Category: Current Affairs Regions

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Going Beyond U.S. Immigration Law to Accept Climate Migrants

13 April 2021 – by Caroline Foley

Introduction

Imagine traveling almost 1,000 miles by foot with your family to have access to drinkable water, leaving behind your community to venture into an unknown land. Eric, his wife, and two children, an indigenous Mayan family from Guatemala were forced to do just that. When the family arrived in the U.S., their two children were diagnosed with anemia. Further test results also showed high levels of lead, which were most likely a result of the rainwater they collected and consumed. When it stopped raining, they had no choice but to walk 2 miles to bring water home. They also tried to dig 20 meters into the ground to find water, but to no avail. At last, they turned to their mayor for help, but unfortunately that, too, failed.[1]

The adverse farming conditions brought by droughts have worsened the crisis in the area in Central America known as the “Dry Corridor.” According to UNICEF, the effects of climate change disproportionately impact particularly indigenous families.[2]  In the San Marcos department in Guatemala, indigenous peoples are faced with droughts caused by climate change that have affected water supplies for human consumption and irrigation. Many parts of Guatemala face desertification, because rainfall is expected to decrease by 60 percent, and the amount of water keeping soil moist may drop by as much as 83 percent.[3] A study predicts that as many as 680,000 climate migrants might be forced to move from Central America and Mexico to the United States between now and 2050.[4] More generally speaking, extreme weather events are the leading cause of migration around the world. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates that 21.5 million people per year, on average, over the past decade have had to flee their homes due to storms, floods, wildfires, droughts, and other weather events[5]. These events have increased in severity and frequency due to climate change.

Despite the alarming numbers, one of the difficulties in “making a case” for climate migrants is to draw the line between when conflict is created and/or fuelled by climate change, or when it is driven by other factors, such as those of political nature and poverty. In the example of Guatemalans who migrated to the United States, poverty and violence are often cited as the push factors, when often they were a product of the droughts caused by climate change.

Neither does the  U.N. refugee definition cover their ‘status.’ However, there are regional expansions of the “refugee” definition in Latin America and Africa that are gradually becoming accepted  by international organizations and countries; and should, therefore, also be adopted by the United States to address the regional climate migration crisis in Central America.

I. Current Immigration Law in the U.S.

U.S. refugee policy used to recognize that those displaced by “natural calamity” deserved protection. The 1953 Refugee Relief Act defined a refugee as “any person in a country or area which is neither Communist nor Communist-dominated, who because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity or military operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto… and who is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life or for transportation.”[6] However, the 1980 Refugee Act subsequently eliminated “natural calamity,” and instead adopted the United Nation definition of a refugee, which makes no reference to natural disasters.

Currently, in the United States, there are few options for migrants who left their country primarily because of climate change. One of the options available only applies to migrants who are already living in the United States when the natural disaster takes place, and the other option has not been recognized by any Federal Court in the United States.

  1. Temporary Protected Status

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is granted to individuals who are unable to return to their countries due to “ongoing conflict, environmental disasters, or extraordinary and temporary conditions.”[7] The Secretary of Homeland Security has the discretion to decide when to designate a country for TPS. Although they often consult with the Department of State and the National Security Council, the Secretary’s decision as to whether or not to designate a country for TPS is not subject to judicial review. A TPS designation is a very short-term resolution as individuals will be protected six, twelve, or eighteen months at a time. At least 60 days prior to the expiration of TPS, the Secretary may extend or terminate a designation based on the conditions in the foreign country. If the Secretary decides against renewing the TPS designation for a certain country, all TPS beneficiaries from that country return to the immigration status held prior to receiving TPS and can become subject to removal. Overall, the benefits of TPS status is limited and only benefit a small portion of climate migrants.[8]

  1. Asylum Law

Another narrow option in U.S. immigration law is asylum law. To qualify for asylum, the individual must be fleeing persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”[9] Most of the  litigation happens in the context of “membership to a particular group.”Advocates and practitioners are creative in expanding this category before immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. However, the category of “accepted” particular social groups is limited to only a small portion of asylum seekers, which became even smaller once Donald Trump assumed office. In effect, legal practitioners have been unable to expand “membership in a particular social group” to include people affected by climate change.[10]

Returning to our initial case, people like Eric do not qualify for TPS nor asylum, neither can they return to Guatemala due to both the land conflict and climate-induced water shortage. There is an ongoing push to expand TPS so as to include migrants who are currently not in the U.S. at the time of designation, and to advocate for a broader definition for a “particular social group.” I will attempt to look at how some regions have dealt with local migration within the continent and how, or if, the U.S. could adopt a regional approach and/or a broaden the refugee definition.

II. International Framework for Refugees

Africa and Latin America have acknowledged that the UN Definition of a refugee as per the 1951 Convention fell short in helping migrants displaced within their continents. They have both pushed for bolder policies to expand the definition in order to protect a migrant’s basic right to life.

The Organization of African Unity Convention (“OAU”) of 1969 is a regional expansion to the 1951 United Nations Convention.[11] A specific purpose of the 1969 OAU Convention was to provide additional refugee protection. The broader refugee criteria included in Article I(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention protects people who migrate as a result of “events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole” of the country of origin.

It should be noted that the factors that pushed the need for the 1969 OAU Convention are no longer restricted to Africa. The 1969 OAU Convention does not define or limit the concept of “events seriously disturbing public order”. The language allows for interpretations reflecting the ongoing developments in the continent.[12] Although the Convention is silent as to whether victims of natural disasters can legitimately be considered as refugees, the Convention operates as a human rights protection, and “events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality”,[13] can be construed to cover this category.

The OAU Convention inspired the Cartagena Declaration which incorporates a similarly worded extended refugee definition, as well as the doctrine of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.[14]  The Declaration recognized the need to protect persons displaced by the unrest in Latin America during the 1980s, which was instrumental in responding to the people displaced by the coup d’etats and generalized government violence that happened in the region. The Declaration’s interpretation is informed by international and regional human rights and humanitarian law, especially the norms and standards of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, and the evolving case law of the Inter-American human rights bodies.

While not a treaty, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration is similar to the OAU in that in Conclusion III(3) it recommends that refugees include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by … other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”.[15] Although the Cartagena Declaration is not legally binding, most Latin American countries have adopted its broader refugee definition by incorporating it within their domestic law or through practice. Even the countries that have not adopted it, have recognized its crucial role in protecting displaced persons in the region, including the United States. This version of the  refugee definition has also been recognized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights[16], and the General Assembly of the Organization of the American States.[17]

It is important to note that national refugee agencies are in charge of interpreting and applying the refugee definition in the Declaration. Mexico and Brazil, for example, have granted refugee status under the broad definition of the Declaration to more than 53,000 and 46,000 Venezuelan Refugees.[18] In December 2014, 28 countries across the Americas convened in Brasilia to mark the 30th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration.[19] At the end of the meeting, officials adopted the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, agreeing to further the work begun in Cartagena and move toward implementing solutions for displaced persons.[20] The Declaration is currently incorporated by 16 countries and we can see a continuous increase in commitments. While no country in Latin America as of today has interpreted the Cartagena Declaration to grant refugee status based on the effects of climate change and disasters, due to the ongoing developments, it has still been listed, along  with the 1969 OAU Convention, as an example of progress with regard to regional refugee protection.[21]

III. Moving forward

Assessing claims for international protection based on climate change is extremely complex when attempting to apply the  UN 1951 Convention, the OAU Convention, and the Cartagena Declaration. Although, there is currently no real intention to change the  refugee definition, there is certainly a lot of advocacy and conversation happening around the need to recognize climate migrants by the United Nations and country leaders.

For example, in 2020, the UN Human Right Committee in Teitiota v. New Zealand clarified that people seeking asylum are not required to prove that they would face immediate harm if deported back to their home countries because climate-related events can occur suddenly, or over time. Most importantly, Committee members underlined that the international community must assist countries adversely affected by climate change.[22] Furthermore, given that the risk of an entire country becoming submerged under water is one of extreme nature, the conditions of life in such a country may become incompatible with a right to life with dignity before the risk is realized.[23] Although the decision is not binding to the United States, it is a step in the right direction.

Another effort has been the creation of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at IOM, which oversees and supports all policy projects on environment- and climate change-related migration. One of IOM’s goals in managing environmental migration includes providing assistance to affected populations during a disaster and facilitating migration as a climate change adaptation strategy.[24] While the IOM partners with the UNHCR on the issue of resettlement, climate migrants are not a priority as they do not  don’t fall within the 1951 refugee definition.[25]

As for the current refugee program in the United States, participants in the climate migrant resettlement program could be eligible to apply for lawful status if the program was tied to a regional compact on climate displacement like Cartagena or OAU Convention. Though this may not immediately result in greater resettlement opportunities, it could expand protection.

In October 2020 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued the Legal Considerations regarding claims for international protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters[26]. The UNHCR established that “people displaced by the adverse effects of climate change and disasters can be refugees under regional refugee criteria” under the “circumstances that have seriously disturbed the public order” prong of the Cartagena Declaration and OAU Convention.[27]

In this regard, the UNHCR concluded that the key question in making a decision regarding eligibility of refugee status under this ground, is whether human dignity has been violated, and if so, whether the state is unwilling or unable to address it. Looking at the refugee definition more broadly, UNHCR concludes that climate change may have significant adverse effects on state and societal structures, individual well-being and the enjoyment of human rights. Additionally, it recognizes that a narrow focus might “fail to recognize the social and political characteristics of the effects of climate change and their interaction with other drivers of displacement”.[28] 

The UN has defined a “disturbance” to public order occurs when there is a disruption to the normal and stable functioning of this order.[29] The “serious” threshold may embrace quantitative and qualitative dimensions and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature and duration of the disruption and its consequences on the security and stability of the state and society therein.[30] Whether a disturbance to public order stems from human or other causes is not determinative for concluding a serious disturbance of public order; the central concern is the effect of a given situation. Accordingly, the principal inquiry at the time of assessing a claim for refugee status is whether a serious disturbance to public order exists as a matter of fact, based on an assessment of available evidence.

Both under Cartagena and OAU Convention, the refugee definition requires “circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. As such, climate change or a disaster must have an effect on the person’s place of habitual residence and force the person to leave their country. The document gives the criteria to analyze whether the climate change that unfolds is a risk of harm: how the disaster unfolds and develops; the geographical proximity of the disaster to the person’s place of habitual residence; how it affects their life, physical integrity, liberty and enjoyment of other human rights; and how the State responds.[31]

Lastly, the document highlights that if there is a real risk of being subjected to serious harm, that person has the right to be protected from irreparable harm by Articles 6 (right to life) and 7 (prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[32] In addition to the UNHCR report, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, also highlights the link of healthy environment and human rights when it stated that human beings need to be at the center of concerns for sustainability and should be entitled to a healthy life in “harmony with nature.”[33]

Conclusion

The Biden’s administration has taken an interest in the protection of climate migrants. On February 4, 2021, the Biden administration ordered a report on climate change and its impact on migration, including forced migration, internal displacement, and planned relocation, to be submitted in 180 days.[34] This report will include options for protection and resettlement of individuals displaced directly or indirectly from climate change and mechanisms for identifying such individuals. Most importantly, the Biden administration requests that the report looks at opportunities to work collaboratively with other countries to respond to “migration resulting directly or indirectly from climate change”.[35]

It is crucial that the United States, as well as the rest of the world, recognize how interconnected we are, especially to neighboring countries. The Cartagena Declaration and OAU Convention, although imperfect, are a step towards realising our shared responsibility within our continents to protect families like Eric’s.

This article is part of our Spring 2021 collaboration with students from the International Human Rights Clinic at the Western New England University.

Caroline Miranda Foley is a law student at Western New England, Massachusetts. She has worked in immigration law for the past ten years and is passionate about access to justice, especially in the immigrant community. She has been an immigrant in the United States for over 15 years, and is very tied to the Brazilian and other Latino community where she resides. 

References

[1] The author of this piece worked on this immigration case personally. The names were changed to protect anonymity.

[2]John Vidal, How Guatemala is Sliding into Chaos in the Fight for Land and Water, The Guardian (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/19/guatemala-fight-for-land-water-defenders-lmining-loging-eviction.

[3] Abraham Lustgarten, The Great Climate Migration has Begun, NY Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/climate-migration.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).

[4] Id.

[5] Erol Yayboke, A New Framework for U.S. Leadership on Climate Migration, CSIS (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-framework-us-leadership-climate-migration.

[6] Maria Cristina Garcia, Does the United States Need a Climate Refugee Policy?, Historical Climatology (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.historicalclimatology.com/features/does-the-united-states-need-a-climate-refugee-policy.

[7] See footnote 4.

[8] Temporary Protected Status: https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status

[9] Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 & 1967), https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.

[10]Shea Flanagan, “Give me your Tired , your Poor, your Huddled Masses”: The Case to Reform Asylum Law to Protect Climate Change Refugees, De Paul J. for Soc. Justice (2019), https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1202&context=jsj#page=23.

[11] Persons covered by the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and by the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Apr. 6, 1992), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68cd214/persons-covered-oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems.html.

[12]Legal Considerations Regarding Claims for International Protection Made in the Context of the Adverse Effects of Climate Change and Disasters, UNHCR (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html.

[13] Id.

[14] Summary Conclusions on the Interpretation of the Extended Refugee Definition in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration (Oct. 2013), https://www.unhcr.org/53bd4d0c9.pdf.

[15]  Cartagena Declaration 1984: https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf

[16]Advisory Opinion OC-25/18, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (May 30, 2018), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c87ec454.html.

[17] Proteccion de los Solicitantes de la Condicion de Refugiado y de los Refugiados en las Americas, OAS (Jun. 5, 2012), https://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/AG-RES_2758_XLII-O-12_esp.pdf.

[18] The Cartagena Refugee Definition and Venezuelan Displacement in Latin America, International Migration (Dec. 2, 2020),  https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.12791?af=R.

[19]Regional Refugee Instruments & Related, Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, 3 December 2014, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5487065b4.html.

[20]Marissa Esthimer, Protecting the forcibly Displaced: Latin America’s Evolving Refugee and Asylum Framework, Migration policy Institute (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/protecting-forcibly-displaced-latin-america-evolving-refugee-and-asylum-framework.

[21] The Cartagena Declaration at 35 and Refugee Protection in Latin America, E-International Relations (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.e-ir.info/2019/11/22/the-cartagena-declaration-at-35-and-refugee-protection-in-latin-america/.

[22] UN Human Rights Ruling could Boost Climate Change Asylum Claim, UN News (Jan. 21, 2020),  https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1055671.

[23] Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, UN Human Rights Committee (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,5e26f7134.html.

[24] Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division, IOM, https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change.

[25] See footnote 4.

[26] See footnote 11.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Key Concepts on Climate Change and Disaster Displacement, UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/5943aea97/key-concepts-climate-change-disaster-displacement.html.

[30] Id.

[31] See footnote 11.

[32]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, OHCHR (Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.

[33]Report of the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development (Aug. 12 1992), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf.

[34]  Executive Order on Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migtation: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/04/executive-order-on-rebuilding-and-enhancing-programs-to-resettle-refugees-and-planning-for-the-impact-of-climate-change-on-migration/

[35] Id.

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The Latest on Predicting Factors for Migration

12 April 2021 – by Atoosa Gitiforoz

Nature Communications, a scientific journal published by Nature Research, is a peer-reviewed, open access journal covering natural sciences. In a new study, published on the 6th April ’21, researchers, using machine-learning analysis, identify predictors of migration into the European Union.

Calculating numbers of climate migrants is inherently challenging because of the difficulty in defining causality; people often migrate for a multitude of reasons.

Studies show for example, a strong correlation between migration caused by climate change and higher levels of violence leading to an increase in migrant flow.

The study identified violence and insecurity as the strongest predictors of asylum migration to the EU, such as during the migration crisis of 2015-16. Economic and climate conditions, to a lesser extent, are predictors of migrant flow, and more so in non-conflict areas. Other studies however, have predicted that global warming may triple the number of asylum seekers to Europe in this century. A report published in 2019, by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, directs policy makers to consider that climate change can further exasperate stresses for conflict and disrupt food chains hence threatening livelihoods.

Whilst the stated confidence for climate change as a predictor for migration is low across recent studies, system research into the extent climate change can influence political violence, (or other superior factors identified as good predictors of migration) indicates a priority for future research.

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Receding Glaciers Threaten Uttarakhand Residents’ Electricity and Homes

8 April 2021 – by Benjamin St. Laurent

Residents of the Indian state of Uttarakhand, which sits a few hundred miles north of New Delhi and is bordered to its north by the Himalayas, have come face to face with the deadly impacts of climate change. In early February, the effects of melting glaciers in the Himalayas caused a flash flood of debris-filled water to crash through the Tapovan Vishnugad Hydropower Plant. Reports have estimated the death toll may be as high as 200, as search and rescue efforts were stymied by the harsh terrain around the Dhauliganga River. The flash flood was likely triggered by a massive section of glacial ice breaking free and causing a surge of water to rush downriver. Evidence shows that climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of these disasters by exacerbating extreme rainfall in the region as well as raising the average temperature of the glacial ice.

In a country grappling with the task of providing electricity for its growing population, the increased risk of severe flooding and avalanches may put India’s goal of expanding electricity access and reducing power outages at risk. According to The Associated Press, experts tasked with studying the impact of receding Himalayan glaciers on dams in the area have long recommended that hydroelectric projects “take into account the ecological fragility of the mountains and the unpredictable risks posed by climate change”, and other sources of renewable energy may pose less harm to the local community. But the human impact that these disasters have on residents of Uttarakhand is too often overlooked.

The increased risk of severe flooding and avalanches has already killed thousands of Uttarakhand residents and displaced many others. NPR reported that a number of villages immediately began evacuating residents and nearby riverside areas were put on high alert.  According to the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), climate change is increasing the frequency of migration in Uttarakhand as well as the risk associated with relocation. To better accommodate the needs of migrants, PIK recommends that policymakers establish safe routes of migration and support the development of alternative livelihood options for the large population of agricultural workers who may be forced to leave their land behind.

Sources

Prakash Kashwan, N. (2021). Hydropower projects are wreaking havoc in the Himalayas. Retrieved 4 April 2021, from https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/19/hydropower-projects-are-wrecking-havoc-in-the-himalayas

BBC. (2021). Uttarakhand dam disaster: Race to rescue 150 people missing in India. Retrieved 5 April 2021, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-55975743

Vaidya RA, Shrestha MS, Nasab N, Gurung DR, Kozo N, Pradhan NS, Wasson RJ, Shrestha AB, Gurung CG, Bajracharya A, Dasgupta P, Shrestha MS, (2019) Chapter 11: Disaster Risk Reduction and Building Resilience in the Hindu Kush Himalaya In: Wester P, Mishra A, Mukherji A, Shrestha AB (eds) The Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment. Springer Nature, Cham, p 402. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92288-1_15

Ghosal, A. (2021). Himalayan glacier disaster highlights climate change risks. Retrieved 4 April 2021, from https://apnews.com/article/climate-climate-change-courts-avalanches-india-7be7a76eea4d497b22609ff3d5194e69

Frayer, L. (2021). Scores Are Feared Dead In India After Himalayan Glacier Breaks Away. Retrieved 5 April 2021, from https://www.npr.org/2021/02/07/965046888/scores-are-feared-dead-in-india-after-himalayan-glacier-breaks-away
Upadhyay, H., Vinke, K., Bhardwaj, S., Becker, M., Irfan, M., George, N.B., Biella, R., Arumugam, P., Murki, S.K., Paoletti, E. (2021): Locked Houses, Fallow Lands: Climate Change and Migration in Uttarakhand, India. Report, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Potsdam and The Energy and Resources Institute (Teri), New Delhi. Retrieved 4 April 2021, from
https://www.pik-potsdam.de/en/news/latest-news/locked-houses-fallow-lands-climate-change-and-migration-in-the-himalayan-state-of-uttarakhand-india

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New Massachusetts Climate Law Will Work to Protect Vulnerable Communities

7 April 2021 – by Evelyn Workman

A new Massachusetts climate law has been heralded as a crucial step in the state’s fight for environmental justice. The wide-ranging legislation, signed by Governor Charlie Baker at the end of last month, sets new goals on emissions and clean energy, however, it also has a significant emphasis on environmental justice. 

The climate change legislation commits to achieve net zero emissions for Massachusetts by 2050, however in addition to this the bill also aims to protect vulnerable communities. The law has provided a clear definition of a community overburdened by pollution – also known as an Environmental Justice (EJ) community – defining it based on race, income and language-proficiency criteria. Advocates have welcomed this new definition, claiming it improves on the confusing parameters which were previously used in identifying the most vulnerable communities in the state.

The bill recognises the significant impact of climate change on EJ communities, which are more likely to have poor air quality and disproportionately high levels of pollution, and aims to allow these communities to have a say in future infrastructure projects or any other projects likely to impact air, water or soil quality. The law also says that the state must take into account how existing pollution levels have already impacted residents when considering whether to approve any new project in an EJ community. 

This bill is a significant step towards protecting vulnerable communities who are disproportionately affected by climate change and paves the way for other states, and other countries, to pass climate justice laws in the future. 

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Gender, Climate Change, and Migration: Promising Policy and Programmatic Practice in addressing Linkages from a Gender Equality and a Women’s Leadership Perspective

6 April 2021 – by Atoosa Gitiforoz

The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Gender and Disaster Network, and, the Arab Water Council, organised a webinar: ‘Gender, Climate Change, and Migration: Promising Policy and Programmatic Practice in addressing Linkages from a Gender Equality and a Women’s Leadership Perspective.’

The event took place on March 23, 2021, gathering NGOs, CSOs and CBOs, think tanks, academic bodies, the private sector as well as regional and national stakeholders.  At the event, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) directed participants to the Sendai Framework Voluntary Commitments platform to submit their gender-related commitments and promote their work.

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, adopted at the Third UN World Conference in Sendai, Japan, on March 18, 2015 – with a roadmap to reduce disaster losses by 2030, holds a particular focus on women’s capacity development, gender-disaggregated data and gender equality across policy and planning initiatives. It ‘is the first major agreement of the post-2015 development agenda, with seven targets and four priorities for action.’

One of four priorities (Priority 4) in the current Sendai Framework: ‘Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to «Build Back Better» in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.’, points to women and persons with disabilities to be public leaders in reconstruction and response phases to climate disasters. This follows from findings so far that women, children and people in vulnerable situations are disproportionately affected by climate disasters. Hence it is vital that women participate in implementing gender-sensitive disaster risk reduction policies and initiatives.

In practice, the Sendai Framework recommends investment into capacity development and maintenance into grassroots organisations and women’s groups that are knowledgeable of local needs and function as important community mobilizers. The Sendai Framework remains open to submissions of commitments for Disaster Risk Reduction.

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The Causes and Effects of the Australian Flood Disaster

5 April 2021 – by Hazal Yilmaz

The effects of the flood disaster that followed the heavy rainfall in Australia last week are still continuing in the region. In the worst flood disaster in 60 years, 18.000 people were evacuated and 3 deaths were recorded. The economy is adversely affected by the damage to property and the disruption of coal exports.

Australia’s wildlife and livestock are also one of the parties most affected by this flood. Animals, reptiles and spiders, who were trying to take refuge in the surrounding houses and struggling to survive, were tried to be rescued by the locals and officials.

Successive fire and flood disasters make us question the impact of global warming on these natural phenomena. Scientists think that Australia’s tides between excess drought and excess rain will be the new reality. Although the authorities are careful in linking the cause of extreme rainfall to climate change, various reports and studies have suggested that the warming of Australia increased the intensity of the rainfall. Although global warming and changes in the structure of the atmosphere are not the only factors, Australia’s current warming of 1.4C increases the moisture holding capacity of the atmosphere and worsens the situation.

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What is the SDG Global Festival of Action?

4 April 2021 – by Hazal Yilmaz

The SDG Global Festival of Action was held for the fifth time from the 25-26 March 2021 with the aim of accelerating the process towards achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

For two days, at what was this time a virtual event, the UN brought together individuals and organizations in dynamic and interactive sessions under the objectives of SDG Action Campaign. Emphasizing the importance of individual actions, solidarity and cooperation in achieving sustainable development goals, participants were encouraged to think on how we can achieve transformative change, both socially and economically.

UN Climate Change, which gives wing to innovative projects in the direction of the climate action and bring stakeholders together, is considering increasing the innovation potential with “The UN Climate Change Innovation Hub”. The Hub aims to create an opportunity of cooperation for climate actors, who will try to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5C with various innovations. We will be able to follow the Hub’s work closely after it goes into operation together with the UN Climate Change Conference COP26 in November 2021.

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The Biden Administration on Climate Migration

4 April 2021 – by Atoosa Gitiforoz

The Biden Administration has marked international climate action as a key driver of his foreign policy goals. A climate change summit, organised by Biden, is to take place on the 22nd and 23rd April 2021, where 40 world leaders will discuss the urgency and economics of stronger climate action.

In February 2021, President Biden signed an ‘Executive Order on Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migration’. The report includes the discussion of international security implications of climate migration, protection and resettlement options, strategies to identify climate migrants and how these findings impact US foreign assistance related to climate change emergencies, as well as partnership opportunities with other countries, international bodies and NGOs.

A policy brief has since been launched in March, by the Duke Centre for International Development (DCID), which specifically looks at factors driving migration from Honduras to the U.S. border. In the report, food insecurity linked to climate change was one of the key factors in increased migration from Honduras to the U.S in recent years. The report suggests investments to improve agricultural resilience to rainfall to improve food security, as a long-term plan.

A study by The Washington Postin 2019 looked at American public opinion towards climate migrants, compared to economic migrants and refugees. The study also looked at whether stances on climate migration correlated with positions about climate change mitigation efforts. The respondents by largely favoured climate migrants over economic migrants, and refugees over climate migrants. The findings also showed that most Americans don’t see climate change mitigation and climate migration as related. In other words, news about climate migration did not make respondents more likely to support climate change mitigation efforts more broadly.

President Biden’s efforts at reorganising the US migration system, callings for reports on climate-change mitigation and foreign policy efforts to push for stronger climate action, are promising. There are still significant gaps in the support line for climate migrants arriving in the US; for example, the US government does not have policies designed to support the mental health needs of climate change migrants. Recent analyses on the issue of US climate migration policy also points to the problem of treating climate migration as an independent issue. Studies show the strong correlation between migration caused by climate change and higher levels of violence leading to an increase in migrant flow. Recommendations by studies related to Honduras- US migration include: ‘A multi-track approach to address both agricultural resilience and the difficult knot of violence, governance, and corruption has the best chance of reducing the need of Hondurans to migrate.’

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An Uncertain Future for Migrant Farmers in Ghana

1 April 2021 – by Benjamin St. Laurent

A recent study has examined the plight of rural migrant farmers in Ghana who continue to face the realities of climate change. For decades, Ghanaian farmers have left their homes in the Upper West Region for the prospect of better agricultural conditions in the Brong-Ahafo Region. They have made this journey hundreds of miles south due to worsening soil conditions and declining rainfall volume and frequency which has led to a lack of food security. The 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC predicts, with high confidence, that mean precipitation will decline in mid-latitude subtropical dry regions such as Ghana’s Northern semi-arid climate.

The Brong-Ahafo Region is a hub for agricultural production in Ghana and has historically provided migrants with employment opportunities. But climate change has led to declining agricultural conditions in this region as well. As in many developing countries, agriculture has shifted from staple crops to cash crops that can be exported, such as Cocoa. According to the MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, between 2014 and 2019 Cocoa exports declined 20.5% ($664M USD) while precious metal, gem, and mineral exports increased significantly.

Baada, Baruah, and Luginaah discussed the realities these migrant farmers faced in Brong Ahafo through interviews and focus group discussions and reported that “premigration hopes of improving their lives in the middle-belt had not been matched by the postmigration realities”. Migrant farmers, especially women, often lack access to farming resources, land, and social capital when they arrive. While seemingly bleak, the authors of this study identify a number of potential solutions including providing migrants with equitable access to land tenure and farming resources, as well as creating alternative employment opportunities in the Upper West Region, where farming has already become increasingly difficult.

Sources

Baada, J., Baruah, B., & Luginaah, I. (2020). Looming crisis – changing climatic conditions in Ghana’s breadbasket: the experiences of agrarian migrants. Development In Practice, 1-14. doi: 10.1080/09614524.2020.1854184 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09614524.2020.1854184

IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 60. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/

OEC. (2021). Ghana (GHA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. Retrieved 30 March 2021, from https://oec.world/en/profile/country/gha/

Baada, J., Baruah, B., & Luginaah, I. (2021). Climate change is affecting agrarian migrant livelihoods in Ghana. This is how. Retrieved 29 March 2021, from https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-affecting-agrarian-migrant-livelihoods-in-ghana-this-is-how-156212

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Intensification of Heatwaves in the Middle East and North Africa Could be a Significant Driver of Migration From the Region

30 March 2021 – by Evelyn Workman

Extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, will become increasingly common in the future, as our climate continues to warm. More and more scientific research is being carried in this field, due to the potential devastating consequences to humans as a result of more frequent and more severe heatwaves. One recently published paper within this field has found that, unless greenhouse gas emissions are significantly curbed, life-threatening and extreme heatwaves will be observed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and could be a significant driver for mass migration to cooler northern regions in the future.

The study, “Business-as-usual will lead to super and ultra-extreme heatwaves in the Middle East and North Africa” published in the journal npj Climate and Atmospheric Science, used a multi-model ensemble of climate projections, and then predicted future heatwaves and characterised them with the Heat Wave Magnitude Index. The results indicate that, under a business-as-usual pathway (greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase at present day rates) unprecedented super- and ultra-extreme heatwaves will develop in MENA in the second half of this century. The study predicts the events will involve temperatures exceeding 56 °C and will last for several weeks at a time, leading to life-threatening conditions for humans. In addition, by the end of the century, about half of the MENA population could be exposed to these ultra-extreme heatwaves on an annual basis. This potential intensification of heatwaves in MENA could lead to increased migration from the region to cooler, more northern places. 

The authors suggest that immediate and drastic action on climate change, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, are necessary to prevent such extreme heatwave events from occurring. In addition, they also suggest that cities in the area will have to develop adaptation solutions to cope with the greater prevalence and severity of heatwaves in the area. 

Sources

George Zittis, Panos Hadjinicolaou, Mansour Almazroui, Edoardo Bucchignani, Fatima Driouech, Khalid El Rhaz, Levent Kurnaz, Grigory Nikulin, Athanasios Ntoumos, Tugba Ozturk, Yiannis Proestos, Georgiy Stenchikov, Rashyd Zaaboul, Jos Lelieveld. Business-as-usual will lead to super and ultra-extreme heatwaves in the Middle East and North Africa. npj Climate and Atmospheric Science, 2021; 4 (1) DOI: 10.1038/s41612-021-00178-7