This thesis was submitted to the University of Sussex in 2021 – by Louisa Gaus
Abstract
The influence of climate change on migration flows is a highly disputed topic, furthermore, the discourse about whether migration is a failure to adapt or an adaptive strategy emerges. The Republic of Kiribati has imminent adaptation needs due to the high dependency of the population on local ecosystems for subsistence and income, prevailing development issues, rapid population growth, and projected climate change impacts. The previous and current administrations deployed otherwise opposing adaptation approaches. Namely, ex situ adaptation, which inevitably leads to relocation, and in situ adaptation policies, approaches deployed ‘in the place’ of residence. Nevertheless, the significant negative implications of a sole prioritisation of one of these approaches suggest an alternative policy. This research argues, alongside other scholars, the emergent need for a hybrid adaptation policy. The aim is to answer the question if in situ and ex situ adaptation approaches can be harmonised or are due to their inherent characteristics incompatible in practice, and, from a practical perspective, what challenges such a hybrid adaptation policy encounters. The findings suggest that, in theory, in situ and ex situ adaptation approaches can be harmonised. However, due to the practical limitations stemming from the economic challenges and the lack of international law frameworks supporting cross-border migration, these adaptation approaches cannot yet be united into a hybrid adaptation policy in Kiribati.
What inspired you to write and research this piece?
In my opinion, the polarized debate about ex situ and in situ adaptation leaves little space for flexible decision-making. This inspired me to explore this what-if scenario of a hybrid adaptation policy practically.
What impact do you hope this research will have?
Hopefully, this research inspires us to think about climate change and migration not as a ‘fight or flight’ situation, but as an issue which is handled with a solution-oriented perspective and flexible short- and long-term planning.
Growing up in a small town in Southern Germany, I was always curious about other parts of the world. In my community, I engaged from a young age in youth work, such as leading a youth group. In 2015, after graduating from school, I underwent a Voluntary Social Year in the Republic of Kiribati. This stay awakened my passion for climate action and working in an international environment. After returning from overseas in 2016, I followed that passion and started studying ‘International Relations’ at the Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences. In 2019, I had the opportunity to intern at the Regional Program for Climate Change and Energy Security of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Hong Kong-America Center in SAR Hong Kong.
In my Bachelor’s thesis, which was submitted in 2020, I researched the impacts of climate change on public health. In 2020, inspired by my past experiences and studies, I started my Master’s degree in ‘Climate Change, Development and Policy’ at the University of Sussex and Institute of Development Studies in Brighton, UK. The result thereof is my thesis on adaptation policies in the Republic of Kiribati. Currently, I am interning at the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit in Berlin, Germany, and am eager to further engage myself in climate action. In my free time, I enjoy climbing, hiking, doing DIY projects (such as cutting my friends’ hair), and playing the violin and the ukulele.
No edits have been made to maintain the author’s tone of voice.
“It’s an act of sabotage on our future, a reckless and totally irresponsible act.”[i]
Such was the reaction of climate official Ian Fry, from the tiny South Pacific Island nation of Tuvalu, to Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and represents the first instrument in international law to contain legally binding greenhouse gas limitation and reduction commitments for industrialized countries. As such, Canada’s withdrawal from this legal milestone not only directly worsens the situation of threatened states such as Tuvalu through its apparently intended increase in greenhouse gas emissions, but also sends an ominous signal to the rest of the world, potentially opening the door for other states to follow suit.
Tuvalu is one of the countries suffering the most from the consequences of climate change. Rising sea levels are causing the erosion of ever larger coastal areas of the island nation’s low-lying atolls (coral reefs).Groundwater is becoming saline, threatening both food crops and drinking water supplies, and the increasing number of storms is destroying vital infrastructure in the country. Thus, Fry’s statement can be understood as an example of a global trend: the consequences of climate change are increasingly being recognized as a massive threat to peace for more and more states.
Examples of possible sources of conflict arising from climate change include the struggle for resources[ii], food scarcity[iii], and forced migration, with estimates for the year 2050 ranging from 200 million[iv] to 1 billion[v] climate refugees. The view that not only the consequences, but also the underlying causes of climate change, can be perceived as a threat to peace in their own right, seems set to gain acceptance.[vi] And these very causes of climate change can, in turn, often be clearly attributed to the actions of certain states.
Based on this extremely limited introduction, it becomes important to consider the question of whether states whose citizens, economies, and cultures suffer particularly severely from the consequences of man-made climate change may, under certain conditions, resort to the use of force against the polluter states.
In what situations might the use of force in the name of climate change be legal?
There are two possible scenarios under which the use of force may be legal: in the name of self-defense, or with the permission of the UN Security Council.
Regarding self-defense, Article 51 of the UN Charter (1945) states an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against [themselves or another] Member of the United Nations”. If this is interpreted literally, the legality of the use of force against “climate rogue states”[vii] can already be ruled out. Without wanting to belittle the threat of heavy Green House Gas (GHG)-emissions, this is definitely a different kind of threat than ‘an armed attack’.
However, if one takes the commonly accepted requirements of the so-called ‘Caroline Test’, a closer look is worthwhile. The Caroline Test lists a number of criteria that must be met for the right to practice self-defense. In the original formulation of this test (Webster, 1841) it says that, “a use of force can [only] be admissible if there is ‘a necessity of self-defence, instant, over-whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. Moreover, ‘the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it’.”[viii] In essence, this test argues that the two key requirements to justify the use of force in self-defence are ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’. While ‘proportionality’ determines the intensity of force that may be used, the requirement for ‘necessity’ determines whether a resort to the use of force is permissible at all. Thus, the necessity criterion is more interesting for us at this point.
Especially given the Test’s requirement for a threat to be ‘instant [and] over-whelming’, it would seem, given that GHG emissions don’t instantly affect populations, that the necessity criterion cannot be fulfilled. The reality is that many of the harmful effects of climate change take years or decades to come to light, and the delayed effects of emitted GHGs make it extremely difficult to attribute a specific consequence of climate change to a specific state. Thus, at least in the current state of climate change, under this framework it would be argued that states do have the time and therefore possibility to choose other means than force, which in turn must always be a last resort[ix]. In summary, then, “[u]nless the global climate was at a tipping point, and the attacking state or coalition knew it, the imminence of the threat implied by necessity would be absent.”[x]
Instead, the justification for a military strike against GHG-emitting facilities through anticipatory self-defense seems more realistic. This is because such a military strike would involve the pre-emptive thwarting of probable harm emanating from a state which is either unwilling or unable to stop this harm from happening, just as the theory of anticipatory self-defense states. However, the application of this particular variety of self-defense is highly controversial. Many scholars believe “that the pre-emptive use of force against emerging threat(s) is unauthorised under existing legal framework.”[xi]
As such, the use of force against climate rogue states cannot be justified on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter as acts of self-defense, at least for the time being. The other alternative for nations to legitimize a resort to use of force would be by being granted permission from the UN Security Council (UNSC). As a first step in this respect “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”[xii] This type of determination of threats to global peace is usually expressed in a UNSC resolution. Such resolutions not only officially determine that the situation in question is a legitimate threat to the peace, but also provide recommendations or decisions regarding “what measures shall be taken […] to maintain or restore international peace and security”.[xiii] Article 41 of the UN Charter lists a number of peaceful means by which the identified threat to peace shall be overcome. However, if these peaceful means were deemed by the UNSC to either have failed or to be inadequate, the resort to the use of force would be possible[xiv].
Because such a UNSC resolution does not exist as of today[xv], it would be tempting to dismiss this approach as irrelevant. However, this would be too simplistic. In general, the UNSC has an obligation to determine threats to peace[xvi]. A glance at the past shows that this can also involve categories of illicit conduct other than classic, direct violations of the sovereignty of states. In 1992, for example, the UNSC confirmed that “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”[xvii] Thus, it is by no means impossible that calls for climate change to be classified as a threat to peace[xviii] will be heard. And indeed, there have been repeated shifts in this direction in the recent past.
The UNSC, for example, “has held four open debates specifically on climate security risks”[xix] already. At the most recent of these open debates, climate change was unanimously referred to as a ‘threat multiplier’[xx], but no agreement could be reached on a classification as a threat to peace itself. Since two or three of the five permanent members with veto power in the UNSC, China and Russia, and in recent years also Trump’s USA, have taken the politically motivated stance that “[i]n fact, qualifying climate change as a threat to the peace was, in their view, neither ‘right’ nor beneficial”[xxi], this classification is not to be expected in the near future.
How might this change in the future?
Nevertheless, should climate change be classified as a threat to peace at some point, the whole situation could possibly change very quickly. The effectiveness of peaceful means can already be doubted from today’s point of view, since neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Paris Agreement can be considered to have effectively halted climate change and GHG emissions[xxii]. Were a Security Council resolution to be passed, it could open the door for the use of force against climate rogue states. For very practical reasons, however, it must be asked at this point whether this would actually be effective, either in combating climate change, or in furthering and protecting human rights at all. If a tiny state like the aforementioned Tuvalu suddenly had the theoretical right to take military action against a large country like Canada, it would still lack the means to do so. Thus, the jus ad bellum wartime principle of ‘probability of success’, in contrast to the other principles[xxiii], could not be fulfilled under any circumstances[xxiv]. The principle of ‘probability of success’ states that war can only be justified if such violence has a real chance of changing the causal grievance in the long run. If Tuvalu is now apparently justified in using force against Canada due to changed conditions, there is still the question of how it should win this war. Tuvalu does not have an army, and if one were to be created, it would almost certainly not be able to take on the Canadian army. A tiny country like Tuvalu trying to take military action against a superpower like Canada is likely to cause harm and loss of life, but has very little chance of bringing about change.
From this point of view, the proportionality of military action is also highly questionable. Because the principle of proportionality prohibits any “attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”[xxv] The invoking of the right to collective self-defense could provide a remedy[xxvi]. Going beyond this, the question may even arise, “[i]f a state pursues or allows very damaging activities that harm its own population or the international community as a whole through climate change, would it be legal to use force to stop those activities in the name of humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect [R2P]?”[xxvii]. However, this would only be possible if the UNSC classified the consequences of climate change as a mass atrocity crime[xxviii]. Additionally, the status of R2P is also controversial[xxix].
Conclusion
The scope of this paper could only provide a very rough framework. Nevertheless, it was possible to show why there is currently no legal resort to the use of force against climate rogue states and under what circumstances this assessment could change in the future. In addition to these findings themselves, however, it is momentous that such deliberations are taking place at all. Of course, no one wants to see countries become violent in the name of climate change, nor to see the devastation of communities, cultures and infrastructure that comes with war and violence. That the use of force is even being discussed is testament to the fact that there is still no actual, reliable way of holding states accountable for their international climate responsibilities. Countries and ecosystems around the world are at a breaking point, and in the not-too-distant future, the progress of climate change could lead to an even more frightening scenario.
Given that climate change is already triggering violence today, as destroyed homes or impeded access to drinking water might cause people in hardship to resort to violence in order to ensure their survival. If those states, whose citizens are worst affected, in their desperation see no other way out than using force against climate rogue states to stop them from causing further harm, we could see a rapid downturn into a new spiral of violence. Finding a way of holding states accountable for their international climate responsibilities is urgently needed, because otherwise violence will not only increase as a consequence of climate change impacts, but seems likely to also increase as an attempt to control the reckless actions of other states.
However, as explained in detail above, the use of force would not even come close to solving the problems caused by climate change. It must therefore be a top priority that international cooperation eventually lives up to its name and that a viable solution for the well-being of all in the face of the changing climate is found and implemented. We need to finally come together as an international community in holding nation states accountable – because only in this way can we ensure that this paper remains what it is: the description of an intellectual, purely theoretical thought experiment.
Ole ter Wey is currently studying International Law and Human Rights at the UN-mandated University for Peace in San José, Costa Rica. He previously lived with a local community in Kiribati for over a year. There, he experienced first hand the consequences of climate change endangering the existence of an entire state. It was then that he began thinking about how to address forced migration and dedicated his Liberal Arts Bachelor to the topics of migration and integration.
[ii]Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2012): Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49(1), pp. 3-9. DOI: 10.1177/0022343311431288.
[iv]Brown, Oli (2008): Migration and Climate Change, p. 11. In: IOM Migration Research Series, Vol. 31. https://www.ipcc.ch/apps/njlite/srex/njlite_download.php?id=5866
[v]Bassetti, Francesco (2019): Environmental Migrants: Up to 1 Billion by 2050. https://www.climateforesight.eu/migrations-inequalities/environmental-migrants-up-to-1-billion-by-2050/
[vi]e.g., Steinbruner, John D. (2013): Climate and Social Stress – Implications for Security Analysis, p. 37. Washington: The National Academies Press.
[vii]Martin, Craig (2020): Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Change Crisis and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, p. 334. In: Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 45(S). DOI: 10.7916/cjel.v45iS.5786.
[viii]Corten, Olivier (2017): Necessity, p. 862. In: Marc Weller, The Oxford Handbook of The Use of Force in International Law, pp. 861-878. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[ix]UNOCHA (2012): Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Emergency Operations: What is Last Resort?. http://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Last%20Resort%20Pamphlet%20-%20FINAL%20April%202012_5.3.pdf
[x]Kinsella, David (2013): The Use of Force to Achieve Climate Change Goals, p. 18. http://web.pdx.edu/~kinsella/papers/isa13.pdf
[xi]Mirza, Muhammad Nasrullah (2019): Use of Force in Self-Defence for Global Peace: A Conceptual Framework, p. 21. In: Strategic Studies, Vol. 39(3), pp. 1-21. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48544307
[xii] UN Charter (1945): United Nations Charter (full text), Art. 39. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
[xv]Bourghelle, Valentine (2019): Climate change in the Security Council: On the road to qualifying climate change as ‘threat multiplier’. In: Völkerrechtsblog, 9 December 2019. DOI: 10.17176/20191209-180639-0.
[xvi]Dipalo, Sabina (2018): The Security Council’s Non-Determination of a Threat to the Peace as a Breach of International Law, p. 61. In: Pécs Journal of International and European Law. 2018/01, pp. 61-81. http://ceere.eu/pjiel/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/63pjielPJIEL1801.pdf
[xviii]e.g., Scott, Shirley V. (2008): Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is It Time for the Security Council to Legislate?. In: Melbourne Journal of International Law. Vol. 9(2), pp. 495-515. https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/1683221/Scott.pdf
[xix]Toufanian, Melissa Turley (2020): Climate Change at the UN Security Council: Seeking Peace in a Warming World. https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/climate-change-a-un-security-council-seeking-peace-warming-world/
[xxi]Bourghelle, Valentine (2019): Climate change in the Security Council: On the road to qualifying climate change as ‘threat multiplier’. In: Völkerrechtsblog, 9 December 2019. DOI: 10.17176/20191209-180639-0.
[xxii]As the most prominent examples, neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Paris Agreement could significantly change the progress of climate change.
[xxiii]Proper authority, just cause, right intention, proportionality, last resort.
[xxiv]Stanford Encyclopedia (2016): War, 2.5. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/
[xxvi]Kunz, Josef L. (1947): Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, p. 872. In: The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 41(4), pp. 872-879. https://doi.org/10.2307/2193095
[xxvii]Gray, Christine (2012): Climate Change and the Law on the Use of Force, p. 238. In: Rosemary Rayfuse, International Law in the Era of Climate Change, pp. 219-241. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
[xxviii]Nollkaemper, André (2017): Failures to Protect in International Law. In: Marc Weller, The Oxford Handbook of The Use of Force in International Law, pp. 437-461. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[xxix]Glover, Nicholas (2011): A critique of the theory and practice of R2P.
“Environmental problems threaten people’s health, livelihoods and lives, and can cause wars.”[1]
“This place once used to be my home!” I remember well Akineti’s (pronounced ‘Akines’) facial expression when she told me this whilst pointing beyond the coastal line. I recognized a combination of desperation, disbelief, and anger. Of course, I cannot exclude the possibility that my own feelings prejudiced my perception. Akineti and some 2,000 other I-Kiribati (people of the South Pacific island nation Kiribati, pronounced ‘Kiribas’) live on the small atoll of Tabiteuea North, and therefore, at the forefront of climate change threats. Akineti continued:
“When I lost my home to the sea, my two sons and I fled to Tarawa [capital of Kiribati] to find a job and better protection from the threats of climate change, such as the lack of fresh water supply. However, I then returned only one year later as the situation in Tarawa was even worse than in Tabiteuea. We barely found a place to stay as Tarawa is very densely crowded, I could not grow my own food because of salination, and in the dry season there was almost no clean, fresh water supply.”[2]
In order to place this very personal story within a wider context, the following paragraph shall introduce the reader to the island nation of Kiribati and the impact and challenges climate change has on its people. The aim of this essay is to explore how people like Akineti and the citizens in Kiribati can live a peaceful life despite the threats already mentioned and further elaborated upon below.
Overview of the Situation
The Republic of Kiribati lies about halfway between Australia and Hawaii in the South Pacific and consists of 33 atolls. Together, these atolls make up a mere 800 square kilometres of land. If the sea areas are included in the calculation, Kiribati is one of the largest countries in the world – about the size of India.[3] Until 1979, Kiribati was a British colony. Probably not entirely by chance, the young island state was given its independence in the same year that the last phosphorus deposits were mined, thus exhausting the country’s largest source of income to date.[4] Not least because of this historical incident, Kiribati has been dubbed one of the world’s so-called LDCs (‘least developed countries’). In addition, the Kiribati atolls have a special feature that makes them particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change: the highest elevation of each island rises only three to four meters above sea-level.[5] According to calculations commissioned by the World Bank, about two thirds of the atolls will have sunk into the sea by the end of this century. The same study has found that in less than forty years, life on the islands will no longer be possible due to the salination of the groundwater.[6]
Today, climate change already causes some severe problems for I-Kiribati. According to the United Nations (UN), ‘[c]ommon effects of climate change felt and experienced are coastal inundation, loss of houses along [the] coast leading to relocation of villages to safer inner areas of islands, [and] aggravated soil infertility with sea water intrusion’.[7] This direct ecological impact of climate change ultimately leads to the deterioration of local socioeconomic conditions as it exacerbates the existing development pressures of rapid urbanisation, pollution, and poor sanitation which in turn compromise the availability of freshwater resources and the land that sustain the communities that depend on them.[8]
Though the intensity of these effects will only increase in the future, there is no violent or even open conflict, neither within the Kiribati population nor between Kiribati and any other state. In the Inventory of Conflict and Environment database, the Level of Conflict as well as the Fatality Level of Dispute (encompassing military and civilian fatalities) were predicted as ‘low’[9] and this prediction was confirmed in the last decade. This begs the question of whether conflict resolution really is the right approach to address the above-stated problems. Unfortunately, this superficial understanding of the concept of conflict resolution is applied far too often. As Prof. Emeritus Amr Abdalla[10] and the former UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser Edward C. Luck[11] and others have emphasised, conflict prevention is at least as important as conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. Rather, these three concepts only increase in importance when conflict could not be prevented in time. In order to prevent conflict, it is necessary to recognize conflict potentials at an early stage and to respond proactively.
In the present instance, some latent conflict potentials are obvious. The more citizens flee from the particularly threatened outer islands (such as Tabiteuea) to the main island, the more the overpopulation of Tarawa increases. This results in a variety of potential conflicts, ranging from disputes over land and the struggle for jobs, to increasingly poor sanitation – this list is not exhaustive. Cases in which, despite sufficient information, no timely action was taken can be used here as deterrent examples. Perhaps the cruellest result of a missed opportunity for conflict prevention was the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[12] More than half a year before the genocide began, in August 1993, a report by the UN human rights investigator for Rwanda warned of an escalation of violence between the population groups. But despite these and other early warnings, the UN did not intervene until many hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost. Even if the dimensions in Kiribati are of a much smaller scale, it is nevertheless evident that immediate action must be taken to prevent the initial tense situation from turning into outright violent conflict. That said, before launching into a discussion of concrete measures, the peace that shall be achieved for the people of Kiribati must first be transformed into tangible objectives.
How could peace be achieved more generally?
Specific needs
To achieve stable and long-lasting peace, the basic human needs of all parties must first be met. These are non-negotiable.[13] Since in this case of conflict prevention we initially consider only one (albeit heterogeneous) party, the most urgent needs can be identified quite clearly. The Kiribati population fundamentally requires respect for their rights to life, security, and dignity, as set forth in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[14] It is important to break down these abstract demands more precisely into specific interests
As such, the present main interests of I-Kiribati’ are food security, sufficient access to clean drinking water, and enough space within which to live. Due to the rural exodus caused by climate change, more than 50% of the Kiribati population currently live on the 15 square kilometre main island of South Tarawa. This means that the island has one of the world’s highest population densities of more than 3500 people per square kilometre. This restricts living and farming space, and it also limits job opportunities or access to education given the lack of resources to accommodate the population. The citizens of Kiribati are forced to resort to expensive imported food, with little chance of earning an income. In addition, the sanitation facilities and infrastructure are not designed for such masses of people. This in turn leads to an increase in the contamination of the groundwater and more frequent outbreaks of disease. There are of course many other problems which could be further elaborated upon, but which are beyond the scope of this study. It does not take much imagination to realize that if the above-mentioned threats and pressures continue to increase, an escalation of the enormous conflict potential into violent conflicts could occur over scarce resources. But what must be done now to prevent such an eruption of conflict?
The approach to conflict resolution in general and conflict prevention specifically must be to tackle the causes of conflict at its roots and not merely its symptoms.[15] In this case, these roots are very quickly dug out. All the problems described are attributable to rising sea levels and therefore to climate change.
Approaches to combating climate change
Approaches to combating climate change stem from many different disciplines. Firstly, the field of peace education should be highlighted as possibly one of the most important. In order to achieve change, it is essential to educate people to think critically. This is particularly true in relation to climate change not only for affected populations but especially for external people whose thoughtless participation in the current social order contributes to the progression of climate change. Otherwise, in the style of banking education, only the status quo is maintained. Peace education, with its realistic and critical approach, is therefore predestined to address structural problems, since it ‘strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality’[16].
Secondly, sustainable agriculture can also play a major part in combating climate change by replacing the use of pesticides with more diversity in the crop fields. The loss of more and more diversity in different crop varieties in general and of genetic diversity within a particular crop type due to ubiquitous monoculture poses a threat in the face of climate change. The world population depends on a diminishing variety of crops. And if this one genetic variant of wheat, for example, were to grow worse due to climate change, large parts of the population, especially in developing and least developed countries, would suffer from hunger. Greater diversity in crop fields is therefore an important adaptation to climate change. Moreover, the production of food represents a significant part in the emission of greenhouse gases. It is primarily the production of livestock products that contributes to climate change. Thus, driving the shift from industrial agriculture to agroecology and promoting a more effective, plant-based food supply.[17]
Finally, climate agreements such as the 2015 Paris Agreement or the 2009 Copenhagen Accord also play an important role. These represent globally negotiated climate targets such as limiting global warming to a maximum of 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius. However, the legal status of such agreements is problematic.[18] The Copenhagen Accord is not legally binding, and the Paris Agreement also has its weaknesses. For instance, big players such as the United States (US) and Brazil can withdraw from the agreement, which would represent an immense drawback in the fight against climate change as these states are among the biggest polluters in the world.
What could peace look like in this situation?
Would it be advantageous, then, to support these existing attempts to address climate change in the hopes of maintaining conflict prevention in Kiribati? As plausible as this consideration may seem, it can and must be rejected. For Kiribati, the insight of the international community comes simply too late. The climate reacts slowly to human efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. According to various sources,[19] the climate is only reacting to today’s greenhouse gas emissions with a delay of about 50 years. In other words, even a global end to greenhouse gas emissions starting tomorrow cannot change the fate of Kiribati. I would like to emphasise once again that the fight against climate change is not pointless, but rather that it comes too late for Kiribati. Nevertheless, we may still contemplate which of these peace-bringing approaches would be most promising for conflict prevention in Kiribati.
Taking a slightly futuristic approach would lead us to discuss the lifting of the atolls and strengthening the walls of the freshwater lens. Indeed, there are already some artificial islands in the world whose construction has been adapted. One of the most famous is probably the palm-shaped Palm Jumeriah in Dubai. While this island was created completely from scratch, in Kiribati there would only have to be an elevation of the existing island. This could involve shovelling sediment from the lagoon to gradually raise the island further out of the water. What sounds simple at first, however, means tremendous structural problems for an inhabited island as well as the need for an enormous amount of financial resources. Nevertheless, China is an even more a potent advocate for this solution.[20]
An alternative approach lies in planned migration, or ‘migration with dignity’[21]. This plan was long promoted by former Kiribati President Anote Tong before current President Taneti Maamau’s technocratic approach of lifting the islands became the focus of national interest.
What are the challenges to peace?
Mangroves
Kiribati is already taking adaptation measures to keep the consequences of climate change within tolerable limits. For example, the population is building so-called sea walls to provide some protection during high tide. In addition to other personal protection measures taken by the citizens, the state itself is also promoting projects to prevent land erosion, for example. To this end, large areas of mangroves are being planted in coastal areas, and the resulting strong root network at least slows down the erosion of the coast.[22] However, as an investigative committee of the Kiribati government has also confirmed, these isolated measures will only be able to provide relief for a very limited period.[23]
Floating islands
Commissions of experts are proposing stronger measures for habitat conservation. Researchers from University College London’s Mechanical Engineering Department, for example, are proposing ‘to construct major sea defences, dredge the seabed to reclaim earth or ship earth to Tarawa Atoll, [or to] construct a platform over the island or raise all buildings on stilts’[24]. They even present a floating island as a promising measure. It would consist of 102 triangular aircushion-supported modules, six of which would form a separate district that would be as autonomous as possible whilst still connected to all other communities. The researchers also suggest that ‘[l]ocal photovoltaic and hot water solar panels [are supposed to] provide energy, and rooftop collection and large storage reservoirs [to] provide fresh water’[25]. They promise the citizens of Kiribati ‘that traditional values and lifestyles can be respected and preserved’[26] and at the same time that their quality of life can be drastically improved. These promises of a better life through technical achievements can be cited as a prime example of a techno-centred understanding of sustainability. This is characterized by the conviction that damage caused by climate change can be absorbed by technology, and thus fights the symptoms instead of the origin of the problems. This understanding of sustainability is said to be particularly close to economy as it would not require major cuts in carbon emissions but allows for further economic growth without changes in the means of production.[27] Indeed, this rather economy-centered approach is also reflected in the report of the researchers of the London College, which promises Kiribati the possibility of economic growth based on sustainable design as a result of the adaptation.[28]
Unsurprisingly, however, the vision of the floating island does not begin with economic growth, but with an immense investment. The estimated cost of implementing such a huge project is £874 million per community. If 17 communities and five strategic areas complete the artificial island, the total cost will amount to £19.2 billion [~$25 billion].[29] For an LDC state with a GDP of $188.3 million this is an absurdly high sum. For other states with a significantly higher economic output, this would not be completely unthinkable. So, when a country with a large margin of manoeuvre such as China offers its help, Kiribati will certainly be listening.
Kiribati is now planning to raise its existing islands by one to two meters with China’s help.[30] As President Maamau has stated, ‘[t]here are already plans to build up part of [the capital atoll] Tarawa through dredging fill materials from the lagoon’[31]. He adds that the main island is to be raised, and that the ‘20-year vision has also included strategies to secure dredgers that will assist with these efforts as well as dredging channels in the outer islands’[32]. Thus, the measures could potentially lead to a relaxation of the situation, as fewer people would move from the outer islands to the main island, minimizing the negative effects of overpopulation as described above.
China’s role
The increasingly strong role of China in Kiribati, which is relatively close to Hawaii, is viewed with suspicion by Western forces. In fear of a Chinese military base in Kiribati, the US and its allies in the Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand are trying to frame relations between Kiribati and China in an unfavourable light on the international stage. In August 2019, for example, when the Chinese ambassador was ceremonially received on an outer island, he was given a path of young men lying on the ground in accordance with the local culture. This is one of the highest honours in Kiribati, and if the ambassador had rejected it and not walked over the men’s backs, it would have been considered insulting. Some Australian media, however, used the resulting photograph to portray China as ‘an imperialist state intent on colonizing the world’[33]. This deliberate misinterpretation of the image is a typical way of discrediting the opponent in conflict situations.[34] Though China is clearly aiming to strengthen its influence in the region, considering the fact that if Kiribati does not take effective measures within the next 30 to 40 years, the country will no longer be habitable, it is understandable that China’s offer to help would be accepted.
Migration with dignity
An elevation of the island could just be presented as a first option for the prevention of conflicts, which in Kiribati are increasingly arising from the consequences of climate change. In very simple terms, the shrinking of the island due to rising sea levels was identified as an underlying cause of potential conflict. Since mitigation measures of climate change are too late for Kiribati due to the delayed response of the climate, an approach to conflict prevention in the elevation of the island was thus discussed. However, some weaknesses of this idea, such as its feasibility, were also revealed and questioned. Another approach can be outlined in equally very simplified terms as follows: The original cause of conflict (climate change) for Kiribati cannot be reversed in time. And as with the island elevation approach just discussed, this scenario as well identifies Kiribati’s geographic features as another cause of potential conflict. To address these location issues, an even more radical measure could also be thought through as an alternative to elevating the island: Kiribati’s population is suffering from the effects of climate change combined with the island’s geography. Since climate change cannot be stopped in time, why don’t people move to another location? In this regard, former Kiribati President Anote Tong coined the term ‘migration with dignity’ during his period in office.[35] The idea behind it is to be prepared in the event of the foreseeable end of the island nation. A few years ago, Kiribati has therefore even bought land on an island of Fiji. However, there is little to no infrastructure there, so it would not be feasible to simply move its inhabitants there. Moreover, the country is at least partially inhabited by an indigenous tribe of Fiji, which is why another conflict party could potentially be added in this scenario. But is the purchase of land the only route to regulated and dignified migration?
So far, the answer to this question is probably yes. In 2015, Ioane Teitiota, a citizen of Kiribati, claimed asylum in New Zealand as the world’s first climate refugee. But the New Zealand court rejected the claim and Teitiota’s appeal to the OHCHR was not granted either.[36] The fact that climate refugees have not yet been legally recognized seems at first glance to be rooted in bureaucracy. The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not cover such migrants, since it was originally drafted to protect those fleeing persecution, war, or violence.[37] However, on closer inspection, it seems that the UN is reluctant to put refugees from war and climate refugees on the same level, as it fears compromise in the support of war refugees. For ‘if the UNHCR broadens its definition of “refugee” to support an entirely new category, it is unclear if the political appetite exists to provide the necessary funding’[38] or whether the support of all refugees would be stopped. Contrary to these concerns, there are loud voices calling for exactly such a legal recognition of climate refugees as well. They claim that ‘in order to qualify as a refugee, you need to be fleeing persecution, or to fear persecution. Forgoing the term ‘climate refugee’ is also, in a way, forgoing the idea that climate change is a form of persecution against the most vulnerable and that climate-induced migration is a very political matter, rather than an environmental one.’[39]
However, until such a legal status is established, Kiribati is trying to take alternative paths and has concluded binational agreements with Australia, for example. The deal provides for young people in Kiribati to be specially trained for jobs in demand in Australia and then allowed to work in Australia, thus facilitating access to an official residence permit[40]. In this way, as many people as possible are to succeed in migrating with dignity. However, serious disadvantages of this approach are the so-called brain drain, as many young, well-trained workers leave the country, and the loss of Kiribati culture. While it can be concluded at this point that a violent conflict over resources in Kiribati would be successfully prevented in this scenario, the question of whether the many difficulties of migration do not also provoke some potential for conflict remains.
Conclusion
In conclusion, an evaluation of the two presented scenarios shall be made. The first part of the paper explained why conventional measures for environmental protection come too late for the Kiribati population. Subsequently, two adaptation measures were presented, which are exactly adjusted to the special situation of the island nation. First, the possibility of an artificial elevation of the island was discussed. The technocratic approach has many advantages: The Kiribati population can remain in their accustomed (though certainly changed) environment and, above all, remain together as a community. This would also ensure the preservation of the rich Kiribati culture and language. In Kiribati I felt the strong desire of the people to be allowed to stay in their country and especially not to give up the independence they gained only 40 years ago. Moreover, if the outer islands were to be raised along with the main island of Tarawa, the overpopulation in Tarawa could decrease, thus alleviating a great potential for conflict. However, it should not go unmentioned that Kiribati would be moving between the fronts of a growing international conflict between China and the Western powers. Furthermore, the issue of climate change and rising sea levels would remain a constant topic of discussion, as the adaptation measures would have to be repeated at regular intervals.
The latter point is a major advantage of the migration with dignity approach. Once the migration to a less vulnerable place has been successfully completed, the issue of climate change loses its everyday threat to I-Kiribati. However, another weak point in this scenario cannot go unmentioned: Who says that integration into the new environment will succeed? The many potential conflicts that can arise from a failed integration can be seen in almost every region of the world, even if an analysis of this problem is not possible in the context of this paper. Additionally, the Kiribati culture and language is in danger of being lost in the event of scattered migration to different places in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, etc. In fact, the state of Kiribati would probably disappear with such a step. One possible solution could be a joint migration to the acquired piece of land in Fiji. However, this land does not yet have any infrastructure, and the presence of the indigenous population brings other major potential for conflict. All in all, the migration with dignity approach would buy the desired physical security albeit with many other problems.
However, to ensure that Kiribati does not become one example among many in the near future, the decisive action of the international community is more important than ever before. For, as this article has repeatedly alluded to, the real underlying problem is the progression of climate change. While for Kiribati all mitigation measures are probably too late, for many other vulnerable regions of the world our actions today can still provide a future without dire conflict scenarios arising from the consequences of climate change. Determined climate action thus makes an enormously important contribution to global conflict prevention. In the words of Hopwood, ‘environmental problems are not local but global, so that actions and impacts must be considered internationally to avoid displacing problems from one area to another by actions such as releasing pollution that crosses boundaries, moving polluting industries to another location or using up more than an equitable share of the earth’s resources’[41].
Ole ter Wey, a Correspondent at Earth Refuge, is currently studying International Law and Human Rights at the UN-mandated University for Peace in San José, Costa Rica. He previously lived with a local community in Kiribati for over a year. There, he experienced first hand the consequences of climate change endangering the existence of an entire state
References
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[3] Tereroko, T., et al. (2007). Republic of Kiribati – National Adaption Program of Action (NAPA). Environment and Conservation Division, Ministry of Environment, Land, and Agricultural Development – Government of Kiribati. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf
[4] van Trease, H. (1993). From Colony to Independence. In: H. van Trease, Atoll Politics – The Republic of Kiribati (pp. 3-22). MacMillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies.
[5] Tereroko, T., et al. (2007). Republic of Kiribati – National Adaption Program of Action (NAPA). Environment and Conservation Division, Ministry of Environment, Land, and Agricultural Development – Government of Kiribati. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf
[6] World Bank (2020). Climate Change Knowledge Portal – Country Kiribati. World Bank Group. https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/kiribati
[7] United Nations (2019), General Assembly: National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Kiribati, A/HRC/WG.6/35/KIR/1 (11 November 2019), p. 19. Available from undocs.org/en/A/HRC/WG.6/35/KIR/1.
[8] Storey, D.; et al. (2010). Kiribati: an environmental “perfect storm”. Australian Geographer, Vol. 41(2), pp. 167-181. In: J. Campbell, et al. (2014). Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
[9] Ketchoyian, K. (2011). Kiribati and Sea Level Rise. ICE Case Studies. http://mandalaprojects.com/ice/ice-cases/kiribati.htm
[10] Abdalla, A. (2020). C.R. SIPPABIO – A Model for Conflict Analysis. University for Peace.
[11] Luck, E. C. (2002). Prevention: Theory and Practice. In: F. O. Hampson (Eds.), Prevention – Opportunities for the UN system (pp. 251-274). Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[12] Tanner, F. (2000). Conflict prevention and conflict resolution: limits of multilateralism. International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82(839), pp. 541-559.
[13] Abdalla, A. (2020). C.R. SIPPABIO – A Model for Conflict Analysis. University for Peace.
[14] United Nations (n.d.). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
[15] Abdalla, A. (2020). C.R. SIPPABIO – A Model for Conflict Analysis. University for Peace.
[16] Freire, P. (2005). Pedagogy of the Oppressed (30th Anniversary Edition), p. 81. The Continuum International Publishing Group.
[17]Sylvester, O. (2019). Food security and sustainable agriculture in the 21st century: Key concepts and debates. University for Peace.
[18]D’Aspremont, J. (2015). The Collective Security System and the Enforcement of International Law. In: M. Weller (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (pp. 129-156). Oxford University Press.
[19]e.g., Samset, B. H.; et al. (2020). Delayed emergence of a global temperature response after emission mitigation. Nature Communications, Vol. 11(3261), pp. 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17001-1
[20] e.g., Pala, Christopher (2020): Kiribati’s president’s plans to raise islands in fight against sea level-rise. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/10/kiribatis-presidents-plans-to-raise-islands-in-fight-against-sea-level-rise, last retrieved: 18.08.2021; CBC Radio (2020): The tiny Pacific nation of Kiribati wants to raise its islands to save it from the rising sea. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-wednesday-edition-1.5683498/the-tiny-pacific-nation-of-kiribati-wants-to-raise-its-islands-to-save-it-from-the-rising-sea-1.5682046, last retrieved: 18.08.2021
[21]Gormley, S. (2016). Migration with dignity: Their island nation may someday sink into the ocean, so what are Kiribati’s people to do?. Ottawa Citizen. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/world/migration-with-dignity-their-island-nation-may-someday-sink-into-the-ocean-so-what-are-kiribatis-people-to-do
[22] United Nations (2019), General Assembly: National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Kiribati, A/HRC/WG.6/35/KIR/1 (11 November 2019), p. 19. Available from undocs.org/en/A/HRC/WG.6/35/KIR/1.
[23]Tereroko, T., et al. (2007). Republic of Kiribati – National Adaption Program of Action (NAPA). Environment and Conservation Division, Ministry of Environment, Land, and Agricultural Development – Government of Kiribati. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf
[24]Lister, N.; et al. (2015). Sustainable Artificial Island Concept Design for the Nation of Kiribati, p. 85. Ocean Engineering, Vol. 98, pp. 78-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2015.01.013
[27]Hopwood, B. (2005). Sustainable Development: Mapping Different Approaches. Sustainable Development, Vol. 13, pp. 38-52. DOI: 10.1002/sd.244
[28]Lister, N.; et al. (2015). Sustainable Artificial Island Concept Design for the Nation of Kiribati. Ocean Engineering, Vol. 98, pp. 78-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2015.01.013
[30]Pala, C. (2020). Kiribati’s president’s plans to raise islands in fight against sea-level rise. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/10/kiribatis-presidents-plans-to- raise-islands-in-fight-against-sea-level-rise
[33]Yuwei, H. (2020). Misinterpretation of photo of Chinese ambassador to Kiribati refuted. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198295.shtml
[34]Manor, I.; et al. (2018). Visually framing the Gaza War of 2014: The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Twitter. Media, War & Conflict, Vol. 11(4), pp. 369-391.
[35]Gormley, S. (2016). Migration with dignity: Their island nation may someday sink into the ocean, so what are Kiribati’s people to do?. Ottawa Citizen. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/world/migration-with-dignity-their-island-nation-may- someday-sink-into-the-ocean-so-what-are-kiribatis-people-to-do
[36]OHCHR (2020). Historic UN Human Rights case opens door to climate change asylum claims. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E
[37]W. H. (2018). Why climate migrants do not have refugee status. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/06/why-climate-migrants-do-not-have-refugee-status
[39]Gemenne, F. (2015). One good reason to speak of ‘climate refugees’, p.71. Forced Migration Review, Vol. 49, pp. 70-71.
[40] Tereroko, T., et al. (2007). Republic of Kiribati – National Adaption Program of Action (NAPA). Environment and Conservation Division, Ministry of Environment, Land, and Agricultural Development – Government of Kiribati. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf
[41]Hopwood, B. (2005). Sustainable Development: Mapping Different Approaches, p. 39. Sustainable Development, Vol. 13, pp. 38-52. DOI: 10.1002/sd.244
Amid ongoing global debate around the definition, classification, and treatment of ‘climate migrants’, little attention is paid to what the people affected want.1 There have been multiple reports with varying estimates of the number of people expected to be displaced due to climate change by 2050. 2,3 The common link featured in these reports, however, is that the majority of climate displacement is and will be internal. People around the world will be forced to relocate within their own countries to escape the slow onset impacts of climate change. Even in the face of uninhabitable conditions, people are generally unwilling to leave their homes and relocate to foreign lands. So, in addition to arguing over cross-border arrangements, countries ought to come up with inward-looking strategies to deal with climate-induced displacement.
One needs to look no further than the island states in the Pacific as examples. These small island nations are more vulnerable to the acute effects of climate change than any other region in the world. 4 Sea-level rise, amongst other climatic changes, is threatening the existence of these geographically isolated and small landmasses. Kiribati, which rises no more than two meters above sea-level at its highest point, is one such island state. A 2016 United Nations report has shown that half of the households have already been affected by sea-level rise on one of Kiribati’s constituent islands.5 In neighboring Tuvalu, a UNU-EHS study found that 97% of surveyed households had been impacted by natural hazards between the period 2005 and 2015, yet only 53% of the people affected believed that they would be able to afford migration in the future.6
Despite the above, people of these nations have been unwilling to leave their homes, families, and lives. New Zealand’s Pacific Access Ballot, an annual lottery which selects people from five Pacific countries for New Zealand residency each year, has repeatedly had quotas go unfulfilled.7 The governments of these islands are trying to build adaptive capacity and employ migration as a means of improving the quality of life. The Kiribati government has implemented a program, entitled ‘Migration with Dignity’, which aims to create a skilled workforce that can find decent employment abroad. In 2014, the government also purchased 6,000 acres in Fiji to try and ensure food security whilst the environment changes.8 With support from the Green Climate Fund, the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project will enhance resilience to coastal hazards on some of the nation’s islands.9
These measures might not be enough, but they are better than simply waiting for other countries to help. As Kiribati President, Taneti Maamau said: “We are telling the world that climate change impacts Kiribati, it’s really happening… But we are not telling people to leave.” 8 Rather than simply focusing on relocation – an option that does not support true self-determination for the affected people – international policy should provide adaptive capacity and long-term support to these island states. Many engineering options are available, such as coastal fortification, and land reclamation technologies. It is imperative, therefore, for developed countries to voluntarily adopt these measures before they are forced to do so.
Nikunj is a consultant currently working for a climate focused philanthropy. In the past, he has worked as a business strategy consultant across various sectors and has also volunteered for various non-profits. His undergraduate background is in Engineering from BITS Pilani. Interested in human-environmental ecosystems and how they adapt to climate change, Nikunj has been part of various climate adaptation projects.
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