29 December 2020 – by Eliana Stern
It was not meant to last forever in the real world. But why admit that, when you can go on doing what you always do, mourning and laying blame, always the two together. I don’t need your praise to survive. I was here first, before you were here, before you ever planted a garden. And I’ll be here when only the sun and moon are left, and the sea, and the wide field. I will constitute the field.[1]
— excerpt from Witchgrass, Louise Glück
1. Introduction: The Threat of Displacement
When high-tide hits, Ioane Teitiota races to his flimsy sea wall, quickly patching up holes in the fragile boundary between his home in the archipelago nation of Kiribati, and the ever-menacing ebb and flow of the Pacific Ocean. Today, the nation of Kiribati exists as a collection of small land strips struggling to stay afloat in the increasingly precarious Pacific. Teitiota, the world’s first official climate refugee, currently resides with his wife and three children in the nation’s main island Tarawa, which measures a mere 3m (9.8ft) above sea level at its highest point. His days are spent either preparing for high tide or reeling from it, with periodic attempts to treat the red patches that cover his children’s skin––an adverse effect of bathing in the island’s contaminated groundwater. When asked about his futile battle for recognition as a climate refugee, Teitiota declared somberly, “I’m the same as people who are fleeing war. Those who are afraid of dying, it’s the same as me.”[2]
The historian Will Durant once wrote that “there have only been twenty-nine years in all of human history during which a war was not underway somewhere.”[3] Given this calculation, we can easily conclude that conflict is an innate aspect of human nature and history. For as long as nation-states have existed, so has war and conflict. And for as long as war and conflict have existed, so have refugees. Refugee crises––i.e., the mass-movement or mass-reception of forcibly displaced persons––have been rampant along the US and European borders for generations. Today, however, the face of this crisis is beginning to change. A new age has introduced a new player, one who acts cruelly and mercilessly, who cannot be prosecuted against or pleaded with, and who has little regard for the value of human life: our home, Planet Earth.
As partisan as they may seem in news and politics, the widespread effects and challenges of climate change are no longer something we can ignore, no longer something to be confined to the far-left of the political spectrum. With unprecedented levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the face of our planet is transforming rapidly: temperatures rising, ice sheets melting, sea levels surging, forests burning, oceans acidifying, soils depleting––and that’s only the beginning. The heightened frequency and extremity of natural disasters, particularly along the Earth’s lower latitudinal belt, has rendered many regions and homelands unlivable, causing devastation for millions of citizens around the globe.[4] As we face an increasingly hazardous world at the hands of anthropogenic climate change, it is imperative that we adapt and mitigate risk by means of transforming our current migration system. While the ultimate solution undoubtedly lies in a more pervasive, preventative approach––including reducing global emissions and making a worldwide shift to renewable energy––a more immediate solution must encompass sustainable development in regions most vulnerable to environmental and climate impacts, as well as stronger migratory aid and support through policy-based regulation and protection within domestic and global migration pathways.
2. The Effects of Climate Change
On March 14, 2019, the Tropical Cyclone Idai struck the southeast coast of Mozambique, culminating in a reported 146,000 displaced persons, 100,000 damaged homes, 1 million acres of destroyed crops, $1 billion worth of demolished infrastructure, and approximately 1.85 million people in need of assistance.[5] Though this event was without question the single worst storm in Mozambique’s history, various studies have shown that “unprecedented”[6] storms such as this one will soon become ordinary, setting a new and frightening standard for what we can expect from the weather. In 2017, 68.5 million people were forcibly displaced around the world; one third of those displacements took place due to extreme weather events. What’s more, “scientists fear that extreme events of this sort will increasingly occur in clusters, with one disaster following immediately after another––much as Hurricanes Irma and Maria followed Harvey in August-September 2017.”[7] The potential consequences of this trend are daunting, with both its capacity for unparalleled destruction and its power to inhibit or disincentivize aid from outside parties.
There’s no shortage of critical issues the international community will face as a consequence of climate change. Soil depletion, land degradation and ocean acidification will continue to increase the stress on resources such as food, water and energy, especially in underdeveloped countries. In many poor and divided countries, officials fear that resource scarcity will give way to conflict among internal factions, endangering fragile governments and providing breeding grounds for terrorist groups and organizations.[8] If we do not change our practices rapidly and radically, the combination of resource scarcity, extreme weather hazards, rising sea levels, and increased vulnerability to disease outbreaks will undoubtedly lead to mass displacement and mass migration on a perennial scale.
It is important to note that the effects of climate change are not evenly distributed. Far from it, the World Bank estimated in 2018 that “three regions (Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia) will generate 143 million more climate migrants by 2050.”[9] The countries most likely to feel pressure from climate change are those with low adaptive capacities, vulnerable geographies, fragile ecosystems, and reliance on climate-sensitive industries such as agriculture or fishing.[10] At the same time, it is the citizens living in these countries––generally the poorest and most vulnerable––who often lack adequate resources needed to migrate. While more developed and diversified countries may not feel the stress of climate change as imminently or severely as other regions do, climate calamities in other parts of the world will vastly increase the flow of migrants to the US and European borders. In a 2015 memorandum, the Department of Defense (DoD) wrote to Congress that “climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water. These impacts are already occurring, and the scope, scale, and intensity of these impacts are projected to increase over time.”[11]
In 2008, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released environment working papers which ranked port cities around the world by their exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes. These papers served as the first official estimate of the world’s largest port cities’ vulnerability to coastal flooding and high wind damage due to storm surge, and further aimed to explore how climate change will affect future exposure in port cities, population growth, and urbanization. The top ten cities that this assessment (conducted in 2005) found to be most exposed in terms of population were “Mumbai, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Miami, Ho Chi Minh City, Kolkata, Greater New York, Osaka-Kobe, Alexandria and New Orleans; almost equally split between developed and developing countries.”[12] However, while the exposure of coastal cities may be evenly split along the developed and developing world, it is important to note that exposure does not always translate into impact. The impact of high winds or storm surges in coastal cities nearly always depends on the scope and scale of protection measures. And predictably, cities in richer countries tend to have vastly more thorough protection systems in place than those in the developing world. The policy implications of this report were evidently in favor of greater mitigation and adaptation at the city-scale, especially with regard to global mitigation efforts buying time for cities to put forth more adaptive measures.
A second paper released by the OECD in 2008 served to assess the economic impacts of climate change at the city-scale, focusing on sea level rise and storm surge, using Copenhagen as a case study. The study used a statistical analysis of past storm surges in Copenhagen coupled with geographical information on the city’s population in order to accurately estimate the direct (i.e., damage to infrastructure) and indirect (i.e., unemployment) losses of storm surge. In conclusion, the study found that while Copenhagen’s vulnerability to coastal flooding is relatively low, without the protective measures that are already in place, losses would still reach EUR 3 billion by the current 120-year storm surge event.[13] Because the high level of protection and low level of risk in Copenhagen is not realistic for all cities, the study went on to apply the same methodology to a virtual city––based on Copenhagen but without its current protective measures––in order to estimate the more general economic cost of climate change-induced sea level rise. This approach found that the increased risk due to climate change would prove overwhelmingly destructive in many cities if the global community does not support a massive upgrade in widespread flood protection. In conclusion, the papers note that “even though a coastal city might be very well protected today, the risks of climate change will require attention to the maintenance and upgrade of coastal flood protection in order to limit future risks in the face of future sea level risk and increased storm surge.”[14] Moreover, “it is important to build defenses in a way that allows for flexibility, taking into account the certainties in projections and making it possible to upgrade them if sea level rise is larger than expected.”
3. The Climate-Migration Nexus
When Ioane Teitiota applied for his family’s refugee status in New Zealand in 2015, his case made it all the way to the High Court of New Zealand but was ultimately rejected, and he was later deported for overstaying his visa. Now, back in the disappearing nation of Kiribati, Teitiota stands by his demand, stating “I think being a refugee is the best way of protecting myself. Especially if something happens to Kiribati.”[15] With sea levels rising at approximately 12mm/year, eight Pacific Islands have already been submerged completely. Two more are on the brink of going under, and “by 2100, it is estimated that 48 islands overall will be lost to the rising ocean.”[16] Though the various New Zealand tribunals and courts that considered Teitiota’s case did accept that he was telling the truth, they did not believe the dangers he was describing to be imminent. Specifically, the New Zealand government did not accept that Teitiota’s circumstances were similar enough to those described under international refugee law, and therefore they refused to grant him refuge.
In a similar vein, islands within the Pacific nation state of Tuvalu “have become meaningful spaces in cosmopolitan discourses only as they disappear.”[17] Identified in the 1980s as a region at risk from rising sea levels due to climate change, Tuvalu’s nine coral atolls and reef islands have become a central motif in the climate change debate, along with the nation’s 10,000 inhabitants. In an ineffectual attempt to address the massive environmental justice issue posed by rising sea levels, “members of parliament, diplomats and community leaders repeatedly highlight that Tuvaluans face significant climate change impacts and yet make little contribution to reducing the fossil fuel use that causes them.”[18]
The term “climate refugee” plays an interesting role in today’s discussions on the climate-migration nexus. Though the official definition of a refugee given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence… [and] has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion,”[19] the mainstream definition tends to be much more all-encompassing. Typically, any person who is forcibly displaced from their home due to factors out of their control may be considered a refugee by the general public. Historically, refugees have sought asylum for reasons linked to religious or ethnic conflict and political instability. However, the circumstances that refugees find themselves forced into remain overwhelmingly alike, whether the displacement occurs due to internal conflict, violence, or natural causes.
Are climate refugees not also forced from their homes, separated from those they love, driven by violent forces they have no control over? Climate refugees, like other refugees, live in fear of an ever-pursuing, elusive enemy. Climate refugees, like other refugees, lose everything they have, and are left with nowhere to turn. And yet, these refugees have no mention in the 1951 refugee convention which we still refer to today––a document written in post-war Europe, long before climate change became an international threat.[20]
The current system in place for helping aid refugees does not take into account the existence of climate refugees, and therefore is nowhere near well-equipped to manage a world of increasing climate stressors. Because climate migrants are not recognized as refugees under international law, they are not afforded the same legal protection in seeking asylum. Not only does this force many people to remain in dangerous or hazardous environments, but it makes the migratory journey that much more treacherous for those who are forcibly displaced. In order to truly transform our global system of migration into one that is well-prepared to address climate-related crises, we must first establish an official status for climate migrants that caters to their specific climate-related fears and grants them legal recognition and protection as individuals displaced at the hands of the environment. Without this, climate refugees will be forced to continue migrating under extremely strenuous circumstances, with little to no aid from the international community.
4. The Solution: Restructuring the Global Migration System
First and foremost, measures must be taken by the international community in order to reduce forced climate migration to the extent possible. Much can be done through disaster risk reduction (DRR), a systematic approach to managing and mitigating natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, and cyclones.[21] The mentality behind this approach lies in the distinction between hazards and disasters. Hazards, which consist of natural, climate-related causes, often lead to disasters in communities where the hazard took place. However, the severity of these disasters depends on a myriad of factors, including exposure, vulnerability, and most importantly, resilience. While we may not be able to control exposure or even vulnerability, we have significant power in building and strengthening resiliency in regions which may be hit the hardest. This can be done through a widespread upsurge in sustainable development, e.g., stronger sea walls, hurricane-proof glass, improved early evacuation/warning systems, and the implementation of DRR in urban development/planning.[22] With more systems in place to reinforce durability and resilience in regions most vulnerable to climate stressors, a significant portion of climate displacement could feasibly be eliminated. However, preventative measures––as crucial as they may be––are not enough. Prevention is the logical first step in adapting to climate change, but by no means is it the comprehensive solution we need.
The second step in alleviating climate migration is, predictably, aid to migrants. When climate displacement cannot be avoided by means of DRR or sustainable development, it is crucial that migrants receive support and recognition from the international community. In 2015, the UN International Organization of Migrants (IOM) created a Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division––the first of kind, dedicated to solving issues within the migration-climate nexus. Dina Lonesco, head of the MECC division, wrote that “regular migration pathways can provide relevant protection for climate migrants and facilitate migration strategies in response to environmental factors.”[23] If migration pathways for climate migrants were actualized, they could serve as a means by which the international community provides “status for people who move in the context of climate change impacts, such as humanitarian visas, temporary protection, authorization to stay, regional and bilateral free movements’ agreements, among several others.”[24] Though the MECC division is currently responsible for “overseeing, supporting and coordinating the development and policy guidance for activities with a migration, environment and climate change dimension,”[25] their efforts thus far have been relatively small-scale, and they have yet to implement any of the truly radical transformations needed to ease the stressors of climate migration.
Whereas the MECC division within the IOM has thus far worked mainly in research and advocacy, a new international framework known as The Nansen Initiative is emerging as “a bottom-up, state-led consultative process with multi-stakeholder involvement”[26] in order to establish a protection agenda for those who have been displaced internationally in the context of climate change-induced disasters. On the topic of its mission and goals, The Nansen Initiative wrote that “while people displaced within their own countries are covered by national laws, international human rights law, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and a few regional instruments, a serious legal gap exists with regard to cross-border movements in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change.”[27] As previously stated, “these people are not refugees under international refugee law, and human rights law does not address critical issues such as their admission, stay and basic rights.” The Nansen Initiative, therefore, is working to fill this legislative gap, and has begun doing so through inter-governmental regional consultations and civil society meetings in the Pacific Islands, Central America, the Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia. The “bottom-up” strategy of The Nansen Initiative consists of starting small in order to build a foundation which can be used globally. It approaches this strategy by holding sub-regional consultations which build a consolidated knowledge base, then moving into a global dialogue to set an official protection agenda (which may include new laws, soft law instruments, and binding agreements), and finally ending with dissemination and follow-ups in regions around the world.
The protection agenda which The Nansen Initiative is working to build will be based on three main pillars: international cooperation and solidarity; standards for the treatment of affected people (i.e., admission, status and stay); and operational responses such as funding processes behind international and humanitarian aid. With a mission as ambitious as this one, it is important for the leaders of The Nansen Initiative to lay out a structured timeline for their agenda, which they outline on their mission page. Similar to the proposals I have already put forth, The Nansen Initiative plans for three distinct phases. First on the agenda is preparation before displacement occurs, much like what I laid out in my description of Disaster Risk Reduction. The second phase is comprised of protective and assistive efforts during displacement, whether this be through policy implementation, international aid, or a combination of the two. Lastly, the agenda would not be complete without delineating a transition to solutions in the aftermath of a disaster. Jane McAdam, a law professor at the University of New South Wales who specializes in refugees and climate change migration, wrote about The Nansen Initiative, saying, “it’s not a one size fits all approach, but a disaster toolkit.”[28] In a world of increasing unpredictability with regard to natural disasters and climate calamities, The Nansen Initiative’s model for flexibility and versatility seems the only feasible solution.
5. Conclusion: Moving Forward
Climate change will always be a hard pill to swallow, as is anything which inhibits our profit-making capacity, our beloved practices and traditions, or the reality of any foreseeable future. Monetary means, as well as plain inertia, have served as a barricade by which the industrialized world protects itself from the effects of climate change. In doing so, we have turned a blind eye to nations which do not have this option, ignoring the direct consequences of our inefficient energy practices which we do not have the misfortune of experiencing firsthand. The failures of international asylum laws have culminated in global catastrophe, and the repercussions of these failures will only continue to grow.
Despite the proposals laid out in this paper, the only real strategy for combating climate change lies in eliminating the root of the problem: the burning of fossil fuels. Because “the human activities causing climate change are a more essential foundation of world economies, and less amenable to simple technological correctives,”[29] the solution must ultimately encompass a vast economic and technological transformation on a global scale. While a restructuring of the global migration system is a necessary adaptation to climate change and climate migration, there will be no future for this system if we do not also address the heart of anthropogenic climate change, and alter our ways of life. The vast transformations needed to solve this issue has turned the climate crisis into a generationally-divisive topic, with many younger activists taking a stand against an older generation of global emitters. One such activist, 16 year old Greta Thunberg, spoke at the UN Climate Action Summit this past September, declaring pointedly to her audience that “you are failing us. But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you… Right here, right now is where we draw the line. The world is waking up. And change is coming, whether you like it or not.”[30] Until then, Ioane Teitiota sits and waits in his cinder-block home in Tarawa.
Eliana is a sophomore at Stanford University majoring in Earth Systems, with minors in Arabic and Creative Writing. While on campus, Eliana could often be found planting, harvesting, and planning community events at the O’Donohue Family Stanford Educational Farm, where she serves as Vice President of Stanford RooTS. Since returning home due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Eliana has continued to foster her passions for food systems and social justice by working with The Farmlink Project, a volunteer-run, grassroots movement founded by students in response to the exploding food insecurity crisis. Farmlink connects farmers with surplus to food banks in need—getting food into the hands of those who need it and providing a source of income for farmers and truckers hit hardest by the pandemic.
Concerned with both the application and education of environmental justice, Eliana has taken unexpected advantage of the current remote situation by working with Curious Cardinals, another student start-up, where she mentors young students in writing, art, and environmental science.
References
[1] Glück, Louise. “Witchgrass.” Read A Little Poetry, 5 Mar. 2011, readalittlepoetry.wordpress.com/2005/09/29/witchgrass-by-louise-gluck/.
[2] McDonald, Tim. “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee.” BBC News, BBC, 5 Nov. 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34674374.
[3] Hedges, Chris. “War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning.” War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, PublicAffairs, 2014, pp. 16–36.
[4] Dessler, Andrew E., and Edward Parson. The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: a Guide to the Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
[5] Podesta, John. “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.” Brookings, Brookings, 4 Sept. 2019, www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/.
[6] Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” 2019.
[7] Klare, Michael. “If the US Military Is Facing up to the Climate Crisis, Shouldn’t We All? | Michael Klare.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 12 Nov. 2019, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/12/us-military-pentagon-climate-crisis-breakdown-.
[8] Klare, “If the US Military Is Facing up to the Climate Crisis, Shouldn’t We All?” 2019.
[9] Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” 2019.
[10] “5 Facts on Climate Migrants.” Institute for Environment and Human Security, 26 Nov. 2015, ehs.unu.edu/news/news/5-facts-on-climate-migrants.html.
[11] Klare, “If the US Military Is Facing up to the Climate Crisis, Shouldn’t We All?” 2019.
[12] Nicholls, R., et al. (2008), “Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes: Exposure Estimates”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/011766488208.
[13] Hallegatte, S., et al. (2008), “Assessing Climate Change Impacts, Sea Level Rise and Storm Surge Risk in Port Cities: A Case Study on Copenhagen”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 3, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/236018165623.
[14] Hallegatte, S., et al. “Assessing Climate Change Impacts, Sea Level Rise and Storm Surge Risk in Port Cities: A Case Study on Copenhagen,” 2008.
[15] McDonald, “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee,” 2015.
[16] Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” 2019.
[17] Farbotko, Carol. “Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Climate Refugees and Cosmopolitan Experimentation.” Wiley Online Library, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd (10.1111), 12 Apr. 2010, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-8373.2010.001413.x?casa_token=LBnGClY1O7MAAAAA%3AdZWtnhgT8VaN7gS_Vh2qgdHewKzcHwdcQMah7HmuWmhw-_HScnPM7jptNHLMi_WEItquvLwTvA.
[18] Farbotko, “Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Climate Refugees and Cosmopolitan Experimentation,” 2010.
[19] “How to Help Refugees – Aid, Relief and Donations: USA for UNHCR.” How to Help Refugees – Aid, Relief and Donations | USA for UNHCR, www.unrefugees.org/.
[20] McDonald, “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee,” 2015.
[21] Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction. United Nations, 2008, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction.
[22] Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction. United Nations, 2008, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction.
[23] Lonesco, Dina. “Let’s Talk About Climate Migrants, Not Climate Refugees – United Nations Sustainable Development.” United Nations, United Nations, June 2019, www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/.
[24] Lonesco, “Let’s Talk About Climate Migrants, Not Climate Refugees,” 2019.
[25] “Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division.” International Organization for Migration, 15 Feb. 2019, www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change.
[26] “Towards a Protection Agenda for People Displaced across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the Effects of Climate Change.” The Nansen Initiative, www.nanseninitiative.org/.
[27] “Towards a Protection Agenda for People Displaced across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the Effects of Climate Change.” The Nansen Initiative, www.nanseninitiative.org/.
[28] McDonald, “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee,” 2015.
[29] Dessler, and Parson, “The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: a Guide to the Debate,” 2020.
[30] Staff, NPR. “Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech At The U.N. Climate Action Summit.” NPR, NPR, 23 Sept. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit.
