What’s in a Definition: Refugee Protection is Failing Folks Fleeing Climate Disaster in Bangladesh

boat on sea under foggy weather

14 December 2020 – by Dharma Khalsa

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is slated to create the largest number of refugees in the coming decades. Yet, the current refugee definition does not adequately protect the increasing number of people bound to flee these inhospitable conditions. In 2016 extreme weather-related disasters displaced around 23.5 million people.[i] What is lost in this statistic are the people forced to flee their homes because of slow-onset environmental degradation like droughts, sea level rise, and melting permafrost.[ii]

Imagine for a moment that you are a Bangladeshi villager. For years you have watched as water creeps closer to your home. Then, one day, you return from a walk in the fields to find your house under water. Although you are used to some amount of flooding, this time the damage is too much. The next day, you pack up what you can and make the trek to a new home in the big city of Dhaka. This home is in a slum of the Mirpur district because you cannot afford anything else. You find somewhere to land, packed in like sardines next to your new neighbors; likely folks from other parts of the country, fleeing similar situations. After months with no job, nearly no food or clean water, and inadequate sanitation, you decide to try your luck elsewhere. You pack up your things, yet again, and hop on a bus to the Indian border. However, once you arrive you encounter a fence and are turned away before you can enter. With nowhere else to go you take a huge risk and flee to Europe.

For many this is a reality. Bangladesh is on the frontlines of the worst climate impacts. It is known as the ‘Land of Rivers’ because in a nation about the size of New York state there are nearly 800 rivers.[iii] Its low elevation, high population, inadequate infrastructure, and heavy reliance on farming makes Bangladesh a major generator of climate refugees.[iv] Bangladeshis have long used migration as a coping strategy because of the country’s natural susceptibility to extreme weather. However, the rate of migration has drastically increased with the modern onslaught of climate change.[v]

Bangladeshis are far from the only population facing an increase in climate refugees. However, the state is relatively poor, and therefore often struggles to suitably provide for its’ internally displaced citizens.[vi] Many end up fleeing the country altogether. In fact, in May 2017, Bangladesh was the largest single origin of migrants arriving in Europe.[vii]

Although there is an obvious need to assist people fleeing climate driven disasters and slow-onset environmental degradation, the current legal frameworks are insufficient. Climate refugees likely have a well-founded fear of living under hostile conditions, yet the current refugee definition only includes those with a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.”[viii] This definition is far too narrow and leaves out folks fleeing their homes due to climate change.  

This paper will examine the definition of a refugee as contemplated by the 1951 Convention through a hypothetical asylum claim for Janaki Aktar, originally from Kushtia, Bangladesh who flees to Dhaka after rising sea levels flood her home. It will then look at some of the regional expansion of the refugee definition to see if they might better apply to climate refugees. It will ultimately conclude that none of the current definitions are flexible enough to account for the thousands of people displaced by climate related events every year.

CLIMATE REFUGEES LIKELY DO NOT FIT THE 1951 CONVENTION DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE

At the individual level, a grant of asylum hinges on meeting the definition of a refugee.[ix] Mercifully, there may be some room to stretch the definition to account for instances where a government fails to care properly for its most vulnerable citizens who have been displaced by climate change. If the government is in such a state of disfunction that the fleeing person is “unwilling or unable” to avail themselves of state protection, they might be able to make a claim for asylum.[x] However, climate refugees will likely have to fight the definition at every turn, which makes the definition unsuitable for the increasing number of climate refugees seeking protection from the international community.

The Country Conditions

In May 2017, the largest single origin of migrants arriving in Europe were from Bangladesh. [xi] This is largely because Bangladesh is vulnerable to climate change. Generally, people do not flee their homes and villages at such a drastic rate without a good reason. The largest city in Bangladesh, Dhaka, is often the first stop for rural peoples who must abandon their homes. However, this city is already stretched to its limits.[xii] The fact that such a large number of Bangladeshis are leaving speaks to a state in peril.

States have a responsibility to protect and create conditions of dignity for their citizens. In Bangladesh, unlike in the United States, which has a higher level of economic stability, folks who are affected by climate change tend to end up falling outside of governmental protection. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, in New Orleans, there were many people displaced who were given temporary state protection until they got back on their feet. Bangladesh has had climate events that far surpass Katrina, yet folks, more often than not, are left unprotected by the government.[xiii] Unlike Katrina, Bangladeshis that leave their country do so because the state social nets are not equipped (or are non-existent) to support poor, rural communities who have lost their homes due to climate change.

Well-Founded Fear

The wide-spread migration happening in Bangladesh is a result of these general country conditions and it further lends itself to meeting the well-founded fear requirement.[xiv] A well-founded fear is “the likelihood of harm” and is often based on a pattern or an ongoing practice of persecution.[xv] The pattern of internal relocation to quell the suffering of losing one’s home, livelihood, and community, rather than providing resources to rebuild or fortify current residences exacerbates the degradation of human dignity faced by climate refugees in Bangladesh. Thus, this pattern contributes to the unreasonableness of relocating within the country.

Although “[a]n applicant cannot establish a well-founded fear or threat to life or freedom if she could avoid harm by ‘relocating’ to another part of the country,” this is only true if “such relocation would be reasonable.”[xvi] Therefore, the opposite of this must also be true. If it is unreasonable for an applicant to relocate to another part of the country, then they should be able to establish a well-founded fear or threat to life or freedom. Bangladesh’s reluctance to invest in cities, besides Dhaka, further contributes to the unreasonableness of relocation within the country.

On the list of circumstances potentially making relocation unreasonable is lack of “economic infrastructure” and “geographical limitations.”[xvii] In this case, Janaki attempted to relocate to Dhaka because that was likely the only option within Bangladesh to find work to support her family. Yet, the state was unable to provide the necessary economic infrastructure for her to meet these needs. Additionally, because the majority of Bangladesh (including Dhaka) is so vulnerable to climate change, the country is inherently limited by geography to provide a more secure place for Janaki to move. Without a reasonable alternative for relocation within Bangladesh, Janaki might be able to prove a well-founded fear through a pattern of persecution.

Persecution

“Persecution” is the “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.”[xviii] In this case, the “persecution” at issue is not (as might be expected upon first blush) the climate event or even climate change itself, but rather it is the government’s inability to provide care and protection to its citizens. Such an inability results in the total loss of economic personhood.[xix]

In Kovac v. INS the court held that although the persecution is not direct, “economic proscription so severe as to deprive a person of all means of earning a livelihood may amount to physical persecution.”[xx] In that case, Kovac was a trained chef who was unable to find work cooking in Yugoslavia. Here, Janaki is not just looking for a “better” job or even a job in her previous field, she is seeking to maintain a sense of human dignity by finding any work at all. She is seeking to feed herself and her family, to have access to clean water, and not to contract a disease. Therefore, the economic proscription is so severe as to completely deprive Janaki of all means to earn a living. As Janaki has been denied all employment opportunities due to the state’s lack of economic infrastructure, her economic persecution far surpasses the economic deprivation experienced in Kovac.

When contemplating the application of economic deprivation in Dhaka (a city that is already incredibly overpopulated) living in a slum where “communicable diseases fester and fires sporadically raze homes” might be the only option due to a lack of work, and therefore a lack of financial resources.[xxi] In this sense, economic deprivation likely rises to the level of physical persecution as it is directly tied to the experienced physical discomfort. However, proving this is still a difficult task because courts have recognized that poverty, disease, and illiteracy exist in every country and do not in themselves amount to persecution. Thus, the surrounding circumstances, including the country conditions and nexus of persecution will help slide the scale one way or the other.

On Account Of “Social Group”

Here is where the definition gets harder to meet because a climate refugee does not appear to clearly fit into a Convention group. The well-founded fear of persecution must be on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.” [xxii] The most likely option is that this persecution is on account of social group. Specifically, Janaki is part of a group of displaced, rural citizens with little education, who have lost their home, land, and community. Yet, it is tricky when trying to discern whether her persecution was on account of this social group or this group resulted in de facto persecution by the state. 

However, if she fails to show direct persecution for a convention reason, thus establishing ‘nexus,’ all hope might not be lost. In fact, “where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a Convention group, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to offer protection is for a Convention reason,” nexus may still be established.[xxiii] This is called bifurcated nexus, where direct harm or the failure of state protection against persecution on the basis of a Convention reason can meet the definition. Therefore, although climate change did not target Janaki for a Convention reason, as climate is generally an indiscriminate force without such an agenda, all might not be lost. She may yet prove that the state failed to protect her from economic deprivation on account of being a displaced person from a rural community. Assuming the state does not extend its lack of protection to everyone in Dhaka, equally, a case for persecution based on bifurcated nexus might exist.

Furthermore, the UNHCR does not endorse the term “climate refugee” and tends to only recognize refugee status of a person displaced by climate events if there are “nexus dynamics” at play. [xxiv] Arguably, in any case that a climatic event rises to the level where conditions exist that force a person to flee across borders, these dynamics exist. Thinking back to the case of Katrina, had the Bangladeshi (or any) state created a social net to provide for displaced folks, they likely would never have left the country. Even so, Janaki will likely have to evidence that “nexus dynamics” in the form of bifurcated nexus resulted in persecution on account of her social group. Unfortunately, it is likely that the state would treat a poor urban citizen the same as a displaced rural citizen, and thus she will likely not be able to meet this element.

Courts in the U.S. have noted that “aliens fleeing general conditions of violence and upheaval in their countries, would not qualify for asylum.”[xxv] This likely includes climate refugees as they would have to fight the definition at every turn. Therefore, a broader definition is needed to account for climate refugees seeking asylum. Some regional Conventions have sought to address broader scales issues of violence and upheaval in their definitions. This is where the idea of an effects versus intent framework may be important to consider.

CLIMATE REFUGEES LIKELY DO NOT MEET THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (“OAU”) OR THE CARTAGENA CONVENTIONS DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE IN A MEANINGFUL WAY

Looking at the social framework of refugee protection, if climate change drives a person from their homeland because they are not cared for by their own state, this may result in de facto loss of state protection. Yet, the original 1951 Convention definition is too narrow to account for such a social framework. The refugee definition has been stretched by the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) and the Cartagena Convention, in an attempt to provide protection for refugees fleeing larger events than individual persecution. However, even this expansion of the definition does not meet the ever-expanding needs of climate refugees who still very much feel the effects of displacement, regardless of the basis for that displacement.

The OAU was the first regional Convention to expand the definition of a refugee. The:

term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.[xxvi]

On its face, this definition should accommodate a climate ‘event’ like a hurricane or a flood. But it still does not seem to account for slow onset climate change, such as increased salinity or rising sea levels. Furthermore, in application the OAU definition is primarily geared towards large social events like civil war and the repercussions therein. Climate issues have been taken into account under the OAU to some degree but, generally, like the 1951 Convention definition, only when they include “nexus dynamics.”[xxvii]

The second expansion of the definition happened at the Cartagena Convention and:

includes among refugees, persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.[xxviii]

This expansion comes the closest to protecting climate refugees. For example, following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Haitian refugees used the Cartagena Convention to argue for asylum.[xxix] Many of these claims succeeded under a humanitarian argument that focused on the impact of the earthquake on displaced Haitians rather than particularized persecution executed by the state or an individual.[xxx]

This is important because it illustrates the kind of broad, social, humanitarian thinking that will likely be necessary to adequately protect climate refugees. However, the 2010 earthquake is still the only time in the modern era that this argument has been successful at such a large scale and it will likely be contested as these impact claims become commonplace. Furthermore, the Cartagena Convention is a limited expansion in South America that does not extend to places like Bangladesh.

CONCLUSION

As this paper shows, there is often a tension in the way refugee status is applied between the individual status of an asylum seeker and the social imperative to protect human dignity. When definitions become too narrow—as to list permissible grounds—it becomes easy for certain people to fall through the cracks. The refugee definition has lost touch with its intended purpose when it must be stretched so far that it breaks in order to grant asylum to folks fleeing climate disaster. Therefore, a great need exists for new safety nets and protections to replace the piecemeal apparatus that climate refugees currently have to stitch together to gain back human dignity.

As climate change begins to ravage more and more communities, it also takes on a human face. In order to protect human rights, it is increasingly important to consider what our intention is as a global community. Whether we wish to prioritize a narrow view of refugee protection that focuses on the perpetrator of harm or throw open the doors and accept the effects of harm experienced be people as a basis for protection. It may be that climate refugees have to take a note from the UNHCR and stop using the term “refugee” altogether. And perhaps, to their benefit, a wholly different mechanism must be developed that is flexible enough to account for the variety of harms that climate change so often creates.

ALL IMAGES TAKEN BY AUTHOR ON A TRIP TO KUSHTIA, BANGLADESH IN FEB. 2014:


Dharma grew up New Mexico, on a piece of property that borders one-hundred acres of BLM land. At 11, she spent 6 years attending a boarding school in Amritsar, India, where she graduated from high school. Dharma then attended Mount Holyoke College, where she earned a B.A. in history and fine art in 2013. After graduating, she spent 6-months visiting 22 countries on six continents (including Bangladesh). She then moved to Portland, Oregon where she worked on the front lines for Greenpeace as an environmental activist.

Dharma now attends the University of New Mexico School of Law, where she is working towards the Natural Resource and Environmental Law certificate, is co-editor-in-chief of the Natural Resource Journal, was on the Environmental Moot Court team, and tutored for the Property I. In the summer of 2019, Dharma clerked for Kennedy, Kennedy & Ives, working mainly on plaintiff civil rights litigation. In 2020, she worked for the USDA (from her kitchen). In her free time (not during a pandemic), Dharma can be found at a hot-yoga studio, a poetry slam, coffee-shop, on an airplane to some foreign country, or exploring the local outdoors.


References:

[i] All statistics taken from: Environmental Justice Foundation (“EFJ”), Climate Displacement in Bangladesh, https://ejfoundation.org/reports/climate-displacement-in-bangladesh.

[ii] Id. The actual number of climate refugees is likely much higher

[iii] EJF, No Place Like Home–Bangladesh: Land of Rivers,  https://ejfoundation.org/films/bangladesh-land-of-rivers.

[iv] EJF, Climate Displacement in Bangladesh, https://ejfoundation.org/reports/climate-displacement-in-bangladesh.

[v] Id. The number of people displaced by sea level rise, storms, cyclones, drought, erosion, landslides, flooding, and water salinization has not been otherwise seen in the modern era.

[vi] Id. Between 1,000-2,000 people move to Dhaka every day (largely due to the changing environment).

[vii] Id.

[viii] 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees; See INS v. Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining a refugee as any person outside of their country… who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail… of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.); Contrast with UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, Art. 1(2) (defining a refugee as an individual who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country…”)

[ix] See Sale v. Hatian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).

[x] See Tatiana Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2006).

[xi] EJF, Climate Displacement in Bangladesh, https://ejfoundation.org/reports/climate-displacement-in-bangladesh.

[xii] Poppy McPherson, The dysfunctional megacity: why Dhaka is bursting at the sewers, THE GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/mar/21/people-pouring-dhaka-bursting-sewers-overpopulation-bangladesh

[xiii] EJF, No Place Like Home – Bangladesh: Land of Rivers,  https://ejfoundation.org/films/bangladesh-land-of-rivers.

[xiv] Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979) (explaining that fear is considered well-founded if it is establish, to a reasonable degree, that continued stay in the country of origin has become intolerable for the reasons stated in the definition, or it would be, for the same reasons, intolerable to returned).

[xv] See INS v. Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).

[xvi] 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(3).

[xvii] Id.

[xviii] See Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status at 104-105 (1991). 

[xix] See Djordje Kovac v. INS, 407 F. 2d 102 (1969).

[xx] Id.; Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F. 2d 744 (1961).

[xxi] Poppy McPherson, The dysfunctional megacity: why Dhaka is bursting at the sewers, THE GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/mar/21/people-pouring-dhaka-bursting-sewers-overpopulation-bangladesh

[xxii] 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

[xxiii] UNHCR Social group guidelines at ¶ 23.

[xxiv] Climate change and disaster displacement, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html  (“The term “climate refugee” is often used in the media and other discussions. However, … Climate change affects people inside their own countries, and typically creates internal displacement before it reaches a level where it displaces people across borders. There may be situations where the refugee criteria of the 1951 Convention or broader refugee criteria of regional refugee law frameworks may apply, for example if drought-related famine is linked to situations of armed conflict and violence–an area known as “nexus dynamics.” Regardless, the term “climate refugee” is not endorsed by UNHCR, and it is more accurate to refer to “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change.”)

[xxv] See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).

[xxvi] OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Art. I(2), (June 20, 1974) https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html (emphasis added).

[xxvii] Sanjula Weerasinghe, In Harm’s Way: International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change, UNHCR, 38-58 (Dec. 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/5c1ba88d4.pdf.

[xxviii] Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Art. III(3), (Nov. 22, 1984) http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36ec.html (emphasis added).

[xxix] Sanjula Weerasinghe, In Harm’s Way: International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change, UNHCR, 60-86 (Dec. 2018),  https://www.unhcr.org/5c1ba88d4.pdf.

[xxx] Id.

Walk With Me

silhouette of people standing on mirror during golden hour

14 December 2020 – by Dave Inder Comar

The failure of states to stabilise the climate, along with the scientific uncertainty of whether the planet can actually stay under 1.5 degrees C of total planetary warming,[i] suggests the real possibility that dramatic change and damage to the Earth will manifest by 2050 — and humans may not be able to prevent it. In a world plagued with global and enduring inequalities, these changes will also affect people and countries in a disproportionate and unjust way. Low-income nations, saddled by colonial legacies and inferior status in the global order, find themselves in difficult straits in preparing for climate change and are highly vulnerable with respect to climate-related disasters.[ii] As such disasters increase in scope, migration and displacement from low-income countries will accelerate, leading to tens of millions or even billions of displaced people from already distressed areas to richer countries.[iii]

Mitigating the scope of this crisis is imperative. But we must be very careful, and intentional, in putting forth the appropriate response. How governments intend to resolve the challenges of the climate crisis is as important as actually resolving the crisis itself. For example, it is not difficult to imagine an authoritarian response to challenges posed by climate change—either in those areas beset by climate damage, or in richer countries seeking to manage people movement, economic dominance, and challenges to the social order brought by displaced peoples or by an unhindered Nature. Traditional Hobbesian theory predicts that grave threats to life are the trigger for a Leviathan armed with broad, even dictatorial powers, in response to those threats.[iv]

The stakes, then, are not just the continued habitability of the planet. What is also at risk this century is the very concept of the inherent dignity of all people—the foundation for human rights and democratic norms. It is an open question whether the legal and political frameworks that protect this dignity will withstand the climate crisis,[v] a prospect which should trouble any true friend of civilisation and freedom, irrespective of political or philosophical belief.

The emergence of a cold-blooded and killing Leviathan—or set of Leviathans—in the decades ahead has already been previewed, and here I refer to the reprehensible and cruel responses of governments to the complex and deep-rooted issue of human migration to date. Climate change becomes the magnifier of displacement, the proverbial gasoline to the fire that will increase not only the levels of migration to come, but also the inhuman actions of governments already committed to the politics of the armed lifeboat—a world of militarised borders, aggressive anti-immigrant policing, and indefinite states of emergency and unilateral counter-insurgency actions against domestic and foreign political threats.[vi]  

In this kind of world, the protections of international law and treaties are openly dispensed with as citizens in rich countries consent to floating bodies of children and their parents in the Mediterranean[vii] or in the Rio Grande,[viii] the existence of detention camps at international borders operated in criminal conditions,[ix] and even the Kafka-esque pronouncement that requires toddlers to appear in court to defend themselves at their own deportation proceedings,[x] all as permissible responses to displacement. The state of exception implemented after 9/11 brought with it the resurgence of torture,[xi] heinous wars of aggression against countries in the Middle East,[xii] and indefinite detention of enemies in illicit facilities where the rule of law is not permitted to have effect.[xiii] This state of exception has yet to be rescinded, and may very well serve as the model or even the backbone, for more perverse deviations from the rule of law as the climate crisis accelerates.

Citizens in high-income countries have broadly accepted brutish practices for decades against the displaced, irrespective of the government in power. In light of this, the political infrastructure has been established not just for an enduring form of climate apartheid[xiv] that divides the world into a devastated and inundated Global South and more protected (but still impacted) Global North; it is beyond that—much beyond that in fact—more terrifying, more broken, more monstrous than even the 20th century dystopian novels had the capacity to imagine. Those novels could not have foreseen climate breakdown, tens of millions on the move for food, water, and dignity, and the automated machines, virtual barriers, drones, and face-recognition cameras used to gatekeep away the displaced from refuge.

Human consciousness evolved to avoid the traumas associated with Nature; being eaten by a predator, finding food, seeking shelter. It may not have the same capacity to withstand the machine horrors, the uninhibited genocides and crimes against humanity, or the amplified propaganda and messaging systems implemented by some governments to maintain power and keep the reality of a forever-changed planet as removed and as remote as possible. We will all be living in an experiment: both with respect to the imminent breakdown of the climate system, but also with the technological and social response to it. There is simply no precedent for what we as a species, but also in our individual lives, are about to experience.

This ‘Century of Crisis’ and ‘Century of the Displaced’ represents more than a crisis of people movement. It is a crisis of our common humanity, and a crisis of democracy. How will this species elect to share the resources of this planet with one another? What are the institutions and values that we must build and hold in order to create a place in which all humans have basic dignity, the means to explore and exercise their freedom, and access to the shared bounty of the planet (or what is left of it)? How will we transition our extractive economies into an economic and political system that ensures balance and harmony with the planet and with each other? What are the choices we must make—not just as communities and nations, but also individually, as academics, professionals, lawyers, activists, and others—in order to avoid the flawed destiny of climate breakdown and to build a road to a better future?

These are questions that touch not just on politics and economics, but also on philosophy, spirituality, and notions of the ‘good life’. It has never been easier in human history to build a walled garden of pleasure, escape, and tedium, surrounded by crystal screens, the endless scrolling of apps, and empty communications with others equally as empty. But no matter how much this garden is exalted in the popular media or by the modern archons of control as ‘what we all should be doing with our lives,’ the bitter truth is this: the road to a shared global freedom—the road to global democracy, the road to a stable climate, the road to a dignified human future for both rich and poor, those seeking refuge and those providing it—will be built on sacrifice, hard work, and the constant presence of failure.

This is now the task at hand. This road that I speak of is a road that must be paved, and walked, in order for our descendants to even have a chance to live on a planet that is habitable, civilised, dignified, and just. It is a road that will take hundreds or even thousands of years to pave and to walk, requiring reformed and even new international institutions that can plan for multiple generations ahead, rectify the inequalities that are the roots of this crisis, provide for justice, and keep and maintain a fragile peace amongst a species that has never truly known what it means to live in peace in a global and unified way. 

These institutions will take a long time to create—longer than you or I have on this planet. Thus, we will have to start this journey though we will never live to see what awaits at the end of such a grand intergenerational project, or even if it will end at all. Who dares to dream a dream that has such uncertainty at its core?

But you and I, living and breathing at this moment, have been given a tremendous and unique honour: the honour of commencing this process, starting this journey, laying the groundwork for those who will stand on our shoulders and become future giants of sustainability, democracy, justice, and peace. We can begin this process today, to give others who we will never meet the opportunity to live in harmony with one another on an Earth that is at peace with itself. We will never see the end of the climate crisis. That glory will belong to others. But we have the honour of beginning the process of solving the problems we have caused or prolonged. It is an honour unique to all of human history.

My friend: I hope to see you, and to walk with you, on this path and on the journey ahead. It is a long walk, so we best get started. Let us walk for as long as we can.

Dave Inder Comar is the Executive Director of Just Atonement Inc. He is also the managing partner of Comar Mollé LLP, a corporate technology firm with offices in San Francisco and New York. Licensed to practice law before the California and New York bars, Mr. Comar has been involved in corporate technology, human rights, and international law for fifteen years. He is passionate about using the law to maintain and preserve global civilization. He holds a law degree from the New York University School of Law, a Master of Arts degree from Stanford University and Bachelor of Arts degrees from Stanford University. He is an advisor to Earth Refuge.


References:

[i] Will Steffen et al. ‘Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene’ (2018) 115(33) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 8252 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115> accessed 25 November 2020 (“even if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5 °C to 2.0 °C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a ‘Hothouse Earth’ pathway”).

[ii] J. Timmon Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, A Climate of Injustice (The MIT Press 2007) 83, 131.

[iii] Michelle Yonetani, ‘Disaster-related displacement in a changing climate’ Vol 65(1) – 2016 <https://public.wmo.int/en/resources/bulletin/disaster-related-displacement-changing-climate> accessed 22 November 2020; Melita H. Sunjic, ‘Top UNHCR official warns about displacement from climate change’ (UNHCR, December 9, 2018) <https://www.unhcr.org/493e9bd94.htm> accessed 25 November 2020; Baher Kamal, ‘Climate Migrants Might Reach One Billion by 2050’ (Inter Press Service, August 21, 2017) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/08/climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-by2050/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-by-2050> accessed 25 November 2020.

[iv] Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol (first published 1938, George Schwab tr, Greenwood Press 1996) 31; Leo Strauss, ‘Notes on The Concept of the Political,’ in The Concept of Political (J. Harvey Lomax tr, The University of Chicago Press 1996) 90 (noting that for Hobbes, “the securing of life is the ultimate basis of the state”).

[v] Stephen Humphreys, ‘Climate change and international human rights law’ in R.Rayfuse and S. Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar 2012) 56 (“In short, there are excellent reasons to suppose that climate change poses a near insurmountable challenge to the current human rights regime”);

[vi] Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement (The University of Chicago Press 2016) 142.

[vii] Helena Smith, ‘Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’ (The Guardian, 2 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees> accessed 25 November 2020.

[viii] Adam K. Raymond, ‘The Story Behind the Viral Photo of a Drowned Migrant Father and Toddler’ (New York Magazine, 26 June 2019)  <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/the-story-behind-the-viral-photo-of-drowned-migrants.html> accessed 25 November 2020.

[ix] Adam Serwer, ‘A Crime By Any Name’ (The Atlantic, 3 July 2019) <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/border-facilities/593239/> accessed 25 November 2020.

[x] Christina Jewett and Shefali Luthra, ‘Immigrant toddlers ordered to appear in court alone’ (The Texas Tribune, 27 June 2018) <https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/> accessed 25 November 2020; Andrew Buncombe, ‘Trump administration admits migrant children as young as 3 appearing in court alone for their own deportation proceedings’ (The Independent, 28 June 2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/child-immigrants-us-court-border-family-migrant-immigration-trump-latest-melania-a8422101.html> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xi] Elisa Epstein, ‘CIA Contractor Details Torture of 9/11 Suspects’ (Human Rights Watch, 27 January 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/27/cia-contractor-details-torture-9/11-suspects> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xii] Saleh v. Bush, 848 F. 3d 880 (9th Cir. 2017); ‘Iraq War illegal, says Annan’ (BBC News, 16 September 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xiii] Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (first published 2003, Kevin Attell tr, The University of Chicago Press 2005) 3-4; Elise Swain, ‘It’s still open: will the Guantanamo Bay Prison become a 2020 issue? (The Intercept, 3 March 2019) <https://theintercept.com/2019/03/03/guantanamo-bay-carol-rosenberg-intercepted/> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xiv] UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights: Climate change and poverty, Phillip Alston’ (17 July 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/41/39 <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/39> accessed 25 November 2020 [51].