Category: Think Pieces

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Five things I Learned From the International School of Climate Migration

11 October 2022 – by Alison Elizabeth Lee

I was very excited when the email arrived in my inbox last May informing me that I had been accepted to the first-ever International School on Climate Migration (ISCM), hosted by Earth Refuge and the Department of Development Studies at SOAS University of London. As a sociocultural anthropologist, I hoped to learn more about ways to investigate climate migration using ethnography in rural and peri-urban areas of Mexico. Although I had been studying migration from Central Mexico to the US for many years, changing environmental conditions and international reports about “climate refugees” piqued my curiosity about how environmental factors shaped migratory flows.

The ISCM brought together experts addressing climate migration from different angles, (especially in Africa, India, and Southeast Asia) and perspectives, such as those of community leaders, activists, peacekeepers, lawyers, development specialists, and academics. Stretched across multiple time zones and connected through Zoom, over the course of five weeks, they shared on-the-ground experiences working with climate migrants and diplomatic, legal, and community efforts to address climate migration. The experiences of those most vulnerable to changing environmental conditions, as well as the historical processes and structural factors that created their vulnerability, often took center stage in our discussions. The ISCM successfully brought to life the complexity of this issue and some of the ways people are imagining better futures. Here are my five takeaways from the ISCM.

1. It’s difficult to distinguish climate migrants from other people on the move

Which factors determine when people move, how they move, who they move with, and where they go? Since the 19th century, researchers have studied the many drivers of migration. The voluminous research on migration theory has mapped out how economic, social, cultural, and political factors shape mobility in different times and places. There is a consensus among 21st century researchers that migration will not be caused by environmental factors alone. Rather, climate and environmental change will act as “threat multipliers” that will exert further pressure on the economic, social, cultural, and political factors which have always been important in shaping mobility. Even in the case of abrupt, sudden changes (for example, flooding caused by stronger and more frequent hurricanes), previous circumstances and underlying conditions shape who can leave, where they can go, and which resources they have access to.

2. Some people are more impacted by climate change and mobility than others through ongoing legacies of colonialism

Some communities and social groups are already suffering, and some will suffer to an even greater degree, from more frequent heatwaves and drought, rising sea levels, and more frequent and intense storms and flooding. Women and girls, indigenous peoples, more economically vulnerable people, racialized communities, and migrants are more vulnerable to environmental change because of ongoing legacies of colonialism. Colonialism subjugated non-Europeans – dispossessing them of land and other material resources, as well as their autonomy and independence. These processes of dispossession continue in the present, both through ongoing, and often violent, appropriation of resources and the failure to recognize and respect the rights of marginalized groups. Furthermore, many so-called solutions to environmental and social change—designed without the input of indigenous groups and those who are economically vulnerable— exacerbate the existing challenges which communities are facing in trying to mitigate and adapt to changing conditions. It is paramount to account for the legacies of colonialism in our understanding of climate-induced displacement, as well as in the programs and policies now being developed and implemented to address it.

3. Where someone has a right, another has a duty: We need to build a legal toolkit that protects people displaced by climate change

Although the term “climate refugee” has gained currency in policy circles and popular usage, the reality is that refugee law—the 1951 Refugee Convention in particular—is not necessarily an adequate legal tool to protect people displaced by climate change. The Convention is best equipped to assist people fleeing persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. Moreover, the impacts of climate are extremely varied, therefore it will be difficult to arrive at a single definition of “climate migrant” that will protect people and not exclude others who may be equally deserving and in need of protection. An alternative is a human rights-based approach to disaster and climate related displacement. In other words, determining how environmental change violates human rights can become a pathway to holding states accountable to their citizens. This accountability would apply to different phases of displacement: in the period prior to displacement, including prevention and preparedness for disasters, during evacuation and displacement, and finally, in the creation of durable solutions. Therefore, legal solutions should be fine-tuned to local conditions to attend to the specific circumstances that different communities face.

4. The relationship between climate change and conflict needs to be contextualized to find locally sustainable and durable solutions

It is well-established that there are now more people displaced as a result of natural disasters than political conflict, and that these displacements are happening all over the world. At the same time, disasters and politics are more frequently acting together to create displacements. In fact, 95% of new displacements in 2020 occurred in countries that have high or very high levels of vulnerability to climate change. Despite these general macro-scale correlations, however, establishing causation is more difficult. Experts clearly outlined how important it is to carefully contextualize people’s experiences with climate change impacts and conflict. Climate change may introduce new threats to livelihoods and/or exacerbate ongoing economic, social, and political problems that may lead to displacement.  If they are to be effective, responses to conflict must be grounded in the specific local situations. Universal ideas—including that climate migration will result from greater and more violent competition for resources, for example—are damaging because they can result in bad policies. In another example, we learned that resettling populations to reduce the risk of hazards can be a violent process, one that silences and erases community histories. Such a process may generate more conflict instead of reducing it. The knowledge(s) and experiences of the people at the heart of conflict must be privileged in the process of creating durable solutions. In the words of one expert: “Solutions must be owned by the people who will live with them.”

5. How mobility is framed matters in science and policy

Researchers have pointed out that the idea of “climate refugees” is problematic because it stokes fears that people displaced by climate change will threaten national security of the countries of the Global North, place burdens on social welfare programs, and negatively affect the cultures and traditions of destination countries. These fears have been exacerbated by populist politicians who capitalize on the othering of migrants, convincing their constituents of the need to increase border control and further restrictions of legal paths to migration. In response to this, the idea that mobility is an adaptation to climate change has gained acceptance among academics and policy makers. This puts a positive spin on migration and highlights how migrants have agency and make appropriate decisions for themselves and their households in the face of changing environmental circumstances. However, this framing can also be problematic because migration may not always be adaptive. Whether or not migration will increase individuals’ and households’ wellbeing will likely be related to whether they had time to plan prior to migrating, as well as the conditions at the destination to support migrants once they arrive. What’s more, even if material wellbeing is achieved through migration, resettling can nevertheless lead to a sense of loss, especially with respect to cultural heritage, identity, and territory (see point 4).  Finally, migration as adaptation can let powerful actors—such as those who created the unlivable conditions which forced communities to migrate in the first place—off the hook, shifting the focus onto migrants and away from the root causes of displacement.

Resist grand narratives, focus on specifics

My main takeaway from the ISCM was to resist the grand narratives about climate migration. Our understandings of the multiple drivers of different migratory flows must be contextualized in specific histories, environmental contexts, ongoing processes of dispossession, and migrants’ agency and possibilities in sending, transit, and destination countries. Prevention, preparedness, response, and the construction of durable solutions will not be successful without meaningful collaboration with the people affected by climate-induced displacement. Their voices, needs, desires, and experiences must be at the center of efforts which respond to climate migration in specific places.

Found this article interesting? You can learn more about the International School of Climate Migration here.

Alison Elizabeth Lee is a sociocultural anthropologist at the Universidad de las Américas Puebla. Her research focuses on international migration, gender, borders, and political economy.

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A Case for Prioritizing Empathy in Climate Change Policy

person walking on dry soil during daytime

24 July 2022 – Sara Sam-Njogu

Over the past few decades, it appears that meaningful international action towards mitigating climate change has been hard to come by. Even less ground has been covered when addressing the increasingly prevalent issues around climate migration. If no action is taken, the World Bank estimates that more than 143 million people will be displaced by 2050 – largely impacting the most marginalized and disadvantaged global communities.[1]

Climate change is defined as a “wicked problem” – so vast and complex that it seems impossible to resolve due to the multiple interdependent factors at play.[2] However, one simple overarching principle is necessary if we, as an interdependent world, are to bring about justice for those affected and displaced by climate change: empathy.

Why Should Policymakers Apply Empathy?

Applying empathy to climate change policy is a fundamental starting place [3], especially if world leaders hope to move beyond the political tug-of-war to establish long-term climate justice. Without it, they are likely to develop approaches that only benefit countries in the Global North in the short-term.[4]

There is a surprisingly simple theoretical concept that could be used by world leaders to apply empathy in their decisions on climate change policy. This concept is so intuitive that my daughters use it without any prompts. When they pull the last coveted cookie from the jar, they instinctively understand the fairness in one of them cutting the cookie while the other chooses which half to take. When she who holds the knife doesn’t know which half she will get, she is incentivized to make the split as even as possible. Cut the left side larger, and she is sure to be stuck with the smaller right side when her sister gets the first pick.

This basic concept has been the subject of the late 20th century political philosopher John Rawls, who defines it as the “original position”[5]. Rawls believed that when dealing with a specific issue, the decision maker is behind a “veil of ignorance”, because when determining the most effective path forward they are not sure which end of the policy they will ultimately be on, nor the timeframe over which the issue may occur. Cut the cookie unequally, and they could be left with  the smaller half once the veil is lifted and their position is revealed.

When it comes to climate change in particular, the veil becomes so opaque that it even obscures important external factors. This is especially true when considering the extent to which various geographical regions will be affected by climate change, despite recent advancements in scientific models which can predict these factors[6]. So how might the effects of climate change develop over time?

Looking Beyond the Veil

With these unknown issues at play, the application of Rawls’ thought experiment becomes somewhat more clear. Climate policy makers represent different countries from around the world, with some of those countries being destinations for migrants, while others are the heavily affected locations those migrants must leave behind. As they come together, these policy makers  are faced with a question they have never comprehensively addressed: under what circumstances should migrants whose own home countries have been made unlivable as a result of rising sea levels, unbearable temperatures, or drought be allowed entry into lesser-affected countries?

Immigration is a heated political topic for many countries in the Global North, including the United States [7], with policymakers facing intense scrutiny from all sides. In order to apply Rawl’s original position framework, the policymaker has to decide on an appropriate policy without truly knowing which position they will occupy – either at present or in the future. While it might seem politically desirable for the receiving country to limit climate-induced migration, the decision maker might find that once the veil is lifted, they may also be in the same position as the migrant at some point in time. Placing oneself on both sides of the situation, especially before adopting any appropriate policies, is crucial to achieving a just result.

Further complicating this dilemma are the inherent quirks within the human response of empathy. For one, humans have a tendency to worry more about today than tomorrow, even though our children will live in the tomorrow which we shape.[8] Moreover, we paradoxically feel more moved to help a single person in need, but when large groups of people are in danger, our empathy and compassion can “collapse”.[9] Ultimately, this could mean that climate change decision makers are working against their own natural impulses. They are tasked with establishing policy to protect populations in the long-term, which in the Global North can be perceived as protecting large, faceless groups of people from other parts of the world.

However, studies have shown some success in overcoming this empathy gap, mainly by viewing climate change through a political lens, as opposed to a purely scientific one.[10] This feels unsatisfying, because many believe the biggest barrier to meaningful progress is precisely a political one.[11] It is far from clear how to overcome this political will issue but the answer lies at the heart of pushing toward empathetic policy.

Undoubtedly, world leaders will always prioritize the countries they represent in these policy decisions, but all of humanity would be better served if these leaders sought out more empathy-based solutions. Although it is mostly those in the Global North who occupy habitable environments today, if the veil right in front of them is lifted, they may find that it is themselves who also need to seek a new home tomorrow.

Found this article interesting? Make sure to listen to our interview with Queer Black Feminist Alicia Wallace on the Intersectionality of Climate Change.

Sara Sam-Njogu is a second year law student at Western New England University School of Law. She is a clinician in the International Human Rights Clinic where she studies climate change, climate migration, and how corporations interact with these important issues. Prior to law school, Sara worked in sales and marketing strategy for consumer goods manufacturers. She lives in Longmeadow, MA with her husband and two daughters.

References

[1] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell—preparing-for-internal-climate-migration. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[2] https://thewire.in/environment/climate-change-wicked-problem. Retrieved 10 July 2022.

[3] https://blog.oup.com/2021/07/why-climate-change-education-needs-more-empathy/. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[4] https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/10/06/how-deep-is-north-south-divide-on-climate-negotiations-pub-85493. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[5] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John Rawls, 4.6, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#OriPos; Davies, Ben. “John Rawls and the ‘Veil of Ignorance.’” In INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS: AN OPEN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE, 92–97. Golden West College, Huntington Beach, CA: NGE Far Press, 2019, https://open.library.okstate.edu/introphilosophy/chapter/john-rawls-and-the-veil-of-ignorance/. Retrieved 10 July 2022.

[6] https://aambpublicoceanservice.blob.core.windows.net/oceanserviceprod/education/pd/climate/factsheets/howreliable.pdf. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[7] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/22/caring-about-tomorrow/. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[9] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/indonesia-tsunami-compassion-collapse/572431/. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[10] https://www.elevatescientific.com/time-to-move-on-from-the-information-deficit-model/. Retrieved 12 April 2022.

[11] https://time.com/6165094/ipcc-climate-action-political-will/. Retrieved 10 July 2022.

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Loss and Damage Finance is Not About Charity

8 December 2021 – by Ole Ter Wey

On the penultimate day of COP26, a representative from the Climate Action Network presented Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon with an award called ‘Ray of the Day’. This symbolized recognition for a long overdue action: during the conference, Scotland became the first country in the world to contribute to a Loss & Damage fund, to help countries in the Global South respond to damage caused by climate change. Initially limited to one million pounds, shortly before the award was presented, First Minister Sturgeon even doubled the amount. A great act that deserved the rousing applause in the room as well as the award. Right?

What Constitutes a ‘Loss’ or ‘Damage’?

The term ‘Loss & Damage’ refers to destruction which has already occurred that can be attributed to climate change, despite mitigation and adaptation efforts. ‘Losses’ are permanent and cannot be recovered; loss of human life, extinction of biological species or destruction of cultural assets or culturally important places are among them. ‘Damages’ however, are reversible, at least in theory; examples might include damaged infrastructure or monetary losses from a collapse in the economy.

The History of Loss and Damage

Loss & Damage first came up in international policy in 1991, when the Alliance of Small Island States promoted climate insurance in the drafting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which can be understood as the most important international agreement aiming to reduce anthropogenic harm to our climate system. Though the term ‘insurance’ did in fact make it into the UNFCCC document as an option requiring consideration , it took more than two decades for a Loss & Damage mechanism to actually be created.

Following protracted, acrimonious negotiations, the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) was finally drafted in 2013. Its main task is to promote “implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change…in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner.”[i] In reality however, the means of WIM are limited to research and dialogue, not implementation at all. And whilst research and the initiation of conversations surrounding climate-induced loss and damage are two urgently needed components in the response to climate change, WIM makes no direct provisions for liability or compensation for loss and damage. Therefore, it must be stated that WIM is by far not as meaningful as the originally proposed climate insurance mechanism.

The case is similar for the so-called Santiago Network, which was established as part of the WIM in 2020. It is focused on ‘the implementation of relevant approaches [for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage] at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”[ii]. Though for too long the lack of implementation of any compensation or liability mechanisms has hindered global progress in this sphere, in a positive move, COP26 discussions have now provided steps towards the operationalization of the Santiago Network.

COP26

At COP26 itself, the words of sympathy were consistently strong, with everyone claiming that they really do want to help. However, it seems that nobody wants to pay for it. Not only is this completely unacceptable, but it’s also tragically ironic. The Global North, with their reticence to contribute financially, is responsible for an unbelievable 92% of climate change[iii], and has made gigantic economic profits through some of the most environmentally damaging activities. To the Global South, on the other hand, devastating damage has been done, with almost no recompense, financial or otherwise. People, cultures, and animal species are dying, local economies are collapsing, and people are forced to flee their homes. Loss & Damage is not about charity, but rather about reparation payments. The money that the affected countries and their populations require should be seen as a duty; something that is owed to them as opposed to a goodwill gesture.

At a side event at the conference, an NGO representative shared his difficult mission back home in Norway. The Norwegian government appears to be of the belief that by agreeing to contribute to what are known as adaptation payments of 100 billion USD per year, they will  no longer be required to talk about Loss & Damage, being under the impression that the two payments basically constitute the same thing. The reality couldn’t be further from the truth, though the distinction is actually quite simple.

Adaptation aims to increase resilience in affected areas in a way that makes it possible to live with the consequences of climate change. Examples might include new crop varieties that can cope with changes in precipitation, or the construction of sea walls to protect against rising sea levels. Loss and damage payments, on the other hand, are due when such adaptation measures have failed. For example, if agriculture becomes completely impossible because of droughts, or people are forced to leave their homes and possessions behind because of flooding. Hence, the adaptation fund (which in itself is far from being provided fully) cannot be used as an excuse for not providing money for the Loss & Damage fund.

Author’s Note

It is noted that Scotland’s contribution to the climate fund is a step forward, albeit only a baby step. But at least a start has been made. However, I find it more than questionable that Scotland is being applauded, and its contribution being positioned as a great act of philanthropy. In reality it is only a partial fulfilment of the state’s international duty, and in the grand scheme of things, I believe it constitutes relatively very minor progress towards what is right, just and long overdue. In contrast, there isn’t enough applause for the young people who are fighting tirelessly for climate justice and who were the ones able to persuade Scotland’s First Minister Sturgeon to at least take this first step. I do trust that they will continue their fight and this step will soon be followed by many others.

Ole ter Wey is currently studying International Law and Human Rights at the UN-mandated University for Peace in San José, Costa Rica. He previously lived with a local community in Kiribati for over a year. There, he experienced first hand the consequences of climate change endangering the existence of an entire state. It was then that he began thinking about how to address forced migration and dedicated his Liberal Arts Bachelor to the topics of migration and integration.

This article was originally published in the Earth Refuge Archive as part of our collaboration with Human Rights Pulse on the COP26 Summit.

References

[i] United Nations (2013): FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, paragraph 5. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#page=6

[ii] UNFCCC (2019): Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts and its 2019 review, paragraph 43. https://unfccc.int/documents/209506

[iii] Hickel, Jason (2020): Quantifying national responsibility for climate breakdown: an equality-based attribution approach for carbon dioxide emissions in excess of the planetary boundary, page e399. In: The Lancet Planetary Health, Volume 4, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages e399-e404. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(20)30196-0

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Could Climate Change Be a Ground for Invoking the Use of Force?

green trees on island during daytime

8 November 2021 – by Ole ter Wey

“It’s an act of sabotage on our future, a reckless and totally irresponsible act.”[i]

Such was the reaction of climate official Ian Fry, from the tiny South Pacific Island nation of Tuvalu, to Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and represents the first instrument in international law to contain legally binding greenhouse gas limitation and reduction commitments for industrialized countries. As such, Canada’s withdrawal from this legal milestone not only directly worsens the situation of threatened states such as Tuvalu through its apparently intended increase in greenhouse gas emissions, but also sends an ominous signal to the rest of the world, potentially opening the door for other states to follow suit.

Tuvalu is one of the countries suffering the most from the consequences of climate change. Rising sea levels are causing the erosion of ever larger coastal areas of the island nation’s low-lying atolls (coral reefs).Groundwater is becoming saline, threatening both food crops and drinking water supplies, and the increasing number of storms is destroying vital infrastructure in the country. Thus, Fry’s statement can be understood as an example of a global trend: the consequences of climate change are increasingly being recognized as a massive threat to peace for more and more states.

Examples of possible sources of conflict arising from climate change include the struggle for resources[ii], food scarcity[iii], and forced migration, with estimates for the year 2050 ranging from 200 million[iv] to 1 billion[v] climate refugees. The view that not only the consequences, but also the underlying causes of climate change, can be perceived as a threat to peace in their own right, seems set to gain acceptance.[vi] And these very causes of climate change can, in turn, often be clearly attributed to the actions of certain states.

Based on this extremely limited introduction, it becomes important to consider the question of whether states whose citizens, economies, and cultures suffer particularly severely from the consequences of man-made climate change may, under certain conditions, resort to the use of force against the polluter states.

In what situations might the use of force in the name of climate change be legal?

There are two possible scenarios under which the use of force may be legal: in the name of self-defense, or with the permission of the UN Security Council.

Regarding self-defense, Article 51 of the UN Charter (1945) states an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against [themselves or another] Member of the United Nations”. If this is interpreted literally, the legality of the use of force against “climate rogue states”[vii] can already be ruled out. Without wanting to belittle the threat of heavy Green House Gas (GHG)-emissions, this is definitely a different kind of threat than ‘an armed attack’.

However, if one takes the commonly accepted requirements of the so-called ‘Caroline Test’, a closer look is worthwhile. The Caroline Test lists a number of criteria that must be met for the right to practice self-defense. In the original formulation of this test (Webster, 1841) it says that, “a use of force can [only] be admissible if there is ‘a necessity of self-defence, instant, over-whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. Moreover, ‘the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it’.”[viii] In essence, this test argues that the two key requirements to justify the use of force in self-defence are ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’. While ‘proportionality’ determines the intensity of force that may be used, the requirement for ‘necessity’ determines whether a resort to the use of force is permissible at all. Thus, the necessity criterion is more interesting for us at this point.

Especially given the Test’s requirement for a threat to be ‘instant [and] over-whelming’, it would seem, given that GHG emissions don’t instantly affect populations, that the necessity criterion cannot be fulfilled. The reality is that many of the harmful effects of climate change take years or decades to come to light, and the delayed effects of emitted GHGs make it extremely difficult to attribute a specific consequence of climate change to a specific state. Thus, at least in the current state of climate change, under this framework it would be argued that states do have the time and therefore possibility to choose other means than force, which in turn must always be a last resort[ix]. In summary, then, “[u]nless the global climate was at a tipping point, and the attacking state or coalition knew it, the imminence of the threat implied by necessity would be absent.”[x]

Instead, the justification for a military strike against GHG-emitting facilities through anticipatory self-defense seems more realistic. This is because such a military strike would involve the pre-emptive thwarting of probable harm emanating from a state which is either unwilling or unable to stop this harm from happening, just as the theory of anticipatory self-defense states. However, the application of this particular variety of self-defense is highly controversial. Many scholars believe “that the pre-emptive use of force against emerging threat(s) is unauthorised under existing legal framework.”[xi]

As such, the use of force against climate rogue states cannot be justified on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter as acts of self-defense, at least for the time being. The other alternative for nations to legitimize a resort to use of force would be by being granted permission from the UN Security Council (UNSC). As a first step in this respect “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”[xii] This type of  determination of threats to global peace is usually expressed in a UNSC resolution. Such resolutions not only officially determine that the situation in question is a legitimate threat to the peace, but also provide recommendations or decisions regarding “what measures shall be taken […] to maintain or restore international peace and security”.[xiii] Article 41 of the UN Charter lists a number of peaceful means by which the identified threat to peace shall be overcome. However, if these peaceful means were deemed by the UNSC to either have failed or to be inadequate, the resort to the use of force would be possible[xiv].

Because such a UNSC resolution does not exist as of today[xv], it would be tempting to dismiss this approach as irrelevant. However, this would be too simplistic. In general, the UNSC has an obligation to determine threats to peace[xvi]. A glance at the past shows that this can also involve categories of illicit conduct other than classic, direct violations of the sovereignty of states. In 1992, for example, the UNSC confirmed that “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”[xvii] Thus, it is by no means impossible that calls for climate change to be classified as a threat to peace[xviii] will be heard. And indeed, there have been repeated shifts in this direction in the recent past.

The UNSC, for example, “has held four open debates specifically on climate security risks”[xix] already. At the most recent of these open debates, climate change was unanimously referred to as a ‘threat multiplier’[xx], but no agreement could be reached on a classification as a threat to peace itself. Since two or three of the five permanent members with veto power in the UNSC, China and Russia, and in recent years also Trump’s USA, have taken the politically motivated stance that “[i]n fact, qualifying climate change as a threat to the peace was, in their view, neither ‘right’ nor beneficial”[xxi], this classification is not to be expected in the near future.

How might this change in the future?

Nevertheless, should climate change be classified as a threat to peace at some point, the whole situation could possibly change very quickly. The effectiveness of peaceful means can already be doubted from today’s point of view, since neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Paris Agreement can be considered to have effectively halted climate change and GHG emissions[xxii]. Were a Security Council resolution to be passed, it could open the door for the use of force against climate rogue states. For very practical reasons, however, it must be asked at this point whether this would actually be effective, either in combating climate change, or in furthering and protecting human rights at all. If a tiny state like the aforementioned Tuvalu suddenly had the theoretical right to take military action against a large country like Canada, it would still lack the means to do so. Thus, the jus ad bellum wartime principle of ‘probability of success’, in contrast to the other principles[xxiii], could not be fulfilled under any circumstances[xxiv]. The principle of ‘probability of success’ states that war can only be justified if such violence has a real chance of changing the causal grievance in the long run. If Tuvalu is now apparently justified in using force against Canada due to changed conditions, there is still the question of how it should win this war. Tuvalu does not have an army, and if one were to be created, it would almost certainly not be able to take on the Canadian army. A tiny country like Tuvalu trying to take military action against a superpower like Canada is likely to cause harm and loss of life, but has very little chance of bringing about change.

From this point of view, the proportionality of military action is also highly questionable. Because the principle of proportionality prohibits any “attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”[xxv] The invoking of the right to collective self-defense could provide a remedy[xxvi]. Going beyond this, the question may even arise, “[i]f a state pursues or allows very damaging activities that harm its own population or the international community as a whole through climate change, would it be legal to use force to stop those activities in the name of humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect [R2P]?”[xxvii]. However, this would only be possible if the UNSC classified the consequences of climate change as a mass atrocity crime[xxviii]. Additionally, the status of R2P is also controversial[xxix].

Conclusion

The scope of this paper could only provide a very rough framework. Nevertheless, it was possible to show why there is currently no legal resort to the use of force against climate rogue states and under what circumstances this assessment could change in the future. In addition to these findings themselves, however, it is momentous that such deliberations are taking place at all. Of course, no one wants to see countries become violent in the name of climate change, nor to see the devastation of communities, cultures and infrastructure that comes with war and violence. That the use of force is even being discussed is testament to the fact that there is still no actual, reliable way of holding states accountable for their international climate responsibilities. Countries and ecosystems around the world are at a breaking point, and in the not-too-distant future, the progress of climate change could lead to an even more frightening scenario.

Given that climate change is already triggering violence today, as destroyed homes or impeded access to drinking water might cause people in hardship to resort to violence in order to ensure their survival. If those states, whose citizens are worst affected, in their desperation see no other way out than using force against climate rogue states to stop them from causing further harm, we could see a rapid downturn into a new spiral of violence. Finding a way of holding states accountable for their international climate responsibilities is urgently needed, because otherwise violence will not only increase as a consequence of climate change impacts, but seems likely to also increase as an attempt to control the reckless actions of other states.

However, as explained in detail above, the use of force would not even come close to solving the problems caused by climate change. It must therefore be a top priority that international cooperation eventually lives up to its name and that a viable solution for the well-being of all in the face of the changing climate is found and implemented. We need to finally come together as an international community in holding nation states accountable – because only in this way can we ensure that this paper remains what it is: the description of an intellectual, purely theoretical thought experiment.

Ole ter Wey is currently studying International Law and Human Rights at the UN-mandated University for Peace in San José, Costa Rica. He previously lived with a local community in Kiribati for over a year. There, he experienced first hand the consequences of climate change endangering the existence of an entire state. It was then that he began thinking about how to address forced migration and dedicated his Liberal Arts Bachelor to the topics of migration and integration.

References

[i]Carrington, Damian (2011): Canada condemned at home and abroad for pulling out of Kyoto treaty. London: The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-condemned-kyoto-climate-treaty

[ii]Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2012): Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49(1), pp. 3-9. DOI: 10.1177/0022343311431288.

[iii]Ibid.

[iv]Brown, Oli (2008): Migration and Climate Change, p. 11. In: IOM Migration Research Series, Vol. 31. https://www.ipcc.ch/apps/njlite/srex/njlite_download.php?id=5866

[v]Bassetti, Francesco (2019): Environmental Migrants: Up to 1 Billion by 2050. https://www.climateforesight.eu/migrations-inequalities/environmental-migrants-up-to-1-billion-by-2050/

[vi]e.g., Steinbruner, John D. (2013): Climate and Social Stress – Implications for Security Analysis, p. 37. Washington: The National Academies Press.

[vii]Martin, Craig (2020): Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Change Crisis and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, p. 334. In: Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 45(S). DOI: 10.7916/cjel.v45iS.5786.

[viii]Corten, Olivier (2017): Necessity, p. 862. In: Marc Weller, The Oxford Handbook of The Use of Force in International Law, pp. 861-878. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[ix]UNOCHA (2012): Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Emergency Operations: What is Last Resort?. http://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Last%20Resort%20Pamphlet%20-%20FINAL%20April%202012_5.3.pdf

[x]Kinsella, David (2013): The Use of Force to Achieve Climate Change Goals, p. 18. http://web.pdx.edu/~kinsella/papers/isa13.pdf

[xi]Mirza, Muhammad Nasrullah (2019): Use of Force in Self-Defence for Global Peace: A Conceptual Framework, p. 21. In: Strategic Studies, Vol. 39(3), pp. 1-21. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48544307

[xii] UN Charter (1945): United Nations Charter (full text), Art. 39. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

[xiii]Ibid.

[xiv]Art. 41 of the UN Charter

[xv]Bourghelle, Valentine (2019): Climate change in the Security Council: On the road to qualifying climate change as ‘threat multiplier’. In: Völkerrechtsblog, 9 December 2019. DOI: 10.17176/20191209-180639-0.

[xvi]Dipalo, Sabina (2018): The Security Council’s Non-Determination of a Threat to the Peace as a Breach of International Law, p. 61. In: Pécs Journal of International and European Law. 2018/01, pp. 61-81. http://ceere.eu/pjiel/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/63pjielPJIEL1801.pdf

[xvii]UNSC (1992): Note by the President of the Security Council: S/23500, p. 3. https://undocs.org/S/23500

[xviii]e.g., Scott, Shirley V. (2008): Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is It Time for the Security Council to Legislate?. In: Melbourne Journal of International Law. Vol. 9(2), pp. 495-515. https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/1683221/Scott.pdf

[xix]Toufanian, Melissa Turley (2020): Climate Change at the UN Security Council: Seeking Peace in a Warming World. https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/climate-change-a-un-security-council-seeking-peace-warming-world/

[xx]UNSC (2019): S/PV.8451. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8451

[xxi]Bourghelle, Valentine (2019): Climate change in the Security Council: On the road to qualifying climate change as ‘threat multiplier’. In: Völkerrechtsblog, 9 December 2019. DOI: 10.17176/20191209-180639-0.

[xxii]As the most prominent examples, neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Paris Agreement could significantly change the progress of climate change.

[xxiii]Proper authority, just cause, right intention, proportionality, last resort.

[xxiv]Stanford Encyclopedia (2016): War, 2.5. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/

[xxv]ICRC (1977): Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Art. 51(5b). https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750065

[xxvi]Kunz, Josef L. (1947): Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, p. 872. In: The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 41(4), pp. 872-879. https://doi.org/10.2307/2193095

[xxvii]Gray, Christine (2012): Climate Change and the Law on the Use of Force, p. 238. In: Rosemary Rayfuse, International Law in the Era of Climate Change, pp. 219-241. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

[xxviii]Nollkaemper, André (2017): Failures to Protect in International Law. In: Marc Weller, The Oxford Handbook of The Use of Force in International Law, pp. 437-461. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[xxix]Glover, Nicholas (2011): A critique of the theory and practice of R2P.

https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/14315
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The Holes in Front of Homes: Wasting Resources on Lawns

topview of grass lawn

8 November 2021 – by Ben Chappelow

The suburban lawn, also known as turf grass, exists as a space of fruitless continuity. In the United States it is the largest crop by acreage, tripling corn, yet it produces no nutritional or agricultural value. Americans use nine billion gallons of water per day to maintain their lawns, but research has found as much as 50% of that water goes to waste due to inefficient irrigation methods.[i] Residents destroy between 5,000 and 385,000 acres of natural habitats per day using harmful chemicals, clearing away biodiverse land vital for pollinators in the process.[ii]

To make matters worse, lawn equipment also makes up 4% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,[iii] outstripping emissions from livestock and manure.[iv] Though the UK any other suburban-abundant nations descended from Great Britain (e.g., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) may not hold the lawn to such heights as the United States, they too share similar residential traditions. As droughts, wildfires, and colony collapse loom, why are so many people holding on to something that sucks up so much water, time, energy, and wildlife while producing so little?

Its Origins

The lawn acts as a symbol of middle-class ideals, of curb appeal and leisure time. It demonstrates civilization ‘triumphing’ over wild land by ritually manicuring it into uniformity, and has become a hallmark of residential life across much of the Global North. However, turf grass isn’t a part of North America’s natural prairies, meadows, or pastures. Poa pratensis, better known as Kentucky bluegrass, and its related species, make up almost every suburban lawn, but are native only to Europe and Asia – not to areas like Kentucky at all.

What we know as lawns today emerged in 16th century France, where aristocratic landowners had slaves and peasantry cultivate empty spaces of neatly manicured grasses.[v] Being able to afford to keep empty space that produced no food was a sign of vast wealth. The lawn grew in popularity within Great Britain, where Enclosure laws ended land rights for commoners and put an end to commonly owned land. These laws prevented individuals farming on the formerly shared land, pushed them into wage labor for landowners, who could deem that the land would be cultivated for strictly aesthetic purposes. Once the British empire established colonies in North America, colonists sought to mimic these displays of elite wealth. Indigenous communities—who had cultivated and maintained the landscape through controlled burning and establishing interdependent relationships with the wildlife—were either killed or driven off the perennial prairie grasses, where colonists would replace native Buffalo with European cattle.

However, these cattle, woefully maladapted for their new North American habitat and couldn’t get enough nutrients from the North American terrain. And so, the British brought their own grasses from Europe, which pushed out native plants and animals that could not subsist with the Kentucky bluegrass. As they shaped the North American land to look like a European countryside, ecological colonization became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

By the late 19th century, with the invention of the push lawnmower, the sprinkler, and the birth of the suburbs, the lawn began to shift from a symbol of wealth and leisure to one of conformity. Lawns were no longer something only the ultra-elite could have. After World War II, middle-class people afford to cultivate their own little pieces of luxury. With soldiers returning home, warfare chemicals becoming reinvented as pesticides and artificial fertilizers, and rapid suburban development, having a strip of trimmed grass in front of your house became the staple of a domestic life.

A significant part of your property value is its curb appeal (how attractive your house looks when viewed from the street). But because the front lawn connects to the street, it isn’t a space cultivated for use. You might imagine the front lawn as a space for children to play, but with cars speeding down your street, dogs defecating in your grass, and the lack of privacy, the backyard is generally where domestic life (playing, gardening, grilling, swimming) resides, and the front lawn serves as a symbolic space of uniformity with the neighborhood. So roughly half of the lawn space you own serves no physical purpose. And while it may be your property, depending on where you live, the front lawn’s aesthetic does not belong to you. Instead, it must conform to outdated legislation based on guidelines set by tradition, no matter how inefficient or harmful those guidelines may be.

Its Disutility

The Kentucky bluegrass can only naturally thrive in climates like those of Northern Europe, which means residents who live anywhere other than New England and some parts of Canada need to constantly tend to their Kentucky bluegrass to keep it alive. The same goes for other common lawn grasses such as scutch grass (native to Africa) and Zoysia grass (native to Asia and Australia, typically hardier than the other two and often used for golf courses). As a result, most residential areas are ripping out native plant species, inserting nonnative grass species in an incompatible climate, and constantly tending to them so they don’t die. These grasses typically require more water than what natural rainfall provides. They require fertilizers to pump more nutrients into a soil in which it has not evolved to grow. And even if you do those two steps right, they require constant maintenance in order to fit an aesthetic ideal.

However, even if one does want to move towards a more natural and less wasteful gardening approach, letting your lawn die and decreasing curb appeal does come with obstacles. If your property is governed by a Homeowners Association, they can fine you for not maintaining your lawn.[vi] One common practice is for the HOA to hire a landscaping crew to renovate your lawn, and make you pay the bill. In certain jurisdictions, you can even be arrested for not mowing your lawn.[vii] For those who are old or physically unable to tend to their lawn, there is no exception.

Aside from the harms inflicted on biodiversity and water security, there are also practical, financial, and health and safety challenges related to lawns. Many choose, or are forced, to hire professionals to handle lawncare, and the average American homeowner spends between $700 and $2,600 per year.[viii] In countries like Australia and Canada where the average suburban lawn is much smaller in surface area, costs are expected to be less. It would be cheaper to tend to your lawn yourself (Americans on average spend $1080 on lawn equipment),[ix] but this increases the likelihood of physical injuries. In 2016, more than 86,000 American adults and 4,500 children went to the emergency room for lawnmower-related injuries.[x] Those whose jobs involve lawn maintenance also face considerable danger. In 2019, 229 ground maintenance workers died from workplace-related accidents, more deaths that year than firefighters and law enforcement combined.[xi]

As freshwater becomes increasingly scarce, using nine billion gallons of water a day to maintain golf courses, roadside greenways, and lawns is a dire misplacement of resources. Despite this seemingly limitless enthusiasm for the garden lawn, in the drier parts of the U.S. and Australia,  we are already seeing restrictions and mandates on how households use limited supplies of water. In Australia’s New South Wales, from December 2019 to February 2020 the government placed restrictions on the use of sprinklers and hoses for watering lawns and washing cars.[xii]

The world’s freshwater security is becoming increasingly jeopardized, and if water supplies continue to fall in the near future, governments will be forced to further restrict outdoor water use. In states like Nevada, lawmakers are banning the watering of grassy areas that do not serve a function, mainly at office parks, in street medians, and at entrances to housing developments. This trend might continue for other states reliant on the Colorado River, which is continuing to dry up.[xiii]

So, with lawns causing all these problems, what are some alternatives?

What else can we do with our property?

Turning away from the traditional lawn may feel uncomfortable. As humans, we have evolved towards conformity. We want to feel a sense of belonging to a tribe. Even without local law enforcement or HOAs forcing you to keep a turf grass lawn, some people naturally want to keep up their home’s appearance. We want to feel like a part of our neighborhood. We want to be aesthetically united with our neighbors.

According to biologist and entomology professor Douglas W. Tallamy, getting rid of the lawn doesn’t mean losing a sense of community. As he states in his book Nature’s Best Hope, you can imagine your property “as one small piece of a giant puzzle, which, when assembled, has the potential to form a beautiful ecological picture.”[xiv] He proposes we exchange the traditional residential lawn with native plants that can support local species. Based on one’s given location, replacing 70% of one’s property with native plant species can provide wonderful benefits to local birds, amphibians, reptiles, and invertebrates.[xv] While invasive does not always mean harmful, filling your lawn with plants that require less water and offer better support to local pollinators is one step towards building a more beneficial landscape.

Another alternative is gardening. Fruit and vegetable gardens, per square foot, require 75% less water on average.[xvi] Even in places like California where water is scarce, gardening under proper methods is more than feasible.[xvii] If you take pleasure in the constant maintenance a yard requires, keeping and maintaining a garden provides a similar outdoor routine that needs less carbon-emitting lawn equipment and produces (sometimes literal) fruit for your labor. We can learn from Cuba’s organoponicos (urban farms).[xviii] With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 90s and an 80% reduction in the country’s trade, Cuba faced a dire hunger crisis. It had to produce twice as much food with less than half of its usual chemical inputs.

With fewer resources, Cuba converted much of its residential land for gardens. Residents utilized more integrated pest management, applied soil and composting conservation methods, and rotated crops. By 2002, Cuba produced 3.2 million tons of organic food from organoponicos, staving off impending hunger crises. Such a radical change to a more nurturing suburban landscape could help remedy food deserts in urban and rural areas. At the very least, converting empty lawn space to gardens would redirect limited resources towards more beneficial investments while keeping properties lush and green.

As individuals, taking small steps is the key to creating a more beneficial landscape. One such step would be working within your local community—with neighborhood committees and HOAs—to make sure property owners have a greater freedom in their choices, and allow homeowners to establish more beneficial spaces without punishing them for going against uniformity. If you’re too busy to garden, replacing yard décor with native vegetation provides benefits to wildlife without all the upkeep. Inform your neighbors about the problems with turf grass lawns, and of the alternatives available. The pride many people take in their lawns isn’t rooted in the lawn itself, but the act of maintaining and cultivating an aesthetic space. If we get rid of the turf grass lawn, we can hold on to the culture of lawncare while changing residential spaces to actually provide utility. And with impeding droughts on the horizon, the time redirect water towards necessary channels is growing more urgent.[xix]  

Benjamin Chappelow is a writer and narrative designer in the Appalachian mountains, United States.

As an immigration researcher and former Narrative Writer for the Climate Resilience Toolkit, he is focused on how the stories we tell dictate our behavior in an ecological crisis. 

References

[i] Environmental Protection Agency. (2013). Outdoor Water Use in the United States. EPA. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/www3/watersense/pubs/outdoor.html.

[ii] National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2005). More Lawns than Irrigated Corn. NASA. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/Lawn/lawn2.php.

[iii] Banks, J. L. (2015). (tech.). National Emissions from Lawn and Garden Equipment. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-09/documents/banks.pdf.

[iv] Center for Sustainable Systems, University of Michigan. (2021). Carbon Footprint Factsheet | Center for Sustainable Systems. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://css.umich.edu/factsheets/carbon-footprint-factsheet.

[v] “RE”. (2017, October 26). Lawns, class, and colonialism. The Re-Enchantment. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://thereenchantment.ca/2017/10/25/lawns-class-and-colonialism-part-one/.

[vi] Taylor, G. (2018, December 12). 10 things no one tells you about homeowner associations. Bob Vila. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.bobvila.com/slideshow/10-things-no-one-tells-you-about-homeowner-associations-52429.

[vii] Herzog, K. (2021, April 7). Lawns are Dumb. Arresting People for Poor Lawn Care is Dumber. Grist. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://grist.org/article/lawns-are-dumb-arresting-people-for-poor-lawn-care-is-dumber/.

[viii] Learn about the cost of projects in the lawn & garden category. HomeAdvisor. (n.d.). Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/lawn-and-garden/.

[ix] Caballero, G. (2021, October 11). Do you really save time and money by mowing the lawn yourself? USA’s #1 ‘Lawn Care Near Me’ Service. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.yourgreenpal.com/blog/are-time-and#:~:text=Here’s%20the%20deal%2C%20data%20gathered,save%20only%20%24270%20per%20year.

[x] Lawn mower injuries in children. OrthoInfo. (2018, January). Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://orthoinfo.aaos.org/en/diseases–conditions/lawn-mower-injuries-in-children/.

[xi] Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2020). (rep.). National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2019 (pp. 1–10). https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf

[xii] Brown, N. (2019, December 11). What Sydney’s new water restrictions mean for you. news.com.au. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.news.com.au/technology/environment/conservation/sydneys-tough-new-water-restrictions-begin-tuesday/news-story/adaef7cb21d8d76a90d3769c2a3c140b.

[xiii] Lustgarten, A. (2021, August 27). 40 million people rely on the Colorado River. It’s drying up fast. The New York Times. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/sunday-review/colorado-river-drying-up.html.

[xiv] Tallamy, D. W. (2020). Nature’s best hope a new approach to conservation that starts in your yard. Timber Press.

[xv] Narango, D. L., Tallamy, D. W., & Marra, P. P. (2018). Nonnative plants reduce population growth of an insectivorous bird. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(45), 11549–11554. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1809259115

[xvi] Conserving water: Edible gardens versus lawns. California Farm and Garden. (2021, August 2). Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://cafarmandgarden.com/water-conservation-fruit-and-vegetable-gardens-vs-lawns/.

[xvii] Wei, C. (2016, October). How to kill your lawn and grow a food forest during a drought. VICE. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.vice.com/en/article/mgk37q/how-to-kill-your-lawn-and-grow-a-food-forest-during-a-drought.

[xviii] Ewing, E. (2008, April 4). Cuba’s Organic Revolution. The Guardian. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/apr/04/organics.food.

[xix] National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (n.d.). Drought timescales: Short- vs. long-term drought. Drought.gov. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.drought.gov/what-is-drought/drought-timescales-short-vs-long-term-drought.

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Walk With Me

silhouette of people standing on mirror during golden hour

14 December 2020 – by Dave Inder Comar

The failure of states to stabilise the climate, along with the scientific uncertainty of whether the planet can actually stay under 1.5 degrees C of total planetary warming,[i] suggests the real possibility that dramatic change and damage to the Earth will manifest by 2050 — and humans may not be able to prevent it. In a world plagued with global and enduring inequalities, these changes will also affect people and countries in a disproportionate and unjust way. Low-income nations, saddled by colonial legacies and inferior status in the global order, find themselves in difficult straits in preparing for climate change and are highly vulnerable with respect to climate-related disasters.[ii] As such disasters increase in scope, migration and displacement from low-income countries will accelerate, leading to tens of millions or even billions of displaced people from already distressed areas to richer countries.[iii]

Mitigating the scope of this crisis is imperative. But we must be very careful, and intentional, in putting forth the appropriate response. How governments intend to resolve the challenges of the climate crisis is as important as actually resolving the crisis itself. For example, it is not difficult to imagine an authoritarian response to challenges posed by climate change—either in those areas beset by climate damage, or in richer countries seeking to manage people movement, economic dominance, and challenges to the social order brought by displaced peoples or by an unhindered Nature. Traditional Hobbesian theory predicts that grave threats to life are the trigger for a Leviathan armed with broad, even dictatorial powers, in response to those threats.[iv]

The stakes, then, are not just the continued habitability of the planet. What is also at risk this century is the very concept of the inherent dignity of all people—the foundation for human rights and democratic norms. It is an open question whether the legal and political frameworks that protect this dignity will withstand the climate crisis,[v] a prospect which should trouble any true friend of civilisation and freedom, irrespective of political or philosophical belief.

The emergence of a cold-blooded and killing Leviathan—or set of Leviathans—in the decades ahead has already been previewed, and here I refer to the reprehensible and cruel responses of governments to the complex and deep-rooted issue of human migration to date. Climate change becomes the magnifier of displacement, the proverbial gasoline to the fire that will increase not only the levels of migration to come, but also the inhuman actions of governments already committed to the politics of the armed lifeboat—a world of militarised borders, aggressive anti-immigrant policing, and indefinite states of emergency and unilateral counter-insurgency actions against domestic and foreign political threats.[vi]  

In this kind of world, the protections of international law and treaties are openly dispensed with as citizens in rich countries consent to floating bodies of children and their parents in the Mediterranean[vii] or in the Rio Grande,[viii] the existence of detention camps at international borders operated in criminal conditions,[ix] and even the Kafka-esque pronouncement that requires toddlers to appear in court to defend themselves at their own deportation proceedings,[x] all as permissible responses to displacement. The state of exception implemented after 9/11 brought with it the resurgence of torture,[xi] heinous wars of aggression against countries in the Middle East,[xii] and indefinite detention of enemies in illicit facilities where the rule of law is not permitted to have effect.[xiii] This state of exception has yet to be rescinded, and may very well serve as the model or even the backbone, for more perverse deviations from the rule of law as the climate crisis accelerates.

Citizens in high-income countries have broadly accepted brutish practices for decades against the displaced, irrespective of the government in power. In light of this, the political infrastructure has been established not just for an enduring form of climate apartheid[xiv] that divides the world into a devastated and inundated Global South and more protected (but still impacted) Global North; it is beyond that—much beyond that in fact—more terrifying, more broken, more monstrous than even the 20th century dystopian novels had the capacity to imagine. Those novels could not have foreseen climate breakdown, tens of millions on the move for food, water, and dignity, and the automated machines, virtual barriers, drones, and face-recognition cameras used to gatekeep away the displaced from refuge.

Human consciousness evolved to avoid the traumas associated with Nature; being eaten by a predator, finding food, seeking shelter. It may not have the same capacity to withstand the machine horrors, the uninhibited genocides and crimes against humanity, or the amplified propaganda and messaging systems implemented by some governments to maintain power and keep the reality of a forever-changed planet as removed and as remote as possible. We will all be living in an experiment: both with respect to the imminent breakdown of the climate system, but also with the technological and social response to it. There is simply no precedent for what we as a species, but also in our individual lives, are about to experience.

This ‘Century of Crisis’ and ‘Century of the Displaced’ represents more than a crisis of people movement. It is a crisis of our common humanity, and a crisis of democracy. How will this species elect to share the resources of this planet with one another? What are the institutions and values that we must build and hold in order to create a place in which all humans have basic dignity, the means to explore and exercise their freedom, and access to the shared bounty of the planet (or what is left of it)? How will we transition our extractive economies into an economic and political system that ensures balance and harmony with the planet and with each other? What are the choices we must make—not just as communities and nations, but also individually, as academics, professionals, lawyers, activists, and others—in order to avoid the flawed destiny of climate breakdown and to build a road to a better future?

These are questions that touch not just on politics and economics, but also on philosophy, spirituality, and notions of the ‘good life’. It has never been easier in human history to build a walled garden of pleasure, escape, and tedium, surrounded by crystal screens, the endless scrolling of apps, and empty communications with others equally as empty. But no matter how much this garden is exalted in the popular media or by the modern archons of control as ‘what we all should be doing with our lives,’ the bitter truth is this: the road to a shared global freedom—the road to global democracy, the road to a stable climate, the road to a dignified human future for both rich and poor, those seeking refuge and those providing it—will be built on sacrifice, hard work, and the constant presence of failure.

This is now the task at hand. This road that I speak of is a road that must be paved, and walked, in order for our descendants to even have a chance to live on a planet that is habitable, civilised, dignified, and just. It is a road that will take hundreds or even thousands of years to pave and to walk, requiring reformed and even new international institutions that can plan for multiple generations ahead, rectify the inequalities that are the roots of this crisis, provide for justice, and keep and maintain a fragile peace amongst a species that has never truly known what it means to live in peace in a global and unified way. 

These institutions will take a long time to create—longer than you or I have on this planet. Thus, we will have to start this journey though we will never live to see what awaits at the end of such a grand intergenerational project, or even if it will end at all. Who dares to dream a dream that has such uncertainty at its core?

But you and I, living and breathing at this moment, have been given a tremendous and unique honour: the honour of commencing this process, starting this journey, laying the groundwork for those who will stand on our shoulders and become future giants of sustainability, democracy, justice, and peace. We can begin this process today, to give others who we will never meet the opportunity to live in harmony with one another on an Earth that is at peace with itself. We will never see the end of the climate crisis. That glory will belong to others. But we have the honour of beginning the process of solving the problems we have caused or prolonged. It is an honour unique to all of human history.

My friend: I hope to see you, and to walk with you, on this path and on the journey ahead. It is a long walk, so we best get started. Let us walk for as long as we can.

Dave Inder Comar is the Executive Director of Just Atonement Inc. He is also the managing partner of Comar Mollé LLP, a corporate technology firm with offices in San Francisco and New York. Licensed to practice law before the California and New York bars, Mr. Comar has been involved in corporate technology, human rights, and international law for fifteen years. He is passionate about using the law to maintain and preserve global civilization. He holds a law degree from the New York University School of Law, a Master of Arts degree from Stanford University and Bachelor of Arts degrees from Stanford University. He is an advisor to Earth Refuge.

References:

[i] Will Steffen et al. ‘Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene’ (2018) 115(33) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 8252 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115> accessed 25 November 2020 (“even if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5 °C to 2.0 °C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a ‘Hothouse Earth’ pathway”).

[ii] J. Timmon Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, A Climate of Injustice (The MIT Press 2007) 83, 131.

[iii] Michelle Yonetani, ‘Disaster-related displacement in a changing climate’ Vol 65(1) – 2016 <https://public.wmo.int/en/resources/bulletin/disaster-related-displacement-changing-climate> accessed 22 November 2020; Melita H. Sunjic, ‘Top UNHCR official warns about displacement from climate change’ (UNHCR, December 9, 2018) <https://www.unhcr.org/493e9bd94.htm> accessed 25 November 2020; Baher Kamal, ‘Climate Migrants Might Reach One Billion by 2050’ (Inter Press Service, August 21, 2017) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/08/climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-by2050/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-by-2050> accessed 25 November 2020.

[iv] Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol (first published 1938, George Schwab tr, Greenwood Press 1996) 31; Leo Strauss, ‘Notes on The Concept of the Political,’ in The Concept of Political (J. Harvey Lomax tr, The University of Chicago Press 1996) 90 (noting that for Hobbes, “the securing of life is the ultimate basis of the state”).

[v] Stephen Humphreys, ‘Climate change and international human rights law’ in R.Rayfuse and S. Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar 2012) 56 (“In short, there are excellent reasons to suppose that climate change poses a near insurmountable challenge to the current human rights regime”);

[vi] Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement (The University of Chicago Press 2016) 142.

[vii] Helena Smith, ‘Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’ (The Guardian, 2 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees> accessed 25 November 2020.

[viii] Adam K. Raymond, ‘The Story Behind the Viral Photo of a Drowned Migrant Father and Toddler’ (New York Magazine, 26 June 2019)  <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/the-story-behind-the-viral-photo-of-drowned-migrants.html> accessed 25 November 2020.

[ix] Adam Serwer, ‘A Crime By Any Name’ (The Atlantic, 3 July 2019) <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/border-facilities/593239/> accessed 25 November 2020.

[x] Christina Jewett and Shefali Luthra, ‘Immigrant toddlers ordered to appear in court alone’ (The Texas Tribune, 27 June 2018) <https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/> accessed 25 November 2020; Andrew Buncombe, ‘Trump administration admits migrant children as young as 3 appearing in court alone for their own deportation proceedings’ (The Independent, 28 June 2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/child-immigrants-us-court-border-family-migrant-immigration-trump-latest-melania-a8422101.html> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xi] Elisa Epstein, ‘CIA Contractor Details Torture of 9/11 Suspects’ (Human Rights Watch, 27 January 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/27/cia-contractor-details-torture-9/11-suspects> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xii] Saleh v. Bush, 848 F. 3d 880 (9th Cir. 2017); ‘Iraq War illegal, says Annan’ (BBC News, 16 September 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xiii] Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (first published 2003, Kevin Attell tr, The University of Chicago Press 2005) 3-4; Elise Swain, ‘It’s still open: will the Guantanamo Bay Prison become a 2020 issue? (The Intercept, 3 March 2019) <https://theintercept.com/2019/03/03/guantanamo-bay-carol-rosenberg-intercepted/> accessed 25 November 2020.

[xiv] UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights: Climate change and poverty, Phillip Alston’ (17 July 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/41/39 <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/39> accessed 25 November 2020 [51].