Activists File First-ever Climate Lawsuit Against Russia

Snow storm in the Red Square, Moscow (Credit: Flickr/Vladimir Varfolomeev)

24 September 2022 – by Cosmo Sanderson

A group of activists have filed the first-ever climate lawsuit against Russia’s government, demanding urgent action to cut greenhouse gas emissions in a country that is warming twice as fast as the global average. 

The lawsuit was filed in Russia’s supreme court by plaintiffs including Ekozashita or ‘Eco-defence’ and the Moscow Helsinki Group, founded in the 1970s to expose human rights abuses in the Soviet Union.

In the 13 September filing seen by Reuters, the group says that “while temperatures around the world have risen by about 1°C compared to pre-industrial levels over the past 50 years, in Russia they have risen by 2.5°C and this ratio will continue or even worsen in the future.”

The group says the lawsuit is the first of its kind to be accepted by a Russian court.

Russia has pledged to cut its greenhouse gas emissions to 70% of their 1990 level by 2030. By 2050, it says it will cut emissions to 20% of the 1990 level. 

But the group says the only way Russia can meet its obligations under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement is to reduce its emissions to 31% of 1990 levels by 2030; and to 5% of 1990 levels by 2050. 

Failure to meet those more ambitious targets could seriously imperil a country that has two thirds of its territory in the Arctic North, the group argues.

Those targets will only be made tougher by Russia’s war with Ukraine, which has aside from its immediate environmental destruction also prompted a reported global “gold rush” for new fossil fuel infrastructure. 

Eighteen activists are also signatories to the lawsuit and the group told The Guardian that it faces “considerable risks” in taking a public stand in a country known for brutal crackdowns against dissent – especially following the invasion of Ukraine. 

However, by taking the government to court, the group hopes that it will “save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.”

The Flooding Catastrophe in the Ahr Tal and its Drastic Consequences

Autumn in the German vineyards

15 November 2021 – by Johanna Wassong

In the summer of 2021, Western Europe experienced some of the worst flooding in decades. It caused tragic loss of life and widespread destruction across Europe, with its effects felt in Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The catastrophic floods were especially powerful in Germany, where 180 people died, 700 were injured, and at the time of writing, 73 people are still missing. Preliminary calculations by German insurance companies suggest that there has been a cost to the economy of 4.5 – 5.5. billion euros, for damage to insured property alone.[1]

Whilst these events are both heart-breaking in their impact on people’s lives, and shocking in their unprecedented nature, this is but one notable example in Western Europe of a trend that has been occurring in other parts of the world for decades, leading to displacement and devastation across the globe. By examining the impact of flooding in the Ahrtal, Germany, scientists have uncovered additional compelling evidence in support of the human-induced contributions to the worsening of natural disasters.

The Ahrtal in Germany – an idyllic region often known for its local wineries and a popular tourist spot for hikers – was and continues to be one of the worst affected regions. At the height of the floods, it is estimated that approximately 90 litres of rain per square meter were falling into the regions around the rivers Ahr and Erft daily, more than any rainfall pattern noted in weather records so far[2].

Can explanations be found for these unprecedented events?

One of the factors predisposing the Ahrtal to flooding is the geography of the region: some valley sections create a funnel effect in the event of extreme floods due to the narrow nature and steep slopes. However, that does not necessarily encompass the full explanation for this catastrophe, which is estimated to be a once in 500-year event, or even rarer according to a study conducted by an international group of scientists from across Europe and the US.[3]

It was also found that human-induced climate change altered both the likelihood and intensity of the heavy rainfall which caused the severe flooding in Western Europe. In other words, not only has human induced climate change made the chances of such flooding happening greater, but it has also led to a worsening of the severity of heavy rainfall events. The study assessed general data from 1-day and 2-day rainfall events separately, and this disaggregation helped to analyse the changes in rainfall duration over the past decades.

The research group landed on three key findings. Firstly, they were able to demonstrate that rising temperatures have made flooding itself worse – climate changed increased the intensity of the rainfall event by about “3 – 19% compared to a global climate 1.2 °C cooler than today”. They also showed that climate change has made the probability of such an event occurring far higher – the likelihood of flooding has increased by a factor of between 1.2-9 compared to a pre-industrial climate. The study also looked at what would happen if the global temperature would continue to increase, up until 2°C warmer than pre-industrial times. Worryingly, the study found that these trends in severity and likelihood would continue to worsen along this predicted trajectory[4].

Though research demonstrating the harms of climate change and global warming already exists, environmental politics within Europe have been slow to change. However, this study based in Western Europe itself, tangibly links climate change to catastrophic effects on people’s livelihoods, and demonstrates its influence in causing huge displacement issues. Though it is unfortunate that governments have in the past not been willing to mobilise when such displacements are occur in far-off countries, it seems possible that in the face of such local impact, this study may succeed where others have failed in galvanizing European action.

The climate crisis as a crisis of global displacement

Due to the extreme floods, and the long-term effects that they had, the residents of the Ahrtal were severely displaced, both in the long and short-term. Whilst volunteering in the Ahrtal, reconstructing a destroyed house which belonged to a local police chief, I heard examples of the displacement which so many were forced to face after their houses were swept away by the floods or ripped down by the authorities due to extreme flooding damage.

One couple explained how their children had to start the new school year in a new region, living with their grandparents, because their own house cannot be lived in, and the school building had also been damaged. This is just one of many examples of the displacement and disruption the residents of the Ahrtal have had to manage. Moreover, ever since the initial, immediate displacement caused by the loss of their home, the residents have continued to experience long-term issues.

Even 3 months after the catastrophe, residents continue feel the ramifications of the disaster. For example, in the city of Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, citizens are left without gas and heating, a challenge that could persist until the winter. Currently, 150 people are still lacking access to these basic services, and others are already living in emergency shelters supplied in the form of containers[5]. The long-term displacement and consequences are often invisible, overlooked as the media turns its attention elsewhere.

There has been widespread disappointment amongst residents with the way the disaster has been handled, not only in terms of the lack of alarm and warning residents received[6], but also in terms of organization after the crisis. One local describes how all of fundraising activities and donations have been organized privately, and there is a palpable feeling of having been let down by the government amongst the affected community. Politicians have expressed their horror and have vowed to fight climate change, with German environment minister Svenja Schulze stating that the recent floods are “the consequences of procrastination and hesitation” in fighting climate change.[7] However, one must be cautious in their optimism in believing meaningful policy change will occur, as these statements were overshadowed by rhetoric surrounding the recent national election in September 2021.

These catastrophes, however, are not new to some developing countries, but a wakeup call only for Western nations. Unfortunately, developing nations such as Bangladesh, countries in the Sahel region and island-nations such as the Maldives, have experienced extreme weather changes and increasing frequency of natural disasters. The question remains if the recent flooding will wake up western nations now that there have been climate-induced disasters and climate induced displacement on their doorstep.  


Johanna Wassong is a final year International Relations student at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, specializing in human rights and refugee rights in sub–Saharan Africa. She is currently writing her dissertation on refugee politics following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Johanna initially started working with refugees in her hometown of Cologne, Germany during the so-called Refugee Crisis of 2015, and was specifically confronted with the issues of environmental migration after the 2021 summer floodings in the Ahrtal. 


References

[1] Bundeszentrale Bildung, “Jahrhunderthochwasser 2021 In Deutschland | Bpb”, Bpb.De, 2021, https://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/337277/jahrhunderthochwasser-2021-in-deutschland.

[2] David Young, “Klimawandel, Flut An Ahr Und Erft – Und Die Frage Nach Dem Verschulden”, Deutschlandfunk, 2021, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/studie-zeigt-zusammenhang-klimawandel-flut-an-ahr-und-erft.2897.de.html?dram:article_id=501936.

[3]  “Heavy Rainfall Which Led To Severe Flooding In Western Europe Made More Likely By Climate Change – World Weather Attribution”, Worldweatherattribution.Org, 2021, https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/heavy-rainfall-which-led-to-severe-flooding-in-western-europe-made-more-likely-by-climate-change/.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Archysport, 2021, https://www.archysport.com/2021/08/after-flooding-in-western-germany-thousands-of-residents-in-winter-without-heating-politics/.

[6] Deutsche Welle, “Germany Ponders Lessons From Deadly Floods — As It Happened”, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-ponders-lessons-from-deadly-floods-as-it-happened/a-58311369.

[7] David Ehl, “The Climate Crisis Can’t Be Stopped, We Must Adapt”, Deutsche Welle, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-the-climate-crisis-cant-be-stopped-we-must-adapt/a-58294704.

To See or Not to See, That is the Question

statues on top of building

20 April 2021 – by Flora Bensadon

Those driven from their homes by the climate crisis need to be welcomed, protected, promoted and integrated”– Pope Francis

On March 30th, 2021 the Migrants and Refugees (M&R) Section and the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development released a booklet entitled “Pastoral Orientations on Climate Displaced Persons” (POCDP). It provides guidelines on how the Church will respond to migration caused by climate change, promoting solidarity between individuals and urging the international community to care for this crisis through immediate action. 

In the document’s preface, the Pope points out that displacement due to an uninhabitable environment might seem like a process of nature when it is in fact the result of “poor choices and destructive activity, selfishness and neglect.” The climate crisis we are now facing comes to no surprise as our environment has been decaying continuously since the start of the Industrial Revolution. While this crisis is a global one, the ones facing the most consequences are those who have contributed the least. Today, we witness the rapid acceleration of climate migration for which there needs to be immediate global responses. 

Come, let us talk this over. If you are ready to listen, we can still have a great future. But if you refuse to listen and to act, you will be devoured by the heat and the pollution, by droughts here and rising waters there” (cf. Isaiah 1:18-20) the Pope quotes. This message, although one of faith, strongly reflects how this crisis has been ignored by many players in the global community. It emphasizes the importance for those in power to listen and acknowledge the distressing position of climate migrants by taking necessary measures to mitigate its impact.

The POCDP begins with a general introduction on the climate crisis and how it plays a role in the displacement of many. It is then followed by nine steps that deal with the various aspects of climate migration. They are the following:

  1. Acknowledging the climate crisis and displacement nexus 
  2. Promoting awareness and outreach
  3. Providing alternatives to displacement
  4. Preparing people for displacement 
  5. Fostering inclusion and integration 
  6. Exercising a positive influence on policy-making
  7. Extending pastoral care
  8. Cooperating in strategic planning and action 
  9. Promoting professional training in integral ecology
  10. Fostering academic research of CCD (Climate Crisis and Displacement)

Local church leaders and congregations were asked to develop these guidelines, particularly those who witnessed first-hand climate-related incidents or displacement, such as archbishop Claudio Dalla Zuanna from Beira, Mozambique. In 2019, the city of Beira was critically hit by Cyclone Idai causing massive flooding, the destruction of 90 percent of its buildings and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Having witnessed the emergency response to this natural disaster, the archbishop stated that it is not enough to solely resettle people. It is important to take additional measures by putting in place the conditions necessary to welcome climate migrants and to provide them with essential services.  

Between 2008 and 2018, 253.7 million people were displaced by climate disasters. The document states that in the first half of 2020 only, 9.8 million people were displaced because of droughts, floods and other climate-related events. The number of climate migrants is still growing and is expected to reach 200 million by 2050. With those numbers in mind, the Vatican’s policy guidelines offer possible ways to raise awareness on climate migration and promote the importance of conversations between governments and policy makers. The M&R Section also encourages churches around the world to welcome displaced people, offer support and integrate them within their new society. 

The POCDP is an important move towards a solution-based approach in the confrontation of the climate migration crisis. By calling for international help and action, the Catholic Church takes a stance in an important debate, which could bring positive changes to our current migration policies. While the primary message of this document relies on a message of faith, it extends a hand to climate migrants, making them feel seen and supported, a step most governments have not yet taken. 


Flora Bensadon is an Earth Refuge Archivist with a degree in History and International Development Degree from McGill University. Through her studies, her culturally diverse background and her travels, Flora has taken a profound interest in the problems of migration, specifically those of climate refugees.


References

Migrants & Refugees Section, Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development. Pastoral Orientations on Climate Displaced Persons. Migrants & Refugees, 2021. https://migrants-refugees.va/2021/03/30/pastoral-orientations-on-climate-displaced-people/

Wells, Christopher. Church offers guidelines for response to climate migration. Vatican News, 2021. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2021-03/church-pastoral-orientations-response-climate-displaced-people.html

Parson, Thea. Vatican Releases Guidelines to Address Climate Displacement. Climate Refugees, 2021. https://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2021/4/9/vatican

Brown, Oli. Migration and Climate Change. IOM International Organization for Migration, 2008. https://olibrown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2008-Migration-and-Climate-Change-IOM.pdf

Wooden, Cindy. Vatican calls for action to assist victims displaced by climate change. Grandin Media, 2021. https://grandinmedia.ca/vatican-calls-for-action-to-assist-victims-displaced-by-climate-change/
Giangravé, Claire. Vatican makes moral case for supporting people displaced by climate change. Religion News Service, 2021. https://religionnews.com/2021/03/30/vatican-makes-moral-case-for-supporting-people-displaced-by-climate-change/

Czech Republic vs. Poland: The First Environmental Lawsuit Between EU Member States

25 March 2021 – by Robert Los

Introduction

In February 2021, the Czech Foreign Minister Thomas Petricek announced a lawsuit against the Polish Republic at the ECJ over the controversial extension of the concession for open-pit coal mining in the Turów tri-border area. What makes this fact pattern stand out amongst other lawsuits between member states is unique to this case only: For the first time in the history of the European Union, two member states are suing each other on the grounds of environmental misconduct.[1]

This article is intended to be the first in a series of accompanied reports on what may become a landmark legal battle and will therefore focus primarily on the political and factual background of the lawsuit. It will conclude with a brief outlook.

Political and factual background

Coal in Europe

For several years now, Europe has been haunted by the question of energy transition and the right way to implement it. A hot debate  at the moment is the meaningfulness and safety of nuclear energy as a supporting force and/or as the foundation of a successful shift toward renewable energy. Another form of historically important and wide-spread energy production is considered to be unsustainable in view of the climatic consequences it entails. While a large number of European countries have relied or still rely on coal-fired power generation, there is a clear movement in many member states from the 2010s onwards to phase out of “coal”.[2]

In this context, special attention is given to three countries in the center of Europe: Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. These three countries not only had the most coal-fired power plants in 2017,[3] – together they had around 50 more than all other European member states (including Great Britain)[4] – but these countries also mine the most coal, by far. In 2017, the three of them were the top producers of soft lignite in Europe with 171.3 (Germany), 61.2 (Poland) and 39.3 (Czech Republic) megatons each. Poland alone stands out in hard coal production with 65.8 megatons per anno.[5] 

Despite these similarities, the three coal heavyweights differ in one crucial feature in the run-up to the lawsuit: while Germany, after a long domestic political struggle, adopted a still much-criticized coal phase-out in July 2020 for 2038 with an early option in 2035,[6] and in the Czech Republic an expert commission has been preparing a coal phase-out since 2019 and in December 2020 recommend a phase out in line with the German plans for the year 2038,[7] a different, more resistant wind has been blowing in Poland, and not only since the conservative PiS government took office.

Coal discussion in Poland

When taking office in 2017, Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki emphasized in his inaugural speech that his country would not abandon coal as a “central form of energy production”. Despite the European Union’s efforts to lower its climate targets, this may not come as a surprise , given that coal accounts for about 80% of Polish energy production (the Czech Republic, in second place, only has 50%), several hundred thousand jobs are linked to the coal industry, and Poland’s enormous coal resources.[8] Undeterred by the certainty that the EU would miss its climate targets, both  liberal and conservative predecessor governments continue to put brakes on European coal reduction efforts in their country.[9] In this sense, the new government, in which the Energy and Environment Ministries announced that a coal phase-out before 2050 was not an option at all, and if so then only a reduction to 50% in energy production was possible, merely perpetuated and enforced the already existing foreign policies of previous Polish governments.[10]

This puts the government in line with what is probably the most important domestic political player in the coal sector: the Solidarność trade union. Originally known for its historic struggle for freedom in communist Poland in the 1980s, the union now aggressively promotes the interests of its members in the coal industry. In addition to saying that Poland should mine God-given coal as long as it is possible and economical, domestic political campaigns have been threatened against politicians who represent otherwise.[11]

But it is precisely this condition of economic viability that opens up a second unintended, domestic political area of tension for the government, in addition to the foreign policy pressure caused by the European climate targets. Poland’s self-imposed focus on coal is costing it dearly in multiple ways. Indirectly, the health damage caused by air pollution from coal-fired power plants and coal-fired furnaces – 33 of the 50 cities with the dirtiest air within the EU are in Poland[12] – is estimated to cost up to 26 billion euros more in the health sector.[13] In addition, since a 2018 ECJ ruling on the failure to comply with the relevant limits and several ignored reminders from the Commission, further fines of 4 to 50 billion euros are threatened if the government does not adopt effective measures as soon as possible.[14] But even directly, the economic viability is questionable. The increasingly expensive emissions trading certificates and the falling price of coal are making coal-fired power plants and extraction sites less and less profitable. Hard coal mining in particular has been running at a loss for years.[15] These operations are kept alive mainly by government subsidies.[16] The question of economic viability finally came to a head in 2018 when the financing question was raised for the planned Ostrołęka C coal-fired power plant. Banks refused to finance the 1.5 billion project because a profit margin could not be expected over the lifetime of the plant.[17] Two years later, the project was actually scrapped at the financing stage by the two state-owned energy companies Energa and Enea.[18]

All this actually led to a rethinking in government circles, where for the first time rumors of a coal phase-out even as early as 2036 occurred. However, Solidarność immediately intervened with its demand for a phase-out in 2060 at the earliest. Due to the fact that workers from the coal sector are among the core of its own electorate, the government accommodated the union and – which somewhatresembles a small revolution – decided in the summer of 2020 to phase out at least hard coal by 2049.[19] This is a result that both the trade unionists and the government can live with. But not the EU’s climate targets and the health of many people in the area. Because until then, the many sites will continue to be subsidized and operated.

Factoring and plant site in Turów

One of these sites is Turów, which is located in the Tri-State-area between Germany and the Czech Republic. Coal has been mined in the region since the early 18th century, initially underground and then as an open pit mine from 1904. Since 1962, the power plant of the same name has also been located in the immediate vicinity to the north. The resources of the 26 km2 mining area – already one of the 4 largest mining areas in Poland and is expected to be expanded to 30 km2 in the future – would allow coal to be mined there until 2044.[20]

And this is the crux of why the Czech Republic and Poland are now at odds over the project. Due to its location and size, the plant also radiates into neighboring countries and impacts both German and Czech environments. The concession originally allowed PGE, an energy company in which the state holds a majority stake, to operate the plant only until April 2020, but the Polish government not only extended it, but also allowed the aforementioned expansion of the production area both in width to 30km2 and in depth by another 330 meters. This expansion would see the polish production site touching the Czech border.[21] 

Concerns of Activists and Plaintiffs

When criticizing the project, a distinction can be made between actual environmental impacts caused by the facilities and procedural errors in the extension and amendment of the concession. This distinction is necessary in particular with regard to the decision of the EU Commission from December 2020, which is a necessary prerequisite for a lawsuit between member states under Art. 259 TFEU, because the weight of the case for future treatment of transboundary environmental impacts will also be decided on this distinction.

Environmental impacts

1. Air pollution

The most obvious impact at coal-fired power plants, air pollution, is also a problem at the site in Turów. The ranking of the European Environmental Agency shows the coal-fired power plant in Turów not only as the second most polluting industrial facility in Poland, but also as the 7th in the entire European Union.[22] A study by the Center for Energy and Clean Air from 2020 shows that the pollution is by no means limited to Polish territory, but also affects German and Czech territory, in line with the phrase “emissions do not stop at borders”. Rather, of the 120 premature deaths in 2017 that could be attributed to emissions from the power plant and open pit mine, 80 occurred in Germany and the Czech Republic and only 40 in Poland. In addition, according to the study, approximately 290,000 people in the German regions of Zittau and Görlitz as well as the Czech region of Liberec are exposed to the maximum tolerable or even higher concentrations of PM2.5 around the clock. The commonly occurring risk increases with respect to diseases such as stroke, lung cancer, heart and respiratory diseases in adults, as well as respiratory infections and harm to cognitive development in children are felt particularly intensively here but extend far beyond this (cf. table 2).[23]

2. Impacts on groundwater and pollution of surface waters

But it does not stop at air pollution. Studies also show that open-pit excavations are affecting groundwater supplies on both German and Czech soil. In the Czech region of Liberec, for example, there is a threat of a significant drop in the groundwater level and, as a consequence, up to 30,000 people could lose access to drinkable water.[24] According to geologist Krupp, significant groundwater drawdown is also expected on German soil, particularly in the region around Zittau. However, this will primarily affect the deeper Tertiary aquifers, which have not yet been used for drinking water production.[25]

However, in addition to subsidence, there is another threat to near-surface groundwater that has contact points with surface waters. As a consequence of the acidic mine waters, significantly higher sulfate concentrations are found in the surface waters near the Turów plant. A similar trend is emerging for cadmium, uranium, and nickel. These pressures have led to waters being classified as “not good” under the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). Presumably, this effect also spreads to the groundwater in contact, but a conclusive determination could not be made due to the lack of measuring points.[26]

3. Ground subsidence

Closely related to groundwater subsidence are future soil subsidence in general. Krupp states in his study that the areas affected by subsidence are largely on Czech and German territory, with the German part in particular comprising mainly built-up areas of the city of Zittau. This largely irreversible subsidence, which could already be as much as 1 m near the state border and gradually decreases to zero toward the west toward the Zittau basin rim, will continue to increase in the coming years due to groundwater subsidence, and according to the study’s assessment, building damage in the Zittau area cannot be excluded.[27]

Krupp further states in his report that PGE’s preferred modeling of the open pit could potentially trigger further soil mechanical instabilities during the flooding phases, which could adversely affect the German areas in particular. This is because the flooding could lead to a reactivation of the latent sliding surfaces of the slope failure from past years that runs under the Neisse River. In a resulting chain reaction, devastating consequences for people, material assets and the environment cannot be ruled out. Krupp for example, warns of the  drying up of the Neisse River due to the overfilling of the open pit mine. Although PGE mentions the dangers of such slope failures in its application, it does not present any countermeasures. Krupp sees all these consequences as preventable, or at least mitigable, through more careful and environmentally friendly modeling of the pit.[28]

Procedural errors as a ground for the lawsuit

In addition to the actual impacts, several areas of concern have been identified by activists and critics at the procedural level of the mine’s extension and expansion.

On the one hand, it was criticized that sufficient public and intergovernmental participation had not taken place. Although there were consultations between the three member states, other concerns regarding the Turów plant are said to have been discussed there. Public participation, meanwhile, was almost completely absent. At least in the case of the short-term extension of the concession by 6 years. The situation is different for the extension of the concession to 2044, which is also being sought. Here, the public will be involved and consulted. Activists and experts hope that this inclusive process  has the capacity to prevent an extension.[29]

On the other hand, experts have diagnosed a flawed environmental impact assessment as the basis for the extension decision of the Polish government. For example, Krupp criticizes a faulty determination of the status quo, so that the preparation of forecasts regarding the impact of different variants on the environment actually seemed impossible. Furthermore, although the report of PGE contains all the required chapter headings, several of them are missing not only the signatures but also the entire substantive explanations. Additionally, Krupp criticizes the fact that either further research was completely waived in the case of missing data or, in some cases, unsuitable sources of information were used.[30]

With such serious deficiencies, the legality of the extension is indeed more than just questionable.

Decision of the EU-Commission

And it was precisely on these actual impacts of the plant and procedural errors that the Czech complaint to the European Commission of September 30, 2020 was based. According to Art. 259 TFEU, member states taking legal action against another member state must file a complaint with the Commission. This is intended as a more or less last resort to achieve a pre-court clarification of internal disputes under Union law, since the Commission in effect makes a non-binding preliminary decision. In the process of this preliminary decision, the Commission deals with the written requests of the two parties.

In its complaint, the Czech government alleged infringements in relation to the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (2001/42/EC), the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (2011/92/EU) and access to information Directive (2003/4/EC) as well as the principle of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.

After hearing from the two states involved, the European Commission courtly announced in a press statement on December 17, 2020 that they agree with the Czech government on certain issues of the complaint. First and foremost, these were the procedural errors that had been criticized.

The Commission found that Poland continued to fail to adequately transpose the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (2011/92/EU) into national law. Thus, even if under Polish law the environmental impact assessment had been carried out fully and in accordance with the requirements, this would not have met European standards. This is also the subject of another pending infringement proceeding under Art. 258 TFEU against the Polish government.

However, the Commission assumes that the requirements of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (2011/92/EU) and access to information Directive (2003/4/EC) were disregarded in any case, as there was no sufficient public participation and consultation between the respective member states concerned. As already mentioned by the critics of the project, consultations between Poland and the neighboring countries did take place, but these were related to the environmental permit and the change of the land-use plan, and  not to the extension of the concession.

The other allegations, in particular those against the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (2001/42/EC) and the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), were rejected by the Commission as unfounded after hearing evidence and arguments from both sides.[31]

The European Commission will now have to look into the present matter again, because the wind of the Commission’s positive partial decision and the new expert opinion by Krupp on behalf of Greenpeace have also persuaded the city of Zittau to lodge a complaint with the EU.[32]

Outlook

In the meantime, the Czech Republic has also taken action, first issuing an ultimatum to the Polish government. This stipulated that an earth wall be built on the Polish side of the border to protect citizens in the Czech Republic from the dust pollution produced by the open pit mine and that the Polish state pay compensation of 40 million euros for endangering the drinking water supply and for the financing of new wells. In addition, an expert commission with specialists from the affected countries should also accompany the project in the future.[33] However, this ultimatum expired without a response, compelling the  Czech government to finally file a lawsuit with the ECJ. Urgent legal protection was also applied for with the intention to  bring the mine to a standstill for the time being.

Both decisions are still pending. The same applies to the decision by the German government as to whether it will join the lawsuit. A preliminary verdict  on the urgent legal protection is expected in the next few weeks. These proceedings have the potential to lead to a  landmark decision that could determine future environmental issues and the handling of emissions in the EU. In particular, the question of the responsibility of emitting states could be taken up in a specific case, which in turn could open the door for other constellations. Furthermore, questions of habitat destruction  by emissions may also be raised

It will be interesting to observe  whether the ECJ adopts the easier option by way of the Commission and refers purely to the procedural errors, so that the substantive issues are decided in the respective national proceedings, including public participation and proper EIA; or whether the judges are tempted to intervene more substantially due to the urgency (and gravity) of this matter.  The legal proceedings are therefore eagerly awaited.


Robert Los is a state exam candidate at Bucerius Law School in Hamburg with a completed specialization in corporate and capital markets law. He has dealt with the topics of migration and climate mainly in the context of voluntary work.


References

[1]                https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/tschechien-zieht-gegen-polen-vor-gericht/ (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 10:17)

[2]                Cf. the phase out map of “Europe Beyond Coal” – https://beyond-coal.eu/coal-exit-tracker/?type=maps&layer=4 (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 11:25)

[3]                Germany: 77; Poland: 44; Czech Republic: 39 – next in the list would be Spain with 15. Cf. https://www.dw.com/de/kohleausstieg-in-eu-cop23-energiewende-klimaschutz-luftverschmutzung-kosten/a-41222994 (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 11:27)

[4]                Cf. https://www.dw.com/de/kohleausstieg-in-eu-cop23-energiewende-klimaschutz-luftverschmutzung-kosten/a-41222994 (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 11:27)

[5]                BGR Energy study: Data and developments in German and global energy development p. 128 et. seqq. – https://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Downloads/energiestudie_2018.pdf;jsessionid=BF449658E24705A0E6200A12B4410B9D.2_cid284?__blob=publicationFile&v=10 (Last access: 12.03.2021, 11:44)

[6]                https://www.bmu.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/nationale-klimapolitik/fragen-und-antworten-zum-kohleausstieg-in-deutschland/ (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 11:53)

[7]                https://deutsch.radio.cz/fach-kommission-empfiehlt-tschechischen-kohleausstieg-bis-2038-8701984 (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 11:54)

[8]                https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/politik/kohle-polen-tschechien-klimagipfel-katowice-112.html (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 13:17)

[9]                https://www.zeit.de/2020/32/polen-klimaziele-eu-kohleausstieg-erneuerbare-energien-klimaschutz/seite-2 (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 12:35)

[10]              https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/politik/kohle-polen-tschechien-klimagipfel-katowice-112.html (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 14:25)

[11]              Ibid.

[12]              https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/polen-beschliesst-verspaeteten-kohleausstieg/ (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 14:16)

[13]              https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/ostblogger/eugh-urteil-zu-smog-in-polen-100.html (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 13:00)

[14]              EuGH, 22.02.2018 – C-336/16; cf. https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/ostblogger/eugh-urteil-zu-smog-in-polen-100.html (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 13:12)

[15]              https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/polen-beschliesst-verspaeteten-kohleausstieg/ (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 14:16)

[16]              https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/politik/kohle-polen-tschechien-klimagipfel-katowice-112.html (Last Access: 12.03.2021; 14:25)

[17]              Ibid.

[18]              https://www.energate-messenger.de/news/200338/aus-fuer-steinkohle-kraftwerksblock-ostroleka-c- (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 14:30)

[19]              https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/polen-beschliesst-verspaeteten-kohleausstieg/ (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 14:16)

[20]              Krupp, Gutachten zu den grenzüberschreitenden Auswirkungen einer Fortführung des Abbaus der Braunkohlelagerstätte Turów (Polen) auf die Gewässer in Deutschland, p.16

[21]              https://www.dw.com/de/braunkohleabbau-im-dreil%C3%A4ndereck-tschechien-stellt-polen-ultimatum/a-56629291 (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 14:59)

[22]              EEA Technical Report No. 20/2014 – Costs of air pollution from European industrial facilities 2008–2012, p.36.

[23]              Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Air quality, toxic and health impacts of the Turow power plant ,Abstract, p.1 – https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Air-quality-toxic-and-health-impacts-of-the-Turow-power-plant_publication.pdf (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 15:54)

[24]              https://english.radio.cz/czech-republic-sue-poland-over-turow-coal-mine-expansion-8710176 (Last Access: 12.03.2021, 16:27)

[25]              Krupp, Gutachten zu den grenzüberschreitenden Auswirkungen einer Fortführung des Abbaus der Braunkohlelagerstätte Turów (Polen) auf die Gewässer in Deutschland, p.16

[26]              Ibid, p.

[27]              Ibid, p. 59 et. seqq.

[28]              Ibid, p. 54 et. seqq.

[29]              https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/verstoesst-die-fortfuehrung-des-tagebaus-turow-gegen-eu-recht/ (Last Access: 14.03.2021, 11:46)

[30]              Krupp, Gutachten zu den grenzüberschreitenden Auswirkungen einer Fortführung des Abbaus der Braunkohlelagerstätte Turów (Polen) auf die Gewässer in Deutschland, p.

[31]              European Commission, Environmental Impact Assessment: Commission adopts reasoned opinion in case brought by Czechia against Poland, 17. December 2020.

[32]              https://www.mdr.de/sachsen/bautzen/goerlitz-weisswasser-zittau/tagebau-turow-zittau-beschwerde-eu-kommission-100.html (Last Access: 14.03.2021, 13:00)

[33]              https://www.dw.com/de/braunkohleabbau-im-dreil%C3%A4ndereck-tschechien-stellt-polen-ultimatum/a-56629291 (Last Access: 14.03.2021, 13:08)

France’s First Climate Refugee – A Sign of a Promising Future for Climate Migration?

18 March 2021 – by Flora Bensadon

In December 2020, France officially recognized its first climate refugee – a 40-year-old Bangladeshi man with severe respiratory asthma. The appeals court in Bordeaux overturned his deportation order, finding that the substantial level of air pollution in Bangladesh would only exacerbate his condition.

Sheel, as the media named him, fled persecution he faced in his hometown north of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. He arrived in France in 2011 where he settled in Toulouse and has since made a living for himself. 

Sheel suffers from severe asthma and sleep apnea for which he needs careful medical treatment that is unavailable in Bangladesh. Upon his arrival in France, Sheel applied for political asylum but his claim was denied by the French Government, leading him to start a procedure for a residence permit as a “sick” foreigner. Sheel was granted a temporary residence permit as a sick foreigner in 2015, as this kind of permit is only granted to those who cannot receive proper treatment in their home country and whose life would be put at risk if they were to be sent back.

The case

In 2019, however, the Haute-Garonne (French department) Prefecture did not renew his residence permit claiming that he would be able to receive proper treatment in Bangladesh. As a result, on 18 June 2019 the Prefecture issued Sheel an expulsion order (or, ‘OQTF’ – Obligation de Quitter le Territoire Français). 

Sheel’s lawyer, Ludovic Rivière, argued that not only would he receive poor medical treatment in his home country but due to the high level of air pollution in Bangladesh, his condition would only worsen. In fact, the Environmental Performance Index of Yale University and Columbia University ranks Bangladesh as 179th in terms of air quality in 2020. In addition to this, the level of fine particles in the air in Bangladesh is six times higher than the maximum required by the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO figures for 2016 also show that 82% of the 572,600 deaths recorded from non-communicable diseases in Bangladesh were caused by air pollution.

In light of those arguments, on 15 June 2020, the Administrative Court of Toulouse cancelled the OQTF as it estimated that provision of Sheel’s required medical treatment would not be adequate in Bangladesh. The Haute-Garonne Prefecture appealed that decision, and the case was then brought before the court of Administrative Appeals in Bordeaux in December 2020. 

Mr. Rivière’s plea was founded on environmental arguments, which he defended by presenting the court with the WHO figures. The court ultimately decided to permit Sheel to stay on French territory and cited the environmental criteria to justify the final decision. The court in fact noted that sending Sheel back to Bangladesh would lead to an “aggravation of his respiratory disease due to air pollution”.

A symbol for greater protection of climate refugees in Europe? 

The notion of a “climate refugee” is not officially inscribed in the French legal system – Sheel is therefore not legally referred to as one. Although environmental criteria have been evoked in some French cases, Sheels’ is the first where environmental degradation is used as the leading argument for the final ruling. Could this possibly open the door for other similar cases? Could this case be seen as a step toward a change in migration policy in Europe, particularly as the number of climate migrants is predicted to rise to 200 million by 2050?

François Gemenne, teacher and specialist in environment-related migration, stated that while he sees Sheel’s case as a step in the right direction, it is unlikely that this outcome will become frequent unless the criteria for asylum are broadened. His reason for this belief is that many asylum seekers that are victims of conflict and/or persecution are often also victims of environmental degradation. Whilst the authorities are aware of this, the lack of regulations and structures protecting climate migrants makes it unlikely for these arguments to be accepted as the main justification for asylum.

However, this could possibly change with the Nansen Agenda, a “state-led consultative process to build consensus on a Protection Agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change”. This initiative was ratified by 110 countries in 2015, including France, and has the potential to clearly define the protection criteria for climate refugees. The issue is, like many immigration policies, it is non-binding, allowing countries to deflect their responsibility to protect refugees. 
While these – the Sheel outcome and Nansen Agenda – are extraordinary first steps for providing solutions to climate migration, policies that clearly protect climate migrants and refugees need to be put in place soon as the number of climate migrants is only set to rise.


Flora Bensadon is an Earth Refuge Archivist with a degree in History and International Development Degree from McGill University. Through her studies, her culturally diverse background and her travels, Flora has taken a profound interest in the problems of migration, specifically those of climate refugees.

The Role of Domestic Courts in Climate Litigation: A Case for Intergenerational Justice in the United Kingdom

green grass covered mountain under cloudy sky during daytime

9 March 2021 – by Stephanie Hader

We are looking ahead, as is one of the first mandates given to us as chiefs, to make sure every decision we make relates to the welfare and well-being of the seventh generation to come, and that is the basis by which we make decisions in council. We consider: Will this be to the benefit of the seventh generation. This is a guideline.

– Iroquois Nation maxim [1]

INTRODUCTION

The 2019 student ‘Strikes 4 Climate Action’ in Australia were a testimony to the urgency of redirecting the climate change discourse to the foreground of political and judicial decision-making. The current warming trend, as was outlined in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, is significant because “most of it is extremely likely to be the result of human activity since the mid-20th century and proceeding at a rate that is unprecedented over decades to millennia”.[2] The scientific evidence is unequivocal. If natural habitats are not protected to the extent that the integrity of all their ecological functions are maintained, we are facing a dim future. As existing in a temporal dimension, precautionary action to protect the ‘right to a healthy environment’ must be taken in the face of uncertainty.

Thousands of primary and secondary school students marched the streets in cities across Australia, attesting that “the youth are rising, we are not compromising”.[3] And they certainly shouldn’t. The judiciary has a prevailing role in responding to their plea. It is with this contention that this paper will argue that all generations – including children and legitimate representatives of future persons –  should be regarded as co-equal in court procedures. In extending the common law rules of standing to all generations, climate litigation will finally have its place in court. This form of intergenerational equity will set new enforceable standards for governments to act as fiduciary trustees in the protection of our shared environment. The outcome will be the reduction of CO2 emissions and slowed or reversed species endangerment.

Scope and Definitions

I will narrow my analytical scope to the role of domestic courts in common law jurisdictions, with an emphasis on Public Law in the United Kingdom. For argumentative purposes, this paper will heavily draw ideas, decisions and principles from other jurisdictions as climate change is a phenomena with consequences that transcend institutional boundaries. The analysis will mostly be anchored in legal philosophy, and will thereby be less technical in nature. The first section of the paper will address our relationship to the environment, followed by our relationship to future generations and lastly to governments. This essay purports to humbly act as a policy paper in appealing to judges, particularly in the United Kingdom, to amend the common law rules of standing. Judgements that contemplate intergenerational elements not only bolster environmental standards, but also exert a persuasiveness that eclipses state borders.

PART I: OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ENVIRONMENT

All of our actions and inactions affect the global ecosystem and its intricate webs. As humans, we have the capacity to shape and destroy our own natural habitat. According to the I=PAT equation, the environmental impact (I) is caused by a very large and ever-increasing human population, the increase in economic growth per capita affluence (A) and the application of resource-depletion and pollution technology (T).[4] The results exposed that the environmental change sweeping the world is occurring at a much faster pace than previously thought. The United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has officially cautioned environmental deterioration as one of the ten most serious threats to the human race.[5] Efforts must be made on all fronts to counteract the irreversible damage done to Earth – a planet we all call home.

Impact of Climate Change

The current statistics concerning climate change are alarming and “no longer academic”.[6] We are confronted with the depletion of our resources, the destruction of entire ecosystems and habitats, the extinction of wildlife and a distressing increase in air pollution. The Global Environmental Outlook’s Regional Assessments paint a bleak picture of the severity of the issue. In Latin America, “nitrous oxide emissions increased by 29% between 2000-2010”.[7] In the Pan-European region, they found that “land-use related emissions, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter persist at high levels and are still increasing”.[8] While overall greenhouse emissions have reduced, the increasing per-capita consumption of final goods and services still remains a “major obstacle to a low-carbon economy”.[9] On a global scale, around half of the world’s original forests have disappeared, despite their integral role in producing oxygen. Due to their ability to act as a carbon sink, it is estimated that 15% of greenhouse gas emissions are the result of deforestation.[10] The quality of our natural atmosphere is severely affected by these changes.

This unbalanced relationship with the environment has led to a “decline in agricultural productivity; increased risk of floods and droughts; threats to food security; increased demand for water; and negative effects on biodiversity”.[11] In North America, global warming “exacerbated the five year drought in Texas by 15-20%” and the 2010 heatwave in the northern hemisphere resulted in 54,000 cumulative excess deaths”.[12] Climate change is exerting multiple interlinked pressures and health threats upon society and “it is clear that the frequency of such events will increase as the climate warms”.[13] Rising temperatures are shifting our planet into an ominous state that is rapidly becoming less hospitable to human life. Costello described climate change as the “largest health threat of the 21st Century”.[14] In this way, all members of the human family “have an interest, and a responsibility, to act to ensure we protect what we all value: a healthy future for both people and nature”.[15] The global average temperature cap has been set by the United Nations Paris Agreement to be well below 2°C. [16] Remaining under this stipulated standard is the crux of the challenge.

Right to a Healthy Environment

A right ensuring that such a future is attainable can appear in many different forms and may be invoked in circumstances where a specific environmental violation incurs serious health consequences. There is a universality claim to such an argument, as our relationship with the natural environment is part and parcel of our existence. A right formed on such a basis transcends cultural relativism, political ideologies, and social constructs. Nature is fundamental, if not indispensable to our survival (at least until we invent an artificial alternative). Ergo, this paper is written on the premise that even if the terminology adopted differs across contexts, the right to a sustainable environment is enshrined in our laws in one format or another. Since this right is a natural right we enjoy as members of the same species, in the case that it is only vaguely construed, there is a strong presumption that it should be read in favor of its existence. Therefore, despite the United Kingdom not expressly providing for a positive right to a healthy environment, an individual claim to a violation brought on these grounds is still reasonable due to its universal potency.

References to rights that have an indirect bearing on the environment can be found in both domestic and international legal instruments. Whilst the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) do not explicitly mention the right to a healthy environment per se, it can still be inferred through a liberal analysis of the language adopted. An example is the ‘right to life’ mentioned in Article 6 of the ICCPR.[17] In the Indian case Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar, the judges extracted the environmental element in declaring “that the right to a healthy environment was an integral part of the right to life”,[18] enshrined in Article 21 of their Constitution.

Another strand of evidence in support of its universality can be found in United Nations’ sponsored declarations and conferences. The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants expressly announced in 1972 that “humans have the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being”.[19] Twenty years later, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development similarly stated that “human beings are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”.[20] Such a long-standing standard in customary international law upholds the assumption that despite the lack of a well-defined right, all persons merely by virtue of their humanity are entitled to an ecologically sound environment and the natural resources it offers. As Sax pointed out, “certain interests are so particularly the gifts of nature’s bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace”.[21]

Other manifestations to a right to a healthy environment have also developed in the course of judicial decision-making. In a famous judgement in 1997 concerning the Gabcikovo Nagmaros Project, it was held that due to the global development of new environmental norms, both states, namely Hungary and Slovakia, “are equally entitled to the preservation of their human right to the protection of their environment”,[22] for “it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself”.[23] Likewise in Columbia and South Africa, domestic courts held the right to a healthy and sustainable environment to be categorically absolute.[24] The Colombian Constitutional Court coined it as being a “precondition to life itself and must be guaranteed even in the face of uncertainty as to the risk of violating the right”.[25] From these examples flows the rationale that a right to a healthy environment is universal and imprescriptible in nature. Accordingly, its legal force can also triumph in the United Kingdom.

Finally, all generations should enjoy equal access to its benefits. Future inhabitants are in this instance defined not as an abstraction, but as consisting of individuals, that are human beings; that is, we can safely assume that they share the same properties to humans today.[26] Their mere incapacity to legally invoke the right to a robust environment, does not affect the existence of such a right. It is thereby not only universal, but also intergenerational. This paper is not committed to the claim that “future generations by definition do not exist now and they cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer or subject of anything, including rights”.[27] Instead it will adopt an unconstrained view that the human right to healthy environment is applicable to all of mankind; past, present and future.

PART II: INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

The previous section established the extremity of the climate change crisis. Naturalist David Attenborough goes so far as to suggest that “the collapse of civilization is on the horizon”.[28] It also concluded that all of mankind has a right to a healthy environment. How this affects our relationship to future generations will be addressed below. 

Two initial points must be made. First, due to the fact that the most destructive effects of climate change are yet to come, children and future generations will experience its most lethal impacts. As they too have a right to a secure environment, adequate climate action is just as much, if not more, their concern than it is ours. Despite this, the voices of children and future generations are mostly left unheard. This paper makes an attempt to address this issue.

Second, a correlating duty to protect the environment naturally derives from the inference that a right to a healthy environment exists. Domestic courts can fulfill this duty in setting stringent environmental standards through public interest litigation. At its core is the “right to demand protection from public authorities in case of any breach or compromise or right”.[29] With such a judicial system in place, measures are available to the public if authorities mishandle the pursuance of a sustainable ecosystem. Provided that the “right to effective judicial protection is one of the cornerstones of societies governed by the rule of law and judicial access is a key aspect of that right”,[30] it has immense power to effectively serve the best interests of the public.

Issue of Standing

It is of great concern that domestic courts in the United Kingdom are currently unable to hear climate change cases on the ground that there is no clear correlation between a plaintiff and the injury caused by rising temperatures. It is either a) that the intended plaintiff does not have sufficient interest in the particular injury, or b) that those who will suffer the injury are unable to be identified as plaintiffs. The issue at hand is one of legal standing (locus standi), which refers to the ability of a particular individual or pressure group to bring legal action in a court of law. It is a matter of “threshold inquiry in the determination of the appropriateness of judicial intervention”.[31] In other words, locus standi is “a place of standing; standing in court; a right of appearance in a justice or before a legislative body on a given question”.[32] Fundamentally, it is about the right to be heard.

The Injury

The first issue is concerned with linking the injury to the legal or natural person. Section 31(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in the United Kingdom provides that “no application for judicial review shall be made… unless… the applicant has sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates”.[33] This is interpreted more liberally for pressure groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth amongst others. Individuals must demonstrate that they have a sufficient interest in the decision they are preparing to challenge.

There is an inherent inability to prove interest in a case where the violation is concerned with environmental degradation or climate change. Due to its complex nature, it is extremely difficult to prove how exactly the ‘injury’ has affected an individual. The applicant must normally “show that the challenged conduct has caused that injury in fact”.[34] However, as there are many different layers of impact, responsible public bodies may not be held accountable for a specific course of action that has the capacity to cause serious consequences for a large group of people in the future.[2] 

The presence of this obstacle is clear in the following cases. In Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland, “applicants failed to show that the operation of the power station at issue exposed them personally to a danger that was not only serious but also, specific, above all, imminent”.[35] A similar conclusion was drawn in Stichting Greenpeace v EC Commission in which the Court of First Instance declared Greenpeace’s action inadmissible, as it was not directly involved with the controversy in question. It was held that “while environmental protection is one of the fundamental objectives of the community”,[36] it does not automatically confer a right on a natural person that is enforceable by law. The environmental violations were not only too remote, but also not deemed to be an issue of public importance at the time.

The difficulties in establishing a causal link between the commission or omission of the public body and the individual or group can lead to courts declaring a case inarguable. Given the inability to establish a direct aggrievance, actions of environmental degradation which are practiced and condoned can be overlooked by the judicial branch on the ground that the violation itself has not yet manifested into a danger grave enough for the party in question to allow court proceedings to commence. As per Lord Denning, “the court would of course not listen to a mere busybody who was interfering in things which did not concern him”.[37]

The Plaintiff

The second issue is concerned with the inability of the standing doctrine to link environmental harm to children and future generations. Despite the inevitable impact of climate change circumventing generational boundaries, youth without representation and the unborn are unable to voice their complaints in court. The future person does not fit into the “regular” concept of a legal person, as the law does not yet have the capability to address and represent an entity which does not yet exist.[38] In the case of Faroque v Bangladesh for example, the court whilst weighing the issue of a pollution-free environment, did not grant locus standi to future generations, simply on the grounds that the Constitution of Bangladesh does not expressly provide them with any rights.[39]

The shortcoming of the courts in articulating the definition of a non-subject has meant that there is no enforceable duty of care for the health and wellbeing of future generations. In this legal reality, the right to a healthy environment, which one pertains by virtue of being a person, cannot be invoked insofar as there is no actual person who may benefit from it. This strict view of the principle that legal personhood is “based on the biological birth and death of the human being”[40] violates the basic fundamental assumption that there will, all singularities aside, be a future generation. In the face of climate change, this narrow understanding of locus standi – that the ‘individual’ in the Supreme Court Act 1981 is merely defined as legal construct rather than a legal person – must be overcome, This will allow room for alternative interpretations. 

locus standi for Future Generations

The way in which both of these encumbrances can be addressed appropriately when considering climate change is through the integration of intergenerational justice into the domestic law of the United Kingdom. It will not only urge “agents to act now on the basis that the antecedent will at some point in the future come true”,[41] but will also establish a link between the plaintiff and the injury so that legal representatives of future generations will be granted the capacity to institute and commence legal proceedings. In recognizing that justice must be achieved across generations, courts can effectively play a role in preserving the future state of the environment from current impairment. This is a normative discussion and will be based on the premise that “in order to care about the future it is necessary that there be a future”.[42]

Philosophy of Intergenerational Justice

To avoid animosity, I will address the ethical element of intergenerational justice and ask whether we have a moral duty to ensure that the right to a healthy environment will also be enjoyed by future generations; otherwise it may be difficult to justify a sacrifice for the sake of a future which has not yet manifested.[43] While there is a strong presumption that there is such a duty, it must first be briefly defended that there is also a general willingness to support the preservation of the existence of humankind. I will base my value judgement on two grounds: that the “human species should survive, and that future generations are entitled to live in dignity”.[44] This notion fortunately “strikes a deep chord with all cultures, religions and nationalities”.[45]

First, from a moral standpoint, it can be assumed that the ‘human species should survive’. As Professor Weiss argued, “the interest in survival is deeply rooted in the thinking of all peoples”.[46] In this way, there is a greater moral force than a mere obligation of present generations.[47] As discussed in the previous section, it has become apparent that humans now have the capacity to shape their natural surroundings on such a scale that warrants scrutiny. We are changing our global environment irreversibly, with “profoundly damaging effects on the robustness and integrity of the planet”.[48] To an extent, humans can now “collectively decide to let the human race peter out”.[49] In the past we only had little discretion over the natural process in which humans replenished the earth. These developments in our powers inevitably changed the nature of human action.[50] With the fate of mankind in our hands, comes the moral responsibility to ensure its survival, at least in part.

Secondly, it also seems fair to assume that ‘future generations are entitled to live in dignity’. For this quality of life to manifest, three basic principles of intergenerational equity must be satisfied according to Weiss: the conservation of options, conservation of quality and conservation of access.[51] If left ignored, we are “threatening the survival of humankind under conditions worthy of human beings”.[52] The reason that we are morally obliged to play an implicit role in shaping their future is that there exists an unspoken “partnership among those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born”, [53] as was phrased by Edmund Burke. At present we are holding the earth on trust for all generations to come, just as previous generations did for us, and it is by virtue of this relationship that we must “realize and protect the welfare and well-being of every generation”.[54] As Weiss elegantly put it, “all generations are inherently linked to other generations, past and future, in using the common patrimony of earth”,[55] and it is with this regard that we can say that the right to a healthy environment spans across all generations.

Intergenerational Justice in International Law

Intergenerational justice is not only normative in nature, as versions of it can also be found in international treaties and conventions. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for example, has a clear provision for the principle of intergenerational equity. Article 3 states that “the parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.[56] Similarly, the Brundtland Commission maintains that “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.[57] It was only a year before this report was released that there was a quest for “all Governments and peoples of the world to discharge their historical responsibility, collectively and individually, to ensure that our small planet is passed over to future generations in a condition which guarantees a life in human dignity for all”.[58] Evidently, the concept of intergenerational equity is not  novel, and is instead deeply anchored in customary international law. 

Intergenerational Justice in Case Law

The above analysis creates a strong argument for the introduction of intergenerational equity into domestic bodies in the United Kingdom. Internationally, some cases have already been successful in pleading the interest of future generations. In Diego Cali & Figli Srl v Servizi Ecological Porto Di Genova SpA, the ECJ stated that the prevention of pollution serves the interests of not only current, but also future generations.[59] In Nauru v Australia, the ICJ linked the rights of future generations to the liability for environmental damages. [60] Most importantly, in Minors Oposa v Department of Environment and Natural Resources in the Philippines,[61] the courts allowed a claim based directly on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. These cases show that there is already a willingness to contemplate the welfare of all generations in court decisions.

I will briefly focus on the Minors Oposa case, as the decision by the Philippines Supreme Court has the conceptual capacity to serve as a transferable model to common law jurisdictions. The facts of the case are as follows: the plaintiffs sought an order from the government to discontinue timber licensing agreements, as the grave environmental damages resulting from deforestation were “causing adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage … to the Plaintiff minor’s generation and to generations yet unborn”.[62] In response, the judges held that future generations should also be warranted legal personhood in the eyes of the court. They reasoned that “we find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned”.[63] Intergenerational environmental interests were deemed sufficiently worthy of judicial protection.

In taking this strong position, the Philippines has thus welcomed climate litigation into its legal narrative. In doing, it plays an active role in reducing the detrimental effects of climate change. In granting locus standi to legitimate representations of future generations the Supreme Court has successfully imputed the missing link between the plaintiff and the injury. Applicants are now affected by the violation in question and thus have sufficient interest in the matter. Further, the next generations who will bear the brunt of the climate change impact will have a voice in court so that representatives will be granted the ability to defend the right to a healthy environment in their name.

Climate change is forcing a paradigm shift in the way that our eco- and legal-systems cooperate. The judgement passed down by the Philippines Supreme Court is a commendable decision in whereby the courts effectively responded to emerging norms. This paper encourages all common law jurisdictions to follow in their footsteps. It is only if future generations can hold public bodies accountable that climate change can be addressed with the judicial attention it deserves. 

Government and Intergenerational Equity

Once intergenerational responsibility is enshrined as a legal principle, in which all three parties (non-voting youths, adults and future generations) are contemplated as co-equal, a stricter standard for the government to protect the environment can then emerge. As per the Public Trust Doctrine, the sovereign holds the environment on trust for public use and owes the public the fiduciary duty to protect and maintain the natural resources it provides.[64] When a “state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated … to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties”.[65] Some interests, such as that of a healthy environment, are so intrinsically important to every citizen that “a government may never alienate trust property by conveying it to a private owner and that it might not affect changes in the use to which that property has been devoted”.[66] There is no reason why this judicial protection of public resources we enjoy today should not also extend to those who will be forced to bear environmental devastations greater than what we can realistically comprehend today. With such an observation in mind, it is imperative that future generations are given a voice in court proceedings, because it is only then that the preservation of the environment will be treated equitably alongside economic or short-term exploitations.

Offering future generations locus standi not only invites climate litigation into the courtroom but will also put pressure on governments acting as trustees to abide by higher environmental protection standards. In Australia, the judges in Gray v The Minister for Planning actively extracted the meaning of intergenerational equity from the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 [67] and used it to assert the responsibility of the government to “ensure the health, diversity and productivity of the environment”.[68] Evidently, the intergenerational preservation of the environment is already being consulted across various authoritative institutions, both domestically and internationally. Implementing the principle of intergenerational equity into legal proceedings in the United Kingdom would in theory be no more than a natural extension of the courts’ compliance with climate action.

PART III: LIMITATIONS

Reservations about the consequences of allowing future generations to legitimately gain entry into the sanctuary of the courts must also be made. Before judges can even begin their attempt in accurately predicting the particular consequences of climate change that will violate the ‘right to a healthy environment’, the courts will have to unanimously agree that future agents will in fact exist and what their identity will be. They must set aside the view that “unborn people cannot have anything as they do not exist”.[69] Without much deliberation, there is certainly an inherent difficulty in deducing steadfast conclusions from mere predictions. This is a very substantial flaw in the theory of intergenerational justice. 

Sanklecha provides three requirements that must be fulfilled before intergenerational justice can be considered in its full capacity. Firstly, we must assume that there will “be agents who exist in the future at all”,[70] because if there were none, it would not be possible to assign a duty to present inhabitants of the planet to preserve it for the next. Secondly, these agents “must be of a certain sort”[71] that will demand rights that are synonymous to what understand to be fundamental. This means that the courts will have to predict their interests. Are the unknown unborn entitled to the exact same biological diversity that we currently enjoy? While for example, “depriving future generations of breathable air … would indeed be a violation of their moral obligations to posterity”, “depriving them of the opportunity to see live Dodos” might not be.[72]

Furthermore, their needs for survival may be drastically different to those we classify as  necessities today. Lastly, the courts must make an assumption about the number of agents. Only if meaningful conclusions can be drawn from these predictions of the future of mankind will we be able to justify the duties that the people of today will have towards the people of tomorrow.

CONCLUSION

Tackling this environmental crisis rests upon the commitment to equality across generations. Quoting the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, we have a “responsibility to protect and improve the environment for both present and future generations.” At a time when children are protesting across the globe in the name of climate action, institutions are urged to finally define and implement their promise. It is not merely about sporadic protective measures, but about a long-term solution to the destabilization of the earth’s climate system. As Albert Einstein said, “we cannot solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them”.[73] Holding his words in high esteem, we must finally allow future generations an opportunity to voice their preferences for the future in the courts of law. What the foregoing shows is that intergenerational equity is not only a moral postulate but a legal framework for environmental change.[74] Enshrining this principle in the United Kingdom as an element of locus standi has the power to reflect an ethos that is planetary in scope.


Stephanie Hader is the Co-founder and Director of Earth Refuge.  She is a Penn LLM Graduate with experience in drafting government reports for both the Australian and German Parliament. Stephanie also holds a Juris Doctor from the University of Hong Kong.


References

[1] Oren, L. (2000) An Iroquois Perspective, in Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, 15

[2] IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)

[3] Albeck-Ripka, L. (2018) Climate Change Protest Draws Thousands of Australian Students, New York Times

[4] Sherbinin, A., Carr, D. Cassels, S. & Jiang, L. (2009) Population and Environment, Annu Rev Environ Resour, Vol 32

[5] Lonergan, S. (1998) The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement, Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 4, 11

[6] Weston, B. and Bach, T. (2009) Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights, and Intergenerational Justice, Vermont Law School Legal Research Paper Series, No. 10-06, 60

[7] UN Environment (2016) Latin American Region, Global Environment Outlook 6 Regional Assessments, 35

[8] UN Environment (2016) Pan-European Region,  Global Environment Outlook 6 Regional Assessments, 66

[9] Ibid. 53

[10] Rawles, S. (2018) Deforestation, WWF-Canon

[11] Kebede, A.S., Dunford, R., Mokrech, M., Audsley, E., Harrison, P.A., Holman, I.P. and Wimmer, F. (2015) Direct and indirect impacts of climate and socio-economic change in Europe: A sensitivity analysis for key land-and water-based sectors, Climatic Change 128(3-4), 1

[12] Safronov, A., Fokeeva, E., Rakitin, V., Grechko, E. and Shumsky, R. (2015) Severe wildfires near Moscow, Russia in 2010: Modeling of carbon monoxide pollution and comparisons with observations

[13] Trenberth, K.E., Fasullo, J.T. and Shepherd, T.G. (2015) Attribution of climate extreme events, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 5, Issue 5, 8

[14] Costello, A., Abbas, M., Allen, A., Ball, S., Bell, S., Bellamy, R., Patterson, C., Friel, S., Groce, N., Johnson, A. et al. (2009) Managing the health effects of climate change, The Lancet

[15] Carrington, D. (2014) Earth has lost half of its wildlife in the past 40 years, says WWF, The Guardian

[16] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2018) The Paris Agreement

[17] United Nations (1966) Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

[18] Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991) High Court of Judicature at Patna Criminal Miscellaneous No 55717

[19] UNEP (1972) Stockholm Convention Protecting Human Health and the Environment from Persistent Organic Pollutants

[20] UNESCO (1992) The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development

[21] Sax, J.L. (1969) The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, 484

[22] The Gabcikovo Nagmaros Project Hungary/Slovakia (1997) Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders, International Court of Justice

[23] Ibid.

[24] Fundepublico v Mayor of Bugalagrande and Others (1991) held in favor of the right to a healthy environment as a fundamental human right. The court made reference to rights contained in the Colombian Constitution and also to “recent developments in international law”. In South Africa, Wildlife Society of Southern Africa and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of South Africa and Others (1996), the right to healthy environment was affirmed in that the court stated that the applicants had locus standi to bring the action pursuant to sections 7(4)(b) and 29 of the Interim Constitution of 1993.

[25] Fundepublico v. Mayor of Bugalagrande and Others (1991) Judgment No. T-4 15/92, First Chamber of Appeal, Constitutional Court, Santafe de Bogota, Colombia

[26] Weiss, E.B. (1990) Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, No. 198, 205

[27] De George, R. (1981) The Environment, Rights, and Future Generations, In Responsibilities to Future Generations, Environmental Ethics, New York: Prometheus Books, 161

[28] Carrington, D. (2018) David Attenborough: Collapse of Civilization is on the Horizon, The Guardian

[29] Pecaric, M. (2012) Public Interest and the Question of locus standi, Belgrade Law Review, No. 3, 318

[30] Ibid. 319

[31] Haskett, D.J. (1981) Locus Standi and the Public Interest, Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 4, Article 4, 40

[32] Blacks Law Dictionary (1990) St.Paul Mina: West Printing Co, 941

[33] Supreme Court Act (1981) United Kingdom

[34] Lee, J. (2000) The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, Journal of Environmental Law, 331

[35] Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland (1997) European Court of Human Rights

[36] Stichting Greenpeace v EC Commission (1998) European Court of Justice

[37] R v Paddington Valuation Office ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd (1965) 2 All ER 836

[38] Haaf, L.T. (2016) Future Persons and Legal Persons: The Problematic Representation of the Future Child in the Regulation of Reproduction, Laws Vol. 5, No. 10

[39] Farooque v Government of Bangladesh (2001) National High Court, Source UNEP

[40] Haaf, L.T. (2016) 10

[41]Sanklecha, P. (2017) Our obligations to future generations: the limits of intergenerational justice and the necessity of the ethics of metaphysics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 47, Issue 2-3, 232

[42] Ibid. 231

[43] Sanklecha, P. (2017) 233

[44] Gündling, L (1990) Our responsibility to future generations, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, Issue 1, 209

[45] Weiss, E.B. (1992) In Fairness To Future Generations and Sustainable Development, American University International Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 20

[46] Weiss in Gündling, L. (1990) 209

[47] Ibid. 210

[48] Weiss, E.B. (1990) 198

[49] Ibid.

[50] Sanklecha, P. (2017) 232

[51] Gündling, L (1990) 209

[52] Ibid. 208

[53] Burke, E (1970) Reflections on the Revolution in France, Works of Edmund Burke, London

[54] Weiss, E.B. (1990) 200

[55] Weiss, E.B. (1990) 199

[56] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) Article 3.1, FCCC/INFORMAL/84

[57] Brundtland Report (1987) Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, A/42/427

[58] The Nairobi Declaration (1982) UNEP Report of the Governing Council. A/37/25

[59] Diego Cali & Figli Srl v Servizi Ecological Porto Di Genova SpA (1997) Tribunale di Genova, European Court Reports

[60] Nauru v Australia (1992) International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders

[61] Minors Oposa v Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (1994) Supreme Court of the Philippines, 33 ILM 173

[62] Minors Oposa v Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (1994)

[63] Ibid.

[64] ‘Public Trust Doctrine’ definition as per the Wex Legal Information Institute

[65] Ibid. 490

[66] Sax, J.L. (1969) 486

[67] Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999 (EPBC) Australia

[68] Gray v The Minister for Planning (2006) NSWLEC 720

[69] Beckerman, W. (2006) The impossibility of a theory of intergenerational justice, Handbook of intergenerational justice , 54

[70] Sanklecha, P. (2017) 231

[71] Ibid. 231

[72] Beckerman, W. (2006) 58

[73] Kevin Harris, Collected Quotes from Albert Einstein (1995), available at http://rescomp.stanford. edu/~cheshire/EinsteinQuotes.html.

[74] Gündling, L (1990) 208

[75] O’Shea Carre in Albeck-Ripka, L. (2018)


The Dormant Pioneer: An Overview of the Forgotten Status of Climate Migrants in EU Law

25 February 2021 – by Robert Los

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been a driving force in the fight against the climate challenges of the future even before Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, presented her ambitious targets for the “European Green Deal” to the public in December 2019.[1] The EU’s international climate policy began to gain significant momentum with the ratification and implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. It finally manifested itself as an international driving factor with the Paris Agreement of 2015, prior to which the EU, together with several developing countries and island states formed the so-called High Ambition Coalition (HAC) and conducted relevant preparatory work to persuade other major players like the United States (US) to reach an ambitious agreement.[2]

The Paris Agreement was signed during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016, which troubled Europe in particular. The highly complex issue of climate migration thus seems destined to receive a heightened degree of attention. In this respect, it may come as no surprise that the agreement acknowledges the problem for the first time in the context of an international climate agreement, albeit only in the legally non-binding preamble.[3] Additionally, by addressing the issue in Art. 50 the agreement incorporates climate migration into the existing system of loss and damage, and opens up the scope of the ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage’ task force.[4] However, it is stated in the same section that the findings of the task force do not provide a legally binding basis for liability or compensation.[5] An international agreement exceeding the status of soft law or mere declarations of intent, and which regulates the complexity of climate migration in a binding manner, is still non-existent.[6]

In light of this legal gap in protection and the EU’s self-formulated claim to leadership in the fight against climate change,[7] this essay intends to provide a cursory overview of the legal status quo of climate migration – an important ramification of climate change – in the EU, and the developments in response to it. First, the historical development of the policy debate on climate migration will be retraced and certain milestones will be outlined before existing regulations at both the European and member state levels will be discussed. Finally, possible leverage points for legal gateways and regulations for the protection of climate migrants will be briefly pointed out.

A discourse with teething problems

Climate migration has been addressed at the European level by European institutions for more than 20 years, although the debate has admittedly not remained consistent. The European Parliament first addressed the issue in 1999 in a resolution on environment, security, and foreign policy.[8] In Art. K of the resolution, the parliamentarians stated that the number of climate migrants already exceeded that of ‘traditional’ refugees, according to international studies. Furthermore, climate migration was classified as a symptom of the global poverty problem, and it was recognized that already-destitute and impoverished people would be specifically and intensely affected.[9] The explanatory statement shows that the complexity of the issue was already recognized at that time. Identifying climate-induced migration as a threat to security and international relations, but above all as having the propensity to become “one of the worst humanitarian crises of our time” and lead to an “exodus of refugees”, the resolution called for international recognition of climate refugees and emphasized the need for international cooperation to mitigate the problem.[10] Subsequently, Green Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in particular have tried, unsuccessfully, to include the issue in reports, studies and resolutions of the EU.[11]

The issue gained renewed and more concrete momentum in the years 2007 to 2009. In addition to the Green MEPs who conducted seminars and again wrote reports to give the issue the attention it deserved, several weighty papers and events addressed the issue. In April 2007, the European Parliament established a temporary Committee on Climate Change with 60 parliamentarians to formulate goals for European policy regarding the fight against climate change. At the Agora on climate change the following year, a number of the more-than 500 European NGOs in attendance warned of a link between climate change and increasing migration. One of the workshops again called on EU institutions to develop a strategy for climate-induced migration.[12] As many as 3 major papers joined the call of the social societies: a paper from the High Representative[13], a paper from the European Commission that linked climate change and security concerns[14], as well as another paper from the European Commission which advocates for the consideration of climate change effects in security, development and migration policy debates.[15]

The Stockholm Program, launched by the Swedish Presidency of the Council, gave the issue major impetus. The report not only established a link between natural disasters and migration, but it also addressed international protection and operational frameworks as “deficient, leaving several categories of people forced to flee or seeking safer existence without effective national or international protection.”[16] Precisely because of the latter, the final report called on the Commission to conduct further research regarding the legal gaps in protection and suggested that it develop a specific set of rules both by drawing on established protective instruments, and incorporating completely new concepts. The primary objective of the authors was to give Europe a pioneering role whereby, in addition to the recommended studies, on the one hand a fund for the provision of financial aid on the ground from European states was to be established and, on the other hand, migration policy was to be incorporated more strongly into development policy and in new international agreements.[17] A study by the European Parliament in 2011 supported this by further highlighting the gaps in legal protection and formulating similar recommendations.[18]

In 2013, the European Commission, under political and societal pressure, responded to the calls with a Staff Working Document.[19] Due to the evidence highlighted in a summary overview of the scientific studies at that time which showed that a large part of climate-induced migration is domestic in nature, development policy and adaptive instruments were identified as the preferable focus of the EU initiatives.[20]  However, a position paper composed mainly by Green parliamentarians agreed to this only partially. They welcomed adaptive (and especially financial) local aid for the people and states affected. However, this alone would not be far-reaching enough for them. Instead, the paper argued for a so-called “two-axis” model. For the first axis, consisting of national or European protection, the paper provided concrete implementation suggestions in recasting existing law as the Qualification Directive, Temporary Protection Directive or the Return Directive[21]. For the second axis, concerned with international protection, the paper made suggestions in the form of addendums or protocols to existing international agreements.[22]

Nevertheless, the discourse dissipated somewhat when, in 2015, the aforementioned refugee crisis interfered with the positive trend. Although the European Commission mentioned climate change as one cause for migration amongst others in the European Agenda on Migration, just as the Paris Agreement did later in the year, the then-current crisis, its causes and respective countermeasures were to seize the full attention of the political agenda.[23] The European Parliament attempted to restart developments on climate migration with two further papers in 2016 and 2017, once again emphasizing cause-and-effect of climate change and migration, and highlighting the need for legal protection instruments.[24]

It can thus be stated that climate migration has been addressed across institutions in the EU in recent decades. Within these discourses, the different dimensions of the problem were also recognized and elaborated. The various dimensions of the problem were also recognized and concrete strategies and starting points were identified. To what extent the discourses have actually resulted in implementation, and whether the EU can thereby live up to its aspired pioneering role will be discussed in the following section.

Status Quo of European Legislation

When considering the legal landscape of Europe, it is convenient to distinguish between different levels and dimensions of protection. Protection can arise from regulations at the level of European law, but it can also arise at the level of member state law. Within the European level, again a distinction can be made between external and internal protection dimensions. Furthermore, the jurisprudence, which will not be covered during the scope of this paper, has to be considered as a third level.[25]

1. Protection at EU level

a. Protection in the external dimension

Legal protection that is explicitly linked to forced migration is found almost exclusively at the externally oriented dimension of European law.

The 2020 report initiated by the European Parliament on this very topic sees above all a gateway for legal protection for climate-induced migration in intergovernmental pacts on mobility and migration. [26] Indeed, it is true that both the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)[27] and the Valetta Summit Action Plan[28] identify changing climatic conditions as a driver of migration in their respective regulations.[29] Both agreements are primarily aimed at addressing the root causes of migration and the legally secure management of migration flows to ensure humane migration. The GAMM in particular, as the overarching regulatory framework for migration in the EU, is of enormous importance in this context. Though several bilateral agreements have been conducted with neighboring and third countries under this framework, none explicitly mention climate-induced migration in the arrangements for better management of migration flows.[30] An explicit mention is only made in the context of adaptive strategies. Whilst the GAMM and the Valletta Summit Action Plan only suggest adaptation as part of the global strategy,[31]  the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa[32] actually concretized this in the aftermath of the Valetta agreement of the EU, its member states and the African states.[33]

In fact, the direct instruments at the European level are exclusively those of preventive and damage-mitigating adaptation. In addition to those already mentioned, there are other regulations and mechanisms of a similar thrust. For instance, the regulations based on the Commission’s concept of “Lives Dignity: from Aid-Dependence to Self-reliance”,[34] intend to “prevent forced displacement from becoming protracted and to gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance in existing displacement situations by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until voluntary return or resettlement.”[35] With respect to damage mitigation instruments, recourse to the general humanitarian aid instruments of the European Union is necessary. Firstly, humanitarian aid – largely determined by the Humanitarian Act of 1996[36] and its concretizations by the Commission – is of interest here.[37] The aim of this “act of solidarity”[38] is above all to help the most vulnerable people in third countries who are exposed to natural disasters or human-induced crises.[39] Secondly, through the 2019 Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU provides a protective umbrella for its own member states that might also take effect in the event of natural disasters.

b. Protection in the internal dimension

Legal protection at the European level in the internal dimension is to be found in the barriers of international human rights and the obligation to protect against their violation. In this regard, the right to life (Art 6 ICCPR, Art 2 ECHR, Art 2 CFR) and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (Art 7 ICCPR, Art 3 ECHR, Art 4 CFR; Art 15 QD) are of particular relevance.[40] However, even in its latest version, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)[41] does not provide protection exclusively for climate-induced migration. If no other recognized ground for protection is met, legal protection is not guaranteed.[42]

The absence of an explicit provision does not exclude protection altogether. Primarily, the definition of inhumane and degrading treatment in Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)[43] and Art 15b of the Qualification Directive (QD)[44] provides for some leeway, supported by established court practice in analogous cases.[45] The QD harmonizes the standards under which a person is classified as “in need of international protection” for the member states. And while its refuge definition is nearly identical to the definition of the Geneva Refugee Convention, it grants a so-called subsidiary protection status. This subsidiary protection is defined as “protection of a third-country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin […] would face a real risk of suffering serious harm”[46]. It is granted, amongst other reasons, in cases of inhumane and degrading treatment.[47] The vagueness of this legal definition allows the member states, their courts and the European courts to interpret it favorably for climate migrants. However, amidst this positive interpretation of indeterminacy, it must also be mentioned that courts “have carefully circumscribed the meaning of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ so that it cannot be used as a remedy for general poverty, unemployment, or a lack of resources or medical care except in exceptional circumstances”.[48] Therefore, in light of the practical reluctance in case law and policy, the indeterminacy seems more like an evasion than a hopeful starting point for legally adequate protection.

Besides the QD, there are two more EU secondary legal acts that might provide protection in their scope. One is the Temporary Protection Directive,[49] which has never been triggered since its creation. In the long term, however, the Directive can only provide temporary protection, the applicability of which is questionable in the case of slow-onset events,[50] and is thus unsuitable for sustainable legal protection for climate migrants. Nevertheless, Art 2d of the Directive,[51] which regulates the arrival of refugees, could legally safeguard the reception and arrival of people affected by natural catastrophes.[52] Also potentially promising is the Return Directive.[53] This regulates the return of refugees and incorporates in particular the principle of non-refoulement for both political and factual reasons. It is worth noting that both an explicit mention of climatic reasons and a harmonized definition or recognition of reasons are omitted, so that member states could theoretically postpone an expulsion on environmental grounds according to Art 9(2).[54] The first efforts in this sphere were made by a German administrative court when it clarified that in exceptional cases, climate and environmental factors can lead to a non-refoulement obligation. However, the court left open the question of when such circumstances could exist, as they were not relevant to the decision and instead only noted that a “very high level of damage” is required.[55] Therefore safe legal grounds are not established, rather  the postponement of return depends again upon administrative will.[56]

c. Conclusion

In summary, given the historical genesis of the European discourse on climate migration, the external dimension is unsurprisingly limited to mostly indirect adaptive assistance, and does no more than merely mention climate change as one of many drivers of migration. The internal dimension lacks explicit instruments altogether and presents the legal practitioner with the challenge of constructing vague and uncertain legal protection from the disconnected existing norms. Therefore, it can be stated that a sophisticated and reliable protection system has not yet been established at the European level. 

2. Protection at the member states’ level

When it comes to protection at the level of national law in the member states, the special characteristics of European law must be considered a priori. In harmonized areas of law, member states can only adopt derogative regulations if they go beyond the requirements in positive terms in cases of “minimum harmonization”, or if they regulate aspects not covered by harmonizing frameworks.[57] Indeed, the European regulations on migration and asylum contain a significant gap between subsidiary protection as defined by the QD, and the principle of non-refoulement as set out in Art 3 ECHR for which member states can develop their own legal protections for refugees to the extent that they do not undermine the minimum standards of the CEAS. [58]

According to the 2020 report of the European Migration Network,[59] 20 member states have made use of this option, each with at least one humanitarian ground that exceeds the minimum standards of the CEAS. A total of 60 additional grounds can be found in the national regulations.[60] However, only two member states’ (Sweden and Italy) regulations explicitly address the issue of climate migration.

In Italy, persons eligible for the protection under Art 20-bis of the Immigration Act are third-country persons who cannot return to the country of origin due to a contingent situation and exceptional circumstances that do not allow for safe conditions upon their return.[61] These circumstances may very well cover environmental reasons amongst others.[62] The application for this protection status is to be submitted to and assessed by the Territorial Chief of Police. An appeal against a negative decision is to be filed with the bodies that otherwise decide on international protection, and does not automatically carry a suspensive effect but must be applied for separately. Within the substantive protection dimension, Italy issues a residence permit for 6 months in case of positive recognition of the status, which is less than the 1-year residence for people in the scope of Subsidiary Protection of the QD. The residence status is valid only on Italian territory and denies the beneficiary some rights granted under the European refugee standard. For example, family reunification is excluded and access to social welfare is reduced to its core elements. Nonetheless, beneficiaries are granted access to the labor market and employment, mainstream health services at a level equal to that afforded to other third-country persons, and general integration support. Since its introduction in 2018, this protection tool has only been used once.[63]

The eligibility definition of Sec. 2a of the Swedish Aliens Act does not differ too drastically from the Italian framework, though there are some differences. For example, it does require that the need for “protection” must feature a triggering environmental event that qualifies as “sudden”, and the unavailability of internal relocation. Additionally, unlike the Italian option, the Swedish application for protection follows the usual procedure for applying for international protection, and an appeal has an automatically suspensive effect. Swedish protection also goes beyond Italian protection in terms of content. Not only is the granted residence status valid for 3 years, but its validity can be extended to other states by issuing a travel document in the form of an alien passport. In addition, spouses – or partners in similar social relationships, such as same-sex or engaged couples – dependent children and parents of unaccompanied minor children are eligible for family reunification. In addition, unlike Italy, Sweden provides access to support services on par with the European Minimum Standards. However, within the context of the European refugee crisis, this protection has been suspended until 2021. How it is set to advance remains unclear.[64]

Alongside the two explicit regulations, there are also provisions in Finland and Cyprus that take ecological circumstances into account in the context of granting protection. Finland considers environmental reasons when assessing humanitarian grounds under Chapter 6 Section 88a of the Finnish Aliens Act, especially in cases in which neither refuge nor subsidiary protection can be granted, but the return to the home country seems unbearable. Similar to the Swedish regulation, this protection was also suspended around 2015.[65] Art 29 (4) of the Cypriot Refugee Law mentions environmental destruction as an additional justification for non-refoulement, but does not grant protection on this ground alone.[66]

Conversely, the remaining member states do not provide for any protective regulations. There are also hardly any known initiatives to close the national gaps in this sphere.[67] Most states refer to the international consensus on refugees – manifested in the Geneva Refugee Convention – and refuse to adopt a differing interpretation.[68] Thus, similar to the situation on the European level, legal practitioners in these states are left to search for new interpretation and readings of national law. In conclusion, it can be said that at the member states’ level, the protective dimension is being rolled back rather than developed further. Even where there is still explicit protection for people fleeing climate-induced change, it is weaker than that provided to other displaced peoples.

Ways forward

The current status quo is inadequate, and results in the need for further development and improvement of the current level of protection in view of the ever-increasing numbers of people forced to flee as a result of climate change. There are various possible answers to the question regarding which path to take, and perhaps the first thing to do is to take a general step in the direction shared by them all.

That is, to carry the issue from niche academic spheres into the broader public conversation and, above all, into day-to-day political discourse. This applies to both the European and national levels. A survey conducted by the European Migration Network shows that in most member states, the topic is discussed in academic and socially engaged circles, but lacks the attention of legislative and executive powers.[69] In view of the historical genesis of the discourse, this may seem a tedious and  Sisyphean-like task, especially at the European level, but it is a fundamental prerequisite for the implementation of protective instruments and assistance of any kind, including the elimination of legal uncertainties. A slight positive trend may even be triggered if one realizes that in the last few years, both European[70] and member state institutions[71] have paid some attention to the subject in studies, despite the fact that these are not legally binding. We can only add to the clamor made in the last two decades by those in the relevant spheres, and hope that this time the positive upward trend will manifest itself into concrete and protective action.

Once this step has been taken, the question arises as to which path will finally be taken. There are various options, which are not necessarily contradictory and can also coexist in some cases. Broadly speaking, to pick up on the two-axis suggestion of the Green MEPs, there are two major currents – each in turn with two tributaries – for legal policy-making. Given that most climate-related migrants are internally displaced persons, there must be a local and regionally focused course of action. Despite the focus on internally displaced persons and local support, the remaining protection seekers must not be neglected, so that the second course of action should focus on guaranteeing international and national protection for them.

A distinction can then be made within the local and regional strategy. On the one hand, the path of adaptation already proposed by the Commission in its 2013 findings can be taken. This mostly-financial aid can certainly make use of the already existing European mechanisms and build upon them. It would be crucial to also legally couch this financial aid with regard to climate migration in a concrete manner. Moreover, financial aid could be established and coordinated more effectively through regionally focused international agreements with countries in the affected regions. This leads into the second sub-prong of the local and regional strategy. In addition to an actively supportive role, the EU can play a passively supporting role as an advocate or promoter in the international forum for local initiatives with a bottom-up approach to international governance, and as a mediator for negotiation in such agreements.

The second stream of action can also be divided into an active, self-implementing sub-prong and a passive, facilitating sub-prong that relies on the cooperation of others. The latter would consist primarily of seeking, in addition to regional and local agreements, an international compromise that goes beyond the soft-law arrangements agreed to date. For instance, additional protocols to the Geneva Refugee Convention or the Paris Agreement are conceivable, or the promotion of an entirely new agreement that adapts refugee protection rules to the challenges and circumstances of the modern world.

The former, self-implementing part, in which the EU would not be dependent on external help, would have to consist of a redesign of the existing regulations. In particular, an adaptation of Art 15 of the QD, which has already been discussed, would provide a suitable solution. It would be plausible to add a fourth section, (d), to the already existing alternatives, which would also provide for subsidiary protection in the case of an “environmental catastrophe.” For better protection, however, a legal definition of the term should be standardized, so that imprecision and difficulties of delimitation are avoided in practice.[72] Alternatively, an Art 15a QD with corresponding content could be introduced.[73]

Furthermore, member states could, of course, issue their own national regulations, which would provide for protection up to the point of regulation at European level. Besides the concrete standardization of protection, the EU and its member states could develop other legal instruments for protection. Such as, for example, a humanitarian corridor which already exists in several European states and provides a pathway for people escaping conflict,[74] or a temporary travel document issued by the states in the form of a climate passport. This would offer those who are threatened by climate change the option to demand civil rights in safe countries.[75]

Conclusion

As discussed, the current outlook – despite years of attention and discourse – does not do justice to the ultimate goal of protection. Rather, it seems almost negligent in the fight against the climate crisis to utterly exclude it as an important factor, or to instead surrender to the benevolent interpretation of legal practitioners. Although there are mentions of the topic in various agreements and instruments, there is no commitment beyond the status of soft law.

On the legal protection level, with the exception of two national regulations in Italy and Sweden, there is a complete lack of rules that address the issue. This is disappointing, as the EU could be a pioneer and has a wide range of options for implementation. It is submitted that if all four described tributaries of the two main streams were implemented and followed, the EU would be able to provide effective protection.

Of course, the implementation of one is better than complete inaction, but as stated above, this would only lead to a patchy and, above all, deficient protective dimension, and would not necessarily lead to an improvement of the status quo. This would neither correspond to the ambitious, but also self-claimed pioneering role of the EU, nor to the moral responsibility stemming from the Polluter Pays principle (to which the polluting countries agreed in the Paris Agreement).

This shows precisely how much of a difference an ambitious major player can make, even in terms of initiatives for which the EU would have to rely on the cooperation of other countries. The ambitious deal from 2015 would have not been possible without the initiation of the HAC. Accordingly, it would be desirable for the EU to address the issue and follow societal and academic demands in order to alleviate the current unsatisfactory status quo with regard to climate migration and its related challenges. There is truly no lack of concrete proposals, only the lack of concrete will to revisit the spirit of the HAC.


Robert Los is an Archivist at Earth Refuge and a student of law at the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany. His interest and commitment to climate law issues extends mainly to voluntary work alongside his studies and work.


References

[1] https://www.politico.eu/article/the-commissions-green-deal-plan-unveiled/ (Last Access: 18.01.2021, 17:23).

[2] https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/can-the-eu-lead-the-way-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/ (Last Access: 21.01.2021, 15:25).

[3] Paris Agreement(2015), Preamble.

[4] https://www.iass-potsdam.de/de/node/5386 (Last Access: 18.01.2021, 17:43).

[5] Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1), Addendum, Nr. 51; The Warsaw International Mechanism and its requires a separate examination that will follow in a separate essay.

[6] Cf. for a deeper examination: Mile (2021):  Protecting Climate Migrants: A Gap in International Asylum Law; https://earthrefuge.org/protecting-climate-migrants-a-gap-in-international-asylum-law/ (Last Access: 21.01.2021; 15:34).

[7] Cf. the opening statement of Ursula von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary Session in Jul:y 2019; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_4230 (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 18:37).

[8] European Parliament (1999): Resolution on the environment, security and foreign policy. 28.1.1999, A4-0005/99.

[9] European Parliament (1999): Resolution on the environment, security and foreign policy, Art. J and Art. L. 28.1.1999, A4-0005/99.

[10] European Parliament (1999): Resolution on the environment, security and foreign policy, explanatory note. 28.1.1999, A4-0005/99.

[11] www.reseau-terra.eu/article844.html (Last Access: 15.01.2021; 22:37).

[12] Ibid.

[13] High Representative and the European Commission (2008), Climate Change and International Security.

[14] Commission of the European Communities (2008). European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – Action Plan. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2008) 1991.

[15] European Commission (2009): WHITE PAPER Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action; COM (2009) 147.

[16] https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12098/html#_TOC_N1047B (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 23:54).

[17] Ibid.

[18] Kraler/Cernei/Noack (2011), “Climate Refugees”: Legal and Policy Responses to Environmentally Induced Migration. Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (PE 462.422) Brussels, European Parliament.

[19] European Commission (2013): Commission Staff Working Document: Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration -Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change.

[20] Ibid, p. 17 and 35.

[21] Cf. also Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), Climate Change and Migration: Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration. Study commissioned by Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies (PE 655.591), Brussels, European Parliament, p. 67.

[22] The Greens (2013): Climate Change, Refugees and Migration.

[23] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), Climate Change and Migration: Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration. Study commissioned by Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies (PE 655.591), Brussels, European Parliament, p. 66.

[24] European Parliament (2016): Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration; European Parliament (2017): Addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU external action European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU External Action (2015/2342(INI)).

[25] In view of the few previous rulings on the matter, both at national and European level, this can be disregarded for the time being. However, an incorporation into the other categories will follow. For a summary overview cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 79 et seqq.

[26] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 68 et seqq.

[27] European Commission (2011), COM(2011), 743 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

[28] Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015).

[29]  Cf. European Commission (2011), COM(2011), 743 final, p. 6 et. Seqq.; Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015), p. 3.

[30]  Cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 68 et seqq.

[31] European Commission (2011), COM(2011), 743 final, p. 6 et. Seqq.; Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015), p. 3.

[32] Cf. for more detail: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eutf_2019_annual_report_english.pdfeuropa.eu (Last Access: 17.01.2021; 21:50).

[33] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 69.

[34] European Commission (2016c) COM(2016) 234 final: Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; cf. for a more detailed description Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 69.

[35] European Commission (2016c) COM(2016) 234 final, p.2

[36] Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996.

[37] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 69.

[38] Commission of the European Communities (2007): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid; COM(2007) 317 final; Commission of the European Communities (2008). European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – Action Plan. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2008) 1991; European Commission (2015). Implementation Plan of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Commission Staff Working Document, SWD (2015) 269 final.

[39] Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, Art. 1; cf. for a more detailed description of humanitarian aid system Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 70 et seqq.

[40] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 71.

[41] Cf. for more detailed information: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 22:01).

[42] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 71.

[43] https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 19:54).

[44] Qualification Directive (2004), Directive 2004/83/EC: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/en-qualification-directive-directive-200483ec-29-april-2004#Art%2015%20QD (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 20:02).

[45] For the analogous transfer of case law on the rejection of sick persons, cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 79 et. seqq.

[46] Qualification Directive (2004), Directive 2004/83/EC: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/en-qualification-directive-directive-200483ec-29-april-2004#Art%202%20QD (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:06).

[47] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 71 et. seqq.

[48] McAdam (2014). The human rights implications of cross-border displacement in the context of disasters what are the protection gaps and what is the role of the human rights council?.

[49] Temporary Protection Directive (2001), EU CD 2001/55/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0055&from=en (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:10).

[50] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 73.

[51] Qualification Directive (2004), Directive 2004/83/EC: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/en-qualification-directive-directive-200483ec-29-april-2004#Art%202%20QD (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:14).

[52] Beirens/Maas/Petronella/Velden (2016): Study on the Temporary Protection Directive,

p17; Study commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and

Home Affairs Unit C.3 — Asylum.

[53] Return Directive (2008), EU RD 2008/115/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:22).

[54] Return Directive (2008), EU RD 2008/115/EC, Art. 9: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:22).

[55] VGH Mannheim (2019): 29.10.2019, A 11 S 1203/19.

[56] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 73.

[57] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14527&from=DE (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:27).

[58] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 74.

[59] European Migration Network (2020): Comparative Overview of National Protection Status in the EU and Norway – EMN Synthesis Report for the EMN Study 2019.

[60] European Migration Network (2020), p. 4.

[61] European Migration Network (2020), p. 25.

[62] European Migration Network (2017): EMN Ad-Hoc Query on ES Ad hoc Query on Humanitarian Protection.

[63] European Migration Network (2020), p. 25.

[64] European Migration Network (2020), p. 25.

[65] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 78.

[66] Ibid.

[67] European Migration Network (2018): European Migration Network; Ad-Hoc Query on Climate change and migration.

[68] Explicitly stated by Austria, Czech Republic, Germany to a questionnaire on environmentally induced migration distributed by ICMPD to selected EU+ countries in March 2020; cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 78.

[69] European Migration Network (2018).

[70] see, for example, the 2020 study commissioned by the European Parliament on Climate Change and Migration: Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020).

[71] see, for example, the advisory study of the Economic Advisory Council of the Federal Government in Germany, which dealt with climate migration in 2018: WBGU (2018), Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness.

[72] Hush proposes a definition along the lines of: “a natural disaster affecting a large number of persons in a geographic area, occurring either suddenly or over time, with or without human action, and causing the destruction, or reasonable threat of destruction, or severe degradation of, the applicant’s livelihood, residence, community, or land”; Hush (2018)- Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden.

[73] Hush (2018) – Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden.

[74] Cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 75.

[75] Cf. for a more detailed examination of this idea: Los (2020), Climate Passport: A Legal Instrument to Protect Climate Migrants – A New Spirit for an Historical Concept; cf. WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 ff.

Climate Passport: A Legal Instrument to Protect Climate Migrants – A New Spirit for a Historical Concept

white ruled paper

31 December 2020 – by Robert Los

Introduction

According to the UNCHR, 79.5 million people were seeking refuge away from home at the end of 2019.[1] This migration is based on a variety of different motives and phenomena, including war, political, cultural or religious persecution as well as economic and humanitarian crises. According to development trends, change in climate is more and more often part of this bundle of motives.[2] The term ‘climate-induced migration’ includes both sudden migration due to extreme weather events, and slower population movements due to gradually developing long-term climate changes.[3] Due to the difficulty of determining a single reason for a person’s migration from this bundle of motives, the estimated figures for climate migrants by 2050 range from 25 million to 1 billion people.[4] Regardless of the exact number, which can deviate anyway due to unforeseen events, the problem is becoming more and more virulent. The international community will have to consider solutions to offer protection to the people affected. One proposed solution includes applying historical knowledge and reissuing a historical instrument.

This short essay explores this concept of a ‘climate passport’ for people compelled to leave their previous residence due to changes in climatic conditions, a concept suggested by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) in 2018.[5] In the course of this essay, the historical dimension of the ‘Nansen‘-passport, the legal instrument upon which the WBGU bases its concept, and the moral embedding of the principle of a Climate Pass will be discussed. Subsequently, the legal side of the concept will be examined and finally it will be concluded that in legal theory an intergovernmental claim already exists.

Nansen-Passports

First of all, it is worth taking a brief historical look at the Nansen Pass. The event that triggered its creation was the Soviet government’s 1922 decision to revoke the citizenship of 800,000 Russian citizens living in exile. These 800,000 people fled from the ongoing fighting of the Russian civil war both during and after World War I, or chose exile in fear of suppression by the newly formed government and were scattered throughout Europe.[6] In response to this deficiency, the ‘arrangement with respect to the issue of Certificates of Identity for Russian Refugees’ was negotiated in Geneva from 3-5 July 1922 under the leadership of the then-High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen. The ratifying states were obliged to issue passports to the now stateless people so that cross-border movement was an option during their search for a new home. In this way, the trapping dynamics of statelessness were overcome.[7] In 1933, the agreement was broadened to include Armenian, Turkish and Assyrian refugees.[8] Until it was discontinued, the passport had secured guest rights in safe countries for hundreds of thousands of people[9] and was recognized by 52 countries in 1942.[10]

In 1938 the Nansen International Office for Refugees was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for implementing this project.[11] To this day, this solution is still considered a successful individual counter-model to the concept of planned control of migration flows, which implementations historically all have failed.[12] Though the Nansen Pass no longer exists, its legacy lives on. The refugee travel documents issued today by states on the basis of the Geneva Convention for Refugees can be seen as the successors of the Nansen Pass.

Transferability of the Nansen principles to climate-induced migration

Since existing legal agreements do not explicitly provide for such an instrument or a similar one for climate-related migration, it is necessary to determine whether such an instrument is necessary and, if so, what form it should take.

Current legal protection of climate migrants

The first question to be asked is whether there is a need for such a legal protection instrument. This would not be the case if sufficient protection for climate refugees were already guaranteed by the prevailing legal norms and instruments.

Geneva Convention on Refugees

The basis for the protection of refugees in an international context is generally the Geneva Convention for Refugees of 1951 (GCR). With regard to climate migration, several issues arise concerning the scope of the Convention. Article 1 of the convention defines a refugee as follows: 

‘As a result of events […] and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’[13]

Besides the obvious omission of climate-induced migration, the definition raises other less obvious hurdles that preclude analogous application or a broad interpretation.

According to the definition, a cross-border element is required, with the consequence that international refugee law only applies when a refugee leaves their country of origin and therefore the protection of internally displaced persons is primarily the responsibility of the affected state.[14] This leads to the exclusion of a significant number of climate migrants, since the majority – approx. 80%[15] – do not cross the borders of their country of origin during their first climate-related movement.[16] [17]

Another decisive criterion in the definition of a ‘refugee’ is the existence of persecution, which itself must be based on a severe violation of human rights of a characteristic mentioned in the GCR.[18] For a climate migrant to fulfil the ‘persecution’ requirement, a favorable and broad understanding of climate-induced destruction would be necessary in order to attest the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) to a degree of wrongdoing comparable to political, religious or cultural persecution. Moreover, environmental change is unlikely to selectively affect (or persecute) one cultural, political or religious group alone.[19] A simple analogy can therefore not achieve the desired goal. This is particularly true because expanding the scope to include climate refugees would require a complete reversal of the paradigms underlying the GRC.[20] Until now, refugee law has protected people who flee persecution in their own state and thus seek protection elsewhere. However, climate migrants mainly need protection from actors in their own states.[21]

Climate migration is thus only covered by the GRC in more extreme cases. Unless special conditions are met – for example, if state actors deliberately destroy the environment in order to take targeted action against certain groups of people[22] – the Convention cannot be said to provide adequate protection to climate migrants. Although an amendment to the Convention in favor of environmental refugees is increasingly demanded and discussed, actual implementation of this is unlikely.[23] This prognosis is supported by current political developments[24] and the argument that an amendment could lead to a weakening of the existing international consensus on the GRC.[25]

Other international or regional treaties

Turning to other agreements, disillusionment arises quickly. Auspicious was the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which resulted from the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants by the UN General Assembly of 2016.[26] The Compact cites climate change as a cause of flight and calls for international cooperation.[27] But even before its ratification in December 2018, the agreement already lost significance due to the withdrawal of the USA in 2017[28] – not only an important player in world politics, but also one of the largest emitters.[29] Criticism and headwind also came from the ratifying states. In the face of this, the German Federal Government assured that the Compact would not be a legally binding agreement.[30] This was however not enough for critics of the Compact, so that even before ratification the Federal Constitutional Court ruled out the possibility of a legally binding agreement in interim legal protection.[31] Thus, this initially promising agreement rapidly degenerated into so-called ‘soft law’: agreements that may have moral or political effect but are not legally enforceable.[32]

The proposal of a Global Pact for Environment, which aims to securitize central principles of international environmental law, goes in a similar direction. Among other things, it is intended to establish the right to a healthy environment, which is fertile ground for individual rights of climate migrants.[33] Whether the Pact, which is to be signed at the Earth Summit 2022,[34] will ultimately be legally binding and therefore overcome the status of soft law is still unclear, but there is room for doubt.

There are also some agreements that exist to protect refugees at a regional level, but save for the Arab Refugee Convention[35], even these by definition do not cover environmentally induced migration, or apply solely to internally displaced persons.[36] While the Arab Refugee Convention[37] and most other agreements targeting internal migration share the fate of international agreements due to their legally non-binding character,[38] the African Kampala Convention is an exception to this norm. It is a legally binding agreement that creates a framework for the protection and distribution of internal migrants and obligates ratifying states to protect affected persons.[39]

The idea of timely migration in the form of the Climate Pass

What all these agreements have in common is the provision of reactive or retrospective protection for migrants affected by climate change. The concept of the Climate Pass developed by WBGU, on the other hand, aims to facilitate active, early, and thus dignified migration from affected regions.[40] Such a passport would grant the holders not only the right to be admitted by other countries, but rights similar to those of citizenship. The WGBU makes a distinction in order to identify the states that are obliged to admit refugees and those individuals that would be entitled to a passport.

The ‘polluter-pays’ principle should be applied to ensure that climate migrants are fairly distributed amongst the receiving states.[41] So, those states that are responsible for a large part of the anthropogenic contributions to climate change should shoulder most of the burden. It is imperative that both historically cumulated emissions and current per capita emissions should be taken into account.  According to these factors, WBGU proposes the 10 nations with the highest historical cumulative emissions and the 15 nations with the highest per capita emissions as primarily responsible. This is because these countries bear a considerable moral responsibility for the origin of many causes of migration. The gross domestic product, area and population density of the respective countries are recommended as additional indicators.[42] For reasons of effective protection, however, a further evaluation criterion should be the extent to which the potential host country is affected by climate change themselves. If, for example, Sint Marteen or Trinidad & Tobago – both amongst the 15 countries with the highest per capita emissions[43] – are themselves threatened by climate change,[44] protection in a less affected country such as Germany seems more appropriate. After all, the Climate Pass is not intended to shift problems but to offer a dignified future to the migrants by solving them.

When it comes to the question of who is to receive the Climate Passport, a system of prioritization will also have to be conducted, this time according to a time component. Although all those affected should have the right to such a humanitarian instrument, the first step will be to protect those people who will be affected by climate changes at the earliest possible stage. In particular, inhabitants of flat island states are to be mentioned. The exact identification of the particularly affected areas is to be carried out by a commission of scientific experts.[45]

Finally, it should be mentioned that the Climate Pass is not a silver bullet solution to problems caused by climate change. Rather, it is intended to flank other climate protection measures, and the WBGU points out that it can even support the achievement of other goals. For example, a country that feels overburdened by the obligation to admit refugees could be incentivized to reduce its emissions. The principles developed and presented here are to be understood as guidelines that require concrete implementation. First and foremost, the signatory states would have to agree on measures and guidelines on how to deal with migrants before and after the period of flight in order to prevent migrants from having a precarious existence in the destination country. The focus of these guidelines should not be solely on economic factors. Cultural and social disruption must also be addressed.[46] The WBGU would prefer the drafting of an international agreement, for instance, an additional protocol to the Paris Convention of 2015.[47]

Obligation under international law of the issuing states to assume responsibility

The WBGU forms its argument upon the moral obligation of states arising out of responsibility and thus hopes for the creation of an international agreement. It is possible, however, that an intergovernmental obligation under international law already exists.[48] This would be favorable due to the fact that there is little evidence of an upcoming international consensus in view of the actual political situation, including a failure by many states to meet the Paris Agreement climate targets.[49]

Basis of liability

In order to establish a binding obligation upon emitting states, a legal basis is necessary by which these states are liable for climate damage caused by emissions. Although the major emitters have recognized responsibility in the Paris Convention, one searches in vain for liability rules.[50] It is worth noting that it has been stated that the agreement should not prejudice liability issues.[51]

This leaves recourse only to the liability rules of general international environmental law,[52] in particular by applying the rules of customary law on the ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (ARS). Of primary interest here is the liability norm of Art. 31 ARS, which states the following:

‘1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.

2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.’[53]

Whether a presumed violation of law is present, is once again determined by general international law. Here, above all, the international environmental law and its fundamental principle formulated in the IGJ evaluation on the use of nuclear weapons is of importance.[54] It essentially establishes that all states are obliged to refrain from activities on their own territory that damage or destroy the environment of other states.[55] As Frank notes, such damages would be rewarded in the case of the loss of entire habitats according to the international legal definition of environmental damage.[56]

The problem of causation and evidence

The question of liability is followed by the classic problem of causation. Since scientifically calculated climate models are only prognoses, the legal requirements for evidence and causality in environmental law disputes must be addressed.

In its commentary on the ARS Draft, the ILC positions itself in such a way that in the event of serious and irreversible damage, full scientific certainty of causation is not required.[57] A North American court of arbitration provided a more concrete definition, as it defined its requirements as ‘clear and convincing evidence of the damage’ in Trail Smelter of 1939 and 1941.[58] What constitutes the exact inner nature of the terms, however, was not answered by the court. Wolfrum classifies this criterion between the criteria ‘preponderance of evidence’, where sufficient probability is already adequate, and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which presupposes the removal of any reasonable doubt,[59] so that a high degree of persuasiveness of the evidence – but no conclusive certainty – is required for clear and convincing evidence.

It is likely that these requirements could be met by today’s climate projections from internationally recognized scientists, because even if they cannot provide an exact prediction of the future, they make substantial and sufficiently concrete statements. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the arbitral tribunal intended to apply this newly created criterion to claims for damages. This doubt is supported by the fact that the court only adopted this standard in the second part of the judgment when assessing preventive claims and felt compelled to give specific reason for this, and that ‘preponderance of evidence’ was already adequate for prove of damage.[60] So, there are good reasons for applying the preponderance of evidence, but since the WBGU Climate Passport also contains preventive purposes, the stricter interpretation should be considered. Because current climate predictions are sufficient under the stricter interpretation, a decision in dispute at this point is not decisive for the purposes of this essay.

For the existence of a causality link in the sense of the conditio sine qua non formula, Art. 47 ARS requires first a breach of duty by the state itself. At the same time, however, a contributory causality is sufficient.[61] Whether a state’s greenhouse gas emissions are a contributory cause depends on whether the damage caused by climate change can be attributed to it via an individualized causal chain.[62] As Sands/Peel note, GHG-emissions lead to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere worldwide.[63] Consequently, a contributory cause for climatic changes is given for damages, which can be attributed to this increased concentration in the upper atmosphere. This will be applicable to ‘slow onset’- effects but cannot yet be conclusively answered for extreme weather events due to difficulties in providing evidence.[64]

The limitations of the court in Trail Smelter that excluded such environmental impacts that are ‘too indirect, remote and uncertain’ are irrelevant to the question of liability causation. The court only wanted to limit the scope of damage and exclude general indirect, economic damage, since it is ‘purely speculative’.[65]

Obligation of result or obligation of conduct?

The decision is arguably the starting point for the question of liability. Both an obligation of result as well as an obligation of conduct are being discussed. The latter would require a violation of due diligence to avoid environmental damages in other states. When answering this question, three judgments of international law are relevant to the outcome.

As mentioned, Trail Smelter is the starting point. The court of arbitration concluded that there was both an obligation of conduct and an obligation of result with the two differentiated according to the nature of the claim. The first would thus apply to the prevention of environmental damage on foreign territory, while the latter would apply to the compensation of damage.[66] The court also clarified that the implementation of preventive measures does not exclude a claim for compensation.[67]

Those supporting a general obligation of conduct rely primarily on the Pulp Mills ruling from the ICJ[68]. It is true that the court was examining the due diligence of the Uruguayan environmental audit system and even reprimands it for shortcomings. However, this position overlooks that the court explained its decision already with lacking causality and thus with its judgement no statement about the arrangement kind of the obligation was made.[69]

But most recently, with both the ICJ rulings in the proceedings Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa- Rica,[70] the court has tipped the balance in one direction by again taking up the differentiation from Trail Smelter. In both decisions, the court makes a strict distinction between ‘procedural obligations’ regarding avoidance of possible environmental hazards on the territory of other states and ‘substantive obligations concerning transboundary harm’ regarding compensation. Exclusively on a ‘procedural level’ the court requires a violation of due diligence. According to the reasons for the judgement, liability depends solely on the causality and the extent of the damage. [71]

For the Climate Pass, this implies that different requirements may apply depending on when its validity is enforced between countries. In the WBGU’s ideal scenario, it should also facilitate preventive migration. This would mean that the state to which the claim is made would have to violate its duty of due diligence. The ICJ sets strict standards for this duty. The Court states that the ‘determination of the content of the environmental impact assessment should be made in light of the specific circumstances of each case’,[72] reinforcing its ruling in Pulp Mills.[73] If the investigation reveals possible environmental damage, the acting state is obliged under international law to find a solution in good faith with the affected states to eliminate or minimize the risk.[74] According to current scientific findings on climate change, such a risk can be affirmed without too much difficulty, so that even in the case of a procedural due diligence requirement, there is an obligation imposed on the emitting states.

The only question that remains is how the content of the obligation can be structured.

Content and Scope of Liability

This last question can again be divided into two parts: first, are the states jointly and severally liable and second, what exactly is the liability of the states?

States as joint and several debtors

The question of whether states are jointly and severally liable in addition to their own partial responsibility is answered by Art. 47 ARS:

‘1. Where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act.’[75]

In the commentary on the ARS, the authors give examples of when such a joint interaction exists. On the one hand, this is supposed to be the case if states act in a way in which they are considered to be acting together from an external perspective. For instance, through the action of a common organ.[76] This possibility alone could be sufficient under international agreements in which the states have recognized joint responsibility.[77] On the other hand, it can also occur when several states contribute to the pollution or damage of an object or area. Here the pollution of a river is mentioned as an example. As Frank correctly states, the case is very similar to that of greenhouse gas emissions. Here too, several actors contribute to the pollution of an environmental medium with corresponding consequential damage. Joint and several liability must therefore be assumed.[78] As drawn from national legislation, Art. 47 ARS in its second paragraph also permits a later internal equalization of all liable states.[79]

Content of Liability

With regard to the preventive intent of the Climate Pass, a claim for compliance could arise from the mirroring of the prevention obligation under Art. 3 ARS. For this purpose, Art. 2 (a) in conjunction with Art. 3 ARS presupposes that considerable damage is imminent and that there is a high probability of its occurrence.[80] Although it would be possible to subsume climate damage and the resulting migration as imminent damage with a high probability of occurrence, it seems highly questionable whether this claim could constitute an active obligation on the part of emitters in addition to a claim to cease and desist from greenhouse emissions. Prevention will principally mean to refrain from damaging behavior.  Irreversible environmental processes that have already been set in motion and are resulting in damage are then more a question of the justification of the extent of the damage in a claim for compensation. Additionally, it is important to note the difficulty of identifying and proving a single motive from a bundle of causes for displacement in this instance.

A claim for damages already incurred is less problematic. According to Art. 31 ARS, the obligated state owes full reparation for damage that has been sustained. Under international law, this also includes adequately caused indirect damage.[81] Thus, the loss of one’s livelihood due to climatic change caused by temperature or sea level rise is also included. Art. 35 ARS basically establishes that damages must be compensated in the form of in rem restitution. Frank argues that in case of climate migration this would require states to help climate migrants to continue living a dignified life in a new environment.[82] This interpretation is supported by the basic principle arising out of Factory of Chorzow. Accordingly, states are obliged:

‘to wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and to reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed ‘.[83]

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that the WBGU’s concept of a Climate Passport, at least in part, has an anchoring in international law in addition to a moral anchoring in the ‘polluter-pays’ principle. This anchoring could in turn establish an obligation for states to implement the goals of a Climate Passport at least indirectly. This would apply at least to instances in which damage in the concrete form of habitat destruction by climatic change has already occurred.

Whether there is an obligation arising as a counterpart to the prevention prohibition to participate beyond this is doubtful. However, in view of the ideal version of the Climate Pass, this leaves the legal obligation with the following unsatisfactory ‘procedural’ hurdles, which run the risk of undermining the actual objective, namely, to enable early and humane migration.

The first hurdle is that the claim exists only between states. As a result, people who are actually affected by the changes would have to trust that their government would bring a claim on their behalf. This presupposes that the states not only recognize the dramatic situation of their own people, but also admit their own inability and powerlessness to remedy it. In states that are particularly badly affected, this may seem tangible as a last resort, but in states that are affected by ‘slower’ catastrophes in particular, political power mechanisms are pushing this solution further into the distance. The probability that such a claim will be asserted too late for large sections of the affected population, or at least too late to enable dignified migration seems highly probable. An aggravating factor is that in the majority of cases the current global political reality would prefer monetary support at contractual level until the very last moment rather than actual participation in a project like the Climate Passport. Monetary support in the sense of adaptation at home can certainly have a positive effect and is probably preferable to fleeing to farther-flung parts of the world for socio-cultural reasons. That is provided, of course, that these regions have the capacity and opportunities to shoulder these groups of people. From the perspective of legal protection, however, a securitized right in the form of a recognized Climate Passport is preferable for individuals.

Another hurdle is judicial enforcement. Individual legal disputes can delay ad-hoc decisions for an unnecessarily long time and make it difficult to enforce existing claims. An individual case-by-case approach to such a complex global situation in court cannot be the desired outcome and common goal of the international community.

An international agreement would therefore be compelling not only for reasons of protection, but also for reasons of effectiveness. Standardization would facilitate processes and would indeed establish a ‘lighthouse’ of humanity,[84] as WBGU was aiming for with the proposal of this concept. Without standardisation, such a lighthouse, would have to be fought for continuously on a case-by-case basis and and would not radiate enough light to create an impact. 


Robert Los is a student of law at the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany. His interest and commitment to climate law issues extends mainly to voluntary work alongside his studies and work


References

[1] UNCHR (2020): Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019.

[2] Rigaud/Sherbinin/ Jones/Bergmann/Clement/Ober/Schewe/Adamo(Mccusker/Heuser/Midgley (2018): Groundswell – Preparing for Internal Climate Migration; WBGU – Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (2008): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Hauptgutachten; WBGU (2014): Klimaschutz als Weltbürgerbewegung. Sondergutachten.

[3] WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 25.

[4] Ionesco/Mokhnacheva/Gemenne (2017): The Atlas of Environmental Migration; cf. WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 25.

[5] WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.

[6] http://www.arkivverket.no/eng/Using-the-Archives/Online-Exhibitions/The-Nansen-Passport/Nansen-the-humanist (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[7] League of Nations, Arrangement with respect to the issue of certificates of identity to Russian Refugees, 5 July 1922, League of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. XIII No. 355, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b4864.html (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[8] League of Nations, Arrangement of 12 May 1926 relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 12 May 1926, Treaty Series Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2004.

[9] WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24.

[10] Marrus (2013): Nansen-Pass. In: Diner, D., Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte und Kultur 44.

[11] https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1938/nansen/lecture/ (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[12] Oliver-Smith/de Sherbinin (2014): Resettlement in the twenty-first century. Forced Migration Review 45, p. 23–25; cf. WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24.

[13] Article 1A II of Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

[14] cf. Nümann(2019): Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’, https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/283563/rechtliche-schutzmoeglichkeiten-fuer-klimafluechtlinge- (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[15] Adger/Pulhin/Barnett/Dabelko/Hovelsrud/Levy/Oswald Spring/Vogel (2014): Human security, p. 767.

[16] EACH-FOR Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (2009): Synthesis Report, S. 72; Nümann(2019): Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’.

[17] Later, further escapes – e.g. because of poverty – as late consequences of the first climate-induced flight are probably still regarded as flights for the respective reasons. This leads to problems in questions of liability under international climate law and will be discussed below.

[18] Nümann(2014): Umweltflüchtlinge? Umweltbedingte Personenbewegungen im internationalen Flüchtlingsrecht, p. 254 et seqq.

[19] Cf. Hathaway (1991): The Law of Refugee Status, S. 92 f.; Zimmermann/Mahler(2011): Article 1 A, para. 2 1951 Convention. In: Zimmermann: The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A Commentary. Oxford und New York, p. 440.

[20] See McAdam (2010): Climate Change Displacement and International Law. Side Event to the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges 8 December 2010, p. 2, www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d95a1532.pdf (Last access: 20.11.2020).

[21] cf. Nümann, Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’, 2019; McAdam (2009): From Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 592.

[22] One example of this is the draining of the marshlands in the 1990s by Sadam Hussain in Iraq in order to take action against the predominantly Shiite marsh Arabs; cf. Nümann(2014): Umweltflüchtlinge? Umweltbedingte Personenbewegungen im internationalen Flüchtlingsrecht, p. 313 et seqq.

[23] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.

[24] While the European Union and the USA deal ingloriously with migration in the Mediterranean and Central America respectively, projects to deal with climate migration are being put off. It is all the more fatal that Finland and Sweden have repealed their existing rules for climate refugees in the face of the refugee crisis in 2015; see Kraler/Katsiaficas/Wagner(2020): Climate Change and Migration, Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration.

[25] Hanschel (2017): Klimaflüchtlinge und das Völkerrecht. Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 1, p. 1–8; WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.

[26] UN General Assembly (2016): New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016. New York: UNGA.

[27] United Nations (2018): Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Final Draft. New York: UN.

[28] USA saw its sovereignty curtailed by the agreement, cf.  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-un-global-compact-on-migration (Last Access: 20.11.2020).

[29] Edenhofer/Jakob (2019): Klimapolitik – Ziele, Konflikte, Lösungen, p. 25.

[30] https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article184525526/Antrag-von-SPD-und-CDU-Koalition-schliesst-eine-rechtliche-Wirkung-von-UN-Migrationspakt-aus.html (Last Access: 20.11.2020).

[31] BVerfG, Beschluss der 2. Kammer des Zweiten Senats vom 07. Dezember 2018 – 2 BvQ 105/18 -, para. 1-23.

[32] Markard (2018): Migration wird erstmal das Thema aller, Der Tagesspiegel v. 18.11.2018; https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/un-migrationspakt-erstmals-eine-gemeinsame-haltung-der-welt-zu-migration/23648828.html (Last Access: 20.11.2020).

[33] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.

[34] United Nations (2019): Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 30 August 2019.

[35] Art. 1 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees lists ‘natural disasters’ as a reason for migration.

[36] Kälin (2017): Klimaflüchtlinge oder Katastrophenvertriebene. German Review on the United Nations 65 (5), 207–212; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.

[37] Kälin/Schrepfer (2012): Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change. Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches. UNHCR, Division of International Protection, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series. Genf, p. 34. www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[38] Ferris/Bergmann (2017): Soft law, migration and climate change governance. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8 (1), 6–29.; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.

[39] Art. 5 IV, 12 II African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa; cf. cf. Nümann(2019):Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’.

[40] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 28.

[41] WBGU (2008): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Hauptgutachten.; WBGU (2009): Kassensturz für den Weltklimavertrag – Der Budgetansatz. Sondergutachten.

[42] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 29 et seqq.

[43] Sint Marteen: 19,5 t CO2 per capita; Trinidad & Tobago: 34,2 t CO2 per capita; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 30.

[44] cf. for Trinidad & Tobago see World Health Organization (2020): Health & Climate Change – Country Profile 2020, Trinidad & Tobago; cf. For Sint Marteen see Gerges/Hirschfeld/Hutar/Salzman/Sorensen/Meyer (2018): Corruption in an Era of Climate Change: Rebuilding Sint Maarten after Hurricane Irma, Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 18-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179203 (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[45] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 28.

[46] Serdeczny (2017): What Does It Mean To ‘Adress Displacement’ Under the UNFCCC? Discussion Paper No. 12.; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 29.

[47] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 28.

[48] Individualized claims of migrants against emitting states are also being discussed. But there are considerable doubts; cf. Vöneky/Beck (2017): in Prölß, Internationales Umweltrecht, p. 166.

[49] Cf. for failing to meet climate targets see Climate Action Network Europe (2018): Off target Ranking of EU countries’ ambition and progress in fighting climate change.

[50] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 529.

[51] Art. 8 para 1 Paris Agreement, 2015; https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; Nr. 53 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 2015; https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[52] Frank (2016): Anmerkungen zum Pariser Klimavertrag aus rechtlicher Sicht, Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 2016, p. 354.

[53] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[54] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 531 et seqq.; Schmalenbach (2017): Verantwortlichkeit und Haftung, p. 215 et seqq., in:  Prölß, Internationales Umweltrecht, 2017.

[55] ICJ (1996): Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep 1996, 226 (242) (para 29).

[56] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 532.

[57] ILC-Prev. Draft Art. 3 Com. (14).

[58] Trail Smelter Arbitration (USA v. Canada), Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938/41), Vol. III, 1964 et seqq.

[59] Wolfrum (2013): International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence, In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2013 para. 10 and para. 69 et seqq.

[60] Frank(2014):Klimahaftung nach Völkerrecht in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Extra 11/2014, p. 4 et seqq.

[61] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[62] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019 p. 531; dissenting: Vöneky/Beck (2017): Umweltschutz und Menschenrechte in Prölß, Internationales Umweltrecht, p. 133 et seqq.

[63] Sands/Peel (2018): Principles of International Environmental Law, p. 298.

[64] Rahmstorf/Schnellnhuber (2019): Der Klimawandel, p. 68 et seqq.

[65] Trail Smelter Arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938/41), Vol. III, p. 1931 f.

[66] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 532.

[67] Trail Smelter Arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938/41), Vol. III, p.1980.

[68] Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20.4.2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14.

[69] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 532.

[70] Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) u. Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 2015, 615 et seqq.

[71] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 533.

[72] Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) u. Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 2015, p. 707.

[73] Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20.4.2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 83.

[74] Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) u. Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 2015, p. 707.

[75] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[76] cf. Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 534.

[77] f.i. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Paris Agreement

[78] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 534.

[79] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).

[80] Frank(2014):Klimahaftung nach Völkerrecht in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Extra 11/2014, p. 3 et seqq.

[81] cf. Art. 31 com. (9) u. (10) ARS.

[82] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 534.

[83] ICJ, Factory of Chorzow, Urt. v. 13.9.1928, PCIJ Series A No. 17 (Merits).

[84] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 30.