25 February 2021 – by Robert Los
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been a driving force in the fight against the climate challenges of the future even before Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, presented her ambitious targets for the “European Green Deal” to the public in December 2019.[1] The EU’s international climate policy began to gain significant momentum with the ratification and implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. It finally manifested itself as an international driving factor with the Paris Agreement of 2015, prior to which the EU, together with several developing countries and island states formed the so-called High Ambition Coalition (HAC) and conducted relevant preparatory work to persuade other major players like the United States (US) to reach an ambitious agreement.[2]
The Paris Agreement was signed during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016, which troubled Europe in particular. The highly complex issue of climate migration thus seems destined to receive a heightened degree of attention. In this respect, it may come as no surprise that the agreement acknowledges the problem for the first time in the context of an international climate agreement, albeit only in the legally non-binding preamble.[3] Additionally, by addressing the issue in Art. 50 the agreement incorporates climate migration into the existing system of loss and damage, and opens up the scope of the ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage’ task force.[4] However, it is stated in the same section that the findings of the task force do not provide a legally binding basis for liability or compensation.[5] An international agreement exceeding the status of soft law or mere declarations of intent, and which regulates the complexity of climate migration in a binding manner, is still non-existent.[6]
In light of this legal gap in protection and the EU’s self-formulated claim to leadership in the fight against climate change,[7] this essay intends to provide a cursory overview of the legal status quo of climate migration – an important ramification of climate change – in the EU, and the developments in response to it. First, the historical development of the policy debate on climate migration will be retraced and certain milestones will be outlined before existing regulations at both the European and member state levels will be discussed. Finally, possible leverage points for legal gateways and regulations for the protection of climate migrants will be briefly pointed out.
A discourse with teething problems
Climate migration has been addressed at the European level by European institutions for more than 20 years, although the debate has admittedly not remained consistent. The European Parliament first addressed the issue in 1999 in a resolution on environment, security, and foreign policy.[8] In Art. K of the resolution, the parliamentarians stated that the number of climate migrants already exceeded that of ‘traditional’ refugees, according to international studies. Furthermore, climate migration was classified as a symptom of the global poverty problem, and it was recognized that already-destitute and impoverished people would be specifically and intensely affected.[9] The explanatory statement shows that the complexity of the issue was already recognized at that time. Identifying climate-induced migration as a threat to security and international relations, but above all as having the propensity to become “one of the worst humanitarian crises of our time” and lead to an “exodus of refugees”, the resolution called for international recognition of climate refugees and emphasized the need for international cooperation to mitigate the problem.[10] Subsequently, Green Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in particular have tried, unsuccessfully, to include the issue in reports, studies and resolutions of the EU.[11]
The issue gained renewed and more concrete momentum in the years 2007 to 2009. In addition to the Green MEPs who conducted seminars and again wrote reports to give the issue the attention it deserved, several weighty papers and events addressed the issue. In April 2007, the European Parliament established a temporary Committee on Climate Change with 60 parliamentarians to formulate goals for European policy regarding the fight against climate change. At the Agora on climate change the following year, a number of the more-than 500 European NGOs in attendance warned of a link between climate change and increasing migration. One of the workshops again called on EU institutions to develop a strategy for climate-induced migration.[12] As many as 3 major papers joined the call of the social societies: a paper from the High Representative[13], a paper from the European Commission that linked climate change and security concerns[14], as well as another paper from the European Commission which advocates for the consideration of climate change effects in security, development and migration policy debates.[15]
The Stockholm Program, launched by the Swedish Presidency of the Council, gave the issue major impetus. The report not only established a link between natural disasters and migration, but it also addressed international protection and operational frameworks as “deficient, leaving several categories of people forced to flee or seeking safer existence without effective national or international protection.”[16] Precisely because of the latter, the final report called on the Commission to conduct further research regarding the legal gaps in protection and suggested that it develop a specific set of rules both by drawing on established protective instruments, and incorporating completely new concepts. The primary objective of the authors was to give Europe a pioneering role whereby, in addition to the recommended studies, on the one hand a fund for the provision of financial aid on the ground from European states was to be established and, on the other hand, migration policy was to be incorporated more strongly into development policy and in new international agreements.[17] A study by the European Parliament in 2011 supported this by further highlighting the gaps in legal protection and formulating similar recommendations.[18]
In 2013, the European Commission, under political and societal pressure, responded to the calls with a Staff Working Document.[19] Due to the evidence highlighted in a summary overview of the scientific studies at that time which showed that a large part of climate-induced migration is domestic in nature, development policy and adaptive instruments were identified as the preferable focus of the EU initiatives.[20] However, a position paper composed mainly by Green parliamentarians agreed to this only partially. They welcomed adaptive (and especially financial) local aid for the people and states affected. However, this alone would not be far-reaching enough for them. Instead, the paper argued for a so-called “two-axis” model. For the first axis, consisting of national or European protection, the paper provided concrete implementation suggestions in recasting existing law as the Qualification Directive, Temporary Protection Directive or the Return Directive[21]. For the second axis, concerned with international protection, the paper made suggestions in the form of addendums or protocols to existing international agreements.[22]
Nevertheless, the discourse dissipated somewhat when, in 2015, the aforementioned refugee crisis interfered with the positive trend. Although the European Commission mentioned climate change as one cause for migration amongst others in the European Agenda on Migration, just as the Paris Agreement did later in the year, the then-current crisis, its causes and respective countermeasures were to seize the full attention of the political agenda.[23] The European Parliament attempted to restart developments on climate migration with two further papers in 2016 and 2017, once again emphasizing cause-and-effect of climate change and migration, and highlighting the need for legal protection instruments.[24]
It can thus be stated that climate migration has been addressed across institutions in the EU in recent decades. Within these discourses, the different dimensions of the problem were also recognized and elaborated. The various dimensions of the problem were also recognized and concrete strategies and starting points were identified. To what extent the discourses have actually resulted in implementation, and whether the EU can thereby live up to its aspired pioneering role will be discussed in the following section.
Status Quo of European Legislation
When considering the legal landscape of Europe, it is convenient to distinguish between different levels and dimensions of protection. Protection can arise from regulations at the level of European law, but it can also arise at the level of member state law. Within the European level, again a distinction can be made between external and internal protection dimensions. Furthermore, the jurisprudence, which will not be covered during the scope of this paper, has to be considered as a third level.[25]
1. Protection at EU level
a. Protection in the external dimension
Legal protection that is explicitly linked to forced migration is found almost exclusively at the externally oriented dimension of European law.
The 2020 report initiated by the European Parliament on this very topic sees above all a gateway for legal protection for climate-induced migration in intergovernmental pacts on mobility and migration. [26] Indeed, it is true that both the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)[27] and the Valetta Summit Action Plan[28] identify changing climatic conditions as a driver of migration in their respective regulations.[29] Both agreements are primarily aimed at addressing the root causes of migration and the legally secure management of migration flows to ensure humane migration. The GAMM in particular, as the overarching regulatory framework for migration in the EU, is of enormous importance in this context. Though several bilateral agreements have been conducted with neighboring and third countries under this framework, none explicitly mention climate-induced migration in the arrangements for better management of migration flows.[30] An explicit mention is only made in the context of adaptive strategies. Whilst the GAMM and the Valletta Summit Action Plan only suggest adaptation as part of the global strategy,[31] the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa[32] actually concretized this in the aftermath of the Valetta agreement of the EU, its member states and the African states.[33]
In fact, the direct instruments at the European level are exclusively those of preventive and damage-mitigating adaptation. In addition to those already mentioned, there are other regulations and mechanisms of a similar thrust. For instance, the regulations based on the Commission’s concept of “Lives Dignity: from Aid-Dependence to Self-reliance”,[34] intend to “prevent forced displacement from becoming protracted and to gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance in existing displacement situations by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until voluntary return or resettlement.”[35] With respect to damage mitigation instruments, recourse to the general humanitarian aid instruments of the European Union is necessary. Firstly, humanitarian aid – largely determined by the Humanitarian Act of 1996[36] and its concretizations by the Commission – is of interest here.[37] The aim of this “act of solidarity”[38] is above all to help the most vulnerable people in third countries who are exposed to natural disasters or human-induced crises.[39] Secondly, through the 2019 Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU provides a protective umbrella for its own member states that might also take effect in the event of natural disasters.
b. Protection in the internal dimension
Legal protection at the European level in the internal dimension is to be found in the barriers of international human rights and the obligation to protect against their violation. In this regard, the right to life (Art 6 ICCPR, Art 2 ECHR, Art 2 CFR) and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (Art 7 ICCPR, Art 3 ECHR, Art 4 CFR; Art 15 QD) are of particular relevance.[40] However, even in its latest version, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)[41] does not provide protection exclusively for climate-induced migration. If no other recognized ground for protection is met, legal protection is not guaranteed.[42]
The absence of an explicit provision does not exclude protection altogether. Primarily, the definition of inhumane and degrading treatment in Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)[43] and Art 15b of the Qualification Directive (QD)[44] provides for some leeway, supported by established court practice in analogous cases.[45] The QD harmonizes the standards under which a person is classified as “in need of international protection” for the member states. And while its refuge definition is nearly identical to the definition of the Geneva Refugee Convention, it grants a so-called subsidiary protection status. This subsidiary protection is defined as “protection of a third-country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin […] would face a real risk of suffering serious harm”[46]. It is granted, amongst other reasons, in cases of inhumane and degrading treatment.[47] The vagueness of this legal definition allows the member states, their courts and the European courts to interpret it favorably for climate migrants. However, amidst this positive interpretation of indeterminacy, it must also be mentioned that courts “have carefully circumscribed the meaning of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ so that it cannot be used as a remedy for general poverty, unemployment, or a lack of resources or medical care except in exceptional circumstances”.[48] Therefore, in light of the practical reluctance in case law and policy, the indeterminacy seems more like an evasion than a hopeful starting point for legally adequate protection.
Besides the QD, there are two more EU secondary legal acts that might provide protection in their scope. One is the Temporary Protection Directive,[49] which has never been triggered since its creation. In the long term, however, the Directive can only provide temporary protection, the applicability of which is questionable in the case of slow-onset events,[50] and is thus unsuitable for sustainable legal protection for climate migrants. Nevertheless, Art 2d of the Directive,[51] which regulates the arrival of refugees, could legally safeguard the reception and arrival of people affected by natural catastrophes.[52] Also potentially promising is the Return Directive.[53] This regulates the return of refugees and incorporates in particular the principle of non-refoulement for both political and factual reasons. It is worth noting that both an explicit mention of climatic reasons and a harmonized definition or recognition of reasons are omitted, so that member states could theoretically postpone an expulsion on environmental grounds according to Art 9(2).[54] The first efforts in this sphere were made by a German administrative court when it clarified that in exceptional cases, climate and environmental factors can lead to a non-refoulement obligation. However, the court left open the question of when such circumstances could exist, as they were not relevant to the decision and instead only noted that a “very high level of damage” is required.[55] Therefore safe legal grounds are not established, rather the postponement of return depends again upon administrative will.[56]
c. Conclusion
In summary, given the historical genesis of the European discourse on climate migration, the external dimension is unsurprisingly limited to mostly indirect adaptive assistance, and does no more than merely mention climate change as one of many drivers of migration. The internal dimension lacks explicit instruments altogether and presents the legal practitioner with the challenge of constructing vague and uncertain legal protection from the disconnected existing norms. Therefore, it can be stated that a sophisticated and reliable protection system has not yet been established at the European level.
2. Protection at the member states’ level
When it comes to protection at the level of national law in the member states, the special characteristics of European law must be considered a priori. In harmonized areas of law, member states can only adopt derogative regulations if they go beyond the requirements in positive terms in cases of “minimum harmonization”, or if they regulate aspects not covered by harmonizing frameworks.[57] Indeed, the European regulations on migration and asylum contain a significant gap between subsidiary protection as defined by the QD, and the principle of non-refoulement as set out in Art 3 ECHR for which member states can develop their own legal protections for refugees to the extent that they do not undermine the minimum standards of the CEAS. [58]
According to the 2020 report of the European Migration Network,[59] 20 member states have made use of this option, each with at least one humanitarian ground that exceeds the minimum standards of the CEAS. A total of 60 additional grounds can be found in the national regulations.[60] However, only two member states’ (Sweden and Italy) regulations explicitly address the issue of climate migration.
In Italy, persons eligible for the protection under Art 20-bis of the Immigration Act are third-country persons who cannot return to the country of origin due to a contingent situation and exceptional circumstances that do not allow for safe conditions upon their return.[61] These circumstances may very well cover environmental reasons amongst others.[62] The application for this protection status is to be submitted to and assessed by the Territorial Chief of Police. An appeal against a negative decision is to be filed with the bodies that otherwise decide on international protection, and does not automatically carry a suspensive effect but must be applied for separately. Within the substantive protection dimension, Italy issues a residence permit for 6 months in case of positive recognition of the status, which is less than the 1-year residence for people in the scope of Subsidiary Protection of the QD. The residence status is valid only on Italian territory and denies the beneficiary some rights granted under the European refugee standard. For example, family reunification is excluded and access to social welfare is reduced to its core elements. Nonetheless, beneficiaries are granted access to the labor market and employment, mainstream health services at a level equal to that afforded to other third-country persons, and general integration support. Since its introduction in 2018, this protection tool has only been used once.[63]
The eligibility definition of Sec. 2a of the Swedish Aliens Act does not differ too drastically from the Italian framework, though there are some differences. For example, it does require that the need for “protection” must feature a triggering environmental event that qualifies as “sudden”, and the unavailability of internal relocation. Additionally, unlike the Italian option, the Swedish application for protection follows the usual procedure for applying for international protection, and an appeal has an automatically suspensive effect. Swedish protection also goes beyond Italian protection in terms of content. Not only is the granted residence status valid for 3 years, but its validity can be extended to other states by issuing a travel document in the form of an alien passport. In addition, spouses – or partners in similar social relationships, such as same-sex or engaged couples – dependent children and parents of unaccompanied minor children are eligible for family reunification. In addition, unlike Italy, Sweden provides access to support services on par with the European Minimum Standards. However, within the context of the European refugee crisis, this protection has been suspended until 2021. How it is set to advance remains unclear.[64]
Alongside the two explicit regulations, there are also provisions in Finland and Cyprus that take ecological circumstances into account in the context of granting protection. Finland considers environmental reasons when assessing humanitarian grounds under Chapter 6 Section 88a of the Finnish Aliens Act, especially in cases in which neither refuge nor subsidiary protection can be granted, but the return to the home country seems unbearable. Similar to the Swedish regulation, this protection was also suspended around 2015.[65] Art 29 (4) of the Cypriot Refugee Law mentions environmental destruction as an additional justification for non-refoulement, but does not grant protection on this ground alone.[66]
Conversely, the remaining member states do not provide for any protective regulations. There are also hardly any known initiatives to close the national gaps in this sphere.[67] Most states refer to the international consensus on refugees – manifested in the Geneva Refugee Convention – and refuse to adopt a differing interpretation.[68] Thus, similar to the situation on the European level, legal practitioners in these states are left to search for new interpretation and readings of national law. In conclusion, it can be said that at the member states’ level, the protective dimension is being rolled back rather than developed further. Even where there is still explicit protection for people fleeing climate-induced change, it is weaker than that provided to other displaced peoples.
Ways forward
The current status quo is inadequate, and results in the need for further development and improvement of the current level of protection in view of the ever-increasing numbers of people forced to flee as a result of climate change. There are various possible answers to the question regarding which path to take, and perhaps the first thing to do is to take a general step in the direction shared by them all.
That is, to carry the issue from niche academic spheres into the broader public conversation and, above all, into day-to-day political discourse. This applies to both the European and national levels. A survey conducted by the European Migration Network shows that in most member states, the topic is discussed in academic and socially engaged circles, but lacks the attention of legislative and executive powers.[69] In view of the historical genesis of the discourse, this may seem a tedious and Sisyphean-like task, especially at the European level, but it is a fundamental prerequisite for the implementation of protective instruments and assistance of any kind, including the elimination of legal uncertainties. A slight positive trend may even be triggered if one realizes that in the last few years, both European[70] and member state institutions[71] have paid some attention to the subject in studies, despite the fact that these are not legally binding. We can only add to the clamor made in the last two decades by those in the relevant spheres, and hope that this time the positive upward trend will manifest itself into concrete and protective action.
Once this step has been taken, the question arises as to which path will finally be taken. There are various options, which are not necessarily contradictory and can also coexist in some cases. Broadly speaking, to pick up on the two-axis suggestion of the Green MEPs, there are two major currents – each in turn with two tributaries – for legal policy-making. Given that most climate-related migrants are internally displaced persons, there must be a local and regionally focused course of action. Despite the focus on internally displaced persons and local support, the remaining protection seekers must not be neglected, so that the second course of action should focus on guaranteeing international and national protection for them.
A distinction can then be made within the local and regional strategy. On the one hand, the path of adaptation already proposed by the Commission in its 2013 findings can be taken. This mostly-financial aid can certainly make use of the already existing European mechanisms and build upon them. It would be crucial to also legally couch this financial aid with regard to climate migration in a concrete manner. Moreover, financial aid could be established and coordinated more effectively through regionally focused international agreements with countries in the affected regions. This leads into the second sub-prong of the local and regional strategy. In addition to an actively supportive role, the EU can play a passively supporting role as an advocate or promoter in the international forum for local initiatives with a bottom-up approach to international governance, and as a mediator for negotiation in such agreements.
The second stream of action can also be divided into an active, self-implementing sub-prong and a passive, facilitating sub-prong that relies on the cooperation of others. The latter would consist primarily of seeking, in addition to regional and local agreements, an international compromise that goes beyond the soft-law arrangements agreed to date. For instance, additional protocols to the Geneva Refugee Convention or the Paris Agreement are conceivable, or the promotion of an entirely new agreement that adapts refugee protection rules to the challenges and circumstances of the modern world.
The former, self-implementing part, in which the EU would not be dependent on external help, would have to consist of a redesign of the existing regulations. In particular, an adaptation of Art 15 of the QD, which has already been discussed, would provide a suitable solution. It would be plausible to add a fourth section, (d), to the already existing alternatives, which would also provide for subsidiary protection in the case of an “environmental catastrophe.” For better protection, however, a legal definition of the term should be standardized, so that imprecision and difficulties of delimitation are avoided in practice.[72] Alternatively, an Art 15a QD with corresponding content could be introduced.[73]
Furthermore, member states could, of course, issue their own national regulations, which would provide for protection up to the point of regulation at European level. Besides the concrete standardization of protection, the EU and its member states could develop other legal instruments for protection. Such as, for example, a humanitarian corridor which already exists in several European states and provides a pathway for people escaping conflict,[74] or a temporary travel document issued by the states in the form of a climate passport. This would offer those who are threatened by climate change the option to demand civil rights in safe countries.[75]
Conclusion
As discussed, the current outlook – despite years of attention and discourse – does not do justice to the ultimate goal of protection. Rather, it seems almost negligent in the fight against the climate crisis to utterly exclude it as an important factor, or to instead surrender to the benevolent interpretation of legal practitioners. Although there are mentions of the topic in various agreements and instruments, there is no commitment beyond the status of soft law.
On the legal protection level, with the exception of two national regulations in Italy and Sweden, there is a complete lack of rules that address the issue. This is disappointing, as the EU could be a pioneer and has a wide range of options for implementation. It is submitted that if all four described tributaries of the two main streams were implemented and followed, the EU would be able to provide effective protection.
Of course, the implementation of one is better than complete inaction, but as stated above, this would only lead to a patchy and, above all, deficient protective dimension, and would not necessarily lead to an improvement of the status quo. This would neither correspond to the ambitious, but also self-claimed pioneering role of the EU, nor to the moral responsibility stemming from the Polluter Pays principle (to which the polluting countries agreed in the Paris Agreement).
This shows precisely how much of a difference an ambitious major player can make, even in terms of initiatives for which the EU would have to rely on the cooperation of other countries. The ambitious deal from 2015 would have not been possible without the initiation of the HAC. Accordingly, it would be desirable for the EU to address the issue and follow societal and academic demands in order to alleviate the current unsatisfactory status quo with regard to climate migration and its related challenges. There is truly no lack of concrete proposals, only the lack of concrete will to revisit the spirit of the HAC.
Robert Los is an Archivist at Earth Refuge and a student of law at the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany. His interest and commitment to climate law issues extends mainly to voluntary work alongside his studies and work.
References
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[5] Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1), Addendum, Nr. 51; The Warsaw International Mechanism and its requires a separate examination that will follow in a separate essay.
[6] Cf. for a deeper examination: Mile (2021): Protecting Climate Migrants: A Gap in International Asylum Law; https://earthrefuge.org/protecting-climate-migrants-a-gap-in-international-asylum-law/ (Last Access: 21.01.2021; 15:34).
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[8] European Parliament (1999): Resolution on the environment, security and foreign policy. 28.1.1999, A4-0005/99.
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[12] Ibid.
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[15] European Commission (2009): WHITE PAPER Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action; COM (2009) 147.
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[17] Ibid.
[18] Kraler/Cernei/Noack (2011), “Climate Refugees”: Legal and Policy Responses to Environmentally Induced Migration. Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (PE 462.422) Brussels, European Parliament.
[19] European Commission (2013): Commission Staff Working Document: Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration -Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change.
[20] Ibid, p. 17 and 35.
[21] Cf. also Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), Climate Change and Migration: Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration. Study commissioned by Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies (PE 655.591), Brussels, European Parliament, p. 67.
[22] The Greens (2013): Climate Change, Refugees and Migration.
[23] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), Climate Change and Migration: Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration. Study commissioned by Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies (PE 655.591), Brussels, European Parliament, p. 66.
[24] European Parliament (2016): Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration; European Parliament (2017): Addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU external action European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU External Action (2015/2342(INI)).
[25] In view of the few previous rulings on the matter, both at national and European level, this can be disregarded for the time being. However, an incorporation into the other categories will follow. For a summary overview cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 79 et seqq.
[26] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 68 et seqq.
[27] European Commission (2011), COM(2011), 743 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.
[28] Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015).
[29] Cf. European Commission (2011), COM(2011), 743 final, p. 6 et. Seqq.; Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015), p. 3.
[30] Cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 68 et seqq.
[31] European Commission (2011), COM(2011), 743 final, p. 6 et. Seqq.; Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015), p. 3.
[32] Cf. for more detail: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eutf_2019_annual_report_english.pdfeuropa.eu (Last Access: 17.01.2021; 21:50).
[33] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 69.
[34] European Commission (2016c) COM(2016) 234 final: Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; cf. for a more detailed description Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 69.
[35] European Commission (2016c) COM(2016) 234 final, p.2
[36] Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996.
[37] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 69.
[38] Commission of the European Communities (2007): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid; COM(2007) 317 final; Commission of the European Communities (2008). European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – Action Plan. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2008) 1991; European Commission (2015). Implementation Plan of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Commission Staff Working Document, SWD (2015) 269 final.
[39] Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, Art. 1; cf. for a more detailed description of humanitarian aid system Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 70 et seqq.
[40] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 71.
[41] Cf. for more detailed information: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 22:01).
[42] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 71.
[43] https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 19:54).
[44] Qualification Directive (2004), Directive 2004/83/EC: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/en-qualification-directive-directive-200483ec-29-april-2004#Art%2015%20QD (Last Access: 19.01.2021; 20:02).
[45] For the analogous transfer of case law on the rejection of sick persons, cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 79 et. seqq.
[46] Qualification Directive (2004), Directive 2004/83/EC: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/en-qualification-directive-directive-200483ec-29-april-2004#Art%202%20QD (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:06).
[47] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 71 et. seqq.
[48] McAdam (2014). The human rights implications of cross-border displacement in the context of disasters what are the protection gaps and what is the role of the human rights council?.
[49] Temporary Protection Directive (2001), EU CD 2001/55/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0055&from=en (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:10).
[50] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 73.
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[53] Return Directive (2008), EU RD 2008/115/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:22).
[54] Return Directive (2008), EU RD 2008/115/EC, Art. 9: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:22).
[55] VGH Mannheim (2019): 29.10.2019, A 11 S 1203/19.
[56] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 73.
[57] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14527&from=DE (Last Access: 20.01.2021; 20:27).
[58] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 74.
[59] European Migration Network (2020): Comparative Overview of National Protection Status in the EU and Norway – EMN Synthesis Report for the EMN Study 2019.
[60] European Migration Network (2020), p. 4.
[61] European Migration Network (2020), p. 25.
[62] European Migration Network (2017): EMN Ad-Hoc Query on ES Ad hoc Query on Humanitarian Protection.
[63] European Migration Network (2020), p. 25.
[64] European Migration Network (2020), p. 25.
[65] Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 78.
[66] Ibid.
[67] European Migration Network (2018): European Migration Network; Ad-Hoc Query on Climate change and migration.
[68] Explicitly stated by Austria, Czech Republic, Germany to a questionnaire on environmentally induced migration distributed by ICMPD to selected EU+ countries in March 2020; cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 78.
[69] European Migration Network (2018).
[70] see, for example, the 2020 study commissioned by the European Parliament on Climate Change and Migration: Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020).
[71] see, for example, the advisory study of the Economic Advisory Council of the Federal Government in Germany, which dealt with climate migration in 2018: WBGU (2018), Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness.
[72] Hush proposes a definition along the lines of: “a natural disaster affecting a large number of persons in a geographic area, occurring either suddenly or over time, with or without human action, and causing the destruction, or reasonable threat of destruction, or severe degradation of, the applicant’s livelihood, residence, community, or land”; Hush (2018)- Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden.
[73] Hush (2018) – Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden.
[74] Cf. Kraler/Katsificias/Wagner (2020), p. 75.
[75] Cf. for a more detailed examination of this idea: Los (2020), Climate Passport: A Legal Instrument to Protect Climate Migrants – A New Spirit for an Historical Concept; cf. WBGU (2018): Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness, p. 24 ff.
