In November 2020, Central America was hit with not one, but two, devastating hurricanes: Eta and Iota, which caused extensive damage across Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama. Following these disasters, The Franciscan Network for Migrants reported that approximately 34 people emigrate every hour from Guatemala and Honduras because of climate-related reasons. By 2050, the World Bank estimates that 1.4 million people in Mexico and Central America could migrate due to the consequences of climate change.
Eta and Iota were recorded as Category 4 hurricanes, and two of the most intense storms in the region’s history. The severe winds and devastating floods affected six million people, and caused the displacement of nearly 600,000 people in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Little government assistance was given, meaning that up to 250,000 people were still in emergency shelters in January 2021. Eta and Iota destroyed people’s houses but also significantly impacted employment in the region. For instance, in Honduras, the agricultural sector provided for one-third of the country’s employment but 80% of this employment was destroyed by the storms.
President Biden’s Executive Order
In light of the clear acceleration of climate migration, President Biden signed an executive order in February 2021 on “Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migration”. Federal agencies were to submit reports on climate change and its impact on migration, including a discussion on the implications of climate-related migration on international security, and a plan for protection and resettlement of those displaced due to climate change.
While this first step is an important one, as of now climate migrants do not have clear international protection. Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, refugees are recognized as individuals outside their home country because they face persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. As such, this definition does not include climate refugees – they are therefore being denied international protection. Biden’s executive order is a promising initial step, but the administration needs to go further. The United States (U.S.) is responsible for the largest share of heat-trapping fossil fuel emissions. These fossil fuel emissions are a large contributing cause of climate migration, so it is now crucial for the administration to include climate migrants in its migration policies.
Kamala Harris Disregards Climate Migration
In June 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris held a press conference with Guatemalan President, Alejandro Giammattei. She discussed the President’s plan to moderate migration at the southern border, and designated corruption and human trafficking as the most pressing causes of migration to the U.S. from Central America. Her visit to Guatemala came a few months after Hurricanes Eta and Iota, and President Biden’s executive order. Yet, Harris failed to acknowledge climate change as the biggest cause for migration in 2020.
The administration plans to tackle migration by investing $4 billion to “build security and prosperity” in Central America. This investment will be used to stimulate the region’s economy and to tackle corruption. Once again, this plan could help in the short term, but it fails to acknowledge more pressing matters that need to be dealt with in the long term, such as the effect of increasing global temperatures, rising sea levels, or severe weather events displacing millions of people. It seems futile for the Biden administration to invest a large sum of money to stimulate the economies of these countries without acknowledging the fact that their populations are already migrating due to climate change. The U.S. continues to fund fossil fuel projects in the Global South – from which a majority of climate migrants will be fleeing in the next 30 years – when its priority should be protecting those who have already fled.
It is crucial that now, more than ever, governments and international institutions change their policies to include climate migrants. Today, we witness the acceleration of climate change and the mass migration that it causes. This is no longer a problem for the future – it has already begun. With the COP26 taking place this November, governments must go beyond solely discussing climate migration. It is time to act and provide adequate international protection to the victims of human-caused climate change.
Flora Bensadon holds a degree in History and International Development Degree from McGill University. Through her studies, her culturally diverse background and her travels, Flora has taken a profound interest in the problems of migration, specifically those of climate refugees.
The global cryptocurrency revolution has reached an all-time high with people actively involved in cryptocurrency investing. The idea of a decentralized currency without privacy concerns has been the key factor behind the growing popularity of these digital currencies. This has been acknowledged by institutions like Deutsche Bank, which anticipates that by 2030 digital currencies will have over 200 million users and could eventually replace cash one day. Another major factor that propels the success of already popular cryptocurrency is its portrayal as a ‘greener’ alternative to traditional cash and its potential to evolve into a global currency. However, Elon Musk stirred global controversy when he questioned the environmental impact of cryptocurrencies, and subsequently declined to accept Bitcoin for Tesla payments.
The exchange rate of Bitcoin has fallen drastically, due to subsiding hype and excitement, the prevalence of common sense, and the global audience shifting their attention to how much energy is actually consumed by these cryptocurrencies. The potential conflict between these ‘future global currencies’ and the efforts being made towards ‘a sustainable future’ is intriguing. This article attempts to understand this potential conflict through a detailed analysis of the energy consumed by cryptos, its incompatibility with the idea of a sustainable future, and the challenges it poses to a greener tomorrow.
Cryptocurrency Mining and Energy Consumption
Cryptocurrencies, unlike the traditional banking system of maintaining account balances in a central database, make use of a distributed network of ‘miners’. These are a network of specialized computers that keep a record of new and constantly added blocks. A computational race exists between these miners to earn incentives, and as such blocks can only be recorded by solving cryptographic puzzles. Incentives or bonuses are only given to the recording miner. While on the one hand this assures a fail-proof system, on the other, it requires huge computational power. This mining process tends to lose efficiency due to the rising prices of the cryptocurrencies, because the mathematical puzzles to create blocks become more complex and require more computation power to keep the number of transactions constant. This means more computing power and energy is being consumed per block to process the same number of transactions in the face of the increasing complexity of the puzzles.
As per recent research by the University of Cambridge which aims to create a Bitcoin electricity consumption index, it has been estimated that the miners of Bitcoin alone are going to consume 130 Terawatt-hours of energy (TWh). This energy is close to 0.5% of global electricity consumption. Just like any other conventional source of energy, electricity has its fair share of carbon emission issues. Using the standard global scale, such an amount of electricity usage would put the Bitcoin economy on par – in terms of carbon dioxide emissions – with a small developing nation. It is also interesting to note that 65% of Bitcoin mining takes place in China, where the major source of electricity generation is coal burning. Many other countries around the world are primarily dependent on coal and fossil fuels for electricity generation. This is even more concerning as coal burning is a significant contributor to climate change, owing to the high carbon emission rates associated with it. An alarming report by CNBC suggests that Bitcoin alone produces 35.95 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions every year.
The Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals
Under Article 2(c) of the UN Paris Agreement (a legally binding international treaty on climate change adopted by 196 Parties at COP 21 in Paris on 12 December 2015) every signatory is obligated to make attempts to hold global temperatures within 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This agreement also reflects the understanding that the future of international finance must include a to switch to low greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, the signatories that allow for such crypto-mining to continue are directly violating the agreement. Furthermore, the central idea of the agreement was to enable modern technology to be utilized in a way that mitigates greenhouse gas emissions to the highest standard possible. The highly polluting use of technology, such as that discussed above, would be in stark contravention of the spirit of the agreement.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a global agenda which was adopted by countries in 2015 with a vision to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. The 17 SDGs and 169 targets are part of what is known as ‘the 2030 Agenda’ which recognizes that “eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development”. Usage of cryptocurrencies directly contradicts these goals which were formulated to ensure a sustainable and better future for humanity. They directly go against SDGs 7, 9, 11, and 12 which deal with ensuring affordable and clean energy, industry, innovation and infrastructure, creating sustainable cities, and responsible consumption and production respectively.
The Solution: Revamping the Crypto-Model
The analysis of the various reports and the due examination of the crypto energy consumption pattern highlights that the seemingly ‘green’ currency actually has a huge carbon footprint. The present generation of the human race, in its efforts to tackle global climate change, has been constantly trying to transition towards more energy-efficient technology. Millions of dollars are being poured into research and development to come up with sustainable and green technology. On the face of this, the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies can be seen as a major setback because, in their present state, they endanger the future of human civilization.
With global temperatures increasing, we have seen a fresh rise in global warming-related issues. Whether it be as a result of untimely flooding or pre-season blooming, the very existence of human life is being threatened. People are forced to leave their homelands because of climate stressors. It is ironic that the currency which promised to, in a way, mitigate the challenges of the global climate crisis has itself become one of its major causes. The energy consumption of these cryptocurrencies and the hope of a sustainable future are antagonist pairs; neither can live while the other survives. The key lies not in the complete abandonment of cryptos but a gradual transition to more energy-efficient ways of mining them.
Whether you’re in favor of cryptocurrencies or against them, there is little doubt that these blockchain-based currencies use enormous amounts of energy. Much of this energy usage comes from burning coal and other fossil fuels, although cryptocurrency advocates have argued that renewable sources are also a major component. While the exact figures are disputed, even the best-case scenarios indicate that mining is a major factor in carbon dioxide emissions. Thus, the question that naturally follows is: do we abandon the cryptocurrency framework? The answer to this question is tricky. While there is no denying that cryptocurrencies in their present state of operation are a great threat to the idea of sustainability, there have been recent developments of alternate cryptos which are more promising and less energy-consuming. For instance, Ripple (XRP) consume only 0.0079 KWh per transaction – this is highly power-efficient when compared to Bitcoins. Further, new forms of energy-efficient crypto mining are being introduced.
Cryptocurrencies, in their current form, are not only highly inefficient, but their continued usage can pose considerable danger to the future of humans. There is more than one solution to the problem: from devising a better mining strategy, to transitioning towards greener energy for mining. The entire concept is so nascent that hardly any academic debate or scientific report available could suggest concrete plans. However, looking at the growing popularity of cryptos, it is pertinent to note that there indeed exists a problem and the need of the hour lies not in ignoring it, but rather starting a meaningful discussion to come up with better strategies to effectively tackle it.
Raj Shekhar is a law student at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi, Jharkhand, India. He is the current Future Leaders India (Political Strategy) Fellowship holder.
Amid ongoing global debate around the definition, classification, and treatment of ‘climate migrants’, little attention is paid to what the people affected want.1 There have been multiple reports with varying estimates of the number of people expected to be displaced due to climate change by 2050. 2,3 The common link featured in these reports, however, is that the majority of climate displacement is and will be internal. People around the world will be forced to relocate within their own countries to escape the slow onset impacts of climate change. Even in the face of uninhabitable conditions, people are generally unwilling to leave their homes and relocate to foreign lands. So, in addition to arguing over cross-border arrangements, countries ought to come up with inward-looking strategies to deal with climate-induced displacement.
One needs to look no further than the island states in the Pacific as examples. These small island nations are more vulnerable to the acute effects of climate change than any other region in the world. 4 Sea-level rise, amongst other climatic changes, is threatening the existence of these geographically isolated and small landmasses. Kiribati, which rises no more than two meters above sea-level at its highest point, is one such island state. A 2016 United Nations report has shown that half of the households have already been affected by sea-level rise on one of Kiribati’s constituent islands.5 In neighboring Tuvalu, a UNU-EHS study found that 97% of surveyed households had been impacted by natural hazards between the period 2005 and 2015, yet only 53% of the people affected believed that they would be able to afford migration in the future.6
Despite the above, people of these nations have been unwilling to leave their homes, families, and lives. New Zealand’s Pacific Access Ballot, an annual lottery which selects people from five Pacific countries for New Zealand residency each year, has repeatedly had quotas go unfulfilled.7 The governments of these islands are trying to build adaptive capacity and employ migration as a means of improving the quality of life. The Kiribati government has implemented a program, entitled ‘Migration with Dignity’, which aims to create a skilled workforce that can find decent employment abroad. In 2014, the government also purchased 6,000 acres in Fiji to try and ensure food security whilst the environment changes.8 With support from the Green Climate Fund, the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project will enhance resilience to coastal hazards on some of the nation’s islands.9
These measures might not be enough, but they are better than simply waiting for other countries to help. As Kiribati President, Taneti Maamau said: “We are telling the world that climate change impacts Kiribati, it’s really happening… But we are not telling people to leave.” 8 Rather than simply focusing on relocation – an option that does not support true self-determination for the affected people – international policy should provide adaptive capacity and long-term support to these island states. Many engineering options are available, such as coastal fortification, and land reclamation technologies. It is imperative, therefore, for developed countries to voluntarily adopt these measures before they are forced to do so.
Nikunj is a consultant currently working for a climate focused philanthropy. In the past, he has worked as a business strategy consultant across various sectors and has also volunteered for various non-profits. His undergraduate background is in Engineering from BITS Pilani. Interested in human-environmental ecosystems and how they adapt to climate change, Nikunj has been part of various climate adaptation projects.
Climate-induced violence is rising in poverty-ridden regions across the earth, and women are being left in the shadows of its wrath.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, compounding variations in seasonality have resulted in an increased incidence of extreme weather events, acute environmental degradation, and a widespread decline in quality of life. With more than 95% of farmed land using rain-fed cultivation, these regions are heavily reliant on stable rainfall cycles to maintain annual agricultural yields. 1 In recent years, increasing severity in climate variability has magnified the intensity and frequency of flooding and drought, exacerbating issues of food insecurity and resource scarcity throughout the land.
Changes in climate disproportionately impact the livelihoods of women because they possess limited social control and ownership of land, and often serve as primary caregivers within their communities. They also face increased exposure to gender-based violence during periods of economic and environmental upheaval, as well as harmful discrimination in the labour market, making it difficult to generate alternative sources of income as needed.
Economic pressures have intensified with environmental disaster in many rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, driving hunger-based fatalities. In Angola, girls as young as the age of 12 are resorting to prostitution in order to avoid starvation. 2 Crisis coverage from the Thomas Reuters Foundation reports that “a girl might get 500 kwanzas ($1) for sex – enough to buy about a kilo of beans or two kilos of maize – but could get as little as 200 kwanzas.. Sometimes they earn as little as 5 RGT ($0.31) for one sexual encounter, which is .. not even enough to buy a loaf.” 3 These conditions simultaneously place girls at higher risk of sexual exploitation and human trafficking due to the subversive nature of the sex market.
In the Amboseli basin of southern Kenya, rising temperatures have caused rivers and grasslands to dry up, causing women and young girls to walk extensive distances to collect essential resources including firewood and water. 4 A field report conducted by the UN Africa Renewal program affirms that these tasks are both physically and mentally demanding, as it may take more than 20 hours per week to locate clean water, examine existing well levels, and carry the water home. 5 This process leaves young girls vulnerable to sexual assault and rape, whilst worsening the spread of infectious disease and infirmity within already weakened communities.
Environmental extremes also aggravate the prevalence of child marriage in various rural regions. The intensity and duration of recent dry spells have left countless families in dire need of basic resources, causing many to offer their daughters as brides to help ease financial stress. In rural districts of Malawi, “girls are forced sometimes to marry younger than 14. Some are impregnated by schoolteachers, some are forced to get married so the in-laws will bring bread and butter to their homes, others marry because of peer pressure. Especially when harvests are not good, these problems arise as girls are used to generate income.” 6
An increase in child marriage has further driven the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), as this procedure is often carried out in preparation for marriage. Despite bans that have been implemented to prohibit both of these practices, researchers in northern Kenya have witnessed a climate-related surge in cases. 7 Throughout the 2020/2021 season, periods of prolonged drought were superseded by widespread locust outbreaks, resulting in deeper impoverishment and irreparable damage to livestock and crops. Despairing households succumbed to desperate measures, marrying off their daughters in exchange for dowries. 8
Girls who have undergone FGM are also perceived as more ‘valuable’ in comparison to those who remain uncut, inviting higher bride prices. Many families are able to circumvent the bans on these practices by shipping their daughters to neighboring countries where laws are less restrictive, and having them sent back prior to marriage. 9
In the absence of government intervention, rates of child marriage and FGM will continue to rise in synchronicity with environmental disaster and displacement. A severe lack of legal reinforcement and safeguarding services in regions across Sub-Saharan Africa is contributing to this endless cycle of gender-based violence. If vulnerable areas are left without stronger protection aid, this issue will only continue to worsen as levels of hunger and extreme weather events become more pervasive.
It is vital to draw deeper attention to the connections between climate change and violence against women and children in order to subvert the underground nature in which many of these practices are conducted. In addressing the impacts of climate-sensitive stresses, it is crucial to accentuate the various gender disparities inherent in a shifting ecological framework.
Rachel Aronoff recently graduated from UC Santa Barbara with a degree in English, and a specialization in Literature and the Environment. She is also certified in health and wellness coaching, personal training, and in the process of becoming a yoga instructor.
2. Batha, Emma. (2020) Cheap as bread, girls sell sex to survive hunger crisis in Africa. (2020). Thomas Reuters Foundation News. Retrieved May 24, 2021. https://news.trust.org/item/20200130182713-wao6m/
6. Climate change connections to HIV and AIDS. (2009). The Winds of Change: Climate change, poverty and the environment in Malawi, Oxfam International. Retrieved April 27, 2021. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/winds-change
“We demand that Global North countries recognise climate migrants as such.”
– Xiye Bastida, youth climate activist, US Leaders Summit on Climate 2021
As climate activists demand accountability from powerful corporate and government actors, the disproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable groups is the imprint on the flipside of the climate justice coin. With climate change and human rights issues growing inseparable, activists are focusing their attention on vulnerable groups like farmers, women and people in poverty, especially in the Global South. An issue that encompasses all these groups is climate-induced displacement and migration.
‘Climate migration’ refers to the movement of people forced to leave, or choosing to leave their homes predominantly due to climate change impacts[1]. Slow onset climate change impacts that drive climate migration include crop failure, water shortage, and rising sea levels. These can pressure people to flee their homes either by rendering their livelihoods untenable (e.g. for farmers) or making their homes uninhabitable (e.g. due to sea level rise)[2]. Other sudden climate-induced events like flash floods and typhoons also drive temporary displacement.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 80% of annual worldwide sudden onset natural disaster-induced displacement occurs in the Asia Pacific region, where income inequality, conflict, and regional connectivity are also major drivers of migration[3]. A 2010 report for the US National Intelligence Council predicted that climate change may induce cross-border movements of “Vietnamese and Indonesians to Malaysia, Cambodians and Laotians to Thailand, Burmese to Thailand and Malaysia, and Filipinos throughout the region”[4]. Within borders, coastal communities can feel the growing impacts of sea level rise, fish stock depletion and intensifying coastal storms, and may move inland away from the coasts. Nearby cities and urban areas with commerce, job opportunities, and family relations also serve as pull factors for displaced people[5].
LET’S TALK ABOUT IT
Climate migration remains on the fringe of discourse in the front-facing messages of some prominent climate movements, both in Southeast Asia and internationally. It is merely identified as one of many climate threats in cautionary messages about global warming, rather than a potential thrust of climate action. Mentions of climate migration or displacement usually take the form of standalone articles aiming to educate audiences about the urgency of climate change, such as those by Greenpeace US[6]. Extinction Rebellion US consolidates resources on climate change and migration on its website, directing users to news articles and research[7]. In news interviews, members of Klima Action Malaysia (KAMY), a Malaysia youth climate group, cite climate migration as one of the consequences of inaction[8].
Understandably, activists focus on solutions and opportunities that can lead to calls for action that their audiences can contribute to, and demands for governments and corporations. These are messages that feed into their positive imagination of a just transition and a climate-resilient future; but can climate migration be a part of that imagination?
The table below exhibits some examples of initiatives prioritised by these movements.
Organisation/initiative
Region/country
Main calls to action, demands or principles
Greenpeace International
International
‘Ways to Act’· Protect the Oceans· Tell your story· Stop plastic pollution· Join the movement for clean air· Prevent uncontrollable global fires· Raise your voice for climate justice
Sunrise Movement
United States
(Selected) principles· Stop climate change and create good-paying jobs in the process· People from all paths of life· Non-violence· Unite with other movements for change· Fight for the liberation of all people
Asia Climate Rally 2020
Asia
Demands· Climate action now· Defend our environmental defenders· Policies for the people and planet· Demand ambition, collaboration and accountability· Towards a just recovery
Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines (YACAP)
Philippines
‘Points of Unity’· Climate justice· Urgency of climate action· Defend our environmental defenders· Youth-led collective action· System change
Klima Action Malaysia (KAMY)
Malaysia
Demands· Inclusive and intersectional climate action· Serious political will· The right to climate information
Besides calling for accelerated reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as shown in bold, most of these groups share a common thread on inclusiveness and climate justice — making sure that climate action considers the voice and well-being of all people, including vulnerable groups. It is evident that the protection of climate migrants does fall under the umbrella of inclusive climate action that is being championed by many activists; but it is discussed mostly insofar as minimising climate change can help to prevent climate displacement. The fact is that climate displacement is already happening. How does the current plight of climate migrants fit into the demand for a just transition?
A THREAT TO SECURITY?
Governments have already recognised the alleged security threat presented by climate migration for some years. The security-based narrative for approaching climate migration argues that instability in neighbouring countries can drive illegal migration, which can in turn exacerbate drug and arms trafficking and resource-related conflict[9]. This perspective uses self-interest as a credible motivation for governments, so integrating human rights and justice into such a mindset is a challenge. Some have responded to this security concern by advocating for a military strategy focusing on stronger border protection, but climate security expert Professor Lorraine Elliott warns this will instead likely increase instability and uncertainty, while further punishing those already vulnerable to the climate crisis[10]. In a report on climate migration, peacebuilding organisation International Alert stresses that “migration in itself need not be a destabilising factor… it is not the process, but the context and the political response to immigration that shape the risks of violent conflict”[11]. For example, in a study on Indonesian-Malaysian labour migration, researchers found that conflict was triggered when it shifted from “being perceived as an economic issue with potential gains for both countries” to a “political and security issue in which the interests of sending and receiving states were “viewed as threats to one another”[12].
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
In terms of internal displacement, case studies from the Philippines, Cambodia, and Indonesia have found inadequate institutional and legal provisions for the human rights of those affected by natural disasters — especially women, people with disabilities, and the elderly. Researchers’ recommendations included disaster risk management policies with specific guidelines on the treatment of vulnerable groups in compliance with international standards, as well as comprehensive laws enacting the rights of internally displaced people (IDPs) in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. In particular, it was pointed out that such policy development would be an opportunity to overcome patriarchal beliefs and “harness the knowledge and experiences of women”[13].
There is, then, a precedent for climate activists to apply the “justice” in “climate justice”, to garner greater empathy and equity in government responses to climate migrants. Professor Elliott does not support “simply mainstreaming climate change into security discourses”, but rather for “bottom-up policymaking” that aims to strengthen adaptation, social resilience, disaster risk management, and sustainable development strategies[14]. This is echoed by a 2018 World Bank report on internal climate migration, which recommends that governments actively embed climate migration into development planning and seek to improve their understanding of the issue itself[15].
A POSITIVE OUTLOOK
Climate activists also favour a positive framing of climate action, not just as the prevention of disaster, but as an opportunity for better lives. A campaign by the Singapore Climate Rally called #TakeBack2050 encouraged its audience to imagine what life would be like in 2050 after overcoming the climate crisis. Participants raised their hopes for community gardens, renewable energy, and a more equitable society[16]. This uplifting narrative has already been embraced by many world leaders. At the US Leaders’ Climate Summit in April 2021, Vietnam’s President Nguyen Xuan Phuc emphasised that transitioning to a net zero economy would “bring about huge opportunities and benefits, including jobs, ensuring energy security and enhancing economic competitiveness and sustainability”.
Such positivity can also be applied to climate migration. Former director of the Australian Migration Research Centre, Professor Graeme Hugo, argued that climate migration can help build resilience and adaptive capacity in vulnerable areas. Migration can benefit host and source countries through remittances, knowledge transfer, increased foreign direct investment and diaspora involvement in development and most certainly, benefit migrants themselves and their families. Migration has also contributed to poverty reduction in Southeast Asia[17]. Therefore, viewing climate migration as a development opportunity rather than just a coping response can maximise the benefits for all parties.
Paying greater attention to climate migration as a tenet of climate justice is well-aligned with the existing principles and demands of climate activists. While Global North activists can argue for the moral responsibility of developed countries to help climate migrants in and from developing countries; Southeast Asian countries, which are mostly developing, call for different tactics. Framing the issue as a pragmatic development opportunity can help avoid excessive security tensions around climate migration in a region already rife with political turmoil, and instead encourage the mainstreaming of climate migration into national planning. Southeast Asian climate activists repeatedly point out that their countries are already experiencing some of the most intense impacts of climate change, which disproportionately affect vulnerable groups; and these include climate displacement and migration. It is an issue which presents both the urgency and potential for climate activists to call upon governments and the international community to recognise the opportunities that fair and well-planned climate migration and displacement policies in Southeast Asia can establish beyond humanitarian responses.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
Jiahui Qiu is a research officer at the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. She is a graduate in Environmental Studies from the National University of Singapore. Her interests include natural capital and ecosystem services, climate policy, and just transitions.
Research conducted by Earth Refuge Advisor Dr Chris O’Connell in Bolivia and Peru, and published by Anti-Slavery International, indicates that climate change is a big – but not the only – factor driving displacement and vulnerability. He summarises his core findings in this article.
Climate change is the primary cause of migration worldwide. It presents an existential threat that is undermining traditional livelihoods, worsening the vulnerability of already marginalised groups and communities, and driving displacement. According to the World Bank, if sufficient action is not taken, over 140 million people could be displaced by 2050. Indeed, there is growing evidence that this is already occurring, with research linking northward migration from Central America to climate variability.
Under the right circumstances, migration represents an important form of climate adaptation, helping to mitigate economic precariousness and escape hazardous conditions. However, as highlighted in my report – ‘From a Vicious to a Virtuous Circle’ – if communities are not adequately listened to and supported, this situation can expose migrants to the risk of exploitation, including trafficking, debt bondage and forced labour.
My research in Bolivia and Peru reveals that climate change is not the only factor that is driving displacement and vulnerability, however. Until recently, the issue of environmentally destructive activities – such as mining and export-oriented agriculture – was predominantly treated as a ‘pull factor’ for migration by creating a demand for cheap labour. But as research participants made clear, in many places it is also a significant ‘push factor’ by making other economic activities – and even life – unviable in certain places.
Around 90% of the poorest people depend directly on natural resources, while 75% make a living from small-scale farming or fishing. These are more than just economic activities for many communities: they are deeply intertwined with their culture and identity, and often rely on ancestral knowledge passed down through generations. This same knowledge is increasingly recognised as crucial to preserving and restoring biodiversity, and for successful adaptation to the climate crisis.
Nevertheless, vital lifelines for communities and indigenous peoples are being shut down or restricted due to the expansion of extractive activities. Not only do these activities contaminate the air, soil and water, they are also associated with ‘staggering’ rates of deforestation and heavy water usage at a time when climate change is driving water scarcity.
Over and over, research participants described the negative environmental and human impacts of pesticides from industrialised agriculture, toxic oil spills, and pollution from mining residue that contains chemicals and heavy metals. This situation is also endangering the food security of these communities. In the words of an indigenous broadcaster I interviewed in the Peruvian Amazon,
“it is due to pollution, but also to the changes that are happening to the climate – both things are affecting us. The rivers used to be full of fish, but not now; we are eating our last fish…”
For many families and communities, this combination can represent the ‘last straw’ in pushing them to migrate. The cruel irony is that in countries where economic activity relies on natural resource extraction, the only choice for many citizens is to accept offers to work in these same environmentally destructive sectors. This work often consists of highly exploitative and degrading conditions, including instances of debt bondage and forced labour, which causes further human degradation and contributes to further greenhouse gas emissions. This is the vicious circle from which many struggle to escape.
The distinction between environmental impacts linked to climate change and those arising from man-made environmental harm is an important one. While the roots of both lie in the history of unequal development, their immediate drivers and control levers differ. Mitigating climate change is a long-term global challenge, but action to reduce environmental destruction should, in theory, be more straightforward.
Yet, rather than regulating these activities, governments in many countries are actively facilitating them via state policy, including tax breaks, subsidies, and infrastructure projects, while often turning a blind eye to human rights abuses against land- and environmental-rights defenders. This situation must be tackled as a matter of urgency, and must also involve the meaningful participation of affected groups and communities.
Responsibility for this scenario extends beyond national governments to include transnational corporations, consumer demand, and the architecture of global trade and investment – all of which restrict the ‘space’ for governments and suppliers to improve labour and environmental standards. Measures such as mandatory environmental and human rights due diligence legislation and a ‘Just Transition’ that respects workers’ rights are essential steps to taking a holistic approach to climate resilience.
All of this points to the need to not only improve legal safeguards for those who are displaced, but also to actively prevent or mitigate such vulnerability. Whether moving or staying, the fundamental rights of those most affected by climate and environmental breakdown must be upheld. Many of the tools required to tackle this situation already exist in the form of International Labour Organisation conventions, and UN human rights treaties, declarations, and principles such as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights among others. What is needed now is corresponding action to translate these commitments into tangible change.
“The worst victims of environmental harm tend also to be those with the least political clout, such as members of racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, or those who are geographically isolated from the locus of political power within their country”
– Caroline Dommen
The global scale at which modern multinational corporations (MNCs) operate inevitability results in widespread environmental harm.[1] This article contends that international law must be developed to hold MNCs accountable for transboundary environmental harm as well as to offer protection to those upended by such harm.
Developing the international system
Poorly regulated and substandard MNC activities have resulted in numerous accidents such as water contamination, deforestation, soil erosion, and the exploitation of natural resources by oil, mining, and forestry companies.[2] Domestic recourse is the preferred avenue for preventing environmental abuses by MNCs.[3]This, however, is a largely ineffective as it presents an orthodox view of law wherein states are the principle actors in the global order and state sovereignty is paramount.[4] This disregards the fact that MNC operations in the host country have the potential to affect that state’s environment as well as that of other countries, as was the case in Ecuador and Peru with regards to MNC water contamination.[5] Additionally, this ignores the very real influence MNCs have on governments, especially developing states and the threat this presents to domestic enforcement.[6]For example, the Nigerian state relies on oil MNCs as its major source of revenue, granting these corporations enormous influence and control.[7]
The current international legal order is, however, not well equipped to address transboundary environmental harms.[8]One solution is the development of international jurisprudence to recognise a universal substantive environmental right, under which companies can be held accountable.[9]This long-term approach should be supplemented by short term enforcement by economic superpowers such as the United States, where many MNCs are incorporated.[10]
The dual potency of a substantive environmental right
Some scholars and legal experts find universal acceptance of substantive environmental rights at the national, regional, and international levels.[11]However, most of these instruments that address environmental protection and economic development are criticised as being non-binding, soft- law agreements, many of which are worded so broadly that they provide little or no guidance to states or MNCs.[12]The current international instruments do not sufficiently combine environmental protection and human rights or establish a substantive environmental right.
If drafted, or phrased, and implemented correctly, the two main goals of a universal substantive environmental right should be: i) to prevent environmental harm; and ii) to protect those forced to leave their home region due to sudden or long-term changes to their local environment, that is environmental migrants, post-harm.
Transboundary environmental degradation, including that perpetrated by MNCs, can impact millions at a time and the current international legal architecture does not offer any substantive protection for those displaced by this degradation.
The body of international human rights law does not effectively protect against displacement and migration which result from environmental degradation because it has not evolved to keep pace with the rapid advance of economic globalisation and the privatisation of resources.[13]The current lack of a universal provision means that at best, a substantive environmental right preventing harm and protecting migrants is to be derived from other existing rights, significantly weakening the position of those advocating for the protection of climate migrants and for the regulation of MNC activity.
It is therefore paramount that a universal substantive environmental right is developed to prevent of situations of environmental change as such as to promote reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the prohibition of transboundary damage as well as to mitigate the consequences of such harm, including especially the equal protection of all environmental migrants.
Human Rights Pulse core team member and Earth Refuge Archivist Vaughn is passionate about sustainability and human rights, his scholarship and writing focuses on international law, climate change and transitional justice.
[3] E. Prudence Taylor ‘From environmental to ecological human right: A new dynamic in international law?’ (1990) 10 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 309 350.
[4] A Shinsato ‘Increasing the accountability of transnational corporations for environmental harms: The petroleum industry in Nigeria’ (2005) 4 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 194.
[11] U.N. ECOSOC, Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned, Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report, ¶ 240, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994).
[12] Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 261, 297 (1997).
[13] Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J.INT’L L. 103, 123 (1991).
Climate change is generating far-reaching effects on some of the most fragile populations and ecosystems on earth. Despite contributing the lowest carbon emissions per capita, climate-sensitive regions have been forced to bear the brunt of severe weather conditions and chronic biophysical changes in the environment.
Malawi, a landlocked country situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, remains one of the most vulnerable regions in the world affected by anthropogenic climate change. The land and the communities existing within it continue to be ravaged by extreme climate variability and environmental degradation, resulting in increased limitations in human mobility.
Throughout the past two decades, distinct inconsistencies in seasonal weather patterns have made it difficult for small-scale farmers and communities dependent on subsistence farming methods to maintain their livelihood. 1 The worsening irregularities in seasonality have exacerbated issues of food insecurity and disease, whilst intensifying the pervasive sense of poverty that plagues a majority of the nation.
The country’s socioeconomic well-being is actively tied to agricultural output, with 80% of its rapidly expanding population occupying rural land through small-scale farming. 2 A vast proportion of Malawian farmers depend on rainfed cultivation involving stable rainfall cycles to support agricultural production. This system heightens the risk of damage to annual crop yields, and limits the possibility of growth during dry seasons. Due to extreme financial affliction, the use of artificial water channeling remains particularly low, with less than 5 percent of farmers adopting irrigation methods. 3 The reliance on cyclical rainfall patterns amplifies the population’s susceptibility to the adverse effects of climate variability, such as flooding and drought.
Climate assessments reveal that seasonal dry and rainy conditions have become less predictable and more intense. During the 2016/2017 season, Malawi experienced extensive drought that led to acute crop failure and a sharp decline in agricultural production. 4 Simultaneously, crop yields had already dropped by 30 percent in the previous 2013/2014 season, adding to lingering issues of food insecurity and severe malnutrition. 5 Across the country, an estimated 6.5 million people – 39% of the population – including 3.5 million children are projected to have fallen below the annual minimum food requirements. 6 This has produced disturbing health effects on young and developing children, including issues of physical and cognitive impairment. More than 37 percent of children under the age of five (over 1 million) are stunted due to food insecure conditions. 7
Consecutive dry spells have prevailed in succeeding seasons, driving starvation rates. During the 2018/2019 season, 2.8 million people were identified as in crisis, with 450,000 people in immediate need of food. 8 The 2020 dry season brought prolonged drought to the Central and Southern regions of rural Malawi, resulting in limited crop production. The subsequent spread of the COVID-19 pandemic slowed the economy and drove steep rises in commodity prices, affecting the livelihoods of both rural and urban districts. 9 It is predicted that approximately 2.6 million people will require aid to combat food insecurity throughout the 2020/2021 season. 10
Widespread flooding in Malawi has also increased in magnitude and frequency in recent years. In 2019 alone, two major tropical cyclones decimated the country, leaving 731,879 people in immediate need, 99,728 people displaced, and 975,588 facing adverse effects. 11
Changes in rainfall characteristics have made flooding more intense and destructive, exposing some of the poorest districts in the country to environmental displacement. Communities living in Nsanje, a marginalized region deeply prone to climate fluctuations, have been heavily displaced by recent flooding. 12 Many are driven to evacuation camps after finding their homes, livestock, and community infrastructure dismantled by the floods.
These conditions disproportionately amplify the protection risks of women and children because they hold very little social autonomy or access to legal safeguarding services. An Oxfam report revealed that “women may well have little option but to resort to prostitution in order to get income to feed their children. In Bwemba, the women estimate that in between five and seven out of every 10 households the woman might resort to selling sex for food during the critical months of December to February.” 13
Environmental disaster and displacement also force women and young girls to travel further distances to retrieve water, leaving them vulnerable to rape and assault. These measures simultaneously fuel the spread of HIV and AIDs, resulting in greater poverty and weakness within the population. 14
A growing concern is that Malawi’s highly climate-sensitive economy is not equipped to adapt to the impending challenges of climate change. The compounding effects of heavy flooding in conjunction with extensive dry spells will result in increased mortality rates and environmental displacement on a national scale. In order to combat the various challenges presented by severe climate variability, it will be critical for mitigation and adaptation strategies to be implemented at a local level. Utilizing localized knowledge can help provide better insight into developing a strong adaptation framework that prioritizes the needs of those most deeply affected.
It is vital to recognize that the most destitute regions in the nation, and on earth, remain those most insidiously neglected and adversely affected by the impacts of climate change. The ongoing climate crisis in Malawi will continue to deteriorate if its effects on highly vulnerable communities are left unchecked. In developing deeper awareness of the present and forthcoming threats of climate instability, we must mobilize greater urgency to move towards a more climate-resilient future.
Rachel Aronoff recently graduated from UC Santa Barbara with a degree in English, and a specialization in Literature and the Environment. She is also certified in health and wellness coaching, personal training, and in the process of becoming a yoga instructor.
4. Climate Change Impacts in Malawi. (2020). Assessing the impacts of climate change on the agriculture sectors in Malawi, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Retrieved April 27, 2021.
7. Kumchulesi, G. (2018). Persistence of Child Malnutrition in Malawi: Explanations from Demographic and Health Surveys. Journal of African Development,20(1), 69-75. Retrieved April 27, 2021.https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jafrideve.20.1.006
13. Climate change connections to HIV and AIDS. (2009). The Winds of Change: Climate change, poverty and the environment in Malawi, Oxfam International. Retrieved April 27, 2021.https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/winds-change
14. Climate change connections to HIV and AIDS. (2009).
On March 30th, 2021 the Migrants and Refugees (M&R) Section and the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development released a booklet entitled “Pastoral Orientations on Climate Displaced Persons” (POCDP). It provides guidelines on how the Church will respond to migration caused by climate change, promoting solidarity between individuals and urging the international community to care for this crisis through immediate action.
In the document’s preface, the Pope points out that displacement due to an uninhabitable environment might seem like a process of nature when it is in fact the result of “poor choices and destructive activity, selfishness and neglect.” The climate crisis we are now facing comes to no surprise as our environment has been decaying continuously since the start of the Industrial Revolution. While this crisis is a global one, the ones facing the most consequences are those who have contributed the least. Today, we witness the rapid acceleration of climate migration for which there needs to be immediate global responses.
“Come, let us talk this over. If you are ready to listen, we can still have a great future. But if you refuse to listen and to act, you will be devoured by the heat and the pollution, by droughts here and rising waters there” (cf. Isaiah 1:18-20) the Pope quotes. This message, although one of faith, strongly reflects how this crisis has been ignored by many players in the global community. It emphasizes the importance for those in power to listen and acknowledge the distressing position of climate migrants by taking necessary measures to mitigate its impact.
The POCDPbegins with a general introduction on the climate crisis and how it plays a role in the displacement of many. It is then followed by nine steps that deal with the various aspects of climate migration. They are the following:
Acknowledging the climate crisis and displacement nexus
Promoting awareness and outreach
Providing alternatives to displacement
Preparing people for displacement
Fostering inclusion and integration
Exercising a positive influence on policy-making
Extending pastoral care
Cooperating in strategic planning and action
Promoting professional training in integral ecology
Fostering academic research of CCD (Climate Crisis and Displacement)
Local church leaders and congregations were asked to develop these guidelines, particularly those who witnessed first-hand climate-related incidents or displacement, such as archbishop Claudio Dalla Zuanna from Beira, Mozambique. In 2019, the city of Beira was critically hit by Cyclone Idai causing massive flooding, the destruction of 90 percent of its buildings and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Having witnessed the emergency response to this natural disaster, the archbishop stated that it is not enough to solely resettle people. It is important to take additional measures by putting in place the conditions necessary to welcome climate migrants and to provide them with essential services.
Between 2008 and 2018, 253.7 million people were displaced by climate disasters. The document states that in the first half of 2020 only, 9.8 million people were displaced because of droughts, floods and other climate-related events. The number of climate migrants is still growing and is expected to reach 200 million by 2050. With those numbers in mind, the Vatican’s policy guidelines offer possible ways to raise awareness on climate migration and promote the importance of conversations between governments and policy makers. The M&R Section also encourages churches around the world to welcome displaced people, offer support and integrate them within their new society.
The POCDP is an important move towards a solution-based approach in the confrontation of the climate migration crisis. By calling for international help and action, the Catholic Church takes a stance in an important debate, which could bring positive changes to our current migration policies. While the primary message of this document relies on a message of faith, it extends a hand to climate migrants, making them feel seen and supported, a step most governments have not yet taken.
Flora Bensadon is an Earth Refuge Archivist with a degree in History and International Development Degree from McGill University. Through her studies, her culturally diverse background and her travels, Flora has taken a profound interest in the problems of migration, specifically those of climate refugees.
International responses to growing conflict in nations struggling to overcome the consequences of imperialism, capitalism, and neoliberal policy are hypocritical and hyperbolic at best, and deplorable at worst.
The provision of foreign aid in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is extended myopically. It securitizes sexual violence[i], lacks structures supportive of restitution, and fails to ameliorate the legitimate losses of community safety, institutional rights, and welfare post-conflict. In this essay, focus will be placed on two areas within DRC: international aid and its distribution and the implications for the community safety, human rights, and welfare of its citizens.
The provision of international aid in DRC focuses on addressing gender-specific threats, and gender-based violence in particular. This paper employs an intersectional eco-feminist approach to explore the issues of women’s experiences of education inequality, gender-based violence, and environmental injustice to explain why it is necessary to create multi-pronged approaches to mitigate sexual violence in DRC.
This work serves to clarify and underscore the lack of interconnectedness in the policies governing the provision of international aid with regard to education inequality, gender-based violence, and education inequality. In critically exposing the links and inequalities within and between the three, this work implores a policy direction that does not utilize a singular focus but rather encompasses these facets in tandem. In sum, this approach urges a view of the gender-based violence of women as a nodal point [ii] in which each of the aforementioned facets receives the appropriate and necessary support within a nexus of complex and intertwined – as opposed to independent – human rights issues.
BACKGROUND
Gender-based violence takes center-stage in the context of international aid, feminist thought, and conversation on equality. The effort to recognize gender-based violence, threats, and insecurities on an international scale has been thoroughly documented. Established as a war crime in 1919, rape was first tried in 1997. The trial of Jean Paul Akayesu was the first to prosecute rape as a war crime and act of genocide. His trial correlates with the emergence of indictments and trials of rape.[iii]
Hansen[iv] recognizes that the pursuit of rape-related indictments in the historical context of former Yugoslavia as an important step in the international codification of rape during wartime as a humanitarian problem during the early 1990’s. When the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1820 in 2008[v], it was celebrated as a success for the effort of feminists to place gender-based violence, gender specific insecurities, and threats women face on the international stage. Resolution 1820 explicitly recognizes sexual violence as a weapon of war and a threat to international peace and security.
However, this was not without significant effort from the academy. Sara Merger’s article on the Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security[vi]provides great insight on the feminist background and context of gender-based violence in international security. The feminist literature of international conflict-related sexual violence has understood and conceptualized two camps as explanatory variables within the context of gender inequality, military culture, and armed conflicts.[vii]
The ‘opportunistic’ camp asserts that conflict-related sexual violence stems from soldiers’ masculine identity and claim to power; soldiers will rape because they are men, or because they are soldiers, or because they are men and soldiers.[viii],[ix] The widely adopted ‘weapon of war’ perspective argues that conflict-related sexual violence is used strategically by combatants for specific objectives “such as accessing and extracting material resources or undermining enemy morale.”[x],[xi] As it stands now, sexual violence as a weapon of war is recognized in “at least 12 Security Council resolutions passed since 2000 rivaling nuclear and biological weapons, terrorism, arms proliferation for receiving the most attention among security actors.”[xii]
This securitization of sexual violence is seen as an accomplishment amongst feminists, which gives it incredible political value, and deliberately frames sexual violence as a commodified item similar to that of arms or biological weapons. However, it is arguable that this commodification enables a conceptual – and forceful – mutation of our understanding of sexual violence that obfuscates feminist values and understandings of sexual violence, the gendered hierarchies, dimensions, inequities that inform it, and ultimately obscures the structures, power dynamics, and social consequences that underpin everyday sexual violence. According to Merger, securitization effectively decontextualizes and homogenizes sexual violence, augments aid strategies, and creates a political economy of sexual violence. These unintended effects shamefully neglect the intersections of institutional inequality that perpetuate perpetration during conflict and under normal conditions. Little distinction is made between and amongst perpetrators of sexual violence, between and amongst victims, and between the purposes of sexual violence in this framework.[xiii]
In decontextualizing and homogenizing the experience of sexual violence to fit neatly into the securitization framework, incidences of gender-based violence are relieved of their unique contexts and heterogeneity. We must remember that gender-based violence is an interaction, that it is nourished by narratives that render causal connections unclear, and also presents a manipulation of power that can grow to become symbolic. In this paradigm, however, perpetrators in armed groups or civilians are seen as one and the same, victims are given aid as though their experiences are uniform and indivisible, and the causal explanations for sexual violence are relieved of their nuance and complexity.
In the context of this characterization, a “vast majority of aid funds for sexual violence in armed conflict are directed toward treating victims of rape with only about a quarter of international funding directed toward preventing sexual abuse.”[xiv]In fact, findings reveal some organizations received more aid than necessary to “treat victims of sexual abuse, while they lacked funding to implement other crucial projects”[xv]. Strikingly, “funding earmarked for conflict-related sexual violence is nearly double the budget for all security sector reform activities.”[xvi]Security sector reform activities can include environmental protections, institutional development, and protections of education since these are also women’s issues that are gendered and – as will be explored – at their confluence, have high rates of gendered violence. Unfortunately, current aid programs target sexual violence singularly and tend to neglect general forms of violence.[xvii],[xviii],[xix] Funds narrowly provide support for healthcare in response to gender violence but can be limited to emergency responses, and are predominantly appropriated for treating victims of rape, disregarding other forms of sexual harm.[xx]The potential lost in developing aid strategies that may address root causes of conflict and insecurity rather than just one of its symptoms is incredible. Today, we are seeing aid funds specifically directed toward conflict-related sexual violence at the expense of broader programs that could address the structural causes of this form of abuse, or the structural causes of violence more generally.
On the other hand, the skewed nature of aid and its foregrounding of sexual violence as a global security threat has enabled its perpetration, and encouraged an exploitation of the victimization narrative. Merger’s article highlights a few sources that note this problem. Autessere[xxi] finds that the disproportionate focus on conflict-related sexual violence in eastern DRC “raised the status of sexual abuse to an effective incentive and bargaining tool”, whereby armed groups employ sexual violence strategically to break down morale as well as to leverage sexual violence as symbol of strength and dominance. Rebel groups were motivated to engage in “gang rape” by the prospect of seeing their names in headlines, and the increased negotiating power this provided them. Eriksson Baaz and Stern[xxii] note how the international focus on sexual violence against women and girls contributed to “a process in which allegations of rape are perceived as, and become, a particularly effective bargaining, and ultimately quite effective income-earning strategy”. Douma and Hilhorst[xxiii] note individual women in DRC have exhibited “shopping behavior,” whereby they “exchange information on the organizations that offer most or free assistance and by consequence prefer to go there”. There are also reports of “women that admit that they had not been raped, but fabricated a story to obtain services they needed but were only available to rape victims”. Further, stories of community workers that “lure women into saying that they have been raped with the promises for material and financial assistance” prosper. Allegations of rape have “become increasingly entangled in disputes over land, income and property”.[xxiv] Merger describes the confluence of these interactions as a political economy that situates a currency of sexual violence wherein aid organizations, victims, and perpetrators “all find material benefit in the commercial trade in this violence.[xxv]
In the context of DRC, gender-based violence is directly related to environmental justice and educational equity. An expansion of international aid and policy can address these three issues in tandem. Outside of a paradigm of securitization that creates a debilitating political economy around sexual violence,[xxvi] a policy shift recognizing the unique confluence of education inequality, environmental justice, and gendered violence is not only reflective of an eco-feminist approach to policy but would recognize the intersection of education, the environment, and violence. The eco-feminist approach to policy deviates from the co-opted feminist approach that serves to obfuscate humanitarian issues whilst linking it to the environment. In order to elucidate this further, this paper will outline gender-based violence in relation to issues of education inequality and gendered violence with a similar argumentation related to ecology, and particularly natural resource extraction.
I.EDUCATION INEQUALITY, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN
Education Inequality
Education inequality is cited as the number one indicator of social immobility in DRC. It is “a key factor in determining socio-economic status in the DRC, whereby the higher the education level of the head of the household is, the less likely it is for the family to be poor.”[xxvii] Along the lines of gender, girls face a greater rate of inaccessibility to education[xxviii]: they make up more than 54% of the non-schooled population in the world. More broadly, “in sub-Saharan Africa, over 12 million girls are at risk of never receiving an education”[xxix].
Education as a social institution provides safety, access to food, social mobility, and ingratiation into society for orphans and children of rape that are debilitated by gender-based violence which is influenced by conflict. Without policy that reflects the nuances of gender-based violence and its impact on these factors, a deplorable neglect of these children in the name of the application of obfuscated and myopic feminist policy occurs to their detriment.[xxx]
The pointed lack of child protection and child welfare systems in tandem with the underdevelopment of educational institutions is alluded to throughout this paper. According to DeHerdt and Titeca[xxxi], drop out rates and repetition rates were high on average across the country. Primary education was costly for parents and families to afford,[xxxii] and public finance of education went from $150 per pupil to $10 per pupil in 2006. At the same time, the number of primary and secondary teachers on government payroll was cut by half, and salaries were reduced by 25%. Since Tshesikedi has taken office, DRC embarked on a large reform measure to introduce free primary education. The goal was to reduce expenses for the poorest families. The World Bank approved $8 million in grants and loans to promote free primary education in eastern and central provinces.[xxxiii]Since September of 2019, this has been in effect.
Unfortunately, teachers complain they have not received wages which has led to protest. Teachers marched in Bukavu, South Kivu to voice this grievance reflecting failures in the implementation of this policy. Some teachers have abandoned their jobs or are absent with schools in response to the lack of wages. Children are left without supervision in these cases.[xxxiv] Compounded onto this, parents are still required to pay for their children’s uniforms or other decent clothes and learning materials.[xxxv] These impediments are directly affecting children’s access to education and teacher’s rights to timely pay. Overcrowding due to the displacement of refugees has complicated the issue as existing schools are unable to accommodate an overflow of refugee children.
Without a universal primary education or child welfare system, children in DRC are more likely to be exploited by exposure to violence, child mining operations, or by working as servants for families. Primarily, orphaned or children of gender-based violence experience this. They are “excluded from their communities, which causes them to experience severe trauma and distress. This causes a phenomena known as “street children”[xxxvi] ; their vulnerability so normalized as to have name. This paper will explore in depth the reality of a significant number of school-aged children working in mines. The work is extremely dangerous in nature, and these children are exploited due to the political economy of the region. Those more vulnerable –street children, orphans, and children of rape– have higher participation rates.[xxxvii] Orphaned children, for example, are experience dispossession and abandonment. Such vulnerability may be exploited by armed groups and militias to increase their capacity both as working units and operators of mines.
The confluence of these issues is a consequence of gender-based violence, violence in general, and the failure of international aid to recognize these multi-dimensional aspects of conflict. In delivering aid towards narrow and singular focuses, support counter-intuitively and unintentionally exacerbates the current context and impedes the development of approaches that are multifaceted and can target these issues and their intersections. For example, the lack of a developed child-welfare system or child-protection system in DRC, along with education inequality, forces children, particularly ‘street children’ into a an even more vulnerable position by preventing their access to an education as they experience higher rates of exploitation. Moreover, the weakened structure of educational institutions exacerbate the circumstances of these children by the absence of ability to accommodate orphaned children or children of gender-based violence. Yet, funding – as Merger’s analysis pointed out – does not recognize the multiplicity and intersectionality that a multidimensional approach would employ.
The Direct Link Between Education and Violence
Since the international paradigm is one that encourages the predominant narrative of DRC’s humanitarian crisis as one of sexual violence, we can follow that narrative to further illuminate the link between education as an institution and sexual violence to highlight the need for multi-dimensional policy reform. While DRC’s characterization as the rape capital of the world is not a direct misnomer, it ignores institutional, structural, and other causal factors that inform or fail to prevent violence; in particular, the lack of a child welfare-education system as well as a cursory application of feminist objectivity in international policy.
According to Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child[xxxviii]
“Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.
For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:
a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;
b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;
c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.”
‘Multilateral’ and ‘bilateral’ are keywords here. Multilateral approaches would consider the necessity of an education system and child-welfare system that protects children from intercommunal disputes, everyday rape, and rape as a weapon of war[xxxix].
Sexual violence generally occurs at high rates; during conflict, however, we see more pronounced links between gender-based violence and education inequality, outcomes, and child protection. While girls are already at risk of not receiving an education as aforementioned, during conflict the use of communities as a point of leverage puts girls, children, and the institution of education at risk.
To elaborate, as armed groups and national security forces violently negotiate control over natural resource-rich territories, 5.2 million children have gone without an education. In 2016, conflict in the Greater Kasai region displaced 1.8 million children in urgent need of education (HNO, 2019).[xl] Further, in the Tanganyika province, “a resurgence of violence resulted in the destruction of more than 300 schools while in Kasai region damaged infrastructure forced 150,000 children out of school.”[xli] Targeting of community infrastructure, and in particular educational institutions, contributes to the displacement of children and their access to and mobility within the already tenuous education institution in DRC.
The implications of this type violence are many. First, with a resurgence of violence during conflict, and the appeal to armed groups to leverage and negotiate the safety of individuals and communities for strategic gain, we see a similar political economy of war encouraging the destabilization of communities. Second, the violence inhibits the linear development of a social institution. Under ‘normal’ conditions, the progress of students and the social mobility they would experience as a result, would not be interrupted by egregious acts of violence. These acts of violence not only threaten their safety, but also the constitution of their academic identities: their emotional well-being, academic achievement, and academic progression.[xlii] In the upcoming example, it is clear how gender-based violence interdicts successful educational attainment, but destabilizes the structural integrity and continuity of education as an institution. Third, on the international stage, the violence occurring at the confluence of international education and gendered violence is neglected in the international security framework due to the sole focus of funds being provided to institutions for emergency responses, or general responses to gendered violence. Fourth, children that may need an education institution as a provisional space of security, in particular orphaned children and children of rape, are made increasingly vulnerable due to the high rates of exploitation. Together, these implications point to the need for change in international security frameworks to remedy the neglect of the intersection of violence, gender-based violence and education inequality.
Attacks against education institutions cannot be decontextualized. To illustrate the urgency behind a change in policy, we must bear witness to the human losses and victimizations at the confluence of education inequality and gender-based violence.
“On 31 August 2020 unidentified armed men attacked and raped female students at an examination centre hosting 35 final year students, 16 boys and 16 girls in Isiro town in Haut-Uélé province the night before exams. The students went on to take their exams the next day. Also on 31 August 2020 in South Kivu province, about 700 students and their teachers fled after fighting near an exam centre. On 27 August 2020, at least two students and one teacher were reported to have been killed in Masisi area of North Kivu province following a confrontation between security forces and an armed group near an exam centre. The students were killed while sitting the second day of the National Primary End-of-Studies Test in Ngoyi Primary School.[xliii]
Education inequality, child welfare, violence, and security purely and incontrovertibly intersect. Yet, this is not reflected in international policy and aid. In addition to violent and traumatizing victimization, there are further consequences of the lack of recognition of these intersections.
Important consequences of this, outside of violent and traumatizing victimization are many. First, a victimization influenced disruption of education which may prevent successful educational attainment exacerbating long-term educational equity and social mobility. As students endure, anticipate, or avoid violent interactions in school, their potential for educational attainment is impacted. Second, violence inhibits the fortitude of the educational structure and the support it offers. A curtailment of a ‘normal’ socialization process and access to essential services and support networks[xliv] occurs further harming the academic and personal progression of these students. Third, there are intergenerational impacts due to the intensity of the trauma, school dropout rates increase leading to structural disadvantages for future generations. Fourth, this violence largely affects women exacerbating present and significant gender inequality in the education sector and at large.[xlv] Fifth and finally, as these individuals experience sexual violence there is potential for increases in early pregnancy for girls that furthers the disruption in access to education that would otherwise occur during normal conditions.[xlvi]
Appropriating aid funding and security reform funding towards education and child welfare institutionally would greatly benefit and impede the use of sexual violence as a tool both under ‘normal’ conditions and during conflict. The benefits of a stronger, more protected education system and sound child-welfare system include a weakened pipeline to exploitation that armed groups and civilians can exploit, a reduction in the amount of street children and at-risk behavior amongst youth in vulnerable positions, multigenerational impacts related to social mobility for those with and without parental units, and a reduction in gendered inequalities in education. Building, rehabilitating, and most importantly securitizing these institutions would impede gender-based violence holistically.
Fortunately, the World Bank’s funding strategy is working towards this. Within the $800 million dollar aid Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education (EESSE) plan,[xlvii] are a multitude of goals focused on school safety, inclusion, fee reduction, and increase in accessibility. Unfortunately, the project development objectives and context lack a multi-dimensional analysis of inequality and gender-based violence in DRC. There is an avoidance of the link between gender-based violence, conflict, and education. The project indicates sexual violence with the same connotation as the international securitization framework. The component related to safety is “Disbursement Linked Indicator[xlviii] 4: Create Safe and Inclusive School Environments”, which is contingent on three Disbursement Linked Results. The Disbursement Linked Results[xlix] are unrelated to the potential for violence by armed groups and militias. There is a complete absence of funding for security reform for schools or an allusion to the incidence of conflict related Gender-based violence in schools.[l] This suggests a significant opportunity missed in a large funding package to create fortified institutions or to implement preventative measures that could withstand the potential of violence.
The United Nations[li] report does not emphasize the intersections of sexual violence in terms of locations, or with specific focus on educational institutions. Sexual violence is instead decontextualized and homogenized as instances of conflict-based sexual violence, rather than contextualized in terms of location, hierarchy, and gender inequality as feminist theory and praxis would advise.
II.RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
Ecofeminism
Ecofeminism finds its roots in an ethic that recognizes the conceptual connection between environmental justice and feminism. The feminist philosophy argues that a deeper understanding of environmental issues and vice-versa is achieved through an analysis of the domination of nature by human beings in relation to the domination of women and children. The logics that dominate the earth are inextricably linked to the logics that dominate women. Feminist scholarship and environmental ethic are deeply connected.[lii],[liii]Gwen Hunnicutt argues that there is a pervasive logic of domination that explains many aspects of exploitation, extraction, and domination of both women and the earth. Donna Haraway[liv] describes ecofeminist thought as ascribing agency and a constructed reality to the earth enabling it as an actor in the story of man’s domination. In connection to women, Haraway articulates a perspective of feminist thought that describes women’s battle as one in which women, in opposition to a male-dominated society, are agentic actors within socially constructed realities that are devoid of essentialist and misogynistic thought that epitomizes patriarchy. This logic of domination extends from Marxist theory describing man’s domination of nature as a requisite of capitalism. Extending this to the domination of women reveals the link between the domination of nature and the domination of women.
Its conceptualization is strengthened by the incorporation and delineation of intersectional ecofeminism. Intersectional ecofeminism takes into consideration multiple forms and conversations of feminism including Indigenous Feminist thought, Indian Feminist thought, Latin American feminist thought, and African feminist thought. Ecofeminism bridges together the different tenets that link together the rights of the environment and the rights of the humans that inhabit it.[lv],[lvi],[lvii]As Mallory describes, there is much to gain from an “ecofeminist analys[is] of the material and conceptual intersections between the oppression of women, people of color, indigenous peoples, the poor, and other marginalized human groups and the degradation of natural places.”
Further, the many lived experiences of these marginalized groups, the analyses that stem from them, and their shared historical contexts make up the fabric of the fluid quilt that is ecofeminism; rather than existing as a theory to be debated and contested, ecofeminism exists as an inclusive discourse, encouraging the incorporation of new perspectives as Kings and Glazebrook describe.[lviii]
Incorporating this into our analysis of the provision of aid in relation to gendered-violence in DRC means considering the communal-industrial-governmental intersections, and applying the theoretical considerations of environmental and feminist ethic. This is in stark contrast to the one-dimensional approach that considers eliminating sexual violence as the panacea for safety, protection, and mobility for the Congolese civilians.
Political Economies of Resources, Territory, and Sexual Violence
The political economy of sexual violence is intrinsically connected to the political economy of territory and the claim to natural resources in eastern DRC. Environmental justice and natural resource extraction are explicitly linked. While community members lack the agency over their native environments and bear the brunt of the resultant socio-economic consequences, their environments endure significant harm. Experienced in tandem, social inequities that exist within these communities are exacerbated by the presence of harmful extractive activities such as mining. Experiences of volatility, instability, and boom-bust economic cycles as commodity prices shift are characteristic for communities that home extractive activity.[lix] Further, structural problems within these areas occur within the larger landscape of the nation. For instance, persistent poverty is a consistent theme in these areas due to the loss of local economic control to multinational firms.[lx]
The consequences go beyond the structural and environmental. In relation to the political economy of sexual violence, territory and claims to resource-rich land exacerbates the use of sexual violence as a tool of leverage and control. Territory, in particular, impacts the ability of communities to utilize their environment as they would under normal conditions. The contours of territory in the political economy of sexual violence and conflict at large impacts the safety of women and children – arguably this is safety they would experience under normal conditions. Under such conditions, according to Kings, “it is most often women who bear the brunt of the extra burdens created by climate change and environmental degradation.” For example, it is women that bear the brunt of having to travel further to collect water or food each day[lxi]. These travels would be, under normal conditions, considered a typical part of daily life. Under the conditions of conflict and within the political economy of sexual violence, these travels are precarious in DRC. Women and children are more vulnerable to government forces and rebel groups that are alleged to have engaged in heinous acts of sexual violence as a deliberate method to gain territory and disseminate fear. According to the Enough Project’s Interrupting Silence Report:
“…rebel and state army commanders oversaw or orchestrated rape and sexual enslavement while in effective control over their subordinate troops with knowledge that they were committing rape in the context of civilian attacks, triggering their liability for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Court recently heard arguments by Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda alleging that … commander Bosco Ntganda oversaw and ordered troops to rape civilians. Bensouda argued that the FPLC used rape to terrorize non-ethnic Hema civilians under Ntganda’s command, and in one instance Ntganda ordered his bodyguards to rape three women in an apartment where he was staying.”[lxii]
At the intersection of territory and sexual violence, there is a threat to the local economic structure of communities. Policy should reflect the violence in the context of a strategic military tool to manipulate the psychology of communities and gain control over a particular areas and regions with connections to the harm mineral extraction. Policy of this caliber would set environmental regulations in regions and areas where there exist protections against extraction and its detrimental effects; in other words, policy would reflect the reality of the environmental implications of the political economy of sexual violence.
Further, both ecology and sexual violence are not issues to be securitized in tandem. To avoid the risk of further decontexualization, environmental regulations should be developed and implemented in the context of armed group and militia exploitation, economic disruption and use of sexual violence. Not only would this policy reflect a desire to prevent environmental degradation and the aforementioned economic consequences of harmful extractive policies, it would also respect the ownership of those native to their land and variety of harms they experience. Sexual violence on the other hand must be securitized with respect to the social organization in which it occurs as mentioned. Indeed there is an intersection between ecology and violence that cannot be disregarded and must be reflected in policy. Though, distinctively, there must be a respect for the complexity of both issues as occurring in a liminal space. There is a boundary between the sexual violence and environmental violence that occurs in Eastern Congo. Where one meets the other there is certainly overlap and the two human rights atrocities must be contextualized with respect to where there is mutual exclusivity. Experienced by women, men, boys, and girls by civilians, armed groups, military soldiers, and family members, sexual violence is reported to occur on paths to forge for food, it is experienced in the privacy of homes, and experienced on schools sites. Further, according to Claudia Seymour, there is an invisible violence that occurs that is not recognized or understood. The social organization of violence, its social consequences, and the obfuscation of the international human rights provision in its securitization process serves to work against progress in the region. While environmental degradation, exploitation, is experienced where mining cites are present,[lxiii] sexual violence is also the tool or rather vehicle by which familial disruption, morale destruction, and painful invisible violence occurs.[lxiv] Sexual Violence, therefore, shapes the contours of the social reality and organization of the individuals, communities, and provinces experiencing it. Research and policy must reflect this and deviate from a decontextualized conflict perspective that understands sexual violence as a condition or symptom. It is a condition while also being conditional. It requires microscopic observation and analysis to wholly understand and prevent.
The framework of environmental justice reconciles community protection and sustainability with environmental protection and sustainability. Policy that reflects this connection can influence outcomes in the following example. In certain cases,
“crimes involving SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] involving SGBV also undermine authority figures traditionally meant to protect women and children in the community.[lxv] Furthermore, sexual violence both drives and stems from forced displacement: when soldiers and rebels rape civilians, civilians often flee out of fear of repeat attacks or stigmatization. Internally displaced persons and refugees are in turn disproportionately vulnerable to sexual violence in part because they live in IDP and refugee camps that lack security and rule of law.”[lxvi]
In the framework of environmental justice and feminist ethic, social equity and harm prevention are emphasized as values driving policy. In establishing protections for territory, there is recognition of the community impact related to the location of that community and its environment. Practically speaking, environmental considerations in regulatory reforms relating to territory at the national and provincial level would reflect the “precautionary principle; erring on the side of human safety and wellbeing rather than industrial development.”[lxvii] In the next section, we will explore what this may look like.
III.CHILD LABOR
Exploring the linkages between feminist thought and environmental ethic exposes multiple junctures that necessitate policy upheaval and reform. Previously articulated is the necessity to include environmental protections to territory to further dissuade a critical juncture wherein the rights of vulnerable human and non-human life are magnified and accentuated. Unfortunately, without such policy, the rights of the child in Eastern DRC are exploited to a heinous extent. These children are neglected due to international and national focus that homogenizes humanitarian issues related to conflict.
Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports reveal that no advancements were made in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.[lxviii] Despite the aforementioned initiatives such as universal primary education, anti-trafficking in persons law, and the finalization of a five-year strategy to combat human trafficking, there are still large gaps and inequities in the delivery of these programs, and the violence that occurs in spite of these policies, as well the complicity of factions of the military means that children continue to be forced into labor and sexual slavery.[lxix]
Although the national government has taken steps to eliminate the worst forms of child labor– the exploitation of children sexually, militarily, and in relation to mining– complicity within factions of the military prevents full implementation and adjudication of crimes related to child labor legislation. While there is legislation prohibiting forced labor, child trafficking, and commercial sexual exploitation of children, non-state armed groups continue to kidnap, recruit, or use children in armed conflict and mining operations in 2019.[lxx] For example, a North Kivu military court sentenced an Allied Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) colonel to life imprisonment for child soldier recruitment. Also, the Bukavu Garrison Court in South Kivu condemned three members of the Raia Mutomboki militia of systemic child soldier recruitment in 2018. They were sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment.[lxxi] However, during the proceedings, the government was found liable for failing to take all necessary steps and measures to prevent the crimes, and was ordered to pay reparations.[lxxii]
Military and government complicity has long standing consequences. The government consistently failed to prosecute perpetrators to the fullest extent, sometimes repositioning them, effectively treating perpetrators with impunity. For instance, the FARDC was linked to two cases of exploitation of children in two roles – as concubines and forced labor. The responsible perpetrator was redeployed to a different regiment in 2019.[lxxiii]Further exemplifying this impunity is the case of Colonel Ramazani Lubinga, former commander of 601st Regiment of FARDC. A warrant was issued for his arrest for recruiting child soldiers, yet his military superiors refused to comply.[lxxiv]
RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, what is required is a “breakdown of the intellectual silos that isolate topics of conflict economics and security in Congo from gendered violence and women’s empowerment”[lxxv] that then includes environmental justice and feminist ethics.
Children, Education, and Labor
As aforementioned, children outside of school face detrimental consequences to their future mobility, the worst consequence of which is vulnerability to child labor. Thus, social programs and the enhancement of access and reintegration into, and continued pursuit of education for children of vulnerable groups, orphans and those exploited by child laborers is a necessary preventative step.[lxxvi] Outside of social programs, another recommendation would be the socialization of the mining industry. An example of this already exists within the state-owned mined artisanal “strategic minerals”. This means more locally controlled and smaller-scale mining projects have been socialized, removing precarious middlemen which enables greater price stability. Volatility in price affects the local economic context, and is a contributor to persistent poverty while creating devastatingly regular instability in these regions.[lxxvii], [lxxviii] The removal of middlemen also decreases the potential for child labor. Monitoring of the supply chain carried out by a separate body ensures that children and other vulnerable populations are not employed in the mining sites.
Ecofeminism
The incorporation of the environmental-feminist ethic of ecofeminism implies the application of procedural justice, and the inclusion of the most vulnerable groups in the decision-making process. This entails that community leaders – particularly those that have been subject to the harms of extractive policies, child labor, and the complicity of the government – will have the opportunity to authentically and materially participate in the decision-making process regarding price stability, labor supply, and redistribution of revenue in the development of state-owned mining companies. State-owned mining companies must allow and enable community members and stakeholders to hold decision-making power. This is essential to rectifying the injustices of the extractive industry. Top-down approaches and governmental solutions are incomplete without the voice and conversation of those directly impacted by the mining industry, its environmental, and very real human rights consequences. Whilst harsher, more stringent penalties, prosecutorial judgements, and accountability processes are also necessary to serve as a deterrent, reparations and accountability should have an effect beyond that of financial compensation. Procedural justice, equity, and empowerment should be primary goals in social and economic policy recommendations and reforms; procedural equity can also serve to support communities during the disinvestment of mining companies and the negotiations between armed groups, communities, and the government in the elimination of child labor.[lxxix]
Procedural Equity
Community involvement in the deliberation, development, execution, and possible removal of mining operations or other concerns of environmental justice must become a component of international and national efforts to resolve conflict in eastern DRC. Enforcement and protection of procedural equity must be ensured in order to maintain its effectiveness. Its implementation must occur to ameliorate the harsh economic, environmental, and community impacts of extraction to prevent a recurrence of similar consequences in the future.
Securitizing the protection and process of procedural inequity would ensure communities have a stake and claim in the processes that affect their local economies and environmental surroundings. Unfortunately, due to the securitization of sexual violence, the development of procedural equity receives less funding and less priority than explicit efforts to reduce and mitigate rape. Prioritizing and securitizing procedural inequity and increased security reform in this area would alongside efforts to reduce sexual violence and reduce child labor would reflect the true nature of the structural components informing sexual violence, and respecting its relation to the environment.
Policy Implications
Following the recommendations of multiple policy reports[lxxx] on the rights of children and education policy, 1) international aid should reflect the need for the development of a national child welfare system and become an urgent priority 2) Increasing the age required for children to go to school would promote the enrollment of students in school; this also enables the protection of students from exploitation. 3) The socialization and implementation of government funded institutions located throughout Eastern Congo,[lxxxi] in conjunction with the initiatives of birth certificate registration, school enrollment, and the rehabilitation educational institutions, a national child welfare institution should be prioritized.
Policy recommendations for international aid that center procedural equity, or go as far as securitizing procedural inequity, as a deliberate objective in the development of state-owned mining operations or companies, the dissolution of, removal of, or insertion of multinational mining companies. Consideration of the needs of the community, particularly those in conflict zones. During negotiations with armed groups, procedural equity for communities must be considered.
And lastly, on the international stage, the consequential narrative of DRC as the rape capital of the world must be deconstructed and delineate the complex, multifaceted nature of the cultural, social, institutional, political-economics, and influence of conflict compared to ‘normal’ conditions in the massive rates of sexual violence. International aid should move away from the silo of sexual violence and work more broadly towards education equality, child welfare, and environmental justice.
CONCLUSION
The decontextualization and homogenization of sexual violence and conflict economics render the structural and contextual factors that influence the incidence of sexual violence invisible. The resultant narrative of rape as the most pressing humanitarian issue in DRC obfuscates these factors. A new narrative must delineate the multifaceted nature of the cultural, social, institutional, political-economics, and influence of conflict in these rates. International funds and NGOs – both abroad and on the ground – must reflect this change by engaging sexual violence discourse, and directing aid delivery away from unilateral guidelines that isolate access in their administration of aid.
Furthermore, deliberately moving attention away from sexual violence and shifting the contours of international aid to reflect the intersection of the aforementioned dimensions that influence the rate of sexual violence would reduce its compounding counterproductive effects. These include the influence of NGOs on the political economy of sexual violence, the perpetuation of rape as a weapon of war, and the increasing the rate at which individuals create false narratives to access health services and NGO support.
This will enable an appropriation of funds that would better support a response reflective of the multidimensional aspects of violence. If, “in DRC, funding earmarked for conflict-related sexual violence is nearly double the budget for all security sector reform activities,”[lxxxii] it is clear that delineating and contributing aid to the multiple structural components that contribute to this harm would be a better use of international support. Projects such as the full implementation of universal education, child welfare, and implementation of enforced procedural equity are all necessary steps to combat the instability that is globally perceived as symptomatic of an epidemic of sexual violence.
Finally, it is clear from an intersectional ecofeminist perspective that sexual violence never occurs in a vacuum. Considering the structural and institutional influences that contribute to, inform, and could potentially dissuade acts of exploitation and sexual violence is necessary to combat it. Ultimately, by contextualizing and acknowledging the heterogeneity of sexual violence deep institutional and social issues are observable and thus solvable. Through an ecofeminist understanding, the political economy of sexual violence and territory can be scrutinized with the goal of implementing solutions that reflect a departure from the “effacement of critical feminist insights regarding the importance of the domestic, the personal, and the ‘every- day.”[lxxxiii] As a consequence, the “rape capital of the world” is relieved of this reductive, sensationalist, and myopic characterization.
Elias Nepa is a Rising Senior at UC Berkeley studying Sociology with a minor in Gender and Women’s Studies.
References
[i] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
[iii]The Uncondemned. Directed by Michele Mitchell, Nick Louvel, performances by Pierre-Richard Prosper and Sara Darehshori, Film at Eleven Media, 2015
[iv] Lene Hansen (2000) Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3:1, 55-75, DOI: 10.1080/14616740010019848
[v] UN Security Council. 2008. Resolution 1820 (2008) [On Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations] (S/RES/1820). 5916th meeting. June 19, 2008
[vi] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
[vii] Ibid
[viii] Kirby, Paul. 2012. “How is Rape a Weapon of War?.” European Jounral of International Relations 19(4): 797-821
[ix] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
[x] Leatherman, Janie L. 2011. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press.
[xi] ANDERSON, LETITIA. 2010. “Politics by Other Means: When does Sexual Violence Threaten International Peace and Security?” International Peacekeeping 17(2): 244–60.
[xii] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
[xiii] Ibid
[xiv] Ibid
[xv] Autesserre, Severine. 2014. 141 Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[xvi] Douma, Nynke, and Dorothea, Hilhorst. 2012. Fond de commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Disaster Studies Occasional Paper 02. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.
[xvii] Ibid
[xviii] Autesserre, Severine. 2014. 9-138 Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[xix] Eriksson Baaz, Maria, and Maria Stern. 2013. p. 97 Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Probems in the Congo and Beyond. London: Zed Books.
[xx] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
[xxi] Autessere, Severine. 2012. “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences.” African Affairs 111 (443) 202-22; p 205
[xxii] Eriksson Baaz, Maria, and Maria Stern. 2010. p. 52 The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violencei nthe Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Sida Working Paper on Gender Basedviolence. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (The Nordic Africa Institute).
[xxiii] Douma, Nynke, AND Dorothea Hilhorst. 2012. p. 48 Fond de commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Repblic of Congo. Disaster studies Occasional Paper 02. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.
[xxiv] Demmers, Jolle. 2014. “neoliberal Discourses on Violence: Monstrosity and Rape in Borderland War.” In Gender, Globalization and Violence: Postcolonial Conflict Zones, edited by Sandra Ponzanesi, 27-44, p. 41. New York: Routledge.
[xxv] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
[xxxi] Herdt, Tom & Titeca, Kristof. (2016). Governance with Empty Pockets: The Education Sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Governance with Empty Pockets in the DRC. Development and Change. 47. 472-494. 10.1111/dech.12235.
[xxxiii] n/a. “‘When I Grow up, I’ll Be a Teacher’ – The New Ambitions of Congolese Schoolchildren Now That School Is Free.” World Bank, World Bank Group , 16 June 2020,
[xxxv] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform,
[xxxviii] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [accessed 10 February 2021]
[xxxix] Prashad , Jennifer. “Children of Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Humanium, 30 May 2020, www.humanium.org/en/democratic-republic-congo/.
“Sexual violence is largely associated with widespread rape, a method of violence used by combatants and military forces. Conflict in the Eastern region is a critical issue for children as they experience high levels ofsexual and gender-based violence, and researchers have found that survivors of sexual violence under the age of 18 in this region were more likely to experience gang rape and assault than adults were;” “Despite domestic laws in place to protect children fromsexual violence and the presence of the issue on the UN Security Council’s agenda, no real protection is afforded to children in peacetime and in period of conflict.”
[xli] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform,
[xlii] Breetzke et. al in their study of the proximity of sexual violence to schools note that “Schools are, however, necessary and permanent neighborhood institutions which feature prominently in the urban environment. Schools themselves, and the spaces around them should engender feelings of safety and security among learners and be conducive to positive social engagement and interaction. Any incidence of crime in these spaces should be of great concern since crime and violence in and around schools has been shown to affect learners physical and emotional well-being (Muschert and Peguero 2010; Espelage et al. 2013), levels of academic achievement (Wang et al. 2014), and academic progression (Ncontsa and Shumba 2013).”
Breetzke, Gregory & Fabris-Rotelli, Inger & Modiba, Jacob & Edelstein, Ian. (2019). The proximity of sexual violence to schools: evidence from a township in South Africa. GeoJournal. 10.1007/s10708-019-10093-3;
Muschert, G. W., & Peguero, A. A. (2010). The Columbine effect and school anti-violence policy. In M. Peyrot & S. L. Burns (Eds.), New approaches to social problems treatment. Research in social problems and public policy (Vol. 17, pp. 117–148). Bingley: Emerald Group PublishingLimited;
Espelage, D. L., Hong, J. S., Rao, M. A., & Low, S. (2013). Associations between peer victimization and academic performance. Theory into Practice, 52(4), 233–240;
Wang, W., Vaillancourt, T., Brittain, H. L., McDougall, P., Krygsman, A., Smith, D., et al. (2014). School climate, peer victimization, and academic achievement: Results from a multi-informant study. School Psychology Quarterly, 29(3), 360–377;
Further Nconsta and Shumba find that a loss of concentration; poor academic performance; bunking of classes; and depression result from the presence of various forms of violence in a school setting. The analysis of the effect of rape on educational outcomes is not present.
Ncontsa, V. N., & Shumba, A. (2013). The nature, causes and effects of school violence in South African high schools. South African Journal of Education, 33(3), 1–15.
[xliii] N/a. ACAPS, 2020, Education & Child Protection Challenges in Eastern DRC; Impact of COVID-19, Conflict and Policy Reform,
[xlv] Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer. “The Impact of Free Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana.” Working Paper, October 2019
Disbursement Linked Indicators are the basis of disbursement for Investment of Project Funds in the framework of the World Bank’s Aid. These must indicators must be tangible, transparent, verifiable, under government’s influence. They can be scalable to progress. This progress can be actions that lead to outputs, intermediate outcomes, and outcomes.
[li] Karashima, Noboru. “General Assembly.” Trends in the Sciences, vol. 7, no. 8, 2002, pp. 44–45, doi:10.5363/tits.7.8_44. Quotes from: (l) Take all necessary measures to prevent sexual violence and, when it occurs, bring the perpetrators to justice, provide victims with comprehensive care and facilitate their access to remedies for redress; (n) Strengthen national institutions and mechanisms responsible for coordinating human rights and monitoring the implementation of the recommendations of United Nations mechanisms. With no reference to the specifics of institutions.
[lii] Chaone Mallory. “What’s in a Name? In Defense of Ecofeminism (Not Ecological Feminisms, Feminist Ecology, or Gender and the Environment): Or “Why Ecofeminism Need Not Be Ecofeminine—But So What If It Is?”.” Ethics and the Environment 23, no. 2 (2018): 11-35. Accessed March 29, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.23.2.03.
[liii] Hunnicutt, G. (2019). Gender Violence in Ecofeminist Perspective: Intersections of Animal Oppression, Patriarchy and Domination of the Earth (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351026222
[liv] Haraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-99. Accessed March 29, 2021. doi:10.2307/3178066.
[lv] A.E. Kings. “Intersectionality and the Changing Face of Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 22, no. 1 (2017): 63-87. Accessed March 29, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.22.1.04.
[lvi] Glazebrook, Trish. “Karen Warren’s Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 7, no. 2 (2002): 12-26. Accessed March 29, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339034.
[lvii] Chaone Mallory. “What’s in a Name? In Defense of Ecofeminism (Not Ecological Feminisms, Feminist Ecology, or Gender and the Environment): Or “Why Ecofeminism Need Not Be Ecofeminine—But So What If It Is?”.” Ethics and the Environment 23, no. 2 (2018): 11-35. Accessed March 29, 2021.https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.23.2.03.
[lviii]A.E. Kings. “Intersectionality and the Changing Face of Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 22, no. 1 (2017): 63-87. Accessed March 29, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.22.1.04; Glazebrook, Trish. “Karen Warren’s Ecofeminism.” Ethics and the Environment 7, no. 2 (2002): 12-26. Accessed March 29, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339034.
[lix] Stephanie A. Malin, Stacia Ryder & Mariana Galvão Lyra (2019) Environmental justice and natural resource extraction: intersections of power, equity and access, Environmental Sociology, 5:2, 109-116, DOI:10.1080/23251042.2019.1608420
[lx] Ibid
[lxi] Ibid; UN Security Council. 2008. Resolution 1820 (2008) [On Sexual Violence in Conflic and Pos-Conflict Situations] (S/RES/1820). 5916th meeting. June 19, 2008
[lxiii]Laudati, Ann, and Charlotte Mertens. “Resources and Rape: Congo’s (Toxic) Discursive Complex.” African Studies Review, vol. 62, no. 4, 2019, pp. 57-82., doi:10.1017/asr.2018.126
[lxiv] Claudia Seymour (2012) Ambiguous agencies: coping and survival in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,Children’s Geographies, 10:4, 373-384, DOI: 10.1080/14733285.2012.726073
[lxv] Human Rights First, “Dr. Denis Mukwege: Fighting Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” video, October 23, 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-OrOE4eq2w – t=74.
[lxvii] White, Rob. (2013). Resource Extraction Leaves Something Behind: Environmental Justice and Mining. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy. 2. 10.5204/ijcjsd.v2i1.90.
[lxxviii] White, Rob. (2013). Resource Extraction Leaves Something Behind: Environmental Justice and Mining. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy. 2. 10.5204/ijcjsd.v2i1.90.
[lxxxii] Douma, Nynke, and Dorothea, Hilhorst. 2012. Fond de commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Disaster Studies Occasional Paper 02. P. 35. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.
[lxxxiii] Merger, Sara. “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 149-159. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1092/isq/sqw003
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