When President Donald Trump issued a tirade of tweets berating late Maryland congressman and civil rights advocate Elijah Cummings, the media and public were quick to condemn the remarks.
Some cited Carl A. Zimring’s Clean and White: A History of Environmental Racism in the United States in order to explain the racist roots of lodging those specific criticisms against a majority-Black city. Zimring’s book, widely released the same year that Donald Trump was elected, provides an incisive look at how whiteness, waste, and sanitation have been entangled since the emergence of the United States (US). Now, after four years of the Trump presidency and the deaths of over 400,000 Americans due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is arguable that Clean and White offers critical new insight into the current crisis. How might the same legacy of environmental racism in those tweets be at play in the politics of the pandemic?
Environmental Fear-Mongering
When Trump and right-wing pundits call COVID-19 the “Chinese virus”, but make sure to describe the new variant of the virus as “first identified in Britain,” this is not simply the result of differing international relations. Throughout his administration, Trump has evoked fears of foreign filth as a way to pander to white nativism.
In doing so, Trump preyed on the same underlying anxieties about environmental hygiene and sexual pollution that Zimring argues have been stoked since the mid-19th century. He writes that “during the [Civil] war, fear of germs and fear of social order without slavery produced fears that would endure and intertwine”. The early 20th century influx of immigrants and Black southerners to northern cities, Zimring explains, would demand new methods for whites to uphold both racial purity and superiority, two mutually supporting ideas. The sanitary maintenance of these growing industrial cities was just the ticket.
As Zimring shows, non-white citizens have long been over-represented in “dirty” jobs like laundry, waste hauling, and scrap recycling. Jewish immigrants, once barred the white middle-class, were able to “ascend” the racial hierarchy by moving from scrap-scavengers to junkyard managers. Black, Asian, and Latinx residents were, as a result of restricted economic mobility and the supposed biological impurity of their skin color, kept tied to waste. Ideas of “who would deserve to be clean and who should do the cleaning” that were codified in the 1850s were solidified within the 20th century urban order.
A Dirty Legacy
Cleanliness in the years 2020 and 2021 has taken on new meaning, but the costs to non-white communities fall in line with the history that Zimring lays out. Immigrants and non-white communities are overly represented among essential, frontline workers, and fewer than 1 in 5 Black workers are able to telework. One Harvard study found that healthcare workers of color were more likely to care for patients with COVID-19, to report using inadequate or reused protective gear, and nearly twice as likely as white colleagues to test positive for the coronavirus. As non-white nurses, bus drivers, warehouse workers, and cleaning service people continue to be exposed to COVID-19 at dramatic rates, we see the contagious new consequences of centuries-old environmental racism.
But understanding America’s history of environmental racism is not just about survival. It is also about resistance. Despite record-breaking numbers of protesters at Black Lives Matter protests this past summer, high rates of mask wearing and social distancing led to no noticeable increases in COVID 19 cases. While it is too early to tell whether the Capitol riot will prove to have been a ‘superspreader’ event, images of the dense, maskless, and overwhelmingly white crowds demand a new look at how race and hygiene are once again colliding. As Zimring highlights, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated after delivering his “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” speech in support of the Memphis Sanitation Workers’ Strike. The political entanglement of masks, “dirty things” and racial justice is not one of happenstance. It is simply the newest iteration of a history of struggle.
Looking to the future
Almost fourteen years ago to the day, then senator Joe Biden filed the paperwork to launch his bid for president of the United States. Later that afternoon, speaking in reference to fellow candidate senator Barack Obama, Biden remarked: “I mean, you got the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy.”
Clean and White sifts through the dirt and grime of 244 years of American history to prove that understandings of race – and the perpetuation of racism – have always been about who has been deemed to be “clean,” and who has not. As the COVID-19 pandemic rages on and Joe Biden steps up to replace Donald Trump as president, the legacy of environmental racism and hygiene in the United States is more pressing than ever. Whether Joe Biden and white Americans will pay attention remains to be seen.
This book review was published as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.
Aubrey Calaway is writer and researcher who has investigated issues of climate change, human trafficking, and community resilience. She currently works as a research fellow at Human Trafficking Search.
It is undeniable that the effects of climate change disproportionately impact the poor. Climate change interferes with the full exercise of multiple fundamental human rights—like the rights to health, water, food, and housing—through its adverse effects on ecosystems, natural resources, and physical infrastructure.
Since the evolution of Homo sapiens, the earth’s dynamic climate has played a pivotal role in the accumulation, distribution, and preservation of natural resources and wealth. In order to survive and develop, societies have had to constantly adjust behaviours to the climate. Adaptability determines humanity’s ability to cope and recover from events. The largest distinction in adaptation strategies lies between developing and developed countries.
According to the Global Climate Risk Index, eight of the ten countries most affected by extreme weather events from 1998 to 2017 were developing nations. These countries are vulnerable not just to frequency of events but also in their limited capacity to deal with impact. With an increase in intensity and duration of adverse weather events, time and resources available to rebuild will decrease. The impacts of climate change, however, far exceed these broad terms. Effective public health infrastructure underpins the social and economic development, and climate change starkly affects water and sanitation, prevalence of disease, food availability, population growth, and migration.
Water and Sanitation
Over two billion people are dependent on drinking water contaminated with faeces. Water availability and sanitation is an existing issue that will intensify quickly with an increase in the global temperature. Access to reliable sources of drinking water is a fundamental human right entwined in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to a standard of living adequate for health and wellbeing. However, this basic need is not met in many parts of the world. Contaminated water can transmit a myriad of diseases, like polio, typhoid, cholera, and dysentery as well as more-familiar diarrhoea—an illness that is laughed off in the West but causes 485,000 deaths per year in developing countries due to contaminated water. As rainfall and temperature change over time, the provision of clean water, adequate sanitation, and drainage will become even more strained.
Although rainfall is projected to increase in the moist tropic regions and higher latitudes, it is forecasted to decrease in middle latitudes and semi-arid low latitudes. In the regions experiencing reduced rainfall, river levels will drop and warmer temperatures will degrade water quality as dilution of unfavourable contaminants decreases, oxygen dissolves at a slower rate, and micro-bacteria become more active. Climate change exacerbates conditions in already drought-stricken regions, reducing access to clean water and generating drier conditions that strain agriculture and lead to more wildfires.
Disease
The effect of climate change on global disease patterns will intensify existing vulnerabilities across the world. Transmission rate and spread of rodent-borne and vector-borne diseases is expected to increase with the temperature—for example, experts have seen the rate at which pathogens mature and replicate within mosquitos accelerates with temperature. Insect population density and bite frequency also rises. A study by the University of Princeton found that mosquito abundance increases 30 – 100% with every 0.5 degree increase in temperature in the East African Highlands. According to the World Health Organization, over 405,000 people die of malaria annually with the vast majority (>97%) of deaths occurring in developing countries of Africa and Southeast Asia. As habitat distribution of mosquitos changes with the climate, human populations with little or no immunity to infections may be at risk, finding themselves in new transmission zones.
The human right to the “highest attainable standard of health” is implicated by climate change through increased spread of disease and the resulting decreased capacity of health care facilities to cope. This will disproportionately impact the poor through access to quality healthcare, both cost and availability. Malaria can be prevented through spraying DDT, using mosquito nets, taking medications, and through education surrounding stagnant water sources near the dwelling. Malaria can be treated, but most of these solutions are not available to developing countries.
Food Insecurity will Grow With Climate Change
The Climate and Food Vulnerability Index found that the ten most food-insecure countries in the world generate under half a tonne of CO2 per person—collectively 0.08% of total emissions. Crops, forestry, livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture will all be affected by rising temperatures, changes in precipitation regimes, and increased concentrations of CO2. This includes changing patterns of plant and livestock disease, affecting crop yields and agricultural production. Increased frequency of extreme weather events will destroy crops; flooding and rising sea levels will contaminate fresh water sources and agricultural land or cause salinisation and the elimination of nursery areas for fish.
Regions where subsistence farmers, Indigenous people, and coastal communities undertake small-scale food production are particularly vulnerable. This is often due to lack of access to optimal land, adequate agricultural inputs, and access to trade. Approximately three-and-a-half million annual deaths of mothers and young children can be attributed to malnutrition, low birth weights, and non optimal breast-feeding. Growth stunting due to chronic undernutrition affects one in every three children under five-years-old born in developing countries.
It is likely that some agricultural regions will benefit in productivity with the warming climate, but this is almost entirely in high-latitude developed countries that do not already have large proportions of malnutrition. The impacts of climate change on food security and malnutrition are expected to be colossal. Access to food has been recognised as a fundamental human right, and climate change can threaten this through availability, accessibility, adequacy, and sustainability of food—all elements that are already reduced in developing nations.
Migration and Resulting Conflict
Population growth is occurring in conjunction with climate change, intensifying established issues with shelter, water, and food insecurity. With more environments becoming flooded, arid, or inhospitable, large-scale population migration is likely. The UN projects that global populations will reach 9.8 billion by 2050, with roughly 83 million new additions per year. The majority of this increase can be attributed to a small number of countries. It is expected that by 2050, half of the world’s population will reside in India, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States, Indonesia, and Uganda. Eight out of nine of these are Global South nations. Most developed countries are predicted to stay in similar numbers and would even decline slightly if not for the expected migration from developing countries.
Drought increases and desertification of arid environments will cause population migration into urban areas from drought-hit, rural areas. Sea levels are rising as a result of both ice-cap melt and oceanic thermal expansion associated with climate change and will be a prominent driver of large-scale population displacement all around the world.
Impacts will be felt most severely in densely-populated, low-lying river deltas including the river delta of Bangladesh. The IPCC reports that nearly one million people will have to migrate by 2050, growing to over two million by 2100 due to sea level rise.
For some countries it is quite simple: elevate or relocate. But both of these solutions bring a myriad of problems, especially on a large scale.
Responsibility of Developed Nations
The wealthy countries of China, the United States, and the European Union are the world’s top emitters of fossil fuels and contribute over half of global emissions. The reality is the countries that will suffer most gravely are those that have contributed least to the problem. These top emitters contribute 14 times the emissions of the bottom 100 countries. Without substantial action from these countries, the world will struggle to tackle climate change. Questions must be raised about international justice and the violation of human rights.
The disproportionate responsibility of climate change across the world must be represented at an international political level. And the pressure must be put on those key players. This is the focus of some UN initiatives including the Paris agreement and Sustainable Development Goals. Industrialised, wealthy nations are not spared the effects of climate change. On the contrary, climate change exacerbates inequities here as well. Ultimately, climate change gives Western nations a heavy hunch of responsibility. We have the resources, science, and technology to change the trajectory; the Global South often does often not.
Corporate responsibility must also be addressed. Worldwide, 100 fossil fuel corporations are responsible for 71% of all industrial emissions. Even if corporations agree to emissions reduction targets, they often fail to include the emissions associated with the entire life cycle of products—from upstream emissions associated with extraction, production, and processing to the downstream emissions of product use and disposal. Some companies will only include emissions associated with their own facilities, which can be an extremely small proportion of the total. The devil is in the details. It should be a requirement for all corporations to accurately measure emissions and report them with full transparency. These should be reviewed externally and held to accord in emission reduction targets.
Individual actions are important for the climate movement, but corporations have the ability to influence consumer habits, drive policy change, and respond quickly and boldly to the climate crisis. We must hold them accountable.
At this stage in time, industrialised nations are demanding developing countries spend their scarce resources on adaptation and coping strategies to survive. These resources should be spent dealing with existing problems, not those exacerbated by climate change. Aotearoa, as one example, must step up to put pressure on corporations as well as other developed nations to do the same. The Zero Carbon Act was a significant step in Aotearoa, accounting for a climate commission, periodic risk assessments, and national adaptation plans; however, it fails to make the unequivocal link between climate change and human rights—a valuable tool that could escalate action. We have set emission reduction targets, we have raised expectations, but it is still not reflected in a demonstrable, measurable reduction of CO2.
Measurable progress speaks louder than targets, and emissions must be reduced to net zero. Only then will we gain the respect and leverage necessary to encourage significant action in other Western countries. Empathy is an innate human attribute, and if we could prevent the incomprehensible suffering of millions, would we not? Those in developed nations will still find that climate change will cause disruption and discomfort, at best; but the poor will suffer gravely.
I use the terms Native and Indigenous interchangeably throughout this book review. These terms refer to the Indigenous communities across the United States whose land was stolen during European colonisation of the Americas. I am eternally grateful to be living and studying onAbenaki Land.
Dina Gilio-Whitaker, of the Colville Confederate Tribes, creates a compelling narrative centred upon the environmental justice of the centuries-long Indigenous fight against the United States’ (US) cultural andlegal systems. Systems that, to this day, are deep-seated in white supremacist and settler-colonial frameworks of oppression. The author provides a range of case studies surrounding more contemporary environmental justice issues such as the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) and extractive development expansion, to the industrial revolution’s impact on environmental and cultural degradation. An underpinning theme is the paradigm shift required within environmental justice; away from one “defined by norms of distributive justice within a capitalist framework” (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019, pp. 12), to one that “can accommodate the full weight of the history of settler colonialism…and embrace differences in the ways Indigenous peoples view land and nature” (pp.12). She argues that the eradication of Indigenous worldviews through the imposition of dominant Christian settler-colonial ideas still permeates today, and that a deeper understanding of the Indigenous worldview that “there is no separation between people and land, between people and other life forms, or between people and their ancient ancestors” (pp. 138) would pave the way for freedom from environmental harms and injustices for Indigenous communities.
Legal frameworks should protect people, their health and wellbeing, and that of the environment. However, Gilio-Whitaker highlights that the US legal system is embedded in settler-colonial understandings of Indigenous cultures, which continues to cause harm. The first example of this is the Obama administration’s endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (pp.32). Whilst sanctioning for Indigenous peoples’ rights, the government’s “dictatorial and colonial” (pp. 33) approach functions like a backhanded compliment. It claims to support “rights to Indigenous self-determination” (pp. 32), but drowns the document in disclaimers, which shows the lengths to which administrations are willing to go in order to maintain a false pretence of supporting Indigenous peoples. A second example is in passing the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978), which outlawed the ban on Indigenous religious expression, but still provided legal backing for the destruction of sacred sites (pp. 140). The examples of unsuccessful cases, such as Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (pp. 140) and San Francisco Peaks (pp. 141-142), assumes the fundamental misunderstanding of Indigenous religion within Western agendas. This stems from the historical imposition of Christianity that still infiltrates today despite US secularity. This lack of understanding or compassion has forced Indigenous communities to pursue alternative approaches, such as pointing out human health implications (pp. 142), in hopes of establishing legal agency within jurisdictions. In order to decolonise the system, Gilio-Whitaker argues that we must divorce the legal system from a dominant Western religion in order to better protect Indigenous peoples and their cultures.
The need for coalition-building between Native and non-Native peoples is another strong undercurrent of Gilio-Whitaker’s book. However, in order to achieve productive collaboration for environmental justice, an understanding of histories and cultures is required by non-Natives, in order for us to act as better allies and collaborators. One such critical understanding that Gilio-Whitaker promotes through the history of national parks is the social construction of nature originating from the “virgin wilderness hypothesis” (pp. 39), or The Pristine Myth, which physically manifested into national parks. These parks were created in the name of “preservation”, but in reality, the only thing preserved was “white supremacy and settler privilege” (pp. 95) through relentless erasure of Indigenous peoples. In order to move forward in the environmental movement, non-Natives must disentangle ourselves from and decolonise the way we think about nature by for instance, re-imaging the way we think and talk about “wilderness”, particularly in the US. Another critical understanding was brought to the surface in Gilio-Whitaker’s account of the demonstrations organised by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe against DAPL and the culture clash that arose from the requirement for women to wear skirts. It highlighted the importance of traditional understanding and respect when supporting Indigenous communities. At first, I could understand why women stood by their views on wearing a skirt, which was embedded in the historical oppression or conditioning of women. However, Gilio-Whitaker makes a strong argument for why such clashes occur, which made me rethink my own stance. This shift in understanding came from looking at the changes in cultural systems as only benefitting white communities, and ultimately promoting white privilege. This reframing of the non-Native women’s belief as “white cultural superiority” (pp. 124) solidified for me how this culture clash still promotes an inherently racist agenda.
On the whole, I found Gilio-Whitaker’s analysis of Indigenous environmental justice crucial and thought-provoking. However, I felt that there was a political bias which, albeit understandable, convoluted the narrative and was at times contradictory. For instance, in her introduction, the same paragraph claims that Democrats and their values both do and do not support the movement for Indigenous social and environmental justice (pp. 11). Furthermore, the author goes on to argue that President Obama and his administration were more supportive of Indigenous peoples (pp. 33). Yet, throughout the book Gilio-Whittaker highlights the ambivalence of the Obama administration on Indigenous rights through examples such as the UNDRIP endorsement (pp. 32-33) and San Francisco Peaks legal battle (pp. 141). I would argue that instead of this conflicted approach towards a single administration, holding all political parties and leaders accountable would further benefit the environmental justice movement.
Gilio-Whitaker’s holistic account of Indigenous environmental justice structured within contemporary and historical timelines highlights the work that is still required to decolonise knowledge production and for the US to finally divorce itself from deeply racist ideologies that dictate social, environmental and legal systems.
This book review was published as part of our January 2021 collaboration with E&U for the Climate and Human Rights Pulse on Environmental Justice and Human Rights.
Ella Kiyomi Dobson is a senior at Dartmouth College majoring in Environmental Studies and minoring in studio art. They are particularly interested in the intersection of environmental and social issues pertaining to ecological and fisheries conservation. With previous experience working in the field at marine research labs, they are curious as to how to mitigate the consequential social injustices that stem from biological conservation and related policies.
Gilio-Whitaker, D. (2019). As Long as the Grass Grows: The indigenous fight for environmental justice, from colonisation to Standing Rock. Boston: Beacon Press.
In January 2021 Earth Refuge is collaborating with two excellent NGOs aiming to bring you insightful, accessible, and practical content about environmental justice and human rights throughout the month. This webinar is an introduction to all three organisations, their overall missions and how they hope to move forward in tackling environmental injustices globally.
Human Rights Pulse is a platform that brings together human rights practitioners, policymakers, campaigners, and students to raise awareness of current human rights issues around the world and to promote solution-oriented discussion. Human Rights Pulse aims to make human rights discussions accessible, engaging, and practical, in creating content which promotes the values of democracy, sustainability, and human rights.
E&U For The Climate is an international student-led organisation driven by the commitment of young citizens to environmental protection working to advocate for sustainability and policy solutions that mitigate the environmental crisis whilst tackling both climate change and gender/social/ethnic/racial injustices.
The photo of Aylan Kurdi shook the world in September 2015 as the migrant crisis reached its mediatic climax.[1] But this photo does not represent a forgotten past. Climate change, through its impact on food insecurity and subsequent migratory movements, continues to produce waves of humanitarian emergencies, only to be exacerbated by the “threat multiplier” effect.
For the Syrian boy Aylan, Climate Change affected him through its impact on the Arab Spring. This piece will look at the repercussions of Climate Change on the Arab Spring through the 2010 wheat crop yields and the Egypt Uprising. It will also explore the consequences this unrest had on migratory waves.
2010 Wheat Production
The 2011 price of wheat rose to $850, compared to $450 in 2010 as production fell in late 2010.[2] This decrease in production was the result of Canada’s yield,[3] the second in the world, plummeting by a quarter due to record rainfall. At the same time, China experienced droughts and dust storms from early 2010 into 2011, while Eastern Europe, Russia and the United States suffered similar low crop yields. Substitute products were not left unscathed as La Niña decreased Southern soybean and maize harvests, ultimately raising the overall price of food products.[4]
Egyptian Uprising
The Egyptian Uprising on the Tahrir Square in 2011 demonstrates one of the many negative externalities Climate Change can have in such a globalized economy. According to Troy Sternberg, the Chinese wheat drought in November 2010 was the main cause for this uprising.[5] The fall in production by 0.5% put pressure on the price of wheat and affected the availability of bread in Egypt. This in turn led to public protests which were met strongly by the authoritarian regime of President Hosni Mubarak. It is worth noting that Mubarak was in no way popular before these events unfolded.[6] Climate impacts only exacerbated the discontent. Since most Middle Eastern countries have an arid geography, they are heavily reliant on food importation, with some countries spending over 30% of their per capita income on food (Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Iraq).[7] That civil unrest spread throughout the Arab World, and became the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring
As the CNA report “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change” stated back in 2007, Climate Change acts as a “threat multiplier” for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.[8] Projected Climate Change will worsen already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, potentially causing widespread (geo)political instability and the emergence of failed states. Anticipating the impending crisis, the CNA identified both a national security risk for the United States, and the potential for violent unrest in the region. Inevitably, Climate Change played an essential role in the chain of events that unfolded, primarily through the increase in global food prices.[9] However, it is important to point out that the price increase was most likely only an aggregating factor. If governments had been more self-reliant, they may have been able to move away from their heavy reliance on food import through the development of their local markets and, thus, be less sensitive to food price shocks.
Migrant Crisis
The Arab World will “face drier winters, diminishing fresh water runoff and dwindling groundwater resources as the century progresses”,[10] with 75 to 250 million people in Africa projected to be exposed to water stress and food insecurity. This has already led to an increase in urban migration in the region, which intensified the political unrest by bringing “diverse, tribal, ethnic and religious groups into close contact while straining states’ capacity to cope with the needs of the populace”.[11] With its aforementioned impact on political stability, Climate Change will also aggravate poor conditions for people living in the Arab World, accentuating the flight of the population abroad.
Conclusion
The Arab Spring and subsequent migrant crisis can be attributed to many factors. While the most important and conspicuous factor is one of geopolitical nature, Climate Change still played its role in the Arab Spring as the silent trigger to the unrest. The wheat crop yield decrease and food price increase were directly influenced by unusual climate events, such as droughts and record rainfalls, which are directly correlated with man-made Climate Change. As these extreme weather events are going to increase in numbers, we can expect a corresponding emergence of political unrest across the world, especially in areas suffering from food insecurity. As a “threat multiplier”, Climate Change will augment migration movements from developing and underdeveloped countries to those more prosperous, for the latter have an environment less sensitive to the impacts of Climate Change and the resources to mitigate its impact, whereas the former, do not.
Joseph has a keen interest in working towards making our society sustainable. He wishes to use his background studying Climate Change, Economics and Cultural Diversity to bring the issue of climate migration to the forefront of the public debate, in order to promote international collaboration to mitigate the risk for local populations. He currently works in climate finance, with a focus on real estate, where he hopes to move the industry towards becoming more responsible, improving its impact on society.
[1] BBC News. 2020. Migrant Crisis: Photo Of Drowned Boy Sparks Outcry. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34133210> [Accessed 8 December 2020].
[2] Nasdaq. 2020. Nasdaq CBOT Wheat Future. [online] Available at: <https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/commodities/zw?timeframe=10y> [Accessed 8 December 2020].
[3] Werrell, C. and Femia, F., 2013. The Arab Spring and Climate Change – A Climate and Security Correlations Series. Center for American Progress.
[4] Ibid. 22
[5] Ibid. 14
[6] Ibid. 18
[7] Ibid. 19
[8] 2007. National Security And The Threat Of Climate Change. [online] Available at: <https://archive.org/stream/NationalSecurityAndTheThreatOfClimateChangeCNAApril2007/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change%20CNA%20April%202007_djvu.txt> [Accessed 8 December 2020].
There are currently no legal protections for ‘climate refugees.’ Additionally, a debate exists on whether to characterize those displaced by environmental degradation, climate change, and natural disasters as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘climate migrants.’ This paper assesses the law on refugees and addresses the legal protection gap as climate migrants are not a recognized category under international law.[2] Part I discusses the impacts on climate change and the increase in migration. Part II addresses the legal gap and assesses resolutions, court decisions, and a recent UN Human Rights Committee decision on climate refugees. Part III assesses ways the international community can move forward to protect climate migrants and provides several recommendations, and Part IV addresses other relevant gaps in international asylum law.
Overall, this paper is important as it raises awareness on relevant policy issues that the international community must face to strengthen asylum law and promotes the need for a Special Rapporteur on Climate Change, Human Rights, and Migration.
The Intergovernmental Report on Climate Change Report of 2018 demonstrated that the effects of climate change will be starkly different from 1.5°C to 2.0°C.[3] “The current level of global warming is 1.1°C warmer relative to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.”[4] Climate change threatens people’s livelihoods by displacing them from their homes, destroying limited natural resources, and exacerbating food insecurity.[5]Without drastic climate mitigation, the world is on track to 4°C warming by 2100, which would prove to be disastrous.[6] Additionally, those who will bear the worst burden of climate change are also those who have contributed the least to climate change.[7] The world’s Least Developed Countries account for 1% of global emissions, but have experienced 99% of the deaths from climate and weather-related disasters.[8]
Climate change will also continue to devastate populations around the world. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), “since 2009, an estimated one person every second has been displaced by climate or weather-related disaster since 2009 with an average of 22.5 million people displaced by climate or weather-related events since 2008.”[9]A World Bank report Groundswell – Preparing for International Climate Migration also stated “by 2050 – if no action is taken – there will be more than 143 million internal climate migrants” across sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.[10] For example, in Ethiopia, 1.5 million Ethiopians could be prompted to migrate by 2050 because of water shortages; 1.7 million Mexicans can turn into migrants by 2050 from arid north and low-lying southern regions that will be more prone to drought, wildfires, and flooding; and in Bangladesh: 13.3 million Bangladeshis can turn into climate migrants by 2050, exacerbated by overpopulation and overcrowded areas.[11]
Sea-level rise is also posing an increasing risk to coastal areas and is harming human settlements on Island-Nations such as Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands.[12]The people on these islands have few options besides relocating or elevating and protecting their land.[13] In the United States, climate migrants on the The Isle de Jean Charles on Louisiana’s wetlands are prone to experience intense flooding and are seeking relocation.[14]With the increase in the number of potential climate migrants and refugees, the international community must face the issue of how to protect and assist these vulnerable populations. Ultimately, climate change is “fundamentally a humanitarian issue in which our one home, with the perfect conditions for sustaining human life, is at jeopardy.”[15] The next section will assess the current legal framework governing climate refugees/migrants.
The law of refugees is established by an international law framework with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Before the Refugee Convention, in 1921, the League of Nations created the office of the Commissioner for Refugees which assessed Russian refugees’ legal status and provide relief.[16]With the changes of the early to mid-20th century, including people who were fleeing Eastern Europe and other places decimated by the World Wars, the need for an international organization with a mission on migration was clear.[17]
According to the Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who: “[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”[18]Assessing the language in the Refugee Convention and laws adopted in response to the Convention, there is a clear protection gap with regard to climate refugees since the current legal status does not include the “environment,” “climate,” or “natural disaster.”[19]The law also does not account for internal migration or displacement, which according to the World Bank, will greatly increase over the next few decades.[20]
The international community is beginning to recognize the connections among environmental degradation, climate change, and the influx of migrants and refugees. First, the Global Compact for Migration is an international non-binding agreement that “intends to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities that migrants may face.”[21] The Compact states that “societies are undergoing demographic, economic, social andenvironmental changes at different scales that may have implications for and result from migration.”[22]While the Compact does not provide any legal protections for climate migrants, language in the Compact reveals that the international community recognizes that climate change is a factor that influences asylum seekers.
Second, the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as part of the Global Compact on Refugees 2018 states “while not in themselves causes of refugee movements, climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements.”[23]Climate and environmental degradation are included in the sections addressing “prevention and root causes” of migrant and refugee movements. However, the comments on climate change were minimal throughout the document, indicating a lack of awareness of the severity of the issue.
Finally, a task force on climate displacement was created after the 2015 Paris Agreement Climate Conference to “develop recommendations to avert, minimize, and address displacement in the context of the adverse effects of climate change.”[24]The task force published a report with “recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”[25]Some recommendations include: (a) consider national legislation and policies that can minimize and address displacement related to climate change, taking into consideration human rights obligations; (b) enhance research, data collection and sharing of information to understand and manage human mobility; (c) strengthen preparedness, including early warning signs, contingency plans, and resilience building strategies; (d) integrate human mobility challenges into national planning processes; (e) assist internationally displaced persons; and (f) facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people.[26]
Overall, while there are several international reports recognizing the need to protect climate migrants, soft-law resolutions do not provide the legal protections that migrants need.
Courts are also grabbling with the uncertain legal status and legal characterization of ‘climate refugees,’ demonstrated by the case of Mr. Teitiota. In Teitiota v. Chief Executive Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment,a Kiribati citizen, Teitiota applied for refugee status in New Zealand stating that he should be protected as a refugee after residing in New Zealand unlawfully since his permit had expired.[27]Teitiota applied for refugee and protected person status “on the basis of changes to his environment” since sea level rise and other impacts of climate change are forcing people off the island of Kiribati.[28]The court had to determine if Teitiota met the threshold for protected person status under the Refugee Convention.[29]
The lower court in New Zealand originally found a lack of serious harm or serious violation of human rights and “expressed concern about expanding the scope of the Refugee Convention and opening the door to millions of people who face hardship due to climate change.”[30]New Zealand’s Court of Appeals ruled that, while climate change is a major and growing concern, the applicant did not qualify as a refugee under international human rights law within the 1951 Refugee Convention since climate change is not addressed under the Convention.[31]While Teitiota’s asylum claim was ultimately rejected, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of New Zealand recognized the “gravity of climate change” and the possibility “that environmental degradation resulting from climate change or other natural disasters could [] create a pathway into the Refugee Convention or protected person jurisdiction.”[32]
After Teitiota’s asylum application in New Zealand was denied, Teitiota and his family were deported back to Kiribati.[33]He then filed a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee, “arguing that by deporting him, New Zealand had violated his right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).[34]Mr. Teitiota further claimed that sea level rise and other effects of climate change had rendered Kiribati uninhabitable for all its residents.”[35]
In its opinion, the Human Rights Committee concluded that “New Zealand’s court did not violate his right to life” under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)[36]and under asylum law since Teitiota “did not objectively face a real risk of being persecuted if returned to Kiribati.”[37]The Committee further stated that Teitota was not a “refugee” as defined by the Refugee Convention since:
He had not been subjected to any land dispute in the past and there was no evidence that he faced a real chance of suffering serious physical harm from violence linked to housing/land/property disputes in the future. He would be able to find land to provide accommodation for himself and his family.[38] Moreover, there was no evidence to support his contention that he was unable to grow food or obtain potable water. There was no evidence that he had no access to potable water, or that the environmental conditions that he faced or would face on return were so perilous that his life would be jeopardized.[39]
However, the UN decision was incredibly important since it acknowledged the connections between climate change, migration, and human rights, by reasoning that climate change-induced migration can occur through sea level rise, salinization, land-degradation, or through intense storms and flooding.[40] It also emphasized the need for countries to act to prevent and mitigate climate change.[41]
Dissenting Opinion of Committee Member, Dunan Laki Muhumuza, stated the current conditions on the Republic of Kiribati “are significantly grave, and pose a real, personal and reasonably foreseeable risk of a threat to his life under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR.”[42]He disagreed with the majority’s opinion which held that the removal of Teitiota to the Republic of Kiribati did not violate his rights and found that the risks to Kiribati were more immediate and current than the majority found the impacts of climate change to be.[43]
The UN Human Rights Committee decision is said to be a “landmark” decision because the Committee stated that governments should not return migrants to countries where lives would be threatened by climate change.[44]While the Committee ruled against Teitiota, the Committee recognized that climate change and environmental degradation is a real threat to present and future generations. The Committee further noted that without “national and international action on climate change, impacts could become extreme enough to threaten the right to life, making it unlawful for states receiving climate migrants to turn them away.”[45]While the Committee believed that there is still time to for countries like Kiribati to protect their own citizens, they recognized “without robust national and international action, however, climate change might undermine the right to life, “thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations” of countries receiving climate migrants.”[46]Therefore, the UN Human Rights Committee was a drastic step towards recognizing the rights of climate migrants.
The next section will assess various recommendations that the international community can implement to protect climate migrants.
There are several proposed ways to protect climate migrants/refugees. This section will discuss several options, including revising the 1951 Refugee Convention, creating a new Convention that focuses solely on climate refugees, and appointing a Special Rapporteur on Climate Migration. This section ultimately proposes that the most immediate step the international community should take is to appoint a Special Rapporteur with a specific agenda.
Regarding revising the 1951 Convention, there are several challenges which the international community will face. The Head of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at the UN Migration Agency worries that opening the 1951 Convention may weaken refugees current legal status.[47]Opponents also argue that revising the 1951 will be time-consuming.[48]There may also be issues with countries having to re-ratify the convention, and there is already a lack of political will to even implement the Convention as it stands.[49]
There are also substantive challenges with revising the 1951 Refugee Convention to account for climate refugees. First, while many climate refugees will seek asylum across borders, many affected by climate change will also be internally displaced, and the 1951 Convention does not provide any protections for internal displacement.[50]Second, some argue that “focusing [on] a single cause [such as climate change] can distort and oversimplify the context” of extending protection.[51]Therefore, it is not recommended that the international community revise the 1951 Convention but instead look at other options to protect climate migrants.
In response to the legal protection gap, scholars suggest that the international community either revise the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees to include climate refugees or negotiate a new convention to guarantee specific rights and protections for climate refugees and migrants.[52]Faculty of Law at the University of Limoges have proposed a Draft Convention on climate refugees as environmentally-displaced persons with proposed Art. 2(2) stating:
“Environmentally-displaced persons” are individuals, families, groups and populations confronted with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that impacts their living conditions, resulting in their forced displacement, at the outset or throughout, from their habitual residence.[53]
While creating a new convention may also be a lengthy and cumbersome process, a new convention may be the best way to ensure that the connections between climate change and migration are properly assessed. Some organizations report that a new convention must (1) “qualify individuals and communities that cannot avail themselves of government relief from the effects of the climate crisis as those who are “persecuted” and thus allowed to formally make a claim for asylum in a country of their choosing; and (2) it must do so without the need to identify a specific polluter or industrial process as the source of such persecution.”[54]While the international community should eventually aim to create a new Convention, there are a few options that can be achieved sooner than implementing a new Convention.
International non-profits and scholars call for States to meet their obligations under the climate law framework established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).[55]By meeting their obligations under the UNFCCC, the international community will limit climate change to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels. While this will not legally protect climate migrants, it may mitigate how many people are displaced. The Head of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at the UN Migration Agency supports that preventive and mitigation measures (following the Paris Agreement) must be a key part of the discussion in protecting climate refugees.”[56]Therefore, States should be encouraged to meet their international obligations under the Paris Agreement and other future climate agreements regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
International organizations and scholars call for a UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Climate Change “to guide international action on climate-induced displacement.”[57]UN Special Rapporteurs “are independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council with the mandate to monitor, advise and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries (country mandates) and on human rights violations worldwide (thematic mandates).”[58]In 2018, the Human Rights Council appointed a Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment.[59]Therefore, it is plausible and recommended that the UN Human Rights Council appoint a Special Rapporteur on human rights and climate refugees. Additionally, the Head of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division at the UN Migration Agency states that “human rights-based approaches are key for addressing climate migration.”[60]
Moving forward, the international community should continue to investigate the links between climate change and migration. While the international community must decide how it will protect climate migrants, it is recommended that the Human Rights Council appoint a Special Rapporteur on climate migrants. In examining the links between climate change and migration, the Special Rapporteur can be tasked with the following:
Investigate the strengths and weaknesses of defining climate migrants as “environmentally-displaced persons.”[61]
Encourage State Parties to meet their obligations under the international climate regime.
Assess the political will of various States in signing on to a new refugee convention that particularly protects climate migrants.
Determine and prioritize immediate action plans for incredibly vulnerable States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu.
Explore the ethics of resettlement programs that involve vulnerable Pacific Island States such as Fiji, Tuvalu, and Kiribati.[62]Within the resettlement program, the Special Rapporteur can also investigate the ethics behind intercepting migrants and denying refugee status to those traveling by boat.[63]
Examine States’ duties to climate migrants in light of the principle of non-refoulement.[64]
The next section of this paper will briefly address other relevant issues in international asylum law pertaining to legal protection gaps of climate migrants.
Overall, the international system clearly needs more comprehensive protection for asylum seekers all around the world. World leaders are taking antagonistic actions toward asylum seekers and migrants and are using events such as the COVID-19 epidemic as a mechanism to bar asylum seekers from protection.[65]Scholars also note that the 1951 Refugee Convention “contains significant gaps and ambiguities … which render the 1951 Refugee Convention’s applicable legal standards insufficient in ensuring protection.”[66]First, one weakness includes States’ “more restrictive approaches” towards asylum-seekers, which includes State policies that discourage asylum seekers from arriving to a country’s territory.[67]Second, regional instruments exist that alter the standards of asylum law in different areas around the world.[68]Third, while the General Assembly can issue “soft-law” resolutions and “further the progressive development of international law,” there is still a lack of enforcement of international law.[69]
Moreover, the “gaps and ambiguities in the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention resulted in a refugee framework did not adequately cover new refugee law issues … and created disparate and sometimes contradictory standards” which vary depending on the country the asylum seeker is attempting to seek protection from.[70]Countries implement different policies has led to a fragmented and antagonistic approach towards asylum seekers. This is a major concern as countries respond to refugee crises in different ways. Additionally, the issue of climate migration will increasingly apply pressure to States’ legal and political systems. Therefore, it is important for the international community to create a more uniform approach to asylum law. One approach is to create guidance documents each year to encourage States to take a more harmonious approach towards asylum seekers.
There is still no legal framework protecting “climate refugees.” As the impacts of climate change will worsen, the need to ensure legal protections and rights for climate refugees and migrants is more important than ever. While language on climate displacement was at least mentioned in the UN Global Compact for Migration, the term climate refugee is still undefined. In response, it is advised that the international community should appoint a Special Rapporteur to work with UN Subsidiary bodies to (1) assess the strengths and weaknesses of different language on environmentally-displaced persons, (2) encourage State Parties to meet their obligations, (3) assess the political will of States signing on to a new refugee convention, (4) determine and prioritize immediate action plans for incredibly vulnerable States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, (5) explore the ethics of resettlement programs that involve vulnerable Pacific Island Nations, and (6) examine duties to climate migrants in light of the principle of non-refoulement. As Pope Francis has stated: “the natural environment is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the responsibility to everyone. If we make something our own, it is only to administer it for the good of all. If we do not, we burden our consciences with the weight of having denied the existence of others.”[71]
Anxhela (Angela) Mile is a J.D. and LL.M. graduate of the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (Pace Law). At Pace Law, Anxhela specialized in global environmental law and used her legal skills and scientific background to work on climate change and other global environmental issues. During her academic career, Anxhela has worked as a law clerk at the DOJ’s Environmental and Natural Resources Division, as a legal intern to the UN, and as a semester judicial clerk at the Southern District of New York.
[4] Benoit Mayer, The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018), (Nov. 2018) (citing Urgenda Foundation v. The Netherlands [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689 (June 24, 2015); aff’d (Oct. 9, 2018) (District Court of The Hague, and The Hague Court of Appeal at ¶ 3.5).
[7] “Without naturally occurring greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the planet would be 30 degrees cooler on average.” Gus Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability 1, 10 (Yale University Press eds., 2008) (See also Climate change has and will continue to influence the availability of freshwater, damage the health of ecosystems, cause sea level rise that will exacerbate coastal erosion, flooding and wetland loss, and may even increase human health suffering through increases in malnutrition, increased burden of diarrheal disease, and increase cardo-respiratory diseases. A 2004 report by the World Health Organization stated the loss of over 150,000 lives due to climate change).
[18] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) Art 1(A)(2), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
[21]Global Compact for Migration, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact.
[22]Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, ¶ 12, U.N. GA Doc. A/CONF.231/3 (July 30, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.231/3.
[24]COP24 side event: Recommendations of the Task Force on Displacement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage-ld/workshops-meetings/cop24-side-event-recommendations-of-the-task-force-on-displacement (last accessed on October 21, 2019).
[27] Mark Baker-Jones et Melanie Baker-Jones, TEITIOTA v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT – A PERSON DISPLACED, 15 QUT L. Rev. 102, 121 https://eprints.qut.edu.au/111864/1/111864.pdf
[36] Historic UN Human Rights Case, supra note 33.
[37] Human Rights Committee: Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016 (Jan. 7, 2020) ¶ 2.8, 10, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016&Lang=en [hereinafter “Human Rights Committee Decision on Climate Migrants”] (The Court also explained that: “
[38]Id. (The Tribunal noted that the father of the author’s wife was negotiating with the new owner of the land where the author had been living, and that an arrangement had been made to give the father time to relocate his family to their home island in the south. The Tribunal considered that while the author would need to share the available land with other members of his kin group, it would provide him and his family with access to sufficient resources to sustain themselves to an adequate level.)
[40] Press Release, Human Rights Committee, Historic UN Human Rights case opens door to climate change asylum claims (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E.
[45] Hillary Aidun, Ama Francis, U.N. Human Rights Committee Issues Landmark Climate Migration Decision, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (Jan. 21, 2020)http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/01/21/landmark-u-n-decision-says-countries-may-not-turn-away-climate-migrants-in-the-future/.
[49]Seven reasons the UN Refugee Convention should not include ‘climate refugees,’ UNSW Law: Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law (June 7, 2017),https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/seven-reasons-un-refugee-convention-should-not-include-climate-refugees.
[53] Michel Prieur, et al., Draft convention on the international status of environmentally- displaced persons, Revue Europeenne De Droit De L’Environnement 395, 397 (2008), https://www.persee.fr/doc/reden_1283-8446_2008_num_12_4_2058.
[54]Climate Refugees: The Climate Crisis and Rights Denied, Othering & Belonging Institute 1, 2 (Dec. 2019).
[55] EJF Protecting Climate Refugees, supra note 8.
[58]FAQS: United Nations Special Rapporteurs, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/faqs-united-nations-special-rapporteurs.
[59] UN News: David R. Boyd, Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/DavidBoyd.aspx.
[61]See language proposed by the Faculty of Law at the University of Limoges, supra note 53.
[62] Suong Vong, Protecting Climate Refugees is Crucial for the Future, Humanity in Action USA (May 2017) https://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/protecting-climate-refugees-is-crucial-for-the-future/ (Humanity in Action argues that the Pacific Access Category (PAC) program is “discriminatory in nature.” It is a program that “offers resettlement opportunities in New Zealand, although it has an annual cap of just 250 people each from Fiji and Tonga and 75 each from Tuvalu and Kiribati. In addition to the threshold limitations, the PAC requires applicants to have already secured a job offer in New Zealand; to have a good command of English; and to undergo a rigorous and costly medical check-up.”
[63] According to the UNHCR, asylum-seekers who are on a vessel that is being intercepted still have a right to be individually screened to determine if they have a basis of protection, such as a credible fear. If countries such as the U.S. and Australia are allowed to intercept asylum-seekers on the high seas, countries will increasingly be ignoring the human rights protections that asylum seekers and climate migrants deserve.
[64] UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf. (The principle of non-refoulement is a bedrock of the protections granted to refugees and other persons seeking protection in other countries). With climate change intensifying the need for vulnerable to migrate, States must have a more appropriate approach towards protecting asylum seekers and not resort to deportation and detainment.
According to the UNCHR, 79.5 million people were seeking refuge away from home at the end of 2019.[1] This migration is based on a variety of different motives and phenomena, including war, political, cultural or religious persecution as well as economic and humanitarian crises. According to development trends, change in climate is more and more often part of this bundle of motives.[2] The term ‘climate-induced migration’ includes both sudden migration due to extreme weather events, and slower population movements due to gradually developing long-term climate changes.[3] Due to the difficulty of determining a single reason for a person’s migration from this bundle of motives, the estimated figures for climate migrants by 2050 range from 25 million to 1 billion people.[4] Regardless of the exact number, which can deviate anyway due to unforeseen events, the problem is becoming more and more virulent. The international community will have to consider solutions to offer protection to the people affected. One proposed solution includes applying historical knowledge and reissuing a historical instrument.
This short essay explores this concept of a ‘climate passport’ for people compelled to leave their previous residence due to changes in climatic conditions, a concept suggested by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) in 2018.[5] In the course of this essay, the historical dimension of the ‘Nansen‘-passport, the legal instrument upon which the WBGU bases its concept, and the moral embedding of the principle of a Climate Pass will be discussed. Subsequently, the legal side of the concept will be examined and finally it will be concluded that in legal theory an intergovernmental claim already exists.
Nansen-Passports
First of all, it is worth taking a brief historical look at the Nansen Pass. The event that triggered its creation was the Soviet government’s 1922 decision to revoke the citizenship of 800,000 Russian citizens living in exile. These 800,000 people fled from the ongoing fighting of the Russian civil war both during and after World War I, or chose exile in fear of suppression by the newly formed government and were scattered throughout Europe.[6] In response to this deficiency, the ‘arrangement with respect to the issue of Certificates of Identity for Russian Refugees’ was negotiated in Geneva from 3-5 July 1922 under the leadership of the then-High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen. The ratifying states were obliged to issue passports to the now stateless people so that cross-border movement was an option during their search for a new home. In this way, the trapping dynamics of statelessness were overcome.[7] In 1933, the agreement was broadened to include Armenian, Turkish and Assyrian refugees.[8] Until it was discontinued, the passport had secured guest rights in safe countries for hundreds of thousands of people[9] and was recognized by 52 countries in 1942.[10]
In 1938 the Nansen International Office for Refugees was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for implementing this project.[11] To this day, this solution is still considered a successful individual counter-model to the concept of planned control of migration flows, which implementations historically all have failed.[12] Though the Nansen Pass no longer exists, its legacy lives on. The refugee travel documents issued today by states on the basis of the Geneva Convention for Refugees can be seen as the successors of the Nansen Pass.
Transferability of the Nansen principles to climate-induced migration
Since existing legal agreements do not explicitly provide for such an instrument or a similar one for climate-related migration, it is necessary to determine whether such an instrument is necessary and, if so, what form it should take.
Current legal protection of climate migrants
The first question to be asked is whether there is a need for such a legal protection instrument. This would not be the case if sufficient protection for climate refugees were already guaranteed by the prevailing legal norms and instruments.
Geneva Convention on Refugees
The basis for the protection of refugees in an international context is generally the Geneva Convention for Refugees of 1951 (GCR). With regard to climate migration, several issues arise concerning the scope of the Convention. Article 1 of the convention defines a refugee as follows:
‘As a result of events […] and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’[13]
Besides the obvious omission of climate-induced migration, the definition raises other less obvious hurdles that preclude analogous application or a broad interpretation.
According to the definition, a cross-border element is required, with the consequence that international refugee law only applies when a refugee leaves their country of origin and therefore the protection of internally displaced persons is primarily the responsibility of the affected state.[14] This leads to the exclusion of a significant number of climate migrants, since the majority – approx. 80%[15] – do not cross the borders of their country of origin during their first climate-related movement.[16][17]
Another decisive criterion in the definition of a ‘refugee’ is the existence of persecution, which itself must be based on a severe violation of human rights of a characteristic mentioned in the GCR.[18] For a climate migrant to fulfil the ‘persecution’ requirement, a favorable and broad understanding of climate-induced destruction would be necessary in order to attest the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) to a degree of wrongdoing comparable to political, religious or cultural persecution. Moreover, environmental change is unlikely to selectively affect (or persecute) one cultural, political or religious group alone.[19] A simple analogy can therefore not achieve the desired goal. This is particularly true because expanding the scope to include climate refugees would require a complete reversal of the paradigms underlying the GRC.[20] Until now, refugee law has protected people who flee persecution in their own state and thus seek protection elsewhere. However, climate migrants mainly need protection from actors in their own states.[21]
Climate migration is thus only covered by the GRC in more extreme cases. Unless special conditions are met – for example, if state actors deliberately destroy the environment in order to take targeted action against certain groups of people[22] – the Convention cannot be said to provide adequate protection to climate migrants. Although an amendment to the Convention in favor of environmental refugees is increasingly demanded and discussed, actual implementation of this is unlikely.[23] This prognosis is supported by current political developments[24] and the argument that an amendment could lead to a weakening of the existing international consensus on the GRC.[25]
Other international or regional treaties
Turning to other agreements, disillusionment arises quickly. Auspicious was the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which resulted from the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants by the UN General Assembly of 2016.[26] The Compact cites climate change as a cause of flight and calls for international cooperation.[27] But even before its ratification in December 2018, the agreement already lost significance due to the withdrawal of the USA in 2017[28] – not only an important player in world politics, but also one of the largest emitters.[29] Criticism and headwind also came from the ratifying states. In the face of this, the German Federal Government assured that the Compact would not be a legally binding agreement.[30] This was however not enough for critics of the Compact, so that even before ratification the Federal Constitutional Court ruled out the possibility of a legally binding agreement in interim legal protection.[31] Thus, this initially promising agreement rapidly degenerated into so-called ‘soft law’: agreements that may have moral or political effect but are not legally enforceable.[32]
The proposal of a Global Pact for Environment, which aims to securitize central principles of international environmental law, goes in a similar direction. Among other things, it is intended to establish the right to a healthy environment, which is fertile ground for individual rights of climate migrants.[33] Whether the Pact, which is to be signed at the Earth Summit 2022,[34] will ultimately be legally binding and therefore overcome the status of soft law is still unclear, but there is room for doubt.
There are also some agreements that exist to protect refugees at a regional level, but save for the Arab Refugee Convention[35], even these by definition do not cover environmentally induced migration, or apply solely to internally displaced persons.[36] While the Arab Refugee Convention[37] and most other agreements targeting internal migration share the fate of international agreements due to their legally non-binding character,[38] the African Kampala Convention is an exception to this norm. It is a legally binding agreement that creates a framework for the protection and distribution of internal migrants and obligates ratifying states to protect affected persons.[39]
The idea of timely migration in the form of the Climate Pass
What all these agreements have in common is the provision of reactive or retrospective protection for migrants affected by climate change. The concept of the Climate Pass developed by WBGU, on the other hand, aims to facilitate active, early, and thus dignified migration from affected regions.[40] Such a passport would grant the holders not only the right to be admitted by other countries, but rights similar to those of citizenship. The WGBU makes a distinction in order to identify the states that are obliged to admit refugees and those individuals that would be entitled to a passport.
The ‘polluter-pays’ principle should be applied to ensure that climate migrants are fairly distributed amongst the receiving states.[41] So, those states that are responsible for a large part of the anthropogenic contributions to climate change should shoulder most of the burden. It is imperative that both historically cumulated emissions and current per capita emissions should be taken into account. According to these factors, WBGU proposes the 10 nations with the highest historical cumulative emissions and the 15 nations with the highest per capita emissions as primarily responsible. This is because these countries bear a considerable moral responsibility for the origin of many causes of migration. The gross domestic product, area and population density of the respective countries are recommended as additional indicators.[42] For reasons of effective protection, however, a further evaluation criterion should be the extent to which the potential host country is affected by climate change themselves. If, for example, Sint Marteen or Trinidad & Tobago – both amongst the 15 countries with the highest per capita emissions[43] – are themselves threatened by climate change,[44] protection in a less affected country such as Germany seems more appropriate. After all, the Climate Pass is not intended to shift problems but to offer a dignified future to the migrants by solving them.
When it comes to the question of who is to receive the Climate Passport, a system of prioritization will also have to be conducted, this time according to a time component. Although all those affected should have the right to such a humanitarian instrument, the first step will be to protect those people who will be affected by climate changes at the earliest possible stage. In particular, inhabitants of flat island states are to be mentioned. The exact identification of the particularly affected areas is to be carried out by a commission of scientific experts.[45]
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Climate Pass is not a silver bullet solution to problems caused by climate change. Rather, it is intended to flank other climate protection measures, and the WBGU points out that it can even support the achievement of other goals. For example, a country that feels overburdened by the obligation to admit refugees could be incentivized to reduce its emissions. The principles developed and presented here are to be understood as guidelines that require concrete implementation. First and foremost, the signatory states would have to agree on measures and guidelines on how to deal with migrants before and after the period of flight in order to prevent migrants from having a precarious existence in the destination country. The focus of these guidelines should not be solely on economic factors. Cultural and social disruption must also be addressed.[46] The WBGU would prefer the drafting of an international agreement, for instance, an additional protocol to the Paris Convention of 2015.[47]
Obligation under international law of the issuing states to assume responsibility
The WBGU forms its argument upon the moral obligation of states arising out of responsibility and thus hopes for the creation of an international agreement. It is possible, however, that an intergovernmental obligation under international law already exists.[48] This would be favorable due to the fact that there is little evidence of an upcoming international consensus in view of the actual political situation, including a failure by many states to meet the Paris Agreement climate targets.[49]
Basis of liability
In order to establish a binding obligation upon emitting states, a legal basis is necessary by which these states are liable for climate damage caused by emissions. Although the major emitters have recognized responsibility in the Paris Convention, one searches in vain for liability rules.[50] It is worth noting that it has been stated that the agreement should not prejudice liability issues.[51]
This leaves recourse only to the liability rules of general international environmental law,[52] in particular by applying the rules of customary law on the ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (ARS). Of primary interest here is the liability norm of Art. 31 ARS, which states the following:
‘1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.’[53]
Whether a presumed violation of law is present, is once again determined by general international law. Here, above all, the international environmental law and its fundamental principle formulated in the IGJ evaluation on the use of nuclear weapons is of importance.[54] It essentially establishes that all states are obliged to refrain from activities on their own territory that damage or destroy the environment of other states.[55] As Frank notes, such damages would be rewarded in the case of the loss of entire habitats according to the international legal definition of environmental damage.[56]
The problem of causation and evidence
The question of liability is followed by the classic problem of causation. Since scientifically calculated climate models are only prognoses, the legal requirements for evidence and causality in environmental law disputes must be addressed.
In its commentary on the ARS Draft, the ILC positions itself in such a way that in the event of serious and irreversible damage, full scientific certainty of causation is not required.[57] A North American court of arbitration provided a more concrete definition, as it defined its requirements as ‘clear and convincing evidence of the damage’ in Trail Smelter of 1939 and 1941.[58] What constitutes the exact inner nature of the terms, however, was not answered by the court. Wolfrum classifies this criterion between the criteria ‘preponderance of evidence’, where sufficient probability is already adequate, and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which presupposes the removal of any reasonable doubt,[59] so that a high degree of persuasiveness of the evidence – but no conclusive certainty – is required for clear and convincing evidence.
It is likely that these requirements could be met by today’s climate projections from internationally recognized scientists, because even if they cannot provide an exact prediction of the future, they make substantial and sufficiently concrete statements. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the arbitral tribunal intended to apply this newly created criterion to claims for damages. This doubt is supported by the fact that the court only adopted this standard in the second part of the judgment when assessing preventive claims and felt compelled to give specific reason for this, and that ‘preponderance of evidence’ was already adequate for prove of damage.[60] So, there are good reasons for applying the preponderance of evidence, but since the WBGU Climate Passport also contains preventive purposes, the stricter interpretation should be considered. Because current climate predictions are sufficient under the stricter interpretation, a decision in dispute at this point is not decisive for the purposes of this essay.
For the existence of a causality link in the sense of the conditio sine qua non formula, Art. 47 ARS requires first a breach of duty by the state itself. At the same time, however, a contributory causality is sufficient.[61] Whether a state’s greenhouse gas emissions are a contributory cause depends on whether the damage caused by climate change can be attributed to it via an individualized causal chain.[62] As Sands/Peel note, GHG-emissions lead to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere worldwide.[63] Consequently, a contributory cause for climatic changes is given for damages, which can be attributed to this increased concentration in the upper atmosphere. This will be applicable to ‘slow onset’- effects but cannot yet be conclusively answered for extreme weather events due to difficulties in providing evidence.[64]
The limitations of the court in Trail Smelter that excluded such environmental impacts that are ‘too indirect, remote and uncertain’ are irrelevant to the question of liability causation. The court only wanted to limit the scope of damage and exclude general indirect, economic damage, since it is ‘purely speculative’.[65]
Obligation of result or obligation of conduct?
The decision is arguably the starting point for the question of liability. Both an obligation of result as well as an obligation of conduct are being discussed. The latter would require a violation of due diligence to avoid environmental damages in other states. When answering this question, three judgments of international law are relevant to the outcome.
As mentioned, Trail Smelter is the starting point. The court of arbitration concluded that there was both an obligation of conduct and an obligation of result with the two differentiated according to the nature of the claim. The first would thus apply to the prevention of environmental damage on foreign territory, while the latter would apply to the compensation of damage.[66] The court also clarified that the implementation of preventive measures does not exclude a claim for compensation.[67]
Those supporting a general obligation of conduct rely primarily on the Pulp Mills ruling from the ICJ[68]. It is true that the court was examining the due diligence of the Uruguayan environmental audit system and even reprimands it for shortcomings. However, this position overlooks that the court explained its decision already with lacking causality and thus with its judgement no statement about the arrangement kind of the obligation was made.[69]
But most recently, with both the ICJ rulings in the proceedings Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa- Rica,[70] the court has tipped the balance in one direction by again taking up the differentiation from Trail Smelter. In both decisions, the court makes a strict distinction between ‘procedural obligations’ regarding avoidance of possible environmental hazards on the territory of other states and ‘substantive obligations concerning transboundary harm’ regarding compensation. Exclusively on a ‘procedural level’ the court requires a violation of due diligence. According to the reasons for the judgement, liability depends solely on the causality and the extent of the damage. [71]
For the Climate Pass, this implies that different requirements may apply depending on when its validity is enforced between countries. In the WBGU’s ideal scenario, it should also facilitate preventive migration. This would mean that the state to which the claim is made would have to violate its duty of due diligence. The ICJ sets strict standards for this duty. The Court states that the ‘determination of the content of the environmental impact assessment should be made in light of the specific circumstances of each case’,[72] reinforcing its ruling in Pulp Mills.[73] If the investigation reveals possible environmental damage, the acting state is obliged under international law to find a solution in good faith with the affected states to eliminate or minimize the risk.[74] According to current scientific findings on climate change, such a risk can be affirmed without too much difficulty, so that even in the case of a procedural due diligence requirement, there is an obligation imposed on the emitting states.
The only question that remains is how the content of the obligation can be structured.
Content and Scope of Liability
This last question can again be divided into two parts: first, are the states jointly and severally liable and second, what exactly is the liability of the states?
States as joint and several debtors
The question of whether states are jointly and severally liable in addition to their own partial responsibility is answered by Art. 47 ARS:
‘1. Where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, theresponsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act.’[75]
In the commentary on the ARS, the authors give examples of when such a joint interaction exists. On the one hand, this is supposed to be the case if states act in a way in which they are considered to be acting together from an external perspective. For instance, through the action of a common organ.[76] This possibility alone could be sufficient under international agreements in which the states have recognized joint responsibility.[77] On the other hand, it can also occur when several states contribute to the pollution or damage of an object or area. Here the pollution of a river is mentioned as an example. As Frank correctly states, the case is very similar to that of greenhouse gas emissions. Here too, several actors contribute to the pollution of an environmental medium with corresponding consequential damage. Joint and several liability must therefore be assumed.[78] As drawn from national legislation, Art. 47 ARS in its second paragraph also permits a later internal equalization of all liable states.[79]
Content of Liability
With regard to the preventive intent of the Climate Pass, a claim for compliance could arise from the mirroring of the prevention obligation under Art. 3 ARS. For this purpose, Art. 2 (a) in conjunction with Art. 3 ARS presupposes that considerable damage is imminent and that there is a high probability of its occurrence.[80] Although it would be possible to subsume climate damage and the resulting migration as imminent damage with a high probability of occurrence, it seems highly questionable whether this claim could constitute an active obligation on the part of emitters in addition to a claim to cease and desist from greenhouse emissions. Prevention will principally mean to refrain from damaging behavior. Irreversible environmental processes that have already been set in motion and are resulting in damage are then more a question of the justification of the extent of the damage in a claim for compensation. Additionally, it is important to note the difficulty of identifying and proving a single motive from a bundle of causes for displacement in this instance.
A claim for damages already incurred is less problematic. According to Art. 31 ARS, the obligated state owes full reparation for damage that has been sustained. Under international law, this also includes adequately caused indirect damage.[81] Thus, the loss of one’s livelihood due to climatic change caused by temperature or sea level rise is also included. Art. 35 ARS basically establishes that damages must be compensated in the form of in rem restitution. Frank argues that in case of climate migration this would require states to help climate migrants to continue living a dignified life in a new environment.[82] This interpretation is supported by the basic principle arising out of Factory of Chorzow. Accordingly, states are obliged:
‘to wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and to reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed ‘.[83]
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that the WBGU’s concept of a Climate Passport, at least in part, has an anchoring in international law in addition to a moral anchoring in the ‘polluter-pays’ principle. This anchoring could in turn establish an obligation for states to implement the goals of a Climate Passport at least indirectly. This would apply at least to instances in which damage in the concrete form of habitat destruction by climatic change has already occurred.
Whether there is an obligation arising as a counterpart to the prevention prohibition to participate beyond this is doubtful. However, in view of the ideal version of the Climate Pass, this leaves the legal obligation with the following unsatisfactory ‘procedural’ hurdles, which run the risk of undermining the actual objective, namely, to enable early and humane migration.
The first hurdle is that the claim exists only between states. As a result, people who are actually affected by the changes would have to trust that their government would bring a claim on their behalf. This presupposes that the states not only recognize the dramatic situation of their own people, but also admit their own inability and powerlessness to remedy it. In states that are particularly badly affected, this may seem tangible as a last resort, but in states that are affected by ‘slower’ catastrophes in particular, political power mechanisms are pushing this solution further into the distance. The probability that such a claim will be asserted too late for large sections of the affected population, or at least too late to enable dignified migration seems highly probable. An aggravating factor is that in the majority of cases the current global political reality would prefer monetary support at contractual level until the very last moment rather than actual participation in a project like the Climate Passport. Monetary support in the sense of adaptation at home can certainly have a positive effect and is probably preferable to fleeing to farther-flung parts of the world for socio-cultural reasons. That is provided, of course, that these regions have the capacity and opportunities to shoulder these groups of people. From the perspective of legal protection, however, a securitized right in the form of a recognized Climate Passport is preferable for individuals.
Another hurdle is judicial enforcement. Individual legal disputes can delay ad-hoc decisions for an unnecessarily long time and make it difficult to enforce existing claims. An individual case-by-case approach to such a complex global situation in court cannot be the desired outcome and common goal of the international community.
An international agreement would therefore be compelling not only for reasons of protection, but also for reasons of effectiveness. Standardization would facilitate processes and would indeed establish a ‘lighthouse’ of humanity,[84] as WBGU was aiming for with the proposal of this concept. Without standardisation, such a lighthouse, would have to be fought for continuously on a case-by-case basis and and would not radiate enough light to create an impact.
Robert Los is a student of law at the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany. His interest and commitment to climate law issues extends mainly to voluntary work alongside his studies and work
[1] UNCHR (2020): Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019.
[2] Rigaud/Sherbinin/ Jones/Bergmann/Clement/Ober/Schewe/Adamo(Mccusker/Heuser/Midgley (2018): Groundswell – Preparing for Internal Climate Migration; WBGU – Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (2008): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Hauptgutachten; WBGU (2014): Klimaschutz als Weltbürgerbewegung. Sondergutachten.
[3] WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 25.
[4] Ionesco/Mokhnacheva/Gemenne (2017): The Atlas of Environmental Migration; cf. WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 25.
[5] WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.
[7] League of Nations, Arrangement with respect to the issue of certificates of identity to Russian Refugees, 5 July 1922, League of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. XIII No. 355, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b4864.html (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[8] League of Nations, Arrangement of 12 May 1926 relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 12 May 1926, Treaty Series Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2004.
[9] WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24.
[10] Marrus (2013): Nansen-Pass. In: Diner, D., Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte und Kultur 44.
[12] Oliver-Smith/de Sherbinin (2014): Resettlement in the twenty-first century. Forced Migration Review 45, p. 23–25; cf. WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24.
[13] Article 1A II of Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
[14] cf. Nümann(2019): Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’, https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/283563/rechtliche-schutzmoeglichkeiten-fuer-klimafluechtlinge- (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[15] Adger/Pulhin/Barnett/Dabelko/Hovelsrud/Levy/Oswald Spring/Vogel (2014): Human security, p. 767.
[16] EACH-FOR Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (2009): Synthesis Report, S. 72; Nümann(2019): Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’.
[17] Later, further escapes – e.g. because of poverty – as late consequences of the first climate-induced flight are probably still regarded as flights for the respective reasons. This leads to problems in questions of liability under international climate law and will be discussed below.
[18] Nümann(2014): Umweltflüchtlinge? Umweltbedingte Personenbewegungen im internationalen Flüchtlingsrecht, p. 254 et seqq.
[19] Cf. Hathaway (1991): The Law of Refugee Status, S. 92 f.; Zimmermann/Mahler(2011): Article 1 A, para. 2 1951 Convention. In: Zimmermann: The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A Commentary. Oxford und New York, p. 440.
[20] See McAdam (2010): Climate Change Displacement and International Law. Side Event to the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges 8 December 2010, p. 2, www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d95a1532.pdf (Last access: 20.11.2020).
[21] cf. Nümann, Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’, 2019; McAdam (2009): From Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 592.
[22] One example of this is the draining of the marshlands in the 1990s by Sadam Hussain in Iraq in order to take action against the predominantly Shiite marsh Arabs; cf. Nümann(2014): Umweltflüchtlinge? Umweltbedingte Personenbewegungen im internationalen Flüchtlingsrecht, p. 313 et seqq.
[23] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.
[24] While the European Union and the USA deal ingloriously with migration in the Mediterranean and Central America respectively, projects to deal with climate migration are being put off. It is all the more fatal that Finland and Sweden have repealed their existing rules for climate refugees in the face of the refugee crisis in 2015; see Kraler/Katsiaficas/Wagner(2020): Climate Change and Migration, Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration.
[25] Hanschel (2017): Klimaflüchtlinge und das Völkerrecht. Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 1, p. 1–8; WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.
[26] UN General Assembly (2016): New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016. New York: UNGA.
[27] United Nations (2018): Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Final Draft. New York: UN.
[28] USA saw its sovereignty curtailed by the agreement, cf. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-un-global-compact-on-migration (Last Access: 20.11.2020).
[29] Edenhofer/Jakob (2019): Klimapolitik – Ziele, Konflikte, Lösungen, p. 25.
[31] BVerfG, Beschluss der 2. Kammer des Zweiten Senats vom 07. Dezember 2018 – 2 BvQ 105/18 -, para. 1-23.
[32] Markard (2018): Migration wird erstmal das Thema aller, Der Tagesspiegel v. 18.11.2018; https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/un-migrationspakt-erstmals-eine-gemeinsame-haltung-der-welt-zu-migration/23648828.html (Last Access: 20.11.2020).
[33] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.
[34] United Nations (2019): Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 30 August 2019.
[35] Art. 1 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees lists ‘natural disasters’ as a reason for migration.
[36] Kälin (2017): Klimaflüchtlinge oder Katastrophenvertriebene. German Review on the United Nations 65 (5), 207–212; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.
[37] Kälin/Schrepfer (2012): Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change. Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches. UNHCR, Division of International Protection, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series. Genf, p. 34. www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[38] Ferris/Bergmann (2017): Soft law, migration and climate change governance. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8 (1), 6–29.; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 et seqq.
[39] Art. 5 IV, 12 II African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa; cf. cf. Nümann(2019):Rechtliche Schutzmöglichkeiten für ‘Klimaflüchtlinge’, bpb-Dossier ‘Migration und Klimawandel’.
[40] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 28.
[41] WBGU (2008): Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Hauptgutachten.; WBGU (2009): Kassensturz für den Weltklimavertrag – Der Budgetansatz. Sondergutachten.
[42] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 29 et seqq.
[43] Sint Marteen: 19,5 t CO2 per capita; Trinidad & Tobago: 34,2 t CO2 per capita; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 30.
[44] cf. for Trinidad & Tobago see World Health Organization (2020): Health & Climate Change – Country Profile 2020, Trinidad & Tobago; cf. For Sint Marteen see Gerges/Hirschfeld/Hutar/Salzman/Sorensen/Meyer (2018): Corruption in an Era of Climate Change: Rebuilding Sint Maarten after Hurricane Irma, Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 18-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179203 (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[45] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 28.
[46] Serdeczny (2017): What Does It Mean To ‘Adress Displacement’ Under the UNFCCC? Discussion Paper No. 12.; cf. WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 29.
[47] WBGU (2018): Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 28.
[48] Individualized claims of migrants against emitting states are also being discussed. But there are considerable doubts; cf. Vöneky/Beck (2017): in Prölß, Internationales Umweltrecht, p. 166.
[49] Cf. for failing to meet climate targets see Climate Action Network Europe (2018): Off target Ranking of EU countries’ ambition and progress in fighting climate change.
[50] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 529.
[51] Art. 8 para 1 Paris Agreement, 2015; https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; Nr. 53 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 2015; https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[52] Frank (2016): Anmerkungen zum Pariser Klimavertrag aus rechtlicher Sicht, Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 2016, p. 354.
[53] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[54] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 531 et seqq.; Schmalenbach (2017): Verantwortlichkeit und Haftung, p. 215 et seqq., in: Prölß, Internationales Umweltrecht, 2017.
[55] ICJ (1996): Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep 1996, 226 (242) (para 29).
[56] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 532.
[58] Trail Smelter Arbitration (USA v. Canada), Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938/41), Vol. III, 1964 et seqq.
[59] Wolfrum (2013): International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence, In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2013 para. 10 and para. 69 et seqq.
[60] Frank(2014):Klimahaftung nach Völkerrecht in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Extra 11/2014, p. 4 et seqq.
[61] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[62] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019 p. 531; dissenting: Vöneky/Beck (2017): Umweltschutz und Menschenrechte in Prölß, Internationales Umweltrecht, p. 133 et seqq.
[63] Sands/Peel (2018): Principles of International Environmental Law, p. 298.
[64] Rahmstorf/Schnellnhuber (2019): Der Klimawandel, p. 68 et seqq.
[65] Trail Smelter Arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938/41), Vol. III, p. 1931 f.
[66] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 532.
[67] Trail Smelter Arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938/41), Vol. III, p.1980.
[68] Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20.4.2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14.
[69] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 532.
[70] Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) u. Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 2015, 615 et seqq.
[71] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 533.
[72] Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) u. Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 2015, p. 707.
[73] Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20.4.2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 83.
[74] Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) u. Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 2015, p. 707.
[75] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[76] cf. Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 534.
[77] f.i. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Paris Agreement
[78] Frank (2019): Klimabedingte Migration, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2019, p. 534.
[79] ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Last Access: 21.11.2020).
[80] Frank(2014):Klimahaftung nach Völkerrecht in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Extra 11/2014, p. 3 et seqq.
It was not meantto last forever in the real world.But why admit that, when you can go ondoing what you always do,mourning and laying blame,always the two together.I don’t need your praiseto survive. I was here first,before you were here, beforeyou ever planted a garden.And I’ll be here when only the sun and moonare left, and the sea, and the wide field.I will constitute the field.[1]
— excerpt from Witchgrass, Louise Glück
1. Introduction: The Threat of Displacement
When high-tide hits, Ioane Teitiota races to his flimsy sea wall, quickly patching up holes in the fragile boundary between his home in the archipelago nation of Kiribati, and the ever-menacing ebb and flow of the Pacific Ocean. Today, the nation of Kiribati exists as a collection of small land strips struggling to stay afloat in the increasingly precarious Pacific. Teitiota, the world’s first official climate refugee, currently resides with his wife and three children in the nation’s main island Tarawa, which measures a mere 3m (9.8ft) above sea level at its highest point. His days are spent either preparing for high tide or reeling from it, with periodic attempts to treat the red patches that cover his children’s skin––an adverse effect of bathing in the island’s contaminated groundwater. When asked about his futile battle for recognition as a climate refugee, Teitiota declared somberly, “I’m the same as people who are fleeing war. Those who are afraid of dying, it’s the same as me.”[2]
The historian Will Durant once wrote that “there have only been twenty-nine years in all of human history during which a war was not underway somewhere.”[3] Given this calculation, we can easily conclude that conflict is an innate aspect of human nature and history. For as long as nation-states have existed, so has war and conflict. And for as long as war and conflict have existed, so have refugees. Refugee crises––i.e., the mass-movement or mass-reception of forcibly displaced persons––have been rampant along the US and European borders for generations. Today, however, the face of this crisis is beginning to change. A new age has introduced a new player, one who acts cruelly and mercilessly, who cannot be prosecuted against or pleaded with, and who has little regard for the value of human life: our home, Planet Earth.
As partisan as they may seem in news and politics, the widespread effects and challenges of climate change are no longer something we can ignore, no longer something to be confined to the far-left of the political spectrum. With unprecedented levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the face of our planet is transforming rapidly: temperatures rising, ice sheets melting, sea levels surging, forests burning, oceans acidifying, soils depleting––and that’s only the beginning. The heightened frequency and extremity of natural disasters, particularly along the Earth’s lower latitudinal belt, has rendered many regions and homelands unlivable, causing devastation for millions of citizens around the globe.[4] As we face an increasingly hazardous world at the hands of anthropogenic climate change, it is imperative that we adapt and mitigate risk by means of transforming our current migration system. While the ultimate solution undoubtedly lies in a more pervasive, preventative approach––including reducing global emissions and making a worldwide shift to renewable energy––a more immediate solution must encompass sustainable development in regions most vulnerable to environmental and climate impacts, as well as stronger migratory aid and support through policy-based regulation and protection within domestic and global migration pathways.
2. The Effects of Climate Change
On March 14, 2019, the Tropical Cyclone Idai struck the southeast coast of Mozambique, culminating in a reported 146,000 displaced persons, 100,000 damaged homes, 1 million acres of destroyed crops, $1 billion worth of demolished infrastructure, and approximately 1.85 million people in need of assistance.[5] Though this event was without question the single worst storm in Mozambique’s history, various studies have shown that “unprecedented”[6] storms such as this one will soon become ordinary, setting a new and frightening standard for what we can expect from the weather. In 2017, 68.5 million people were forcibly displaced around the world; one third of those displacements took place due to extreme weather events. What’s more, “scientists fear that extreme events of this sort will increasingly occur in clusters, with one disaster following immediately after another––much as Hurricanes Irma and Maria followed Harvey in August-September 2017.”[7] The potential consequences of this trend are daunting, with both its capacity for unparalleled destruction and its power to inhibit or disincentivize aid from outside parties.
There’s no shortage of critical issues the international community will face as a consequence of climate change. Soil depletion, land degradation and ocean acidification will continue to increase the stress on resources such as food, water and energy, especially in underdeveloped countries. In many poor and divided countries, officials fear that resource scarcity will give way to conflict among internal factions, endangering fragile governments and providing breeding grounds for terrorist groups and organizations.[8] If we do not change our practices rapidly and radically, the combination of resource scarcity, extreme weather hazards, rising sea levels, and increased vulnerability to disease outbreaks will undoubtedly lead to mass displacement and mass migration on a perennial scale.
It is important to note that the effects of climate change are not evenly distributed. Far from it, the World Bank estimated in 2018 that “three regions (Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia) will generate 143 million more climate migrants by 2050.”[9] The countries most likely to feel pressure from climate change are those with low adaptive capacities, vulnerable geographies, fragile ecosystems, and reliance on climate-sensitive industries such as agriculture or fishing.[10] At the same time, it is the citizens living in these countries––generally the poorest and most vulnerable––who often lack adequate resources needed to migrate. While more developed and diversified countries may not feel the stress of climate change as imminently or severely as other regions do, climate calamities in other parts of the world will vastly increase the flow of migrants to the US and European borders. In a 2015 memorandum, the Department of Defense (DoD) wrote to Congress that “climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water. These impacts are already occurring, and the scope, scale, and intensity of these impacts are projected to increase over time.”[11]
In 2008, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released environment working papers which ranked port cities around the world by their exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes. These papers served as the first official estimate of the world’s largest port cities’ vulnerability to coastal flooding and high wind damage due to storm surge, and further aimed to explore how climate change will affect future exposure in port cities, population growth, and urbanization. The top ten cities that this assessment (conducted in 2005) found to be most exposed in terms of population were “Mumbai, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Miami, Ho Chi Minh City, Kolkata, Greater New York, Osaka-Kobe, Alexandria and New Orleans; almost equally split between developed and developing countries.”[12] However, while the exposure of coastal cities may be evenly split along the developed and developing world, it is important to note that exposure does not always translate into impact. The impact of high winds or storm surges in coastal cities nearly always depends on the scope and scale of protection measures. And predictably, cities in richer countries tend to have vastly more thorough protection systems in place than those in the developing world. The policy implications of this report were evidently in favor of greater mitigation and adaptation at the city-scale, especially with regard to global mitigation efforts buying time for cities to put forth more adaptive measures.
A second paper released by the OECD in 2008 served to assess the economic impacts of climate change at the city-scale, focusing on sea level rise and storm surge, using Copenhagen as a case study. The study used a statistical analysis of past storm surges in Copenhagen coupled with geographical information on the city’s population in order to accurately estimate the direct (i.e., damage to infrastructure) and indirect (i.e., unemployment) losses of storm surge. In conclusion, the study found that while Copenhagen’s vulnerability to coastal flooding is relatively low, without the protective measures that are already in place, losses would still reach EUR 3 billion by the current 120-year storm surge event.[13] Because the high level of protection and low level of risk in Copenhagen is not realistic for all cities, the study went on to apply the same methodology to a virtual city––based on Copenhagen but without its current protective measures––in order to estimate the more general economic cost of climate change-induced sea level rise. This approach found that the increased risk due to climate change would prove overwhelmingly destructive in many cities if the global community does not support a massive upgrade in widespread flood protection. In conclusion, the papers note that “even though a coastal city might be very well protected today, the risks of climate change will require attention to the maintenance and upgrade of coastal flood protection in order to limit future risks in the face of future sea level risk and increased storm surge.”[14] Moreover, “it is important to build defenses in a way that allows for flexibility, taking into account the certainties in projections and making it possible to upgrade them if sea level rise is larger than expected.”
3. The Climate-Migration Nexus
When Ioane Teitiota applied for his family’s refugee status in New Zealand in 2015, his case made it all the way to the High Court of New Zealand but was ultimately rejected, and he was later deported for overstaying his visa. Now, back in the disappearing nation of Kiribati, Teitiota stands by his demand, stating “I think being a refugee is the best way of protecting myself. Especially if something happens to Kiribati.”[15] With sea levels rising at approximately 12mm/year, eight Pacific Islands have already been submerged completely. Two more are on the brink of going under, and “by 2100, it is estimated that 48 islands overall will be lost to the rising ocean.”[16] Though the various New Zealand tribunals and courts that considered Teitiota’s case did accept that he was telling the truth, they did not believe the dangers he was describing to be imminent. Specifically, the New Zealand government did not accept that Teitiota’s circumstances were similar enough to those described under international refugee law, and therefore they refused to grant him refuge.
In a similar vein, islands within the Pacific nation state of Tuvalu “have become meaningful spaces in cosmopolitan discourses only as they disappear.”[17] Identified in the 1980s as a region at risk from rising sea levels due to climate change, Tuvalu’s nine coral atolls and reef islands have become a central motif in the climate change debate, along with the nation’s 10,000 inhabitants. In an ineffectual attempt to address the massive environmental justice issue posed by rising sea levels, “members of parliament, diplomats and community leaders repeatedly highlight that Tuvaluans face significant climate change impacts and yet make little contribution to reducing the fossil fuel use that causes them.”[18]
The term “climate refugee” plays an interesting role in today’s discussions on the climate-migration nexus. Though the official definition of a refugee given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence… [and] has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion,”[19] the mainstream definition tends to be much more all-encompassing. Typically, any person who is forcibly displaced from their home due to factors out of their control may be considered a refugee by the general public. Historically, refugees have sought asylum for reasons linked to religious or ethnic conflict and political instability. However, the circumstances that refugees find themselves forced into remain overwhelmingly alike, whether the displacement occurs due to internal conflict, violence, or natural causes.
Are climate refugees not also forced from their homes, separated from those they love, driven by violent forces they have no control over? Climate refugees, like other refugees, live in fear of an ever-pursuing, elusive enemy. Climate refugees, like other refugees, lose everything they have, and are left with nowhere to turn. And yet, these refugees have no mention in the 1951 refugee convention which we still refer to today––a document written in post-war Europe, long before climate change became an international threat.[20]
The current system in place for helping aid refugees does not take into account the existence of climate refugees, and therefore is nowhere near well-equipped to manage a world of increasing climate stressors. Because climate migrants are not recognized as refugees under international law, they are not afforded the same legal protection in seeking asylum. Not only does this force many people to remain in dangerous or hazardous environments, but it makes the migratory journey that much more treacherous for those who are forcibly displaced. In order to truly transform our global system of migration into one that is well-prepared to address climate-related crises, we must first establish an official status for climate migrants that caters to their specific climate-related fears and grants them legal recognition and protection as individuals displaced at the hands of the environment. Without this, climate refugees will be forced to continue migrating under extremely strenuous circumstances, with little to no aid from the international community.
4. The Solution: Restructuring the Global Migration System
First and foremost, measures must be taken by the international community in order to reduce forced climate migration to the extent possible. Much can be done through disaster risk reduction (DRR), a systematic approach to managing and mitigating natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, and cyclones.[21] The mentality behind this approach lies in the distinction between hazards and disasters. Hazards, which consist of natural, climate-related causes, often lead to disasters in communities where the hazard took place. However, the severity of these disasters depends on a myriad of factors, including exposure, vulnerability, and most importantly, resilience. While we may not be able to control exposure or even vulnerability, we have significant power in building and strengthening resiliency in regions which may be hit the hardest. This can be done through a widespread upsurge in sustainable development, e.g., stronger sea walls, hurricane-proof glass, improved early evacuation/warning systems, and the implementation of DRR in urban development/planning.[22] With more systems in place to reinforce durability and resilience in regions most vulnerable to climate stressors, a significant portion of climate displacement could feasibly be eliminated. However, preventative measures––as crucial as they may be––are not enough. Prevention is the logical first step in adapting to climate change, but by no means is it the comprehensive solution we need.
The second step in alleviating climate migration is, predictably, aid to migrants. When climate displacement cannot be avoided by means of DRR or sustainable development, it is crucial that migrants receive support and recognition from the international community. In 2015, the UN International Organization of Migrants (IOM) created a Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division––the first of kind, dedicated to solving issues within the migration-climate nexus. Dina Lonesco, head of the MECC division, wrote that “regular migration pathways can provide relevant protection for climate migrants and facilitate migration strategies in response to environmental factors.”[23] If migration pathways for climate migrants were actualized, they could serve as a means by which the international community provides “status for people who move in the context of climate change impacts, such as humanitarian visas, temporary protection, authorization to stay, regional and bilateral free movements’ agreements, among several others.”[24] Though the MECC division is currently responsible for “overseeing, supporting and coordinating the development and policy guidance for activities with a migration, environment and climate change dimension,”[25] their efforts thus far have been relatively small-scale, and they have yet to implement any of the truly radical transformations needed to ease the stressors of climate migration.
Whereas the MECC division within the IOM has thus far worked mainly in research and advocacy, a new international framework known as The Nansen Initiative is emerging as “a bottom-up, state-led consultative process with multi-stakeholder involvement”[26] in order to establish a protection agenda for those who have been displaced internationally in the context of climate change-induced disasters. On the topic of its mission and goals, The Nansen Initiative wrote that “while people displaced within their own countries are covered by national laws, international human rights law, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and a few regional instruments, a serious legal gap exists with regard to cross-border movements in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change.”[27] As previously stated, “these people are not refugees under international refugee law, and human rights law does not address critical issues such as their admission, stay and basic rights.” The Nansen Initiative, therefore, is working to fill this legislative gap, and has begun doing so through inter-governmental regional consultations and civil society meetings in the Pacific Islands, Central America, the Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia. The “bottom-up” strategy of The Nansen Initiative consists of starting small in order to build a foundation which can be used globally. It approaches this strategy by holding sub-regional consultations which build a consolidated knowledge base, then moving into a global dialogue to set an official protection agenda (which may include new laws, soft law instruments, and binding agreements), and finally ending with dissemination and follow-ups in regions around the world.
The protection agenda which The Nansen Initiative is working to build will be based on three main pillars: international cooperation and solidarity; standards for the treatment of affected people (i.e., admission, status and stay); and operational responses such as funding processes behind international and humanitarian aid. With a mission as ambitious as this one, it is important for the leaders of The Nansen Initiative to lay out a structured timeline for their agenda, which they outline on their mission page. Similar to the proposals I have already put forth, The Nansen Initiative plans for three distinct phases. First on the agenda is preparation before displacement occurs, much like what I laid out in my description of Disaster Risk Reduction. The second phase is comprised of protective and assistive efforts during displacement, whether this be through policy implementation, international aid, or a combination of the two. Lastly, the agenda would not be complete without delineating a transition to solutions in the aftermath of a disaster. Jane McAdam, a law professor at the University of New South Wales who specializes in refugees and climate change migration, wrote about The Nansen Initiative, saying, “it’s not a one size fits all approach, but a disaster toolkit.”[28] In a world of increasing unpredictability with regard to natural disasters and climate calamities, The Nansen Initiative’s model for flexibility and versatility seems the only feasible solution.
5. Conclusion: Moving Forward
Climate change will always be a hard pill to swallow, as is anything which inhibits our profit-making capacity, our beloved practices and traditions, or the reality of any foreseeable future. Monetary means, as well as plain inertia, have served as a barricade by which the industrialized world protects itself from the effects of climate change. In doing so, we have turned a blind eye to nations which do not have this option, ignoring the direct consequences of our inefficient energy practices which we do not have the misfortune of experiencing firsthand. The failures of international asylum laws have culminated in global catastrophe, and the repercussions of these failures will only continue to grow.
Despite the proposals laid out in this paper, the only real strategy for combating climate change lies in eliminating the root of the problem: the burning of fossil fuels. Because “the human activities causing climate change are a more essential foundation of world economies, and less amenable to simple technological correctives,”[29] the solution must ultimately encompass a vast economic and technological transformation on a global scale. While a restructuring of the global migration system is a necessary adaptation to climate change and climate migration, there will be no future for this system if we do not also address the heart of anthropogenic climate change, and alter our ways of life. The vast transformations needed to solve this issue has turned the climate crisis into a generationally-divisive topic, with many younger activists taking a stand against an older generation of global emitters. One such activist, 16 year old Greta Thunberg, spoke at the UN Climate Action Summit this past September, declaring pointedly to her audience that “you are failing us. But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you… Right here, right now is where we draw the line. The world is waking up. And change is coming, whether you like it or not.”[30] Until then, Ioane Teitiota sits and waits in his cinder-block home in Tarawa.
Eliana is a sophomore at Stanford University majoring in Earth Systems, with minors in Arabic and Creative Writing. While on campus, Eliana could often be found planting, harvesting, and planning community events at the O’Donohue Family Stanford Educational Farm, where she serves as Vice President of Stanford RooTS. Since returning home due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Eliana has continued to foster her passions for food systems and social justice by working with The Farmlink Project, a volunteer-run, grassroots movement founded by students in response to the exploding food insecurity crisis. Farmlink connects farmers with surplus to food banks in need—getting food into the hands of those who need it and providing a source of income for farmers and truckers hit hardest by the pandemic.
Concerned with both the application and education of environmental justice, Eliana has taken unexpected advantage of the current remote situation by working with Curious Cardinals, another student start-up, where she mentors young students in writing, art, and environmental science.
[11] Klare, “If the US Military Is Facing up to the Climate Crisis, Shouldn’t We All?” 2019.
[12] Nicholls, R., et al. (2008), “Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes: Exposure Estimates”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/011766488208.
[13] Hallegatte, S., et al. (2008), “Assessing Climate Change Impacts, Sea Level Rise and Storm Surge Risk in Port Cities: A Case Study on Copenhagen”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 3, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/236018165623.
[14] Hallegatte, S., et al. “Assessing Climate Change Impacts, Sea Level Rise and Storm Surge Risk in Port Cities: A Case Study on Copenhagen,” 2008.
[15] McDonald, “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee,” 2015.
[16] Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” 2019.
[19] “How to Help Refugees – Aid, Relief and Donations: USA for UNHCR.” How to Help Refugees – Aid, Relief and Donations | USA for UNHCR, www.unrefugees.org/.
[20] McDonald, “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee,” 2015.
[21] Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction. United Nations, 2008, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction.
[22] Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction. United Nations, 2008, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction.
[26] “Towards a Protection Agenda for People Displaced across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the Effects of Climate Change.” The Nansen Initiative, www.nanseninitiative.org/.
[27] “Towards a Protection Agenda for People Displaced across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the Effects of Climate Change.” The Nansen Initiative, www.nanseninitiative.org/.
[28] McDonald, “The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee,” 2015.
[29] Dessler, and Parson, “The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: a Guide to the Debate,” 2020.
[30] Staff, NPR. “Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech At The U.N. Climate Action Summit.” NPR, NPR, 23 Sept. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit.
‘I remember turning around to see the red glow creep upwards behind the silhouette of the tree line. At two o’clock in the morning, our surroundings began to light up like an orange-tinted movie-set. Amidst an increasingly loud roar, I heard a familiar voice yelling at us to load-up in the buggies; “C’mon boys, double-time!” shouted my captain. The fire was chugging towards us, up slope from the drainage below, and it was time to get out.’
James Sedlak is a wildland firefighter based in Lake Tahoe, California. As a first-responder on the frontlines, he has seen the devastation of megafires and feels compelled to help solve problems associated with climate change. He joins EarthRefuge to help procure content surrounding climate change and migration in an effort to raise awareness and bring diverse perspectives to the forefront.
Outside of work you can find him backcountry snowboarding, building out vans, or trail running.
Abstract: Where climate change wreaks havoc, human trafficking will follow. This piece untangles the ways that natural disaster, slow-onset environmental change, and modern-day slavery are already co-constructing cycles of suffering around the world. While the solution is not simple, there are some potential interventions that may help to mitigate the damage.
Aubrey Calaway is writer and researcher who has investigated issues of climate change, human trafficking, and community resilience. She currently works as a research fellow at Human Trafficking Search.
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