finalization of a five-year strategy to combat human trafficking, there are still large gaps and inequities in the delivery of these programs, and the violence that occurs in spite of these policies, as well the complicity of factions of the military means that children continue to be forced into labor and sexual slavery.^[lxix]

Although the national government has taken steps to eliminate the worst forms of child labor– the exploitation of children sexually, militarily, and in relation to mining– complicity within factions of the military prevents full implementation and adjudication of crimes related to child labor legislation. While there is legislation prohibiting forced labor, child trafficking, and commercial sexual exploitation of children, non-state armed groups continue to kidnap, recruit, or use children in armed conflict and mining operations in 2019.^[lxx] For example, a North Kivu military court sentenced an Allied Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) colonel to life imprisonment for child soldier recruitment. Also, the Bukavu Garrison Court in South Kivu condemned three members of the Raia Mutomboki militia of systemic child soldier recruitment in 2018. They were sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment.^[lxxi] However, during the proceedings, the government was found liable for failing to take all necessary steps and measures to prevent the crimes, and was ordered to pay reparations.^[lxxii]

Military and government complicity has long standing consequences. The government consistently failed to prosecute perpetrators to the fullest extent, sometimes repositioning them, effectively treating perpetrators with impunity. For instance, the FARDC was linked to two cases of exploitation of children in two roles – as concubines and forced labor. The responsible perpetrator was redeployed to a different regiment in 2019.^[lxxiii]Further exemplifying this impunity is the case of Colonel Ramazani Lubinga, former commander of 601st Regiment of FARDC. A warrant was issued for his arrest for recruiting child soldiers, yet his military superiors refused to comply.^[lxxiv]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, what is required is a “breakdown of the intellectual silos that isolate topics of conflict economics and security in Congo from gendered violence and women’s empowerment”^[lxxv] that then includes environmental justice and feminist ethics.

Children, Education, and Labor

As aforementioned, children outside of school face detrimental consequences to their future mobility, the worst consequence of which is vulnerability to child labor. Thus, social programs and the enhancement of access and reintegration into, and continued pursuit of education for children of vulnerable groups, orphans and those exploited by child laborers is a necessary preventative step.^[lxxvi] Outside of social programs, another recommendation would be the socialization of the mining industry. An example of this already exists within the state-owned mined artisanal “strategic minerals”. This means more locally controlled and smaller-scale mining projects have been socialized, removing precarious middlemen which enables greater price stability. Volatility in price affects the local economic context, and is a contributor to persistent poverty while creating devastatingly regular instability in these regions.^{[lxxvii], [lxxviii]} The removal of middlemen also decreases the potential for child labor. Monitoring of the supply chain carried out by a separate body ensures that children and other vulnerable populations are not employed in the mining sites.

Ecofeminism

The incorporation of the environmental-feminist ethic of ecofeminism implies the application of procedural justice, and the inclusion of the most vulnerable groups in the decision-making process. This entails that community leaders – particularly those that have been subject to the harms of extractive policies, child labor, and the complicity of the government – will have the opportunity to authentically and materially participate in the decision-making process regarding price stability, labor supply, and redistribution of revenue in the development of state-owned mining companies. State-owned mining companies must allow and enable community members and stakeholders to hold decision-making power. This is essential to rectifying the injustices of the extractive industry. Top-down approaches and governmental solutions are incomplete without the voice and conversation of those directly impacted by the mining industry, its environmental, and very real human rights consequences. Whilst harsher, more stringent penalties, prosecutorial judgements, and accountability processes are also necessary to serve as a deterrent, reparations and accountability should have an effect beyond that of financial compensation. Procedural justice, equity, and empowerment should be primary goals in social and economic policy recommendations and reforms; procedural equity can also serve to support communities during the disinvestment of mining companies and the negotiations between armed groups, communities, and the government in the elimination of child labor.^[lxxix]

Procedural Equity

Community involvement in the deliberation, development, execution, and possible removal of mining operations or other concerns of environmental justice must become a component of international and national efforts to resolve conflict in eastern DRC. Enforcement and protection of procedural equity must be ensured in order to maintain its effectiveness. Its implementation must occur to ameliorate the harsh economic, environmental, and community impacts of extraction to prevent a recurrence of similar consequences in the future.

Securitizing the protection and process of procedural inequity would ensure communities have a stake and claim in the processes that affect their local economies and environmental surroundings. Unfortunately, due to the securitization of sexual violence, the development of procedural equity receives less funding and less priority than explicit efforts to reduce and mitigate rape. Prioritizing and securitizing procedural inequity and increased security reform in this area would alongside efforts to reduce sexual violence and reduce child labor would reflect the true nature of the structural components informing sexual violence, and respecting its relation to the environment.

Policy Implications

Following the recommendations of multiple policy reports^[lxxx] on the rights of children and education policy, 1) international aid should reflect the need for the development of a national child welfare system and become an urgent priority 2) Increasing the age required for children to go to school would promote the enrollment of students in school; this also enables the protection of students from exploitation. 3) The socialization and implementation of government funded institutions located throughout Eastern Congo,^[lxxxi] in conjunction with the initiatives of birth certificate registration, school enrollment, and the rehabilitation educational institutions, a national child welfare institution should be prioritized.

Policy recommendations for international aid that center procedural equity, or go as far as securitizing procedural inequity, as a deliberate objective in the development of state-owned mining operations or companies, the dissolution of, removal of, or insertion of multinational mining companies. Consideration of the needs of the community, particularly those in conflict zones. During negotiations with armed groups, procedural equity for communities must be considered.

And lastly, on the international stage, the consequential narrative of DRC as the rape capital of the world must be deconstructed and delineate the complex, multifaceted nature of the cultural, social, institutional, political-economics, and influence of conflict compared to ‘normal’ conditions in the massive rates of sexual violence. International aid should move away from the silo of sexual violence and work more broadly towards education equality, child welfare, and environmental justice.

CONCLUSION

The decontextualization and homogenization of sexual violence and conflict economics render the structural and contextual factors that influence the incidence of sexual violence invisible. The resultant narrative of rape as the most pressing humanitarian issue in DRC obfuscates these factors. A new narrative must delineate the multifaceted nature of the cultural, social, institutional, political-economics, and influence of conflict in these rates. International funds and NGOs – both abroad and on the ground – must reflect this change by engaging sexual violence discourse, and directing aid delivery away from unilateral guidelines that isolate access in their administration of aid.

Furthermore, deliberately moving attention away from sexual violence and shifting the contours of international aid to reflect the intersection of the aforementioned dimensions that influence the rate of sexual violence would reduce its compounding counterproductive effects. These include the influence of NGOs on the political economy of sexual violence, the perpetuation of rape as a weapon of war, and the increasing the rate at which individuals create false narratives to access health services and NGO support.

This will enable an appropriation of funds that would better support a response reflective of the multidimensional aspects of violence. If, “in DRC, funding earmarked for conflict-related sexual violence is nearly double the budget for all security sector reform activities,”^[lxxxii] it is clear that delineating and contributing aid to the multiple structural components that contribute to this harm would be a better use of international support. Projects such as the full implementation of universal education, child welfare, and implementation of enforced procedural equity are all necessary steps to combat the instability that is globally perceived as symptomatic of an epidemic of sexual violence.

Finally, it is clear from an intersectional ecofeminist perspective that sexual violence never occurs in a vacuum. Considering the structural and institutional influences that contribute to, inform, and could potentially dissuade acts of exploitation and sexual violence is necessary to combat it. Ultimately, by contextualizing and acknowledging the heterogeneity of sexual violence deep institutional and social issues are observable and thus solvable. Through an ecofeminist understanding, the political economy of sexual violence and territory can be scrutinized with the goal of implementing solutions that reflect a departure from the “effacement of critical feminist insights regarding the importance of the domestic, the personal, and the ‘every- day.”^[lxxxiii] As a consequence, the “rape capital of the world” is relieved of this reductive, sensationalist, and myopic characterization.

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References

^[i] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

^[ii] Lykke, Nina. 2005. “Intersectionality Revisited: Problems and Potentials.” Kvin- novetenskaplig tidskrift 2(3): 7–17.

^[iii] The Uncondemned. Directed by Michele Mitchell, Nick Louvel, performances by Pierre-Richard Prosper and Sara Darehshori, Film at Eleven Media, 2015

^[iv] Lene Hansen (2000) Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3:1, 55-75, DOI: 10.1080/14616740010019848

^[v] UN Security Council. 2008. Resolution 1820 (2008) [On Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations] (S/RES/1820). 5916th meeting. June 19, 2008

^[vi] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

^[vii] Ibid

^[viii] Kirby, Paul. 2012. “How is Rape a Weapon of War?.” European Jounral of International Relations 19(4): 797-821

^[ix] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

^[x] Leatherman, Janie L. 2011. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press.

^[xi] ANDERSON, LETITIA. 2010. “Politics by Other Means: When does Sexual Violence Threaten International Peace and Security?” International Peacekeeping 17(2): 244–60.

^[xii] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

^[xiii] Ibid

^[xiv] Ibid

^[xv] Autesserre, Severine. 2014. 141 Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press.

^[xvi] Douma, Nynke, and Dorothea, Hilhorst. 2012. Fond de commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Disaster Studies Occasional Paper 02. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.

^[xvii] Ibid

^[xviii] Autesserre, Severine. 2014. 9-138 Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press.

^[xix] Eriksson Baaz, Maria, and Maria Stern. 2013. p. 97 Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Probems in the Congo and Beyond. London: Zed Books.

^[xx] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

^[xxi] Autessere, Severine. 2012. “Dangerous Tales:  Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences.” African Affairs 111 (443) 202-22; p 205

^[xxii] Eriksson Baaz, Maria, and Maria Stern. 2010. p. 52 The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violencei nthe Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Sida Working Paper on Gender Basedviolence. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (The Nordic Africa Institute).

^[xxiii] Douma, Nynke, AND Dorothea Hilhorst. 2012. p. 48 Fond de commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Repblic of Congo. Disaster studies Occasional Paper 02. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.

^[xxiv] Demmers, Jolle. 2014. “neoliberal Discourses on Violence: Monstrosity and Rape in Borderland War.” In Gender, Globalization and Violence: Postcolonial Conflict Zones, edited by Sandra Ponzanesi, 27-44, p. 41. New York: Routledge.

^[xxv] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

^[xxvi] Ibid

^[xxvii] Prashad , Jennifer. “Children of Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Humanium, 30 May 2020, www.humanium.org/en/democratic-republic-congo/.

^[xxviii] n/a. “Right to Education : Situation around the World.” Humanium, 22 Feb. 2018, www.humanium.org/en/right-to-education/.

^[xxix] Ibid

^[xxx] Ibid

^[xxxi] Herdt, Tom & Titeca, Kristof. (2016). Governance with Empty Pockets: The Education Sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Governance with Empty Pockets in the DRC. Development and Change. 47. 472-494. 10.1111/dech.12235.

^[xxxii] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform, pg, 2, www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20201019_acaps_covid-

^[xxxiii] n/a. “‘When I Grow up, I’ll Be a Teacher’ – The New Ambitions of Congolese Schoolchildren Now That School Is Free.” World Bank, World Bank Group , 16 June 2020,

^[xxxv] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform,

^[xxxvi] Human Rights Watch. (2006, April 4). What Future: Street Children in the Democratic Republic of Congo; https://www.humanium.org/en/democratic-republic-congo/

^[xxxvii] Ibid

^[xxxviii] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [accessed 10 February 2021]

^[xxxix] Prashad , Jennifer. “Children of Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Humanium, 30 May 2020, www.humanium.org/en/democratic-republic-congo/.

“Sexual violence is largely associated with widespread rape, a method of violence used by combatants and military forces. Conflict in the Eastern region is a critical issue for children as they experience high levels of sexual and gender-based violence, and researchers have found that survivors of sexual violence under the age of 18 in this region were more likely to experience gang rape and assault than adults were;” “Despite domestic laws in place to protect children from sexual violence and the presence of the issue on the UN Security Council’s agenda, no real protection is afforded to children in peacetime and in period of conflict.”

^[xl] “APERÇU DES BESOINS HUMANITAIRES RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO.” Humanitarian Response Info! , United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 30 Dec. 2019, www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/democratic-republic-congo/document/rd-congo-aper%25C3%25A7u-des-besoins-humanitaires-d%25C3%25A9cembre-2019.

^[xli] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform,

^[xlii] Breetzke et. al in their study of the proximity of sexual violence to schools note that “Schools are, however, necessary and permanent neighborhood institutions which feature prominently in the urban environment. Schools themselves, and the spaces around them should engender feelings of safety and security among learners and be conducive to positive social engagement and interaction. Any incidence of crime in these spaces should be of great concern since crime and violence in and around schools has been shown to affect learners physical and emotional well-being (Muschert and Peguero 2010; Espelage et al. 2013), levels of academic achievement (Wang et al. 2014), and academic progression (Ncontsa and Shumba 2013).”

Breetzke, Gregory & Fabris-Rotelli, Inger & Modiba, Jacob & Edelstein, Ian. (2019). The proximity of sexual violence to schools: evidence from a township in South Africa. GeoJournal. 10.1007/s10708-019-10093-3;

Muschert, G. W., & Peguero, A. A. (2010). The Columbine effect and school anti-violence policy. In M. Peyrot & S. L. Burns (Eds.), New approaches to social problems treatment. Research in social problems and public policy (Vol. 17, pp. 117–148). Bingley: Emerald Group PublishingLimited;

Espelage, D. L., Hong, J. S., Rao, M. A., & Low, S. (2013). Associations between peer victimization and academic performance. Theory into Practice, 52(4), 233–240;

Wang, W., Vaillancourt, T., Brittain, H. L., McDougall, P., Krygsman, A., Smith, D., et al. (2014). School climate, peer victimization, and academic achievement: Results from a multi-informant study. School Psychology Quarterly, 29(3), 360–377;

Further Nconsta and Shumba find that a loss of concentration; poor academic performance; bunking of classes; and depression result from the presence of various forms of violence in a school setting. The analysis of the effect of rape on educational outcomes is not present.

Ncontsa, V. N., & Shumba, A. (2013). The nature, causes and effects of school violence in South African high schools. South African Journal of Education, 33(3), 1–15.

^[xliii] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform,

^[xliv] Selbervik, Hilde. “Impacts of School Closures on Children in Developing Countries: Can We Learn Something from the Past?” CMI, Cher. Michelsen Institute, May 2020, www.cmi.no/publications/7214-impacts-of-school-closures-on-children-in-developing-countries-can-we-learn-something-from-the-past.

^[xlv] Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer. “The Impact of Free Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana.” Working Paper, October 2019

^[xlvi] Ibid

^[xlvii] http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/818571589383794255/pdf/Project-Information-Document-DR-Congo-Emergency-Equity-and-System-Strengthening-in-Education-P172341.pdf ; http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/818571589383794255/pdf/Project-Information-Document-DR-Congo-Emergency-Equity-and-System-Strengthening-in-Education-P172341.pdf

^[xlviii] http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/654421478722080104/PforR-Overview-Presentation-OPCS.pdf; http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/401331504728046953/pdf/ITK171540-201708061557.pdf; http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/818571589383794255/pdf/Project-Information-Document-DR-Congo-Emergency-Equity-and-System-Strengthening-in-Education-P172341.pdf

Disbursement Linked Indicators are the basis of disbursement for Investment of Project Funds in the framework of the World Bank’s Aid. These must indicators must be tangible, transparent, verifiable, under government’s influence. They can be scalable to progress. This progress can be actions that lead to outputs, intermediate outcomes, and outcomes.

^[xlix] http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/950891592618926682/pdf/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-Emergency-Equity-and-System-Strengthening-in-Education-Project.pdf pg 26

^[l] Ibid, pg 66-67

^[li] Karashima, Noboru. “General Assembly.” Trends in the Sciences, vol. 7, no. 8, 2002, pp. 44–45, doi:10.5363/tits.7.8_44. Quotes from:  (l) Take all necessary measures to prevent sexual violence and, when it occurs, bring the perpetrators to justice, provide victims with comprehensive care and facilitate their access to remedies for redress; (n) Strengthen national institutions and mechanisms responsible for coordinating human rights and monitoring the implementation of the recommendations of United Nations mechanisms. With no reference to the specifics of institutions.

^[lii] Chaone Mallory. “What’s in a Name? In Defense of Ecofeminism (Not Ecological Feminisms, Feminist Ecology, or Gender and the Environment): Or “Why Ecofeminism Need Not Be Ecofeminine—But So What If It Is?”.” Ethics and the Environment 23, no. 2 (2018): 11-35. Accessed March 29, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.23.2.03.

^[liii] Hunnicutt, G. (2019). Gender Violence in Ecofeminist Perspective: Intersections of Animal Oppression, Patriarchy and Domination of the Earth (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351026222

^[liv] Haraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-99. Accessed March 29, 2021. doi:10.2307/3178066.

^[lv] A.E. Kings. “Intersectionality and the Changing Face of Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 22, no. 1 (2017): 63-87. Accessed March 29, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.22.1.04.

^[lvi] Glazebrook, Trish. “Karen Warren’s Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 7, no. 2 (2002): 12-26. Accessed March 29, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339034.

^[lvii] Chaone Mallory. “What’s in a Name? In Defense of Ecofeminism (Not Ecological Feminisms, Feminist Ecology, or Gender and the Environment): Or “Why Ecofeminism Need Not Be Ecofeminine—But So What If It Is?”.” Ethics and the Environment 23, no. 2 (2018): 11-35. Accessed March 29, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.23.2.03.

^[lviii]A.E. Kings. “Intersectionality and the Changing Face of Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 22, no. 1 (2017): 63-87. Accessed March 29, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.22.1.04; Glazebrook, Trish. “Karen Warren’s Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 7, no. 2 (2002): 12-26. Accessed March 29, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339034.

^[lix] Stephanie A. Malin, Stacia Ryder & Mariana Galvão Lyra (2019) Environmental justice and natural resource extraction: intersections of power, equity and access, Environmental Sociology, 5:2, 109-116, DOI: 10.1080/23251042.2019.1608420

^[lx] Ibid

^[lxi] Ibid; UN Security Council. 2008. Resolution 1820 (2008) [On Sexual Violence in Conflic and Pos-Conflict Situations] (S/RES/1820). 5916th meeting. June 19, 2008

^[lxii] Wairagala Wakabi, “Prosecutor: Ntaganda Killed a Priest, Ordered Soldiers to Rape,” Open Society Institute, February 11, 2014, available at http://www.lubangatrial.org/2014/02/11/prosecutor-ntaganda-killed-a-priest-ordered- soldiers-to-rape/; Dranginis, Holly. (2014). Interrupting the Silence Addressing Congo’s Sexual Violence Crisis within the Great Lakes Regional Peace Process. The Enough Project, March 20, 2014.

^[lxiii] Laudati, Ann, and Charlotte Mertens. “Resources and Rape: Congo’s (Toxic) Discursive Complex.” African Studies Review, vol. 62, no. 4, 2019, pp. 57-82., doi:10.1017/asr.2018.126

^[lxiv] Claudia Seymour (2012) Ambiguous agencies: coping and survival in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,Children’s Geographies, 10:4, 373-384, DOI: 10.1080/14733285.2012.726073

^[lxv] Human Rights First, “Dr. Denis Mukwege: Fighting Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” video, October 23, 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-OrOE4eq2w – t=74.

^[lxvi] Megan Bradley, “Sexual and Gender-based violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Opportunities for Progress as M23 Disarms?” The Brookings Institution, November 13, 2013, available at http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2013/11/12-sexual-gender-based-violence-congo-bradley.

^[lxvii] White, Rob. (2013). Resource Extraction Leaves Something Behind: Environmental Justice and Mining. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy. 2. 10.5204/ijcjsd.v2i1.90.

^[lxviii] U.S. Department of Labor. (2019) Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. Pp. 383-397. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor

^[lxix] Ibid

^[lxx] Ibid

^[lxxi] Ibid

^[lxxii] Dranginis, Holly. (2014). Interrupting the Silence Addressing Congo’s Sexual Violence Crisis within the Great Lakes Regional Peace Process. The Enough Project, March 20, 2014.

^[lxxiii] Ibid

^[lxxiv] Ibid

^[lxxv] Dranginis, Holly. (2014). Interrupting the Silence Addressing Congo’s Sexual Violence Crisis within the Great Lakes Regional Peace Process. The Enough Project, March 20, 2014.

^[lxxvi] Ibid

^[lxxvii] Mark C.J. Stoddart, B. Quinn Burt. (2020) Energy justice and offshore oil: weighing environmental risk and privilege in the North Atlantic. Environmental Sociology 6:4, pages 390-402.

^[lxxviii] White, Rob. (2013). Resource Extraction Leaves Something Behind: Environmental Justice and Mining. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy. 2. 10.5204/ijcjsd.v2i1.90.

^[lxxix] Mark C.J. Stoddart, B. Quinn Burt. (2020) Energy justice and offshore oil: weighing environmental risk and privilege in the North Atlantic. Environmental Sociology 6:4, pages 390-402.

^[lxxx] U.S. Department of Labor. (2019) Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. Pp. 383-397. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor

^[lxxxi] Ibid

^[lxxxii] Douma, Nynke, and Dorothea, Hilhorst. 2012. Fond de commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Disaster Studies Occasional Paper 02. P. 35. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.

^[lxxxiii] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003

1 February 2021 –by Vaughn Rajah

On 26 October 2020 the 2019 State of the Climate in Africa Report was published. The Report, a multi-agency publication coordinated by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), provides a snapshot of climate related trends, observed high-impact events, and associated risks and impacts on key sensitive sectors in Africa.

Africa is responsible for only four percent of global carbon emissions and yet is the continent most vulnerable to climate instability. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has been identified as a region likely to suffer future “climate conflicts” resulting from climate-induced political instability and resource scarcity. 

Report Highlights

The Report emphasises rising temperatures and sea levels, changing rain patterns, and extreme weather as the greatest threats to food and water security, health and safety, and development in Africa. 

“Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming spectre of drought because of a La Niña event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic”, said WMO Secretary-General Petteri Taalas. 

In a particularly worrying assessment, the Report concludes that expansive areas of the continent will exceed two degrees Celsius warming above pre-industrial levels by 2080. Two degrees Celsius is the temperature threshold designated as signalling near irreversible climate catastrophe. Much of Africa has already warmed by more than one degree Celsius since the beginning of the twentieth century, with a dramatic rise in heatwaves and searing hot days. 

The latest predictions from 2020 to 2024 indicate continued warming and decreased rainfall, particularly in Northern and Southern Africa, and increased rainfall over the Sahel region. 

Rising Climate Risks in Africa

The Report provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of climate change on the African continent in 2019. Anecdotal evidence has made it clear that, amongst its many other challenges and upheavals, 2020 was even deadlier in this regard. 

Agriculture is the cornerstone of the African economy. This is a major reason why the continent is designated a climate vulnerability hotspot. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that warming risks inducing devastating effects on crop production and food security in Africa, with associated health impacts. Warmer temperatures additionally increase transmission of vector-borne diseases. For warming scenarios ranging from a one to four degrees Celsius increase in global temperatures relative to pre-industrial levels, the overall GDP in Africa is expected to decrease by 2.25 percent to 12.12 percent. The Report indicates that West, Central, and East Africa are likely to suffer the most severe impacts.

Regional Responses

The international legal principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is premised on the notion that developed states must bear greater burdens in tackling climate change than developing states. However, it is incumbent on the African Union (AU) to also play its part in mitigation efforts. Unfortunately, there is currently little knowledge of how the AU understands or responds to climate-related security risks. A glaring omission in the AU’s most notable recent policy, the AU Transitional Justice Policy, is the lack of an explicit engagement with climate risks and redress in Africa. It is imperative that strategies are developed at a national, regional, and international level to mitigate the impacts of climate change in Africa.

This article was originally published by Human Rights Pulse on 31 January 2021 as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.

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